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W. Lutosławski · Plato's Logic

Wincenty Lutosławski

The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic

With an Account of Plato's Style and of the Chronology of his Writings

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PLATO'S LOGIC

THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC

WITH AN ACCOUNT OF PLATO'S STYLE
AND OF THE CHRONOLOGY OF HIS WRITINGS

BY

WINCENTY LUTOSŁAWSKI

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
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1897

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TO

LEWIS CAMPBELL

ON THE THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS

'INTRODUCTION TO THE SOPHISTES AND POLITICUS'

THIS WORK IS DEDICATED

IN GRATEFUL REMEMBRANCE

OF TRUE FRIENDSHIP AND KINDNESS

PREFACE

In undertaking the investigations summarised in this volume, the author's chief aim was to explain the origin of Logic by a psychological study of the first logician. This required a knowledge of the chronology of Plato's writings, not supplied by our historical tradition nor by the extant Platonic investigations. English and French scholars mostly believed this problem to be insoluble; the prevalent opinion in Germany, represented by the successive editions of Zeller's and Ueberweg's handbooks on Greek philosophy, was plainly wrong. Under these circumstances there was need of a new method in order to attain a greater certainty as to the order in which Plato wrote his dialogues. The method here proposed improves the stylistic tests used heretofore by formulating the theoretical principles on which a new science of Stylometry should be based (pp. 145–161) and by applying these principles (pp. 162–193) to five hundred peculiarities of Plato's style (observed in fifty-eight thousand cases) collected in the course of fifty years by some twenty authors working independently (pp. 74–139). This stylometric method, supplemented by many comparisons of the contents of Plato's works (for instance, pp. 329, 333, 366, 368, 372, 396, 430, 452, &c.), and by such observations and suggestions as were found available in the

Platonic literature of all countries, led the author to determine the chronological order of about twenty among the most important of the Platonic dialogues.

On this basis an account of Plato's logical theories and of their development is given here for the first time. It is ascertained that the theory of ideas, generally believed to be the unique form of Plato's logic, was only a first attempt of the philosopher to settle the difficulties of the relation between Knowledge and Being; and that, when past fifty, he produced a new logical system, in which he anticipated some conceptions of modern philosophy, arriving at the recognition of the substantial existence of the individual soul and substituting a classification of human notions for the intuition of divine ideas.

This being a work of research, not a general handbook, the reader need not expect a digest of literature. The authors chiefly quoted are those who were the first to make an important observation, or who have expressed more amply the author's own views on some subject briefly treated here, or whose remarkable want of judgment makes them instructive as examples to avoid. A full indication of the bibliography on any special question has nowhere been attempted except in Chapter III on Plato's style. However, it has been sought to demonstrate the merits of some writers as yet insufficiently appreciated (for instance, pp. 83, 112, 352). As a Pole, the author may possibly be more impartial than the representatives of other nations more active in Platonic research. The works of British scholars are little known in Germany, and, on the other hand, many special German investigations are overlooked in France and Great Britain. Here the results obtained through unconscious international collaboration have been summed up and presented in a general outline,

though without bibliographical completeness. The absence of alphabetical indices in the majority of works on Plato makes it hard to remember by whom a given observation was first made. These historical debts have been acknowledged in many instances, and wherever such an acknowledgment is missing, this should be attributed to defective memory.

The peculiar method of research used in the present work is a result of the author's previous study of natural sciences and mathematics (1881–1885), and he feels much indebted to his teachers at the late German University of Dorpat[1]: Carl Schmidt, Arthur von Oettingen, Johannes Lemberg, Gustav Bunge, Wilhelm Ostwald, Andreas Lindstedt, and Jan Baudouin de Courtenay, all of whom in their lectures and also in private intercourse with their pupils insisted on exactness of method in scientific investigation. His interest in Plato the author owes to Gustav Teichmüller,[2] from whom however he now differs somewhat in his views on the method of Platonic research and on Plato's philosophy (pp. 57–59, 102–103).

[1] To acknowledge this debt of gratitude is all the more a duty, as since the change of this German seat of learning into the Russian University of Jurjew all its most eminent professors have been obliged to resign, and Dorpat University is now but a historical reminiscence, dear to all its ancient pupils.

[2] Under Teichmüller's influence the author wrote ten years ago his first work on Plato: *Erhaltung und Untergang der Staatsverfassungen, nach Plato, Aristoteles und Machiavelli*, Dorpat 1887 (Breslau 1888), wherein Plato's views on political revolutions are shown to be the source of later theories on that subject. The chief contents of Chapter I of the present work have been more amply treated in the author's Polish publications: *O Logice Platona*, Part I, Kraków 1891 and Part II, Warszawa 1892, condensed in the French *Bulletin de l'Académie des sciences de Cracovie*, April 1890 and November 1891. Also Chapters V, VII and VIII rest chiefly on a Polish work of the author: *O pierwszych trzech tetralogiach dzieł Platona*, published by the *Académie des sciences de Cracovie*, Cracow 1896; condensed in the same *Bulletin* for October, November 1895, and in the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. ix. pp. 67–114, October 1895.

The author feels deeply obliged to all who have helped him, and in the conviction that the collaboration of many is needed to bring full light to bear upon the difficult problems dealt with in this volume, he ventures to invite his readers also to assist him in his further studies on Plato by pointing out such errors or even formal deficiencies, however minute, as may be observed (address, care of Longmans, Green, and Co., 39 Paternoster Row, London).

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October 1897.

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ORIGIN AND GROWTH

OF

PLATO'S LOGIC

CHAPTER I

PLATO AS A LOGICIAN

WHILE the amount of scientific knowledge, as distinguished from mere opinion and prejudice, constantly increases, there is not such progress in its quality, or in the degree of certainty attained, as to make knowledge undeniable and infallible. This certainty, being not inherent in reasoning, but dependent upon the logical perfection of our investigations, can be increased only through the development of logical method. Yet we see that the highest truths of natural science are questioned, and not even the law of gravitation is held sacred. Kant said in the introduction to his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* that the logical rules formulated by Aristotle have the rare privilege of being a permanent and unchangeable scientific acquisition. But we have since witnessed vehement attacks on the Aristotelian theory of syllogism, and to some logicians of our century even our oldest logical principles seem to be uncertain.

After two thousand years of philosophical speculation, based on concepts of pure reason, came Mill, with

his belief that general notions could be built up, by some mental process unknown to Kant and to Plato, out of particular sensible experiences. And Mill is reputed in his own country and elsewhere to be a great logician. He stands not alone: his predecessors range from Democritos and Protagoras downwards, and his adherents are numerous. If not even our mathematical notions are acknowledged to be independent of sensation, then every advance in mental philosophy might be questioned, and the crowd of ignorant *βάναυσοι* would exult in proclaiming the uselessness of philosophy.

History of logic: instrumental to logic.

In these discussions on the foundations of human knowledge, small use has been made of historical investigation concerning the origin of prevailing logical theories. Still, it cannot be denied that such inquiries form an essential part of logical science itself. If there is something like truly universal and permanent knowledge, it must have had this character from the beginning, and to show its beginning is to explain its permanence. If, on the other hand, all our knowledge be mere personal opinion, and if it be impossible for man to attain fixed and certain knowledge, if every truth pretending to be scientifically proven hold good only till it be replaced by a better truth, then we can convince ourselves of the provisional condition of our certitude by no better means than by discovering such changes in the fundamental principles of science, in the theory of science itself, which we call logic.

Plato the first logician.

The origin of logic has been largely discussed. Old-fashioned historians[1] thought that logic was as old as mankind, and wrote on the logic of Adam or of Pro-

[1] It was a general custom in early times to begin the history of every science with the creation of man. See, for instance, Jacob Friedrich Reimmann, *Versuch einer Einleitung in die Historiam literariam antediluvianam*, Halle 1709, wherein the author quotes in a humorous way such historians of logic. Much later Antonio Genovesi said in his widely read Logic (*Antonii Genuensis artis logicocriticae libri V.*, editio iv^{a}, Neapoli 1758), p. 7: 'Ego non negaverim, quin, cum Ada magna sapientia a Deo

metheus.[2] But, leaving aside such conceits, the oldest accessible documents for the history of logic are the works of Plato. In such difficult matters second-hand testimony is worthless, and of philosophers earlier than Plato we have only fragments. These fragments—preserved by Plato, Aristotle, and later writers as casual quotations—may give rise to conjectures and discussions; they never afford a clear and full representation of their authors. We can only infer from them that all philosophers before Socrates were more interested in the nature of Being than in the conditions of Knowledge. They used their reason and imagination without making reason itself an object of reasoning.

The first man whom we meet in the history of human thought as a logician, or at least the first logician whose writings have reached us in a form as complete as they were known by his contemporaries, is Plato.

Exceptional preservation of his works.

The complete preservation of his works is amazing, if we consider that no other Attic writer is so well known to us by his own writings. Of one hundred and thirty works by Sophocles seven survive; of ninety-two by Euripides we have but nineteen. Of forty-four comedies by Aristophanes only eleven are preserved; and the comic author who succeeded Aristophanes in Plato's time, Antiphanes, is said to have written two hundred and sixty comedies, of which not one remains. Of the five hundred and twenty-six plays written by these four poets, the most renowned dramatists of Plato's age, we know only thirty-seven—a fourteenth of the whole. When Plato in his

fuerit ornatus, usu rationis plurimum valuerit, id est, quin egregius fuerit Logicus.'

[2] The strange hypothesis that Prometheus was the first logician is due to a misinterpretation of p. 16 c of the *Philebus*, where Plato speaks of 'some Prometheus' who might have brought the light of reason from heaven. Pierre de la Ramée (*Petri Rami Scholae in liberales artes*, Basileae 1578, p. 312) infers that Prometheus was the first logician according to Plato. He also credits Plato with a great logical importance, remarking (p. 325) 'logica Platonis non tantum 4 dialogis continetur, ut videtur Laertius dicere, sed omnibus fere aspergitur.'

Republic proclaimed war against dramatic poets, he could not foresee that his verdict would be so mercilessly enforced by time.

No happier was the fate of the orators, against whom Plato wrote. Lysias was known to him by four hundred and twenty-five speeches, of which but thirty-four remain. Of the sixty works ascribed to his rival Isocrates, two-thirds have disappeared. We have to judge of the famous speeches of these two orators by a fractional part (one ninth) of their work.

Philosophers fared no better. Democritos, reputed to have written sixty works, had great influence on his time. His notion of atoms still remains the basis of our conception of matter, and his ethical principles anticipated Christian teaching: but not one of his works is left. Of all the philosophical literature of Plato's time to which he refers, scarcely anything remains. Not even the works of Aristotle have reached us in a shape nearly so complete or so correct as Plato's.

Peculiar conditions for the preservation of Plato's works.

Our most ancient manuscript of Plato is a thousand years old, and might well proceed from some MS. preserved in Plato's Academy. It has been shown[3] that the *Phaedo* of Plato was known to readers two thousand two hundred years ago in copies less correct than our present editions. A papyrus of the third century B.C. containing fragments of the *Phaedo* embodies evident blunders, unknown to our best manuscripts, and differs in few particulars from the text as read in the nineteenth century.

The creation by Plato of a philosophic school permanently fixed in one place during centuries[4] explains

[3] L. Campbell, 'On the text of the Papyrus fragment of the *Phaedo*' in the *Classical Review*, Oct.–Dec. 1891, vol. v. pp. 363–365, 454–457. The detailed analysis of all the readings of the papyrus leads to the conclusion that 'the amount both of incrustation and of decay is extremely small' and that 'the readings of the papyrus are not to be accepted without question.' Cf. H. Usener, 'Unser Platontext,' pp. 25–50, 181–215 in *Nachrichten der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, 1892.

[4] Up to the year 87 B.C. the Academy was undisturbed. Sulla obliged the Academicians to leave the gardens of Academos, but the Platonic

the preservation of his works in so remarkable a state of correctness and purity. The accidental name of Academy, given to that spot, has been more honoured than that of the Lyceum, where Aristotle gave his lessons. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff[5] made it seem probable that the school founded by Plato had the character of a religious association, thus possessing a stability greater than any purely scientific institution could attain. Such associations were respected by the Roman conquerors, and lasted till the Christian monasteries gave to Plato's works a refuge not less safe than his own Academy.

In such a monastery, on the isle of Patmos, at the beginning of this century, Clarke found the manuscript now preserved in the Bodleian Library, and written 896 A.D.: one of the most ancient Greek manuscripts in existence.[6] This continuity of religious protection was a very exceptional circumstance: alone among the authors of the fourth century B.C. Plato has been read continuously for twenty-three centuries. His school, lasting more than nine hundred years, outlived the schools of Aristotle and Epicurus.

It was fortunate, too, that the Academy was still in being, when the great improvement of writing materials[7] occurred in our fourth and fifth centuries. The light papyrus rolls were then copied on stout and lasting parchment:

school continued to exist in Athens up to 529 A.D., when Justinian dissolved the philosophical schools. On Plato's school see Grote's *Plato*, London 1888, vol. i. p. 265, Zumpt, 'Ueber den Bestand der philosophischen Schulen in Athen' (*Abh. der Akad. d. Wiss. zu Berlin aus dem J.* 1842, Berlin 1844, pp. 27–119), Π. Κωνσταντινίδος, Ἡ Ἀκαδήμια ἤτοι πραγματεία περὶ τῆς Ἀθήνησι Πλατωνικῆς σχολῆς, ἐν Ἑρλάνγῃ, 1874, Usener, 'Organisation der wissenschaftlichen Arbeit' (*Preussiche Jahrbücher*, Band 53, 1884), E. Heitz, 'Die Philosophenschulen zu Athen' (*Deutsche Revue*, 1884), O. Immisch, 'Die Academie Platons' in *Fleckeisens Jahrb.* 1894, pp. 421–442.

[5] Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Philologische Untersuchungen*, 1881, Heft iv.

[6] Gardthausen, *Griechische Paläographie*, Leipzig 1879, p. 344, gives a list of the oldest dated Greek manuscripts and quotes only one older than the Clarkianus, a MS. of Euclid, also at Oxford.

[7] On this reform see T. Birt, *Das antike Buchwesen in seinem Verhältniss zur Litteratur*, Berlin 1882.

one parchment volume, including the matter of many papyrus rolls, occupied less space. Such copies are the definite form in which we now possess the oldest texts of Greek writers, while the papyri have preserved for us only tattered fragments.

Plato's works, copied on parchment while his Academy still flourished, survived in a more correct shape than the text of other writers whose works were not continually read in a school lasting over nine centuries. And it is no mere supposition that they were read, because we know that, up to the last scholarch Damascius, many leaders of Plato's Academy spent their lives in writing commentaries on the Master's dialogues. Such commentaries as those of Proclus (411–485 A.D.), head of the Academy eight hundred years after Plato's death, show great care for correctness of text, a religious awe and conviction of the deep meaning of each word. Our oldest manuscripts of Plato (Clarkianus and Parisinus A) were written in Greece, and this increases the probability of their descent from the copies of the Academy, while many other Greek works came to us through Alexandria and Rome. Moreover, though Plato's writings were often edited in Alexandria and Rome, our oldest manuscripts were written by Greeks for Greek scholars, as is shown by the indications of the copyists.

While other pagan writers were despised by the early Christian clergy, Plato found admirers among the Christian bishops: as, for instance, Eusebius (264–340), St. Augustine (354–430), Theodoretus (390–457), and many others. St. Augustine thought that Plato came nearer to Christianity than any other writer.[8] This means that Christianity was built upon Plato more than upon any other philosopher. The monk who, in the ninth century, copied the works of Plato, knowing that these writings were admired by the greatest authorities of the Church,

[8] St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, lib. viii. cap. iv–xi. in the edition of Migne, tom. vii. pp. 227–236.

transcribed with the greatest care, feeling the same veneration for these texts as Plato's own followers in the Academy.

These unique circumstances explain the survival of Plato's text in a state more correct and authentic than that of contemporary poets or orators, and they further explain why not one of the works written by Plato has perished. There is no valid testimony as to the existence of a single work by Plato not contained in our collection.[9]

Plato's logic neglected.

Considering these facts, and the varied contents of Plato's dialogues, we might expect that each part of the philosophy of Plato would have been made the subject of special investigation by all who were interested in the origin of philosophic thought. But, strange to say, Plato's logic remains almost unknown, as may easily be seen from a short survey of the chief opinions expressed on this subject. Such a survey is tedious, but it helps us to establish the proper method of resolving the proposed problem: What was the origin and growth of Plato's logic? This problem, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, becomes identical with the apparently more important problem of the origin of logic generally, and the origin of scientific certitude as opposed to unscientific and transitory opinions.

Early Platonists up to the fourteenth century are of little importance for our purpose, because their writings are very insufficiently preserved and we could not easily obtain a clear idea of the progress, if any, made by them in the study of the Platonic writings. Our present scientific tradition begins with the fifteenth century and the revival of classical studies in Italy, so that it suffices to learn what has since been done for the knowledge of Plato's logic.

The first champion in modern times of the general im-

[9] On the completeness of Plato's works see Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, 4e Aufl., II Theil, 1 Abth. Leipzig 1889, pp. 436–440.

Platonists and Aristotelians of the xv.–xvi. centuries.

portance of Plato's logic was Georgios Gemistos,[10] named also Plethon, who came in 1438 from Greece to Italy to take part in the Council of Ferrara. He wrote a pamphlet[11] on the difference between Plato and Aristotle, wherein he insists on the logical merits of Plato, against Aristotle's assertion at the end of his *Organon* (183 b 34) that he was the first to find a method of reasoning (*μέθοδος τῶν λόγων*, *De Sophisticis Elenchis*, cap. xxxiv. 6, 183 b 13; cf. Plato, *Sophist* 227 A, *Politicus* 266 D, &c.). Plethon accuses Aristotle of acting in this particular like a sophist and in a way unworthy of a philosopher,[12] because the method of reasoning was well known to Plato, as is shown by his writings.

Gemistos did not take the trouble to go into details, but his allusion to Plato's 'method of reasoning' shows that he gave much more importance to Plato's *Sophist* and *Politicus* than has been usual in this century with the great majority of Platonic scholars.

Georgios Scholarios Gennadios answered with a plea in favour of Aristotle, and Plethon rejoined,[13] insisting upon

[10] Georgios Gemistos, born 1355 in Constantinople, died 1450. He appears to have been named Plethon only after coming to Italy in 1438. On him see: Fritz Schultze, *Georgios Gemistos Plethon und seine reformatorischen Bestrebungen*, Jena 1874.

[11] The first edition of Plethon's work was published according to Fabricius at Venice 1532, together with a Latin paraphrase of it, written by Bernardino Donato. The British Museum has an edition of 1540: *Bernardini Donati Veronensis, De Platonicae atque Aristotelicae philosophiae differentia*, Venetiis 1540, 8vo. In this publication, after seventy-one pages of Latin text, begins the Greek original of Plethon: '*Γεωργίου τοῦ Γεμιστοῦ τοῦ καὶ Πλήθωνος, περὶ ὧν Ἀριστοτέλης πρὸς Πλάτωνα διαφέρεται,*' with a separate pagination of twenty-three leaves. Both the Latin and the Greek text were reprinted at Paris, 1541, 8vo, in the same order. The Latin text of Donato differs from the Greek of Plethon in so far as the last chapter is used as introduction, and the whole put into the form of a dialogue between Policarpus and Callistus, the second representing Plato's thoughts. Schultze quotes only the edition in 4to. published at Basel 1574. Plethon's pamphlet has been reprinted in vol. 160, pp. 889–934, of Migne's *Patrologia Graeca*, Paris 1866.

[12] Page 23 of the Venice edition (Migne 928 d): *Ἀριστοτέλης . . . πάνυ σοφιστικὸν τοῦτο ποιῶν καὶ φιλοσόφου τρόπου ἀλλοτριώτατον.*

[13] The pamphlet of Gennadios is lost, but Plethon's reply to it was pub-

Plato's superiority. These Greek polemics, continued later in the fifteenth century by George of Trebizond [14] and Bessarion,[15] were more rhetorical than scientific, and led to no objective study of Plato's logic. For those who wrote on that subject in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the chief aim was not to ascertain Plato's logical theories, nor how he found them. They acted rather as political opponents, fighting under the standard of Plato or of Aristotle. The champions on Plato's side failed to give exact quotations from his text in proof of their assertions.

In such comparisons between Plato and Aristotle some authors ascribed to their favourite thinker more than he would have claimed himself. In France, for instance, Champier[16] (1516, 1537) ventured to say that Plato invented the figures of syllogism; in Italy, Patrizi [17] (1571)

lished by W. Gass in vol. ii. pp. 54–117 of his work: *Gennadius und Pletho, Aristotelismus und Platonismus in der Griechischen Kirche*, Breslau 1844: 'Plethonis liber contra Gennadii scripta pro Aristotele ex codice Vratislaviensi nunc primum editus.'

[14] *Comparationes Philosophorum Aristotelis et Platonis a Georgio Trapezuntio* . . . Venetiis 1523. Plato is, in this author's opinion, 'rudis, turpis, arrogans, invidiosus, obtrectator in 4 viros Graeciae salvatores,' &c.

[15] *Bessarionis Cardinalis Sabini et Patriarchae Constantinopolitani capitula libri primi adversus calumniatorem Platonis*, without date, but printed at Rome 1469. Another edition, *In calumniatorem Platonis libri quatuor*, Venetiis 1503, is also in the British Museum. The author is anxious to show that Plato used all moods of all the figures of syllogisms.

[16] *Symphoriani Champerii, Symphonia Platonis cum Aristotele et Galeni cum Hippocrate*, Parrhisiis 1516. Of the same author: *Libri VII. de Dialectica, Rhetorica, Geometria, Arithmetica, Astronomia, etc.*, Basileae 1537. In this work, chap. v. of part 2, 'Quid syllogismus secundum Platonem,' contains the assertion 'Plato noster syllogismorum tractatu utitur arguendo et demonstrando.' Then, in the next chapter, 'De syllogismis cathegoricis,' we read 'Syllogismorum cathegoricorum tres figuras posuit Plato.'

[17] Francesco Patrizi (on him see R. Bobba, 'Commentatori italiani di Platone,' Jan. 1892, *Rivista italiana di filosofia*) wrote: *Discussionum peripateticarum tomi IV.*, Basileae 1581 (first published at Venice 1571). On p. 180 Plato is named 'logices sive dialectices inventor;' p. 189: 'syllogismi frequens est apud Platonem mentio.' In another work, *Nova de*

supposed that Aristotle wrote under his own name accounts of Plato's oral teaching; Ramus[18] (1578), Buratelli[19] (1573), Mazoni[20] (1576), and Theupolis[21] (1576) insisted upon the identity of the Platonic and Aristotelian teachings. On Plato's side were also Bernardi[22] (1599), Calanna[23] (1599), and Wower[24] (1603).

Again, Zabarella[25] (1587) in Italy and Keckermann[26]

universis philosophia libris quinquaginta comprehensa, Venetiis 1593 (first published in Ferrara 1591), in the chapter 'Plato exotericus,' p. 42, he starts the supposition that Plato's dialogues represent faithfully the historical Socrates, while Aristotle has written out the secret doctrine of Plato. He adds confidently, 'in philosophia Aristotelis nihil est certum,' and 'in philosophia Platonis rarissima sunt ea quae non sint certissima' (p. 44).

[18] P. Ramus says (*Scholae in liberales artes*, p. 325): 'Speusippo nunquam persuasisset Aristoteles, Aristotelem primum logicae artis auctorem fuisse, cum hac in arte Speusippi discipulus Aristoteles potius fuisset et ex ejus emptis libris suos libros contexuisset.' Against the *Aristotelicae animadversiones* of the same author, published 1543, is directed: *T. Carpentarii Platonis cum Aristotele in universa philosophia comparatio*, Lutetiae 1573, wherein Plato is treated in George of Trebizond's manner.

[19] Gabriel Buratellus, *Conciliatio praecipuarum controversiarum Aristotelis et Platonis*, Venetiis 1573. Morhof (*Polyhistor literarius*, ed. 2ª, Lubecae 1714, p. 40) is right in saying on the author: 'potius suo quam auctorum ingenio rem egit, ut solent plerumque omnes conciliatores.' Buratelli has been followed in Sweden by J. Hising (*Praeside . . . F. Törner, ideam Platonis breviter delineatam . . . proponit J. Hising*, Upsaliae 1706).

[20] *Jacobi Mazonii Caesenatis de triplici hominum vita*, Caesenae 1576, fol. 148, quaestio 2142: 'Plato demum veram excogitavit dialecticam, quam Aristoteles auxit. . . .' In a later work, *In universam Platonis et Aristotelis Philosophiam Praeludia*, Venetiis 1597, p. 118 FF., he enumerates the points in which both philosophers agree.

[21] *Stephani Theupoli, Benedicti filii, patricii Veneti Academicarum contemplationum libri decem*, Venetiis 1576.

[22] *J. B. Bernardi, Seminarium philosophicum continens Platonicorum definitiones*, Venetiis 1599.

[23] *Petri Calannae Philosophia senior, sacerdotia et Platonica*, Palermi 1599.

[24] Joann. a Wower, *De polymathia tractatio*, Basileae 1603, chap. xx.

[25] *Jacobi Zabarellae Patavini Opera*, Lugduni 1587, p. 42.

[26] *Praecognitorum logicorum tractatus, a B. Keckermanno Dantiscano secunda editione recogniti*, Hanoviae 1606, II. ii. 15, p. 82. This history of logic, published for the first time in 1598, was also reprinted in *Keckermanni Opera*, Genevae 1614. The author proclaims himself a Pole (vol. ii. p. 1009 of his works), despite his German name.

(1598) in Poland strongly favoured Aristotle's pretension to be considered as the founder of logic, while Crispi[27] (1594) denounced Plato as having given rise to a great number of heresies. All these works, some containing hundreds of pages occupied with Plato's logic, are devoid of scientific value, because their authors disdained the systematic and detailed study of Plato's own logical theories, and accepted too easily certain late authorities as exponents of Plato's teaching.

Historians of the seventeenth century.

The first attempt to represent Plato's logic without any polemical aim was made by Morainvillier d'Orgeville[28] (1650) in a work which had little vogue. But Morainvillier's object was not the history of human thought: he simply sought in Plato materials for a commentary on the teaching of the Church. He places Plato on the same footing with Proclus and Plotinus as authorities for Platonic teaching, and this is only one instance of the want of critical judgment which belonged to historians of philosophy of that epoch.

Thomas Stanley, in his *History of Philosophy*, and P. Gassendi, in his *History of Logic*, first treated the logic of Plato from a purely historical point of view.

[27] *J. Baptistae Crispi, De ethnicis philosophis caute legendis*, Romae 1594. The author enumerates on 529 pages in folio the heresies which he supposes to have emanated from Plato, and loses no opportunity of showing that Aristotle agrees better with the Church. This work is remarkable for its excellent indices.

[28] L. de Morainvillier d'Orgeville, *Examen philosophiae Platonicae*, Maclovii 1650, 8vo. 634 pages. This work, though it exists in the British Museum and the Bodleian Library, is not quoted in the bibliographies of Brunet, Graesse and Georgii, nor is the author's name mentioned in the biographical dictionaries of Michaud, Didot, Dezobry, and Bouillet, nor in the encyclopaedias of Brockhaus and Meyer. We learn from the introduction that the author was vicar of the bishop at Saint Malo and that Neoplatonic manuscripts brought from Constantinople by his uncle, the Bishop Achilles de Harley de Sancy, were entrusted to him that he might study them and use their contents for the benefit of the Church. This he did much better than a similar writer, Francesco de Vieri (*Compendio della dottrina di Platone in quello che ella è conforme con la fede nostra*, 191 pp. Fiorenza 1577), who, in his exposition of Plato's philosophy for the use of the Church, omitted logic altogether.

Both did so very briefly, and they were unable to distinguish between logical theories and logical reasoning. Stanley[29] enumerates the kinds of syllogism used by Plato without noticing that the use of syllogisms is no more evidence of a knowledge of syllogistic theory than is throwing a stone of a knowledge of the science of mechanics. Gassendi[30] wonders how Aristotle could boast of being the first inventor of syllogism, since Plato had frequently reasoned in syllogisms. To do this without knowing the syllogistic art he believed to be no less impossible than to make shoes without having learned the art of shoe-making. Though Fabricius[31] noticed these strange errors committed by historians of logic, he gave no detailed account of the logic of Plato, so that his observations remained without consequence for our subject.

Reaction against Plato.

After Gassendi and Stanley there came in the seventeenth century a general reaction against Plato's logic. Voss (1658) in Holland[32] and Rapin[33] (1678) in France,

[29] Thomas Stanley, *The History of Philosophy*, London 1655–56–60, 3 vols. vol. ii. pp. 58–67 treats of Plato's logic. He attributes to Plato 'the analytical method, the best of methods' (p. 17) and the use of syllogisms (p. 60).

[30] Petrus Gassendus, *Opera*, Lugduni Batavorum 1658, vol. i. contains: 'De origine et varietate logicae,' reprinted in *Petri Gassendi Logica*, Oxonii 1718, wherein chap. iv. (pp. 42–49) bears the title 'Logica Platonis.' The passage mentioned in the text is pp. 25–26 of the same edition.

[31] *B. J. A. Fabricii Opusculorum historico-critico-literariorum sylloge*, Hamburgi 1738, contains, pp. 161–184: 'Specimen elencticum historiae logicae,' first published at Hamburg in 1690; p. 165: 'Aliud longe est gaudere ratione, aliud esse logicum.'

[32] *G. Joh. Vossii de logices et rhetoricae natura et constitutione*, Hagae comitis 1658 (chap. viii. § 5: 'Priorum inventa, etiam quae apud Platonem leguntur, levia sunt prae iis, quae Aristoteles repperit'). To the same epoch belongs *G. Wegneri de origine logices*, Oelsnae Silesiorum 1667; C. F. Ayrmann, *De dialectica veterum*, Vitembergae 1716. M. H. Trierenberg (*De λόγῳ et νῷ Platonico*, Wittenberg 1676) deals only with the meaning of some words in Plato and in later writers. M. R. Dauth's *Plato coecutiens*, Wittebergae 1686, is only idle talk on Plato's moral principles.

[33] Père Rapin, *Œuvres diverses*, Amsterdam 1693, 2 vols. In vol. i. pp. 269–432: 'La comparaison de Platon et d'Aristote avec les sentiments des pères sur leur doctrine,' written according to the dedication before 1678. Chap. i. of part III.: La logique de Platon: 'Si l'on examine soigneuse-

while acknowledging certain logical merits in Plato, placed Aristotle far above him. Samuel Parker[34] (1666) argued, not only that Plato was no logician, but that he was not free from logical blunders. Stollen[35] (1718), writing the history of logic, did not mention Plato, while Walch[36] (1721) and Amort[37] (1730), in their works on the same subject, were clearly on the side of Aristotle. Still later, a very popular logical writer, Genovesi[38] (1745), thought that Plato's logic was not essentially different from the Socratic teaching.

Tennemann.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, after some less important writings by others,[39] there appeared the first

ment la logique de Platon, on trouvera qu'il en a une, dont la fin est de délivrer l'esprit de l'erreur et de l'opinion, pour y introduire la science' (p. 333). But in the same author's 'Réflexions sur la logique' (vol. ii. pp. 370–384) we read (p. 374): 'il ne parut rien de réglé et d'établi sur la Logique devant Aristote.'

[34] Sam. Parker, *A free and impartial censure of the Platonick Philosophie*, Oxford 1666, contains (pp. 34–40) 'An account of the Platonick Logick.' The author says, against Bessarion, that Plato's inferences 'bottom upon uncertain and inevident principles,' that 'they are circular,' and 'that there is some flaw and incoherence in some of the intermediate propositions' (p. 37) Also Wagner (under the pseudonym Realis de Vienna, *Discursus et dubia in Chr. Thomasii Introductionem ad Philosophiam aulicam*, Ratisbonae 1691) says (p. 137) 'Plato ad logicos vix referri potest.' This agrees with the contempt for logic generally professed by J. F. Reimmann in his *Critisirender Geschichtscalender von der Logica*, Francfurt 1699, and other works (*Versuch einer Einleitung in die Historiam literariam*, Halle 1708, *Versuch einer Einleitung in die Historiam literariam antediluvianam*, Halle 1709).

[35] Gottlieb Stollen, *Kurtze Anleitung zur Historie der Gelahrtheit*, Halle 1718, 3 vols., contains (vol. ii. pp. 115–172) an history of logic.

[36] *J. G. Walchii Parerga Academica*, Lipsiae 1721, contains (pp. 453–848) an history of logic. On Plato he says 'ingenii vis fuit major in Platone quam judicii, quo si quis destitutus, haud aptus erit ad genuinam utilemque logicae artem ornandam' (p. 520); 'Aristoteles logicam redegit in formam artis' (p. 529).

[37] R. D. E. Amort, *Philosophia Pollingana*, Augustae Vindelicorum 1730, contains (pp. 539–544) a chapter—'de logica Platonis'—wherein the author endeavours to show the superiority of Aristotle.

[38] *Antonii Genuensis artis logicocriticae libri V.*, ed. iv^{a}, Neapoli 1758 (first edition 1745). On p. 9 he credits Socrates and Plato with the art of: 'recte definiendi, dubitandi opportune, inductionis analyticae.'

[39] J. G. Darjes, *Via ad Veritatem*, ed. 2^{a}, Jenae 1764 (pp. 210–217: 'de logica

work on Plato's logic that was based on Plato's own writings. This also gave some indication of the importance of a true chronology of the Platonic dialogues as a help towards the right understanding of Plato's philosophy. Tennemann's [40] treatise on Plato's logic under the title of *Theorie des Vorstellens, Denkens und Erkennens* occupies the greater part of the second volume of his *System der Platonischen Philosophie.* Compared with his predecessors, his great merit is that he quotes Plato exactly, and relies on Plato alone as the interpreter of the Platonic teaching. But, being unable to resolve the problem of Platonic chronology, he did not attempt to give an account of the evolution of Plato's logical

Platonis'). S. C. Hollmannus, *Philosophiae rationalis* ed. auctior, Goettingae 1767 (contains, pp. 53–76, a short history of logic). J. A. Eberhard, *Allgemeine Theorie des Denkens und Empfindens*, Berlin 1776 (pp. 109 *sqq.*). J. J. Engel, *Versuch einer Methode die Vernunftlehre aus Platonischen Dialogen zu entwickeln*, Berlin 1780; (also pp. 339–512 in *Kleine Schriften von J. J. Engel*, Berlin 1795, deals chiefly with Plato's *Meno*, and is intended for use in the schools). J. J. H. Nast, *De methodo Platonis philosophiam docendi dialogica*, published first 1787, then reprinted in *Opuscula latina*, Tubingae 1821 (pp. 123–141); complains that the neoplatonists 'veros philosophi sensus turpiter depravarunt' (p. 125), but admits that it is difficult 'veros Platonis sensus eruere' (p. 133). F. V. Leberecht Plessing, *Memnonium*, Leipzig 1787, and *Versuche zur Aufklärung der Philosophie des ältesten Alterthums*, Leipzig 1788–1790, vol. i.; believes, like J. J. Syrbius (*Institutiones philosophiae primae*, ed. 2ª, Jenae 1726), that Plato has taken all his philosophy from the East, and Aristotle owes everything to Plato; against this view wrote J. J. Combes Dounous, *Essai historique sur Platon*, Paris 1809 (2 vols.). Dieterich Tiedemann, *Geist der speculativen Philosophie* (6 vols.), Marburg 1791–1797; (vol. ii. pp. 63–198 deals with Plato, whom he credits with the discovery (p. 87) 'dass die wissenschaftliche Erkenntniss unveränderliche, nothwendige Grundsätze und Begriffe heischt'). J. F. Dammann, *De humanae sentiendi et cogitandi facultatis natura ex mente Platonis*, Helmstadii 1792 (2 parts). J. Gottlieb Buhle, 'Commentatio de philosophorum graecorum ante Aristotelem in arte logica invenienda et perficienda conaminibus' (pp. 234–259) in the *Commentationes societatis regiae scientiarum Gottingensis ad annos* 1791–92, vol. xi. Gottingae 1793, insists on the importance of Plato's logic.

[40] W. G. Tennemann, *System der platonischen Philosophie*, Leipzig 1792–95, 4 vols. (vol. ii. p. 215: 'Plato verwechselte das Denken mit dem Erkennen'). Tennemann deals also with Plato's logic in his *Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. ii. Leipzig 1799 (pp. 242–344).

theories. He quotes chiefly the dialectical works—*Theaetetus*, *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, which, according to him, were written soon after the death of Socrates, though really they are among Plato's latest works. His predilection for these dialogues enabled Tennemann to perceive that Plato's ideas were for him nothing but notions of the human mind; while Brucker and many other writers,[41] including such authorities of our own time as E. Zeller, conceived the Platonic ideas as independent beings, separated from the material world, much as they are represented in certain passages of Aristotle. Tennemann gave the first impartial exposition of the logic of Plato, as it is to be found in Plato's own works, free from later corruptions. But, unaware of the order in which the works were written, he quotes early and late dialogues indifferently, and makes some serious mistakes: as, for instance, in his contention that Plato did not distinguish thought from knowledge. He admits that Plato had a theory of proof, that he gave valuable

[41] Most of the ancient Platonists, as Albinus, Plotinus, Porphyrius, Jamblichus, Proclus, as well as Plethon and Ficinus in the fifteenth century, explained the Platonic ideas as existent in God. This view has been also maintained by :—R. Goclenius (*Idea Philosophiae Platonicae*, Marpurgi 1612, p. 176: 'Plato intelligit ideas . . . in mente divina immortales et immutabiles'); Scipio Agnelli (*Disceptationes de ideis*, Venetiis 1615, p. 33: 'Peripatetici absurdam illam opinionem Platoni tribuunt quae tanto Philosopho penitus indigna est. Volunt Platonem existimasse . . . seorsum a divina mente subsistentes Ideas esse'); R. Cudworth (*The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, London 1678; also C. E. Lowrey, *The Philosophy of R. Cudworth*, New York 1884); J. L. Mosheim (in his Latin translation of R. Cudworth's *Systema intellectuale hujus universi*, Jenae 1733, vol. i. pp. 662–663); J. Helwig (*De ideis platonicis*, in Electorali Viadrina, 1650). In opposition to this view, there has been put forth another opinion, according to which Plato's ideas were substances independent of God and separated from him. This was chiefly supported by M. J. Thomasius (*Orationes*, Lipsiae 1683, pp. 275–300, oratio xiii.: 'De ideis Platonicis exemplaribus,' habita die 9 Aprilis a. 1659); J. Brucker (*Historia philosophica doctrinae de ideis*, Augustae Vindelicorum 1723, without the author's name, p. 36: 'ideae Platoni sunt aeterna rerum sensibilium exemplaria et formae, quae propria substantia gaudent.' Also in *J. Bruckeri Historia critica philosophiae*, Lipsiae 1742, vol. i. p. 691); M. G. E. Schulze (*De ideis Platonis*, Wittemberg 1786).

hints as to the method of scientific investigation, and that he was probably familiar with that theory of syllogism which caused Aristotle to be considered by many historians as the first logician.

Tennemann's work appeared at a time when other writers [42] also favoured Plato in greater measure than heretofore. It became generally recognised that Plato alone is a trustworthy witness as to his own logic, and the philosopher Herbart [43] insisted upon the importance of interpreting Plato by his own writings.

Van Heusde.

The next attempt to give an account of Plato's logic was made by van Heusde [44] in his work on Platonic philosophy. Van Heusde's aim was chiefly to give an introduction to the reading of Plato's dialogues. In his appreciation of Plato, enthusiastic as it is, there is a strange contempt for the theory of proof, and he sees in Plato's dialogues chiefly a theory of invention. He forgets that no truth is really invented before it is proved. He neglects to prove his own assertions, and his three volumes are less a scientific investigation than a brilliant anthology from Plato's works, with the editor's comments on them. On the pretext that it is not advisable to break up an organic whole, van Heusde abstains from comparing the text of various dialogues, and limits himself to an epitome. He regards Plato's logic as standing quite apart from later logic, and even from the logic of Aristotle. We

[42] G. G. Fülleborn, 'Kurze Geschichte der Logik bei den Griechen,' in *Beyträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie*, Züllichau und Freystadt 1794, p. 167; K. Morgenstern, *Entwurf von Platons Leben aus dem englischen übersetzt und mit Zusätzen versehen*, Leipzig 1797 (from the anonymous *Remarks on the Life and Writings of Plato*, Edinburgh 1760); J. J. Wagner, *Wörterbuch der platonischen Philosophie*, Göttingen 1799 (very superficial).

[43] J. F. Herbart, *De platonici systematis fundamento*, first published 1805, reprinted in vol. i. of Herbart's *Kleinere philosophische Schriften her. v. Hartenstein*, Leipzig 1842; believes the theory of ideas the most important in Plato's philosophy, and holds the ideas to be independent substances.

[44] P. G. van Heusde, *Initia philosophiae platonicae*, 3 vols., Trajecti ad Rhenum 1827–1831–1836; a 2nd ed. in 1 vol., Lugduni Batavorum 1842.

may either accept or reject it, but are not expected to find a continuity in the development of logic from Plato down to our own times. Van Heusde thinks, and in this he shares the opinion of Herbart, that it is useless to seek a 'logic' in Plato's dialogues, though they contain a 'philosophy of truth' and a 'theory of invention.' He speaks throughout of a philosophy of Plato as a whole, without any distinction of epochs in Plato's own development. He seems unaware of the possibility of inferences from the comparison of passages, or of such inferences about Plato as might go beyond the first impressions of an attentive reader of the dialogues. For van Heusde a modern representation of any part of Plato's philosophy is no more than an epitome of Plato's works.

Recent logical writers.

After the publication of the work of van Heusde, most writers on Plato's logic, or on any portion of it, limited their attention to a small number of Plato's works,[45] sometimes to a single dialogue, and this prevented them from forming any idea of a logical evolution in Plato. Even Prantl,[46] who looks upon Plato as a simple predecessor

[45] Such small contributions, which are rather commentaries on some passages than historical investigations, rarely show in their titles the limitation of the subject, as for instance: K. Eichhoff, *Logica trium dialogorum Platonis explicata* (*Meno, Crito, Phaedo*), Duisburg 1854; R. Kleinpaul, *Der Begriff der Erkenntniss in Platos Theätet*, Gotha 1867; Hölzer, *Grundzüge der Erkenntnisstheorie in Platos Staat*, Cottbus 1861; H. Dittel, *Platos Anschauungen über die Methode des wissenschaftlichen Gesprächs nach den Dialogen Protagoras Gorgias Meno*, Salzburg 1869; Fr. Schmitt, *Die Verschiedenheit der Ideenlehre in Platos Republik und Philebus*, Giessen 1891; W. Brinckmann, *Die Erkenntnisstheorie in Platons Theätet*, Bergedorf Programm, Jena 1896. Other authors preferred more general titles: F. Ebben, *De Platonis idearum doctrina*, Bonn 1849; C. F. Cooper, *On the Genius and Ideas of Plato*, Göttingen 1864; P. Durdik, *Wie urtheilt Plato über das Wissen?* Prag 1875; R. Wutzdorff, *Die platonischen Ideen*, Görlitz 1875; O. Ihm, *Ueber den Begriff der platonischen δόξα und deren Verhältniss zum Wissen der Ideen*, Leipzig 1877; J. Wagner, *Zu Platos Ideenlehre*, Nikolsburg 1881; M. Guggenheim, *Die Lehre vom apriorischen Wissen*, Berlin 1885.

[46] Carl Prantl, 'Ueber die Entwickelung der Aristotelischen Logik aus der Platonischen Philosophie,' p. 129 sqq., in *Abhandlungen der philosophisch-philologischen Classe der königlich-bayerischen Akademie der*

of Aristotle, and gives him in his history of logic an exceedingly modest place, did nothing beyond collecting a very reduced number of logical quotations—chiefly from Plato's latest works. He said clearly that Plato's ideas had nothing to do with logic (p. 83).

Other writers, as Janet[47] and Heyder,[48] who compared Plato and Aristotle with Hegel, or Waddington,[49] who argued that Plato was wholly independent of eastern philosophy, or Fouillée,[50] who exaggerated the importance of the theory of ideas in Plato's philosophy, or those who, like Lukas,[51] treated some special problems of Plato's logic,[52] agree in one respect: that they are ignorant of the

Wissenschaften, vii^er Band 1e Abt., München 1853; also *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, vol. i. pp. 59–84, Leipzig 1855.

[47] Paul Janet, *Étude sur la dialectique dans Platon et dans Hegel*, Paris 1848, 2nd ed. 1860. On the same subject: A. Vera, *Platonis, Aristotelis et Hegelii de medio termino doctrina*, Paris 1845.

[48] Carl L. W. Heyder, *Kritische Darstellung und Vergleichung der Methoden aristotelischer und hegelscher Dialektik*, Erlangen 1845; on Plato pp. 59–131; and by the same author: *Die Lehre von den Ideen*, Frankfurt a. M. 1874, wherein only pp. 4–12 deal with Plato.

[49] C. Waddington, *Essais de Logique*, Paris 1857 (leçons faites à la Sorbonne 1848–1856). In this book, p. 81: Essai iii. De la découverte du syllogisme. On p. 93 the author asserts that the word syllogismos is unknown in Greece before Aristotle. This is an error, for the word occurs in the *Cratylus* and in the *Theaetetus*, as the author could have easily seen from Ast's *Lexicon Platonicum*. Such an error appears quite natural when we know that the same author thirty years later thought that Serranus edited in Bâle in 1578 an edition of Plato 'qui fait encore autorité' (*Séances et travaux de l'Académie des sciences morales*, tome 126, p. 5: Ch. Waddington, 'De l'authenticité des écrits de Platon,' Paris 1886). Anybody who studies Plato knows that the edition of 1578, published in Geneva, not in Bâle, by Stephanus and not by Serranus, has no authority whatever in comparison with the editions of Bekker, Hermann, and Schanz.

[50] Alfred Fouillée, *La philosophie de Platon*, Paris 1869, 2nd ed. Paris 1888, 4 vols., of which vol. i. contains 'Théorie des idées et de l'amour.'

[51] F. Lukas, *Die Methode der Eintheilung bei Platon*, Halle 1888, deals only with nine dialogues, but represents very completely the theory and practice of classification used in these works.

[52] On special parts of Plato's Logic there are some very valuable contributions: J. R. Lichtenstädt, *Platons Lehren auf dem Gebiet der Naturforschung und der Heilkunde*, Leipzig 1826 (pp. 85–96: 'Empfinden und Wahrnehmen'); L. Dissen, *De arte combinatoria in Platonis Theaeteto*,

decisive distinction between the philosopher's earlier and later writings.

Philological inquiries.

On the other hand, the problem of the chronology of Plato's dialogues was much discussed by writers more interested in the philological details, or in the historical allusions of Plato's dialogues, than in his logic. Sometimes, as in the voluminous works of H. Ritter and Brandis,[53] the chronology was discussed without any bearing on the subsequent exposition of Plato's philosophy. K. F. Hermann acknowledged a gradual development of Plato's thoughts, and intended to give an account of this development, but he published no more than the first volume of his work, and treated in it only the chronology of Plato's writings, not the evolution of his philosophy.

The first to attempt a combination of both problems

Göttingen 1836, reprinted in: *Kleine lateinische und deutsche Schriften*, Göttingen 1839; G. Bode, *Materia apud Platonem qualem habeat vim atque naturam*, Neu Ruppin 1853; C. Kiesel, *De ratione quam Plato arti mathematicae cum dialectica intercedere voluerit*, Koln 1840. Of the same author: *De primis artis logicae praeceptis Platone duce tradendis*, 1851; *Exempla ad illustrandam concludendi doctrinam ex Platonis libris*, Dusseldorf 1857; and *De conclusionibus platonicis*, Dusseldorf 1863; Martinius, *Ueber die Fragestellung in den Dialogen Platos*, Norden 1871; Th. Kock, 'Ein Kapitel aus der formalen Logik, angewendet auf Aristoteles und Platon' (in *Hermes*, vol. xviii. pp. 546–557, Berlin 1883); Saueressig, *Ueber die Definitionslehre Platos*, Oberehnheim 1884; A. Beckmann, *Num Plato artefactorum ideas statuerit*, Bonn 1889. On Plato's relation to Kant: J. Heidemann, *Platonis de ideis doctrinam quomodo Kantius et intellexerit et excoluerit*, Berolini 1863; Stäckel, *Der Begriff der Idee bei Kant und bei Plato*, Rostock 1869; C. Fuchs, *Die Idee bei Plato und Kant*, Wiener Neustadt 1886. On Aristotle and Plato: Fr. Michelis, *De Aristotele Platonis in idearum doctrina adversario*, Brunsbergae 1864; H. Cazac, *Polémique d'Aristote contre la théorie platonicienne des idées*, Tarbes 1889; A. Biach, 'Aristoteles Lehre von der sinnlichen Erkenntniss in ihrer Abhängigkeit von Plato' in *Philosophische Monatshefte*, vol. xxvi. pp. 270–287, Heidelberg 1890.

[53] H. Ritter, *Geschichte der Philosophie alter Zeit*, Hamburg 1836–38. The author settles the chronology and authenticity of Plato's writings in vol. ii. pp. 159–208, but in his later account of Plato's logic on pp. 259–388 makes no use of the order of Plato's work recognised by him. Also Brandis, *Handbuch der Geschichte der griechisch-römischen Philosophie*, vol. ii. Berlin 1844, accepts a certain order of Plato's dialogues on pp. 161–179, but makes no use of that order in his account of Plato's Philosophy.

was Susemihl,[54] who represented the philosophical theories of each dialogue separately, in what appeared to him to be the historical order of their composition. Susemihl's work was not limited to Plato's logic, and it consisted chiefly in an epitome of each dialogue, with commentaries on the theories contained in it. He laid no special stress on logic, and at the time of writing did not perceive the true order of the dialogues as clearly as he perceived it afterwards.[55]

After Susemihl, the relation between the philological question of the chronology of dialogues and the philosophical aim of understanding the growth of the theories contained in these dialogues was insisted upon by Michelis,[56] but he dedicates only a few pages of his work to the logic of Plato, dealing chiefly, like Ribbing,[54] with the theory of ideas.

Ueberweg

Ueberweg,[57] in his treatment of the chronological problem, has shown that the comparison of logical

[54] F. Susemihl, *Die genetische Entwickelung der platonischen Philosophie*, Leipzig 1855–1857–1860, represents the *Sophist* and *Politicus* as earlier than the *Banquet* and *Republic*. The same opinion is held by S. Ribbing, *Genetische Darstellung der platonischen Ideenlehre*, Leipzig 1863–64 (first published in Swedish at Upsala in 1858), and by W. Rosenkrantz, *Die Wissenschaft des Wissens*, München 1866–68, vol. ii. pp. 1–54: 'Ueber die platonische Ideenlehre.' The 'genetische Methode' had been previously advocated by Hermann (*Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie*, Ier Theil, Heidelberg 1839), but he did not fulfil his promise of a systematical exposition of Plato's philosophy.

[55] Susemihl has changed his former opinions under the influence of later investigations, and he recognised in 1884 (*Wochenschrift für Klassische Philologie*, 1er Jahrgang, Leipzig 1884, p. 523, in a review of Peipers' *Ontologia Platonica*) that the *Sophist* and the *Politicus* were written after the *Republic*.

[56] F. Michelis, *Die Philosophie Platons in ihrer inneren Beziehung zur geoffenbarten Wahrheit*, Münster 1859–60; the author held the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, as well as the *Parmenides*, to be earlier than the *Republic*, and even than the *Banquet*, *Phaedo*, and *Phaedrus*.

[57] Ueberweg's *Untersuchungen über die Echtheit und Zeitfolge Platonischer Schriften*, Wien 1861, is one of the most important works on the subject of Plato's writings. The only authors before Ueberweg who believed the *Sophist* to be later than the *Republic* were G. F. W. Suckow (*Die wissenschaftliche und künstlerische Form der platonischen Schriften*,

theories is of importance in determining the order of the dialogues; and on that basis he was the first to show the very late date of the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, which had been almost unanimously placed by former philologers earlier than the *Republic*, and by most of them even earlier than the *Banquet*. But Ueberweg limited his valuable observations to a few dialogues, and to a few striking logical opinions expressed in them. After him many writers touched upon different points of Plato's logic, without attempting to give a full account of it and of the changes which took place in his logical theories.

Oldenberg

In 1873 the philosophical faculty of the University of Göttingen offered a prize for a work on the Platonic dialectic. The prize was awarded to a brief dissertation on this subject by Oldenberg.[58] The author tried to find a difference between the earlier and the later dialectic of Plato, but he neglected Ueberweg's arguments, and ignored Campbell's introduction to the *Sophist* and to the *Politicus*; so that, under the influence of the prevailing authority of Schleiermacher and Hermann, he conceived the form of dialectic which appears in the *Sophist* and *Politicus* to be earlier than that in the *Republic*. This he might have avoided, had he cared to compare the *Laws* with these dialogues.

Peipers

The general inclination to limit the inquiry to a few dialogues has led some authors to strange extravagances:

Berlin 1855) and Ed. Munk (*Die natürliche Ordnung der platonischen Schriften*, Berlin 1856), but they thought so chiefly because they imagined the conversations between Socrates and his pupils as written in the same order as they had been held, and the *Sophist* is the continuation of the *Theaetetus* at the end of which Socrates goes to meet the accusation of Meletus.

[58] H. Oldenberg, *De Platonis arte dialectica*, Gottingae 1873, very superficial. Besides this, another dissertation on the same subject, by J. Wolff, was also awarded a prize by the philosophical faculty at Göttingen, and published in the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, vol. lxiv. pp. 200–253, vol. lxv. pp. 12–34, and vol. lxvi. pp. 69–85, 185–220 (Johannes Wolff: 'Die platonische Dialektik, ihr Wesen und ihr Werth für die menschliche Erkenntniss'). But Wolff did not understand the importance of chronology and he misunderstood Plato in many points.

as, for instance, in disguising the restricted ground of their investigations under very promising titles. D. Peipers[59] wrote more than seven hundred pages of commentary on a single dialogue, the *Theaetetus*, and he divided his work into such parts as 'Consideration of the second part of the *Theaetetus*,' and 'Consideration of the third part of the *Theaetetus*,' closing it with a 'Consideration of the first part of the *Theaetetus*.' He devoted to comparisons with other dialogues about one-eighth of his volume: not more, in fact, than anybody should have given in a good commentary on any single dialogue. This very conscientious commentary of Peipers' is styled *Erkenntnisstheorie Platos*, a misleading title, which has so completely deceived some reviewers that, for instance, Stein,[60] in his short history of the Greek theory of knowledge, says that the Platonic theory of knowledge has found in Peipers an able exponent. Peipers himself, though his work was received by philological reviewers with the greatest consideration,[61] writing at a later date on the ontology of Plato, gave—not a commentary on some other dialogue, but—an exposition of the ontological and of some logical theories of Plato, in their chronological order. And he had the great merit of finding by this method, quite independently of others who had earlier arrived at the same result, that the *Sophist*, the *Politicus*, and the *Philebus* are later than the *Republic*.

Since Peipers, nobody has attempted to give a full

[59] D. Peipers, *Die Erkenntnisstheorie Platos*, Leipzig 1874.

[60] L. Stein, *Die Erkenntnisstheorie der Stoa*, Berlin 1888, contains, pp. 70–77, a short chapter, 'Platos Erkenntnisstheorie.'

[61] Susemihl in *Bursians Jahresbericht*, vol. iii. p. 309, says that Peipers' work is 'tief eindringend und scharfsinnig gearbeitet, klar und schön geschrieben.' R. Hirzel in *Jenaer Literaturzeitung*, 2er Jahrg. Jena 1875, p. 469, recognises in Peipers' work 'Scharfsinn, Methode, Wissen, Klarheit, Durchsichtigkeit,' and H. Schmidt, in vol. cxi. pp. 477–487 of the *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie* (Leipzig 1875), admits the 'Gründlichkeit, Tiefe, Klarheit' of the same. Not one of these reviewers complained about the misleading title, as if it were quite natural to name a commentary to a single dialogue *Erkenntnisstheorie Platos*.

Differences of opinions about Plato's logic.

account of Plato's logic, but among the recent writers on Plato's philosophy H. Jackson[62] has confirmed Ueberweg's and Peipers' finding as to the late date of the dialectical dialogues according to the modification of the theory of ideas they contain; and A. Benn[63] by independent observations found in the *Sophist* the transition from the Platonic to the Aristotelian logic, thus implying that the *Sophist* and *Philebus* were written later than the *Republic*, which contains the classical theory of ideas nearly in the form which is criticised by Aristotle. Benn also insisted upon the very important fact, that the so-called doctrine of ideas was by no means the chief logical theory of Plato, and that in his later works his earlier opinions are considerably modified. But it did not form part of the scope of Benn's work to give a detailed account of these changes, and thus the history of Plato's logical evolution remains as yet untold. Nothwithstanding the many defenders of Plato's logical merits,[64] there are still historians of logic, as for instance Franck, Kuno Fischer, Rabus, Hirzel, who choose to see in Aristotle the founder of that science.[65]

[62] H. Jackson, 'Plato's later theory of ideas,' in the *Journal of Philology*, vols. x., xi., xiii., xiv., xv., London 1882–86.

[63] A. W. Benn, *The Greek Philosophers*, London 1882, vol. i. p. 264.

[64] Plato's logical merits have been insisted upon by T. G. Danzel (*Plato philosophiae in formam disciplinae redactae parens et auctor*, Lipsiae 1845), J. B. Tissandier (*Examen critique de la Psychologie de Platon*, Paris 1851), L. Szczerbowicz (*Parmenides filozof z Elei*, Warszawa 1868, p. 38), and in general histories of logic by C. F. Bachmann (*System der Logik*, Leipzig 1828), Troxler (*Logik*, Stuttgart 1829–1830, 3 vols.), Ch. Renouvier (*Manuel de philosophie ancienne*, Paris 1844), H. Siebeck ('Die Anfänge der Erkenntnisslehre in der griechischen Philosophie' in *Zeitschrift für exacte Philosophie*, vol. vii. pp. 357–380, Leipzig 1867), Giov. Cesca (*La teorica della conoscenza nella filosofia greca*, Verona 1887).

[65] Aristotle is estimated as the founder of logic by Fr. Calker (*Denklehre*, Bonn 1822), Ad. Franck (*Esquisse d'une histoire de la logique*, Paris 1838), Kuno Fischer (*Logik und Metaphysik*, Stuttgart 1852), L. Rabus (*Logik und Metaphysik*, Erlangen 1868), R. Hirzel ('De logica Stoicorum' in *Satura philologa, Hermanno Sauppio obtulit amicorum decas*, Berolini 1879). What K. Fischer ascribes only to modern philosophy, '*die freie voraussetzungslose Erkenntniss*' (p. 17), is to be found already in Plato.

Besides the authors named, a great number have written in general terms on Plato's dialectic, promising more in the titles of their works than they could give.[66]

[66] Many works bearing on their titles the name of Plato do not really belong to Platonic bibliography, because they contain nothing of any importance for our knowledge of Plato. Some authors of popular histories of philosophy writing about Plato invent freely what they think will interest their readers. Aston Leigh (*The Story of Philosophy*, London 1881) counts among Plato's pupils Isocrates, his rival and enemy, and regrets that Plato was born before his time. A. Lefèvre (*La philosophie*, Paris 1879) makes Plato a sceptic. To the same class belongs Courdaveaux (*La philosophie grecque mise à la portée de tous*, Paris 1855). Some other authors go still farther in their imagination: E. Welper (*Platon und seine Zeit*, Kassel 1866) represents Plato as defending himself against the love of a girl unknown to history, and selling olive-oil in Egypt. E. l'Ollivier (*La méthode de Platon*, Paris 1883) pays a visit to Plato in the Champs Elysées, where he meets him in company of Plotinus and Proclus, speaking Latin. A. T. Haymann (*Ariston Platon, sein Leben und Wirken im Lichte seiner Zeit*, Dresden 1871) makes the discovery that Plato began at an early age to learn Greek, and accumulates within a few pages an incredible number of blunders, though he quotes as his source of information Brockhaus' *Conversationslexicon*. J. de Sales (*Ma République, auteur Platon*, Paris 1790) and another anonymous author (*Platone in Italia*, Milano 1804) use the name of Plato to give authority to their political predictions. G. A. Heigl (*Die platonische Dialektik*, Landshut 1812) mixes up fragments of Plato's dialogues with his own inventions. Enoch Pond (*Plato: his Life, Works, Opinions*, Portland, Maine 1847) finds as the chief result of his study of Plato (in Taylor's translation) 'the divine origin and unspeakable importance of the Bible.' The same conclusion is reached by Dietrich Becker (*Das philosophische System Platons in seiner Beziehung zum christlichen Dogma*, Freiburg 1862), and R. Bobertag (*De ratione inter spiritum sanctum et mentem humanam ex Platonis philosophia intercedente*, Vratislaviae 1824). Among books on Plato for general readers, G. P. Weygoldt (*Die Platonische Philosophie nach ihrem Wesen und ihren Schicksalen für höhergebildete aller Stände dargestellt*, Leipzig 1885) has happily avoided striking errors, while A. Arnold (*Platons Werke einzeln erklärt und in ihrem Zusammenhange dargestellt*, Berlin 1835–1836, Erfurt 1855; *System der platonischen Philosophie*, Erfurt 1858; *Einleitung in die Philosophie durch die Lehre Platos vermittelt*, Berlin 1841) undertook a task exceeding his knowledge. Besides these works there has always been idle talk on Plato in many smaller dissertations: G. Schultgen (*De Platonis arte dialectica*, Wesel 1829); C. F. Wieck (*De Platonica philosophia*, Merseburgi 1830); Fr. Hoffmann (*Die Dialektik Platons*, München 1832); F. W. Braut (*Bemerkungen über die platonische Lehre vom Lernen als einer Wiedererinnerung*, Brandenburg 1832); H. Brueggemann (*De artis dialecticae, qua Plato sibi viam ad scientiam veri munivit, forma ac ratione*, Berolini 1838); C. Kühn (*De dialectica Platonis*, Berolini 1843) give much less than might be expected

Of such contributions to Platonic literature, most are devoted to the discussion about Platonic ideas, which are held by some to be independent substances,[67] by others to be God's thoughts,[68] and again by others to be certain

from the titles, and do very little more than collect quotations without order or method. R. Doehn (*De speculativo logices platonicae principio*, Gryphiae 1845) gives a series of comparisons between Plato and other philosophers from Anaximander to Hegel. Carl Günther ('Betrachtungen über die platonische Dialektik' in *Philologus*, Band v. pp. 36–84, Göttingen 1850) and E. Alberti ('Zur Dialektik des Plato,' pp. 112–168 in Ier Supp. Band of *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, Leipzig 1855) have been at least more modest in the title of their articles, and Alberti acknowledges that he wrote more for his own pleasure than for his readers' benefit. E. Schulte's *Platos Lehre von der Erkenntniss*, Fürstenwalde 1868, is a jest, because the reader, whose expectations have been raised by the title, is disappointed when he finds some pages of comments on certain passages of a single dialogue. F. Faber (*De universa cognitionis lege, qualem Plato statuit, cum aristotelea comparata*, Vratislaviae 1865) causes a similar disappointment to the reader; and O. Caspari (*Die Irrthümer der altclassischen Philosophen in ihrer Bedeutung für das philosophische Princip*, Heidelberg 1868) seems to know Plato only from references. Schnippel (*Die Hauptepochen in der Entwickelung der Erkenntnissprobleme*, Gera 1874) gives only a summary of the *Theaetetus*. C. A. Funke (*Die Lehre Platos von den Seelenvermögen*, Paderborn 1878) accuses Plato 'keinen Begriff vom Ich gehabt zu haben.' Carl Schmelzer (*Eine Verteidigung Platos*, Bonn 1885) thinks that Plato's political theories are not meant seriously, and have to be taken as jokes. All these writings, quoted here only to show how Plato's name is abused, are not worth reading.

[67] The ideas were explained as self-existing substances after Herbart chiefly by L. Wienbarg (*De primitivo idearum platonicarum sensu*, Marburgi 1829), F. W. Graser (*Ueber Platos Ideenlehre*, Torgau 1861), T. Maguire (*An essay on the Platonic idea*, London 1866), Alfr. Fouillée (*Histoire de la philosophie*, Paris 1875, p. 90), Aemilius Kramm (*De ideis Platonis a Lotzei judicio defensis*, Halae 1879), Al. Chiappelli (*Della interpretazione panteistica di Platone*, Firenze 1881, p. 131), W. Pater (*Plato and Platonism*, London 1893), and Zeller.

[68] The old explanation of ideas as of God's thoughts is upheld in this century by Stallbaum (*Platonis Parmenides cura G. Stallbaumi*, Prolegomena p. 266, and in many other Prolegomena to Platonic dialogues), H. F. Richter (*De ideis Platonis*, Lipsiae 1827), L. Lefranc (*De la critique des idées platoniciennes par Aristote*, Paris 1843), R. Blakey (*Historical Sketch of Logic*, Edinburgh 1851), J. Felix Nourisson (*Quid Plato de ideis senserit*, Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1852. *Exposition de la théorie platonicienne des idées*, Paris 1858), Alfred Fouillée (in his earlier work *La Philosophie de Platon*, Paris 1869), G. Behncke (*Platos Ideenlehre im Lichte der aristotelischen Metaphysik*, Berlin 1873), W. T. Harris ('Plato's Dialectic

notions of the human mind.[69] These differences of opinion upon a subject so frequently dealt with by Plato

and Doctrine of Ideas' in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, January 1888, pp. 94–112, April 1888, pp. 113–117).

[69] That the Platonic ideas are neither substances nor God's thoughts, but a kind of notions of the human mind, was first supposed in modern times by Kant in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (p. 370 of second edition of 1787), in so far as he alluded to the possibility of 'eine mildere Auslegung' of what Plato said about ideas. Kant's indication has been followed out by G. Faehse (*De ideis Platonis*, Lipsiae 1795) and also arrived at independently by Tennemann. Then Trendelenburg (*Platonis de ideis et numeris doctrina ex Aristotele illustrata*, Lipsiae 1826), after a careful comparison of all quotations from Aristotle, proved that only a wrong interpretation of some passages could have led to the supposition that the ideas are self-subsistent substances. Trendelenburg thinks: 'si sunt ideae a rebus sejunctae nec tamen alicubi extra eas positae, nihil restat, nisi ut menti insint' (p. 45), which leads him to give that 'mildere Auslegung' of ideas to which Kant alluded. Trendelenburg's argument is the more important, inasmuch as he builds his conclusions on the text of Aristotle, while the same text wrongly interpreted leads Zeller to admit that Plato held his ideas to be substances existing apart from objects of experience. Trendelenburg's view was also sustained by J. G. Mussmann (*De idealismo sive philosophia ideali*, Berolini 1826), Dr. Schmidt (*Ueber die Ideen des Plato*, Quedlinburg 1835), H. Ritter and Brandis (see above note 53). After these historians came a very important dissertation of C. Levêque (*Quid Phidiae Plato debuerit*, Parisiis 1852), in which the analogy between the philosophic ideas and the 'in mente insita aeternae pulchritudinis effigies' was shown with great skill. A similar argumentation led Hermann Cohen ('Die Platonische Ideenlehre,' pp. 403–464 in vol. iv. of the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie*, Berlin 1866), independently of Levêque, to the understanding that the ideas were 'geschaut' by Plato in the same way as the artist sees in his own thoughts the work he intends to produce. But Cohen still believed that for Plato each idea was a substance, and only later (*Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik*, Marburg 1879) he came to accept Lotze's interpretation (Lotze, *Logik*, Leipzig 1874, p. 501), according to which the οὐσία of ideas is only a 'gelten,' not a separate substantial existence. The idea as a general notion has been also accepted by J. Steger (*Platonische Studien*, Innsbruck 1869–1872, part 1 p. 39), Carl Heyder (*Die Lehre von den Ideen*, Frankfurt a. M. 1874, p. 5: 'der Ausgangspunkt der Ideenlehre war jedenfalls wie nach der einen Seite ein logischer, das im Begriff gedachte Allgemeine und Beharrliche, so andererseits ein ontologisch-metaphysischer; denn dies Allgemeine und Unwandelbare in der Vielheit und in der Veränderung der Erscheinungen ist zugleich das wahre Sein und Wesen der Sache'), Dieck (*Untersuchung zur platonischen Ideenlehre*, Naumburg 1876, develops Lotze's view), G. M. Bertini (*Nuova interpretazione delle idee Platoniche*, Torino 1876, p. 18: 'quando Platone dice che le idee *sono*, non le trasforma con ciò in *sostanze* individue,

are plainly due to the neglect of chronology, without which a scientific exposition of Plato's logic or of any other part of his philosophy is impossible.

Inferences from the literature on Plato's logic.

The works of our predecessors contain valuable hints of the way in which Plato's logic should be studied. First of all, most modern writers on the subject advise us to trust only Plato himself as to his own logical theories, and not to be deluded by later writers, who, without a scientific method of investigation, attributed to him opinions absent from his writings. A philosopher who spent more than fifty years in composing and polishing works which are well preserved, may be assumed to have expressed his views in them almost as fully as in his oral teaching, about which we have no direct testimony beyond a vague allusion in Aristotle.

We also see clearly from existing works on the logic of Plato that it is indispensable to take into account the order of his writings, because we may reasonably expect him to have progressed during his long life, and because between some of his dialogues there exist contradictions so important as to have led Socher and Schaarschmidt to doubt the authenticity of the *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus*. If we wish to obtain a clear representation of Plato's logic we cannot follow Peipers in limiting our study to one dialogue; we must include in

ma dice solo che esse hanno realità in quel modo che possono averla, senza cessare di essere quello che sono, cioè *idee* . . . essenze, forme necessariamente possibili, cf. p. 79, ibidem), Th. Achelis (' Kritische Darstellung der platonischen Ideenlehre,' pp. 90–113 in vol. lxxix. of the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, Halle 1881, accepts Lotze's view), August Auffarth (*Die platonische Ideenlehre*, Berlin 1883, develops the views of Cohen and credits Plato with the merit of having been the first representative of critical idealism), G. Schneider (*Die platonische Metaphysik*, Leipzig 1884, p. 54: 'Ideen sind ein eigenthümliches Besitzthum des menschlichen Geistes '), P. Shorey (*De Platonis idearum doctrina atque mentis humanae notionibus commentatio*, München 1884), F. Weber (*Die Entstehung des Begriffes der Idee bei Platon*, Brüx 1888), etc. This survey shows that the great majority of competent Platonists after Tennemann have abandoned the old theory of ideas as substances, and only Zeller, in dealing with this question as with many others, remains too conservative.

our examination all the dialogues where logical doctrines are found. These two conditions, (1) the distinction between the age of each dialogue and (2) the inclusion of all Plato's works in the study of each part of his philosophy, have never yet been fulfilled by those who have written upon this subject. The importance of these two conditions will appear in their true light when applied, but it is manifest that a scientific knowledge of Plato's logic is impossible unless we form our judgment at least upon all his more important works, and unless we know the stages through which his thought reached its final shape.

Zeller's objections.

Some objections to the aim of our study are raised by a scholar whose competence and command of Plato are incontestable, and whose opinion, therefore, should be well weighed before venturing upon a path condemned by him. Zeller agrees with van Heusde's opinion, according to which it is unjustifiable to form an artificial system of logic by collecting the logical theories which we find scattered through the philosopher's writings. If Zeller be right, all attempts to argue about Plato's logic are superfluous, and deserve no attention from historians of philosophy. They are condemned beforehand on this showing as a useless logical exercise that can lead to no scientific result. Zeller himself, in his extensive work on Plato, ignores Plato's logic as such, while he blends logical, ethical, metaphysical, psychological problems in accordance, as he thinks, with Plato's own indications. He begins with the theory of perception and imagination, then deals with virtue, with love, with the formation of concepts and their division; he treats in one page of the logical rules of Plato, and proceeds to the theory of language, of ideas, and of moral aims, then states Plato's views on matter, reason, and necessity, the world's soul, the world's beginning and the constitution of the stars, the soul's immortality and metempsychosis, the freedom of the will, the relation between body and soul, and so forth.

Now, although a reading of Zeller's work does not give the impression of discontinuity produced by the above enumeration, everybody who knows Plato understands at once that this order of matters selected by Zeller is his own invention and cannot be supported by Plato's authority, nor can it give a more faithful idea of Plato's philosophy than a systematic exposition. Zeller condemns Tennemann's work because he represented Plato's philosophy according to modern divisions, which, as Zeller thinks, led him into inaccuracies and induced him to attribute to Plato thoughts which were not his. Every other division of an exposition of Plato's philosophy leads to the same danger, and, if we wish to leave Plato's views unchanged by our systematic prejudice, the safest plan is to present Platonic philosophy in the form of a mere epitome of his dialogues. Many authors, in writing on the philosophy of Plato—as, for instance, Grote—have thus understood their task. But such analyses contain but the repetition of Plato's works; they give no new results. Even had Plato left a systematic work on logic we could not be bound by the order of his exposition in our historical account.

Aim of the history of philosophy.

The aim of an investigation on the history of philosophy is not to repeat or to epitomise what each philosopher said in his works, for then the best history would be a faithful edition of the chief texts. Our aim in investigating the logic of Plato is to learn what the philosopher thought, even though he gave no full expression to his thoughts. This constitutes the labour of the historian in all departments—to manifest a reality not fully given by any single witness, to draw inferences from facts, and in this way to produce new truths. In the history of philosophy we are expected to offer a better understanding of a philosopher's thoughts than could be immediately derived from the mere reading of his writings.

A philosopher, whom all must admit to be a com-

Historical method in philosophy.

petent witness, Kant,[70] recognised this possibility and explained it, pointing out that we may understand a philosopher better than he understood himself, just as by means of scientific method we understand the properties of any being better than they could be understood by the being itself. If we wish to gain a scientific knowledge of a plant or an animal, we seek to determine its chief properties and their interdependence. Then only do we obtain scientific knowledge, very much higher than any knowledge derived from external description. We seek to show by what properties a particular object is distinguished from all others and how these properties were developed. Taking a philosopher as an object of scientific study, we may ask many questions of no interest to him, and not directly answered in his writings. We need not repeat his mere words nor describe his writings, because all such descriptions teach us no more than the works themselves. We need not fear to join what is separated nor to sunder what is united in his works, if the sundering and joining be done upon a rational principle, and if the relative date of each expression of opinion be borne in mind.

Psychological evolution of a philosopher.

Our aim is to get an insight into the psychological evolution of our philosopher, though he nowhere mentions his evolution—though he disregarded his change of convictions and perhaps even attempted to conceal such changes. We seek the true meaning, the bases and consequences of his theories, though he may mention them only occasionally or may give no importance to them. We desire to trace the origin of what we admit to be important truths of our science, though, at the outset,

[70] Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Riga 1787, p. 370: 'Ich merke nur an, dass es gar nichts Ungewöhnliches sei, sowohl im gemeinen Gespräch als in Schriften, durch die Vergleichung der Gedanken, welche ein Verfasser über seinen Gegenstand äussert, ihn sogar besser zu verstehen als er sich selbst verstand, indem er seinen Begriff nicht genugsam bestimmte, und dadurch bisweilen seiner eigenen Absicht entgegen redete oder auch dachte.'

they may not have been expressed with a full knowledge of their importance.

True knowledge of a philosopher not attained by mere reading of his works.

Just as the notion of a heavy body is other in analytical mechanics than in current talk, so the scientific knowledge of a philosopher differs from the first impression obtained by reading his works. Those historians who, when speaking of Plato, object to the use of the word logic, on the plea that this word was not used by him, do not write history: they merely collect quotations. Such historical writings always give the unprejudiced reader the impression of vain labour, of an unskilful repetition of texts. In investigating the history of human thought, our object is not only to ascertain facts, but to explain their causation. An historian of philosophy can do this better than the philosopher investigated, since he can make comparisons that are impossible to the philosopher himself. It is true that a certain subjective element enters into every historical study. We may suspect that Plato's idea of his logical system differed from the idea we form of it. But if our idea corresponds to the true meaning of Plato's thoughts, and if we attribute to him nothing against his testimony, then our appreciation of his system may be more trustworthy than his own. Possibly he did not always perceive the deeper connection between all his thoughts, but there is a bond uniting them, which gives the key to his detached opinions.

Thus Tennemann and Prantl understood their task, and though their knowledge of Plato's logic remained incomplete, there is a marked progress between the first and the second in eliminating the subjective element, though neither cared to preserve in his exposition the accidental order in which Plato's logical hints are found in his own dialogues. To admit beforehand that an historian must have some subjectivity is simpler than to persuade our readers that we take from Plato himself the systematic order which allows us fully to understand his logic.

Logical questions subsidiary to other problems.

Plato never professes to teach logic; he always introduces logical questions as subsidiary to psychological, metaphysical, and ethical problems. To understand his logic we must first determine the changes and the progress of his logical views; and this cannot be done without a careful investigation into the chronology of his dialogues.

The knowledge of the true order of Plato's dialogues indispensable for an appreciation of his logical development.

The majority of writers dealing with Platonic chronology had no special interest in his logic: those who were interested in his logic seem to have been unaware of the importance of the chronological distinctions. It is our task to unite both aims, and to show how the study of Plato's logic yields definitive truths as to the chronological order of his writings, and how by the knowledge of this order we may obtain a deeper insight into his logical development. Compared with other philosophical sciences, logic has the privilege of steadier progress. It is not uncommon to see changes in metaphysical convictions occurring in opposite directions—as, for instance, from pantheism to spiritualism, and from spiritualism to pantheism, from free will to necessity, and from necessity to free will. But it is inconceivable that a philosopher who had reached the stage of logical reflection should fall back into illogical dogmatism, or that anybody could forget or cease to apply logical methods once found and tested.

Plato was the first logician, and he produced two successive logical theories.

Plato was the first thinker to appreciate the importance of logic,—not only to seek the truth, but to ask why the truth was true, and how it could safely be distinguished from error. He insisted throughout his works on the difference between knowledge and opinion, and attempted through more than one solution to fix the limits where knowledge begins. His first solution of that problem is known as the theory of ideas, and is generally believed to have remained his unique theory of knowledge. This belief is produced chiefly by the prejudice which prevented the great majority of readers from studying, with all the

attention they deserve, those dialogues which contain a new theory of knowledge, differing from the theory of ideas. Plato is chiefly known by his poetical masterpieces, the *Banquet*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Republic*. His dialectical dialogues, the *Sophist*, the *Politicus*, the *Philebus*, being more difficult to understand, have not been so widely studied. The general assumption is that they were written earlier than the poetical masterpieces, and that they are less noteworthy. It becomes of the first importance to solve this problem: whether the poetical logic of the *Republic* or the dialectical logic of the *Sophist* is the definitive teaching of Plato.

Poetical vision of eternal ideas opposed to the psychological creation of knowledge.

This is no mere historical question. The two conflicting views on logic are as opposed as ever. Does knowledge always exist? and is our acquisition of it only the discovery of pre-existing knowledge? Or is knowledge created by us, produced by our own exertions, not existent save in our own minds? The former hypothesis may be named idealistic, the latter psychological.

Plato and his great pupil Aristotle are generally counted among the idealists, notwithstanding many differences between them. The psychological view is a modern one, chiefly supported by Kant. If we could show that in his later age the father of idealism came near to psychologism, and that he had been misunderstood by his pupils and readers for two thousand years,—this discovery would change the general aspect of the history of logic.

Plato has been generally counted among the idealists, though he progressed beyond

It is worth while to grapple with tedious details in order to resolve such a decisive problem, of which the key is to be found in a previous solution of chronological difficulties. The order of the Platonic dialogues, though it has been discussed for a century, is by no means settled, and the best authorities on the subject differ. Zeller, who is generally esteemed the most competent authority on Plato, agrees with Hermann and Schleiermacher in placing the *Sophist* and the *Politicus* before the *Republic* and the

idealism in his latest works.

Banquet. Other investigators, unknown to each other, have accumulated evidence in support of the opposite view. Nobody has yet undertaken to piece together the small indications contained in these partial investigations, and to exhibit the result. Nor can this easily be done in the present volume with equal precision for all dialogues. But it belongs to our task to show the steady progress brought about by these minute investigations, and to discuss with due accuracy the date of the chief dialogues in order to decide whether Plato, as the outcome of his life's experience, bequeathed to mankind a merely poetical idealism, or the foundations of a theory of self-created science. Are the dialectical works mere juvenile jokes —a kind of school exercises, or are they the ultimate issue of mature thought? This is the chief question for an historian of Plato's logic.

The treatment of the chronological problem has heretofore been twofold—the comparative study of the contents of each dialogue, and the study of Plato's style. Our next task is to review the results obtained by both methods and to compare them with each other.

CHAPTER II

AUTHENTICITY AND CHRONOLOGY OF PLATO'S WRITINGS

It is commonly assumed that Tennemann was the first to deal with the problem of the Platonic chronology. Before the end of the sixteenth century, indeed, Patrizi[71] wrote a chapter 'De dialogorum (*sc.* Platonis) ordine,' but he gave no scientific reasons for the order proposed. It was, like the strange order invented by Serranus,[72] rather an order of reading Plato's works than a guessing at the order in which Plato wrote them.

Tennemann[40] treats the chronology of Platonic dialogues without going into many details. But at least he guessed that the *Phaedrus*, of which he recognised the importance, could not, as had been supposed, belong to the earliest period of Plato. He puts the *Sophist* and the *Politicus* before the *Banquet*, and believes them to have been written in Megara, soon after the death of Socrates.

[71] In *F. Patritii Nova de universis philosophia libris quinquaginta comprehensa*, Venetiis 1593 (the first edition at Ferrara 1591 is not in the British Museum) there is a part under the title 'Plato et Aristoteles mystici atque exoterici' with separate pagination, and fol. 44 begins a chapter 'de dialogorum ordine.' The order proposed is, with omission of some spurious dialogues: *Alcibiades*, *Philebus*, *Euthydemus*, *Cratylus*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, *Gorgias*, *Phaedrus*, *Banquet*, *Ion*, *Hippias*, *Protagoras*, *Meno*, *Laches*, *Menexenus*, *Charmides*, *Lysis*, *Republic*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Parmenides*, *Euthyphro*, *Crito*, *Apologia*, *Phaedo*, *Laws*.

[72] Serranus translated Plato's text for the edition of Plato by Stephanus 1578, and he introduced the order, or rather disorder, which has been maintained in many editions of Plato, including the edition of Didot, Paris 1846–1856.

Tennemann and Schleiermacher

Tennemann had no such doubts concerning authenticity as the next eminent writer on that subject, Schleiermacher[73] (1804), who did not hesitate to pronounce many dialogues spurious, though they had previously been held by every reader for authentic. Some of these, not amounting in all to one-seventeenth of the texts bearing Plato's name, namely, *Hipparchus*, *Minos*, *Alcibiades II.*, *Theages*, *Amatores*, *Hippias major*, *Clitopho*, *Epinomis*, have since been generally recognised either as spurious or as written by some pupil of Plato. Other dialogues condemned by Schleiermacher, as *Hippias minor*, *Io*, *Alcibiades I.*, *Menexenus*, have been more recently defended against his suspicions, but they are of no importance for the study of Plato's philosophy, and they do not exceed, taken together, the volume of a single dialogue such as the *Gorgias*. In the great questions of the date of the *Phaedrus* and *Parmenides*, Schleiermacher chose the opposite solution to that of Tennemann: he believed the *Phaedrus* to be the first work of Plato, and the *Parmenides* also to have been written before or immediately after the death of Socrates.

agree as to some points, except the date of the *Parmenides*, *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo*, *Philebus*, *Euthydemus*, *Cratylus*.

As to other dialogues, there are several important points in which Schleiermacher agreed with Tennemann: both place the *Lysis*, *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Protagoras* before the death of Socrates; both agree that the *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito* had been written about 399 B.C.; both put the *Meno*, *Gorgias*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Politicus* before the *Banquet*, which they both held to have been written about 385 B.C., as Wolf[74] had shown in his introduction to the *Banquet*. Also in looking upon the *Republic*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and *Laws* as the latest works of Plato, Schleiermacher followed Tennemann's indications. He dissented from him chiefly as to the date of the *Phaedrus* and *Parmenides*, which he placed much earlier, and of

[73] *Platons Werke*, von F. Schleiermacher, Berlin 1804–1828 (3 parts in 6 vols.).

[74] *Platons Gastmahl*, herausgegeben von F. A. Wolf, Leipzig 1782.

the *Cratylus*, *Euthydemus*, *Philebus*, and *Phaedo*, which appeared to him later than Tennemann had supposed them to be.

As to the smaller dialogues of doubtful authenticity and little philosophical importance, Schleiermacher recognised better than Tennemann the great difficulty of assigning to each of them a definite place in the general order of Plato's works. They have no influence on our judgment as to any serious aspect of Plato's philosophy, and their study belongs rather to literary investigations on the history of the Greek dialogue generally than to the history of human thought.

Schleiermacher did not admit progress from dogmatism to criticism.

Schleiermacher tried to ascertain the sequence in which Plato might have written his dialogues, if it were supposed that from the beginning he had planned out the whole of his literary activity. This starting-point in judging about chronological questions was suggested by the influence of the mode of German idealism, which prevailed in the first years of the present century. According to such a view, a man's life is an harmonious whole, and a man's works must form a consequent exposition of his doctrines, taking the sum of these doctrines as co-existent in the author's mind before his entrance on a literary career. Schleiermacher had observed the didactic and dogmatic character of the *Republic*, and he believed that this alone gave sufficient reason for thinking that this work was written after the *Sophist* and the *Politicus*, which are rather critical than dogmatic. It is strange that Schleiermacher should not have profited in this regard by the example of Kant's evolution from dogmatism to criticism; he would then have been less confident in representing dogmatism as the latest stage of Plato's thought. It is true that Plato, as a disciple of Socrates, began with criticism. But there is a great difference between such criticisms as we see in the *Protagoras* or the *Gorgias*, which are of a personal character, dealing with simple ethical problems, and the

criticism of the *Sophist* and the *Politicus*, directed not against persons, but against general errors to which human reason is naturally liable, and rising from a merely ethical to a metaphysical point of view.

There is greater force in the argument that the latest works might be expected to be more didactic than the earlier. But according to this standard the *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and *Politicus* are found to be later than the *Republic*, because in them the leader of the conversation proceeds with less regard for the diverging opinions of his hearers than is shown by the Socrates of the *Republic* for the objections of Adeimantus and Glaucon, or by the Socrates of the *Phaedo* for those of Simmias and Cebes. Schleiermacher, while believing that Plato already during Socrates' lifetime developed his theory of ideas so far as it is shown in the *Phaedrus*, was guilty of a curious inconsistency in maintaining a Socratic stage of Plato's philosophy. He reckoned as monuments of this Socratic stage precisely those dialogues which have been also by all later historians called Socratic: the *Protagoras*, *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Lysis*, as well as the *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, and *Crito*.

Ast exaggerates the fundamental inconsequence of Schleiermacher.

This inconsequence of Schleiermacher was noticed by Ast [75] (1816), who simplified the problem by proclaiming as spurious all merely Socratic dialogues except the *Protagoras*. He followed Schleiermacher in his worst error as to the date of the *Phaedrus*, while he wrongly dissented from him as to the date of the *Gorgias* and *Phaedo*, which he believed with Tennemann to have been written about the time of Socrates' death.

In order to sustain the high opinion of Plato's great literary power, Ast denied the authenticity of twenty-one dialogues attributed to Plato, amounting to more than two-fifths of the matter bearing Plato's name. This was the final consequence of seeking in Plato's works an harmonious whole, without recognising that even the

[75] Friedrich Ast, *Platons Leben und Schriften*, Leipzig 1816.

greatest writer must undergo a certain mental development, and may not have continued to think at eighty what he thought at twenty.

First attempt of genetic explication by Socher.

The view of a gradual evolution of Plato's thought was proclaimed by J. Socher [76] some years after the completion of Ast's work. Socher (1820) did not pretend to fix the date of each dialogue; he only attempted to distinguish four successive stages of Plato's thought. He did not venture to impugn the authority of Tennemann, Schleiermacher, and Ast by attributing the *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and *Politicus* to Plato's old age; but, perceiving the difference between these dialogues and others that were probably written soon after Socrates' death, he denied their authenticity, at the same time re-affirming the authenticity of a dozen other dialogues which had been held to be spurious by Ast. As to the chief dialogues, whose authenticity was unquestioned, Socher agrees with Ast, Schleiermacher, and Tennemann in placing the *Republic* after the *Philebus* and immediately before the *Timaeus* and *Critias*; but he differs from them in so far as he believes the *Protagoras* to have been written after the death of Socrates, and he returns, against Schleiermacher and Ast, to Tennemann's opinion in favour of a later date for the *Phaedrus*. These results of the first attempt to treat Plato psychologically are not to be despised if we take into account that the date of the *Phaedrus* is of the greatest importance, and that critics are still found who maintain that 'youthfulness' of this dialogue, so confidently affirmed by Schleiermacher.

developed by Stallbaum.

This fancied youthfulness of the *Phaedrus* was, however, also opposed by Stallbaum, who spent his life in an original study of Plato. Stallbaum [77] followed Tennemann in putting the *Euthydemus*, *Protagoras*,

[76] J. Socher, *Ueber Platons Schriften*, München 1820.

[77] *Platonis dialogos selectos rec. G. Stallbaum*, vol. i., Gothae et Erfordiae 1827. See also the introductions to the single dialogues frequently edited by Stallbaum.

Cratylus, *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Lysis* before the death of Socrates, the *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito* about 399, the *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Parmenides* between the death of Socrates and the founding of the Academy, the *Republic* very late, immediately preceding the *Timaeus*. Against Tennemann and Ast he accepted Schleiermacher's view that the *Phaedo* and *Philebus* were written after the *Banquet*.

H. Ritter.

A like eclectic method was followed by H. Ritter [78] (1838), in whose opinion the *Phaedrus* and *Protagoras* were the earliest works of Plato, and therefore older than the *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo*. He dissented from Schleiermacher chiefly in placing the *Parmenides* after Socrates' death, and the *Phaedo* and *Philebus* before the *Banquet*.

Hermann established the Socratic stage of Plato's philosophy,

A fresh start in the study of the chronology and authenticity of the Platonic Canon was made by K. F. Hermann [79] (1839), who tried to find in Plato's genuine dialogues a steady progress at once with respect to philosophical contents and to literary perfection. His method, very different from the method of Schleiermacher and Ast, led him to results which, in some particulars, corrected the most glaring errors of his predecessors. The imperfection of some lesser works, which had been declared by Ast to be spurious and unworthy of Plato, was explained by Hermann's admission that the genius of Plato could not reach its full height in the first years of his literary activity. Hermann succeeded in demonstrating to every unprejudiced reader the absurdity of ascribing such masterpieces as the *Phaedrus* and the *Parmenides* to a young Athenian of about twenty-five years of age, who even at thirty could do no better than the *Euthyphro*, the *Apology*, and the *Crito*. Hermann ascribed to Plato's

[78] H. Ritter, *Geschichte der Philosophie alter Zeit*, Hamburg 1836–1838, vol. ii. pp. 159–522, on Plato.

[79] K. F. Hermann, *Geschichte und System der platonischen Philosophie*, Heidelberg 1839, only vol. i. published.

preliminary stage some small dialogues, such as the *Hippias minor*, *Io*, *Alcibiades I.*, which Schleiermacher suspected to have been written by Plato's pupils. He added to these the *Charmides*, *Lysis*, *Laches*, *Protagoras*, which Schleiermacher had also placed before the death of Socrates. The *Euthydemus*, *Meno*, and *Gorgias*, placed by Schleiermacher near the *Theaetetus*, were thought by Hermann to belong to the time of the *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Euthyphro*. But in this he betrayed inconsistency, because these dialogues are in all respects riper in thought than the trilogy on the death of Socrates.

but he agrees with Stallbaum and with Schleiermacher as to the dialectic dialogues, and as to all dialogues later than the *Banquet*.

The second period, according to Hermann, produced the *Cratylus*, the *Theaetetus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Politicus*, also the *Parmenides*, and following these after a short interval came the *Phaedrus* and the *Menexenus*. Hermann and Schleiermacher agreed as to the chronology of all the dialogues that were held by them to be later than the *Banquet*, viz. the *Phaedo*, *Philebus*, *Republic*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and *Laws*. It passed almost unnoticed that Hermann's view as to the order of Platonic dialogues did not differ essentially from Stallbaum's; at least, as regards the chief works of Plato, beginning with the *Theaetetus*, they agree completely; and this coincidence is the more remarkable since the *Theaetetus* and the twelve dialogues which, according to Stallbaum and Hermann, are later (the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Parmenides*, *Phaedrus*, *Menexenus*, *Banquet*, *Phaedo*, *Philebus*, *Republic*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Laws*), form over seven-tenths of the volume of the twenty-eight dialogues which Hermann held to be authentic. Hence we may regard the chief common results of Hermann and Stallbaum as the best obtainable by their method.

The common stock of Schleiermacher,

Their partial agreement with Schleiermacher, and even with Ast and Socher, gives them an appearance of scientific objectivity which commands rational assent. On the other side, as later investigations have shown, all these

Stallbaum, and Hermann based on an error: the so-called Megaric period in Plato's life.

authors are wrong in the most important point, namely in their assumption that Plato wrote, or began to write, in Megara soon after the death of Socrates, his trilogy consisting of the *Theaetetus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Politicus*.

If we inquire into the origin of this error we shall understand why the method of Hermann, as well as that of his predecessors, was insufficient, notwithstanding the more plausible nature of the assumptions on which it was based. The advance made by Hermann consists in his having recognised the impossibility of reckoning the *Phaedrus* and the *Parmenides* among the 'Socratic' dialogues. But the old error of placing the dialectical trilogy soon after the death of Socrates is shared by Hermann with all his predecessors.

First origin of this old error.

It is interesting to observe how this error originated and grew in strength until it seemed almost an acknowledged certainty. It already appears in the old tetralogic order of the dialogues, which is retained in nearly all manuscripts of Plato's text, and was probably due to Plato's first successors. According to this order, the *Theaetetus* trilogy is paired with an evidently early dialogue, the *Cratylus*, and placed immediately after the first tetralogy which contains the details of the death of Socrates. We know nothing of the reasons which led to this order, and probably the editor who first arranged Plato's dialogues in tetralogies was less interested in Platonic chronology than we are now. He may have grouped together those dialogues which, to a superficial judgment, might be considered as treating of the same subject, or were united by Plato himself as continuing one another. From a similar point of view Patrizi placed the *Theaetetus* trilogy before the *Banquet* and *Phaedrus*. Tennemann invented more elaborate reasons for such an early date of these three dialogues. His judgment was determined by the purely external circumstance that at the end of the *Theaetetus* the Platonic Socrates mentions the accusation of Meletus. Thence Tennemann infers

Patrizi gives no reasons.

Tennemann identifies too much

that this dialogue, since it seems to record one of the last days of Socrates' life, must have been written shortly after his death. It is the same fallacy which led him to assign an early date to the *Phaedo*. Such an argument is built on a simple possibility which is not even a probability. It has been often repeated since Tennemann by those who identify the Platonic Socrates with the historic Socrates, and take Plato's poetical fiction for literal truth. Like Patrizi, they look upon Plato as a man whose merit lay in writing down what he had heard from Socrates. The absurdity of such a view becomes evident to any one who impartially compares Xenophon's *Memorabilia* with Plato's dialogues. Tennemann himself felt that a mention of Socrates' accusation at the end of a dialogue afforded no ground for chronological inferences as to the date of the composition of that dialogue, and he cautiously added another supposition, that Plato wrote the *Theaetetus*, 'perhaps at the time when he dwelt with Euclides at Megara.'

the Platonic Socrates with the historic Socrates.

Now, the fact of a residence of Plato in Megara is by no means certain, and Tennemann's belief in it was based on no valid historical testimony. He quotes Diogenes Laertius as his authority. This author says: (II. 106) *πρὸς τοῦτόν* (sc. Euclides of Megara) *φησιν ὁ Ἑρμόδωρος ἀφικέσθαι Πλάτωνα καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς φιλοσόφους μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Σωκράτους τελευτήν, δείσαντας τὴν ὠμότητα τῶν τυράννων*. Elsewhere he states the same thing in fewer words: *γενόμενος ὀκτὼ καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν εἰς Μέγαρα πρὸς Εὐκλείδην σὺν καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶ Σωκρατικοῖς ὑπεχώρησεν* (III. 6). Obviously Hermodorus was of opinion that, at the time when some pupils of Socrates, fearing a fate like their master's, fled to Euclides in Megara, Plato joined them. This is given, not as an unquestioned fact, but as an opinion of Hermodorus. Were we sure that this Hermodorus was that same whom Cicero and Suidas mention as Plato's pupil who spread his writings through Sicily, this witness would be discredited by his ignorance

Diogenes Laertius as authority.

Interpretation of the alleged testimony.

of well-known facts. For it was not the 'tyrants' whom Plato had to dread, but the democracy as revived after the expulsion of the Thirty. On authority so shadowy we need not believe that the author of the *Crito* thus fled to another city as fearing the anger of the mob. Even were the fact so far admitted, it would not follow that his sojourn at Megara was long enough for the composition of three dialogues in which so much of his cardinal thinking is condensed. But at the outset the story is suspicious, because of the mention of the tyrants and of an improbable danger. If others had to fear anything, this was less probable of Plato, as nephew of Critias, and belonging to an influential family. And Plato's flight to Megara is contradicted by a witness perfectly trustworthy in such things, and quite competent as to the history of Plato's life. Cicero (*De rep.* I. x. 16) says 'audisse te credo Platonem Socrate mortuo primum in Aegyptum discendi causa, post in Italiam et in Siciliam contendisse ut Pythagorae inventa perdisceret.'

Plato had no necessity to go to Megara or to remain there.

The silence of Cicero.

In this passage Cicero enumerates all the travels of Plato, and there was no reason for omitting his journey to Megara, had he known of it, or had he thought of Euclides as one who had influenced the philosophy of Plato. If Cicero quotes Egypt as the first place whereto Plato travelled after the death of Socrates, then we may assume that Cicero at least knew nothing of that Megaric period in Plato's life which is to-day generally admitted on the authority of a witness much less trustworthy than Cicero. Again, far from suggesting that Plato was indebted to Megaric influence, Cicero says that the Megaric school owes much to Plato (*Academica* II. 42 § 129).

Cicero's testimony

The trustworthiness of Cicero has been frequently questioned in matters of philosophy, and no great importance attaches to his testimony in a question of Platonic doctrine. But in matters of fact, recent investigations have shown more clearly than ever that

Cicero's judgment as to the date of the *Phaedrus* was sounder than Schleiermacher's and Ast's. He was interested in Plato's life, he had visited the Academy; and in a passage where he clearly intends to convey the impression that change of place and study are important to the philosopher, he could not have left unmentioned the Megaric period of Plato's life, had he heard anything of it, and had this Megaric period been of such importance in Plato's life as Tennemann thought. Megara is, according to our present notions of distance, very near Athens, but we must not forget that it belonged to another republic, sometimes at war with the Athenians, and could only be approached from Attica by sea or by a mountainous road. Plato's journey thither should have been included in the enumeration of Cicero, especially if, as Ast supposes, it led to a residence of several years. Cicero often alludes to Plato's travels and Plato's teachers; he never mentions Euclides among the latter, nor Plato's emigration to Megara after Socrates' death. Arguments from silence have been frequently abused; but, in this particular case, the silence of Cicero, and his unvarying omission of Megara when speaking of Plato's voyages, is surely significant. It would prove nothing had Cicero not indicated Egypt as the first place to which Plato travelled after his master's death. This circumstance confirms the presumption raised by the weakness of the evidence on which Tennemann's acceptance of Plato's residence in Megara is founded.

as to the date of the *Phaedrus* has been so well confirmed, that we can believe him trustworthy as to facts of Plato's life.

Tennemann was cautious; he introduced his supposition with a 'perhaps.' This 'perhaps' has been dropped by Schleiermacher without producing any new argument in favour of the probability of a residence of Plato in Megara (p. 20, part 2, vol. i.). Schleiermacher speaks of Plato's flight ('Flucht,' p. 103, part 1, vol. ii.) to Megara as a well-established fact, without even the formality of quoting Diogenes Laertius. But he shows moderation in so far as he limits Plato's literary production

How the myth of the Megaric period grew, and became a tradition by mere repetition.

in Megara to the *Parmenides*, leaving the *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Politicus* for a later time. He thus deprives the story of the plausibility which it might otherwise receive from the preface to the *Theaetetus*. Ast, on the other hand, boldly declares that the *Theaetetus* was 'undoubtedly' written in Megara (p. 185), and this notwithstanding his admission that the mention of the Corinthian war (*Theaetetus* 142 A) refers to a date seven or eight years later than the death of Socrates. Hence Ast accepts as an historical fact that Plato lived at Megara for seven or eight years, and is unaware that even the presence of Plato in Megara shortly after 399 is uncertain. For him it is decisive that the introductory conversation between Euclides and Terpsion is represented by Plato as occurring in Megara. He seems to believe that a dialogue alleged to take place in Megara must have been written there, as if Plato had need to reside in Phlius in order to write the *Phaedo*, or in Crete while he wrote the *Laws*. And he does not limit this special connection with Megara to the *Theaetetus*; he extends it to the *Sophist* and *Politicus* (p. 234) which, according to him, are really, as they profess to be, mere continuations of the *Theaetetus*. He does not go so far as to say that the *Politicus* was also undoubtedly written in Megara, but he sees in the dialectic of this dialogue a Megaric influence.

Stallbaum popularised it in his edition.

Stallbaum also admitted without hesitation that Plato lived at Megara after the death of Socrates, that Euclides had a great influence on his theory of ideas, and that the plan of the *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Parmenides* was sketched during Plato's residence in Megara. In his introduction to the *Theaetetus*[80] Stallbaum feels bound to give reasons for this view, but his reasons add nothing to the feeble arguments of Ast and Schleiermacher. We

[80] *Platonis Theaetetus*, rec. G. Stallbaum, Gothae et Erfordiae 1839, Prolegomena, p. 8: '*Theaeteti*, *Sophistae* et *Parmenidis* scribendi consilium subnatum esse videtur, quo tempore Megaris sit commoratus.'

observe here the birth and growth of one of these myths, which, like tales of the sea-serpent, are repeated because nobody takes the trouble to examine their source. Plato, according to Stallbaum, had no reason for introducing Euclides in the *Theaetetus*, and for representing the dialogue as having been held at Megara, apart from his personal residence in Megara.

After Stallbaum the myth of a Megaric period in Plato's life, and of the Megaric influence in the *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus* became generally received, though nobody found the smallest evidence on its behalf. H. Ritter, in his *History of Philosophy*, accepts the legend as a matter of course. Hermann (p. 52) quotes Cicero as the 'oldest witness' to Plato's travels; but he does not notice the omission of Megara among the places mentioned by him, and he relies, like his predecessors, on Diogenes Laertius as to the asserted residence in Megara. Hermann has no other authority to quote in favour of Plato's residence at Megara than the above passages from Diogenes Laertius; still, he believes (p. 490) that the time spent by Plato in Megara was one of the 'most important periods' in the philosopher's life: as it would be, had he produced there such considerable works.

Hermann did not even discuss any possible doubts.

If we ask how these eminent students of Plato could invent facts and give them out for a part of the history of Plato's life, we recognise the same proceeding which led Bekker and Stallbaum to some alterations of Plato's text. These editors, if a passage was obscure, and if they found in some manuscript a more plausible reading, did not ask very much about the origin of that manuscript: they corrected the text, in the belief that Plato could never have written otherwise than according to the most ingenious suggestions of one of his copyists. Only with the Zurich edition a new method of editing Plato's text was first proposed, and it was developed by Hermann and Schanz. According to this method,

Analogy between old method of dealing with texts and the esthetical considerations reigning in the biographical mythology.

the chief point is to know which among the many manuscripts are really trustworthy, and the most obscure reading of a trustworthy manuscript, if it has some meaning, is preferred to the most elegant and plausible reading of an untrustworthy manuscript, even if this last reading gave Plato credit for more artistic skill than the first. This progress in editing Plato's text, to which Hermann contributed in a very important degree, was not extended by him to the method of writing Plato's life and the history of his works. Here he continued to prefer ingenious hypothesis to careful weighing of the evidence. It was an ingenious hypothesis to explain some of the most original works of Plato by the Megaric influence. The truth, that these original works—so different from everything Plato had written—were a product of a radical change of opinion in the philosopher's old age, was not so ingenious and did not agree with the boundless admiration professed for Plato's perfection.

Truth about dialectical dialogues was esthetically unpleasant.

The theory of ideas, as professed in the *Republic*, was poetically beautiful. It was united to Plato's name all over the world, even by those who only knew of Plato that he had imagined a theory of ideas. It gave a better esthetic impression to say that those dialogues, in which, instead of poetical ideas, we find only abstract notions of pure reason, were a preparatory introduction to the *Republic* than to admit that they were written after the *Republic*, and that they condemned the most popular of Platonic theories, almost Platonism itself. Thus all the above writers from Tennemann to Hermann were led by an esthetic desire to have an harmonious representation of Plato's life, just as earlier editors of Plato's text were anxious rather to read the best and most beautiful text that Plato might have written than the text most probably written by Plato. They thought that any representation of Plato's development, based on whatever ancient evidence, was likely to be true if it agreed with the leading hypothesis which was their starting point. The leading hypothesis

The aim of an harmonious conception of Plato's life originated the error.

for Schleiermacher was a systematic interdependence of all works of Plato, each preparing for the next and prepared by the preceding. For Ast it was the esthetical perfection which Plato, according to him, sought above everything and could always produce. For Hermann it was the author's development from Socratism to the Platonism of the *Republic*. The superficial connection of the *Republic* with the *Timaeus* made the *Republic* appear as a sample of Plato's most mature thought, and every dialogue of different tendency had to be placed earlier.

Logical dealing with testimonies different.

If we wish to know what Plato really was and how he became what he was, we must get rid of esthetical prejudice, and look only at the evidential value of the testimonies we are dealing with. We must know all the facts and distinguish them from personal opinions on those facts. Plato's residence in Megara is not a fact. It is a myth, founded upon a most uncertain tradition, that some of Socrates' disciples fled to Megara after the Master's death. This tradition reaches us through a single witness, and is nowhere confirmed by other witnesses whom we might expect to know it. It is contradictory to what we know of Plato's personal character from his own writings. If we have recourse to hypothetical argument, the hypothesis that a philosopher like Plato acted according to his philosophical principles is much more probable than the hypothesis that Hermodorus was right in accusing Plato of cowardice. On the other hand there is no reason whatever for building upon the testimony of a single untrustworthy witness a theory as to the Megaric influence on Plato's life.

Both Hermann and Schleiermacher were more estheticists than logicians.

Hermann himself recognises (p. 106, note 82) that the above quoted passages from Diogenes Laertius are the only source of the tradition of Plato's emigration to Megara, and he adds with the greatest simplicity that these passages betray such a want of knowledge about Plato that they deserve no confidence as to the date of the journey to Megara. He means that this may have

occurred some years later. But if he does not trust his only authority as to the date of this removal, why trust it as to the place whither Plato first travelled after leaving Athens? Manifestly he selects the testimonies, not according to their historical value, but according to the esthetical impression they produced on him. He liked the idea that the dialectical dialogues were inspired by the Megarics; he disliked esthetically the idea that these dialogues were the result of a change of opinion in Plato after his artistic masterpiece, the *Republic*.

Their followers.

Brandis[81] (1844) and Ribbing[82] followed Schleiermacher, with the difference that they put the *Parmenides* after Socrates' death. Hermann was followed with slight differences by Schwegler,[83] Steinhart,[84] Michelis,[85] and Mistriotes.[86]

Strange merit of Suckow

Suckow[87] (1855) wrote under a misleading title a large commentary on the *Phaedrus*, preceded by a dissertation on the authenticity of other dialogues. This work, though written under the influence of a strange prejudice, which led the author to reject the authenticity of such important works as the *Politicus*, *Critias*, and *Laws*, contains a curious exemplification of the truth, that a wrong method may sometimes lead to correct results. Suckow, being unable to understand that no author can bind himself for

[81] Brandis, *Handbuch der Geschichte der griechisch-römischen Philosophie*, Berlin 1835–1866. In vol. ii. Berlin 1844, pp. 134-570, on Plato.

[82] S. Ribbing, *Genetisk framställning af Platons ideelära*, Upsala 1858, translated into German: *Genetische Darstellung der Platonischen Ideenlehre*, Leipzig 1863–1864.

[83] A. Schwegler, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, Stuttgart 1848; *Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, Tübingen 1859.

[84] *Platons sämmtliche Werke*, übers. von H. Müller, mit Einleitungen begleitet von Karl Steinhart, Leipzig 1850–1866, 8 vols.

[85] F. Michelis, *Die Philosophie Platons in ihrer inneren Beziehung zur geoffenbarten Wahrheit*, Münster 1859.

[86] Πλατωνικοὶ διάλογοι, ἐκδιδόμενοι κατ' ἐκλογὴν ὑπὸ Γεωργίου Μιστριώτου, ἐν Ἀθήναις 1872.

[87] G. F. W. Suckow, *Die wissenschaftliche und künstlerische Form der platonischen Schriften*, Berlin 1855; of the same author: *De Platonis Parmenide*, Vratislaviae 1823 (against the authenticity).

life by rules which he has laid down in one of his works, believed that Plato, after having placed in the *Phaedrus* the philosopher above the lawgiver, could never degrade himself to writing the *Laws*; he took as a sign of authenticity such a superficial distinction as the number of chief parts and their subdivisions, believing that Plato would write all his life and on all subjects according to the same formal plans. He sought the key of our problem of the order of the Platonic writings in a fragment of the old 'Introduction to Plato' by Albinus, who advised the reader to begin with the *Alcibiades* and *Phaedrus*. After such tiresome rubbish, extended over more than 500 pages, Suckow suddenly gives in a few words his opinion on the order of Plato's dialogues, according to which Plato's aim was to give an ideal biography of Socrates; and we learn that he considered the following order as the most probable: *Parmenides*, *Protagoras*, *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, *Republic*, *Timaeus*, *Philebus*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Apology*, and *Phaedo*. This order, radically different from anything proposed before, implies the first positive recognition of an important truth, unknown to all previous inquirers, namely that the *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Philebus* are later than the *Republic*. Unhappily, Suckow did not fulfil his promise of giving ampler reasons for this opinion. Judging from his book, and from a small dissertation on the *Parmenides* written by him thirty-two years before (1823), he was unable to give good reasons and consistent arguments; but, at all events, we must recognise his merit in proclaiming for the first time, amidst a heap of errors, a truth of the greatest importance for the understanding of Plato's philosophy. He quotes Morgenstern and Tchórzewski, who advocated an early date of the *Republic* on account of its supposed relation to the *Ecclesiazusae* of Aristophanes.[88]

contrasted with his want of judgment.

The order proposed by Suckow was substantially the

Munk gives no

[88] C. Morgenstern, *De Platonis Republica*, Halis Saxonum 1794; Tchórzewski, *De Politia Timaeo et Critia*, Kasan 1847.

satisfactory reasons for his admission of the late date of the dialectical dialogues.

same as that which shortly afterwards was sustained by Munk,[89] with the difference that Munk extended it to a greater number of dialogues, adding after the *Protagoras*: *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Gorgias*, *Ion*, *Hippias*, *Cratylus*, *Euthydemus*; after the *Timaeus*: *Critias* and *Meno*; after the *Sophist*: the *Politicus* and *Euthyphro*; after the *Apology*: the *Crito*, and putting the *Philebus* immediately before the *Republic*, while Suckow had placed this dialogue after the *Republic* and *Timaeus*. Munk was less reticent than Suckow as to the reasons which decided him to adopt an order so very different from the conclusions which were common to Schleiermacher and Hermann. He argued that Plato's chief aim in writing his dialogues was to give an extensive biography of Socrates, so that each dialogue had its place assigned according to the apparent age of Socrates at the supposed date of the dialogue. The *Theaetetus*, from this point of view, should be later than the *Republic*, chiefly because in this dialogue Socrates is represented as older than in the *Republic*. On this ground Munk was obliged to look upon the *Phaedo* as the last work of Plato for the mere reason that it represented the death of Socrates. It may be remembered that for the same reason it has been affirmed to be his earliest work.

Such conclusions illustrate the uselessness of all generalisations, leading to a fictitious solution of the problem of Platonic chronology by a single ingenious hypothesis. The true genetic method should include a careful study of detail, with many parallel comparisons between every dialogue and those immediately preceding or immediately following. Such a painstaking inquiry, without prejudice, without a general formula for the whole of Plato's literary activity, was first attempted by Susemihl in a work[54] which deserves very great consideration for its method, though it did not avoid some old errors.

Susemihl first attempted to free himself from

[89] E. Munk, *Die natürliche Ordnung der platonischen Schriften*, Berlin 1856.

Susemihl (I. 286, 477) recognised that the testimony of Diogenes Laertius about a retreat of Plato to Megara immediately after the death of Socrates was of no value, though he still retained, on no better evidence, the tradition of a Megaric period, coinciding with the composition of the *Euthydemus* and *Cratylus*. But he does not show such confidence as Hermann, and he admits that the *Sophist* and *Politicus* were written at least a dozen years after Socrates' death, though before the *Banquet* and *Republic*.

esthetical prejudice as to the order of Plato's dialogues,

The order of those dialogues supposed to be later than the *Banquet* was the same for Susemihl as it had been for Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and Hermann. But he came nearer to the truth than his predecessors as to the place of the *Phaedrus*, which he puts next to the *Theaetetus*, an arrangement which has been confirmed by many later investigations. He accepted Hermann's view that the *Parmenides* followed the *Politicus*, and Schleiermacher's as to the connection of the *Euthydemus* with the *Cratylus*. He differs from both by assuming (with Socher and Stallbaum) a very early date for the *Meno*, which he supposed to have been written before the death of Socrates.

but he still agrees in many points with Hermann.

Though the question of the chronology of Plato's writings had been raised by an historian of philosophy (Tennemann), and for the sake of a philosophical understanding of Plato's theories, we see from the above survey of subsequent writers on that subject, that up to 1860 it was a problem dealt with chiefly by philologers, and, according to philological traditions, from a philological-esthetic point of view. Though Schleiermacher, chiefly a theologian, enjoys in Germany a certain philosophical reputation, he approached our problem as a translator of Plato's works, and translation is a philological business. Stallbaum, Hermann, Susemihl gave their lives mostly to philological work; even Ast, though he published some philosophical handbooks, cannot be called a philosopher,

Only Ueberweg gave strong logical reasons for the late date of the dialectical dialogues,

and the few philosophers who wrote about Platonic chronology in the first half of the nineteenth century generally accepted without criticism the verdict of one or other of the philologers. Now it happened for the first time about 1860 that a philosopher, who was chiefly a logician, set himself to investigate the question of the order of Plato's dialogues. The opportunity for this had been given by the Academy of Sciences of Vienna, which offered a prize for a new investigation as to the authenticity and chronology of Plato's works. The prize was awarded to Friedrich Ueberweg, then a teacher of philosophy in the University of Bonn, and author of a *Logic* later known throughout the philosophical world, as well as his next handbook on the *History of Philosophy*. This was the first attempt of a logician to understand Plato better than his philological interpreters, and the result has shown ever since that good logical training, and a perfecting of previous methods, are the surest means for attaining real progress in the knowledge of Plato's mental development. Ueberweg did not pretend to give a general theory concerning the order of Plato's works, nor did he take into consideration all these works; but he proceeded with such excellent method that he succeeded for the first time in supporting by valid argument the late date of the *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Politicus*, already affirmed by Suckow and Munk on insufficient grounds. Some years before, in his dissertation on the Soul of the World ('Ueber die platonische Weltseele,' *Rheinisches Museum* 1853, Vol. ix. pp. 37-84), he had incidentally anticipated this opinion (p. 70, note 35); but it is only in his *Untersuchungen über die Echtheit und Zeitfolge Platonischer Schriften*, published at Vienna in 1861, that for the first time we find a strong logical argument in favour of the very late date of the *Sophist*, the *Politicus*, and the *Philebus*, showing their affinity with the *Timaeus* and that form of the Platonic doctrine which is known from Aristotle to be the latest. Besides,

comparing them with the *Timaeus* and Plato's later doctrine as known from Aristotle.

Ueberweg called attention to certain characteristic marks of these dialogues, which make their late appearance probable. A 'younger Socrates' is introduced, whom we know from Aristotle (*Metaphysic*, vii. 1036 b 25) to have been Plato's pupil when Aristotle belonged to the Academy: that is, within twenty years of Plato's death. Also the person of the elder Socrates as represented in the *Sophist* and *Politicus* is very different from the character attributed to him in the *Republic*; he is now no longer the leader of the conversation, but only a witness of the teaching of an unnamed foreigner, the 'Eleatic guest.'

Characteristics of Socrates different in these dialogues from what they were in earlier writings.

This transformation of Socrates is common to the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Parmenides*, with the *Timaeus*, known to be a late work—later, at all events, than the *Republic*. It is shown to be probable on artistic grounds that Plato, when he began to teach a doctrine differing greatly from what he had placed in Socrates' mouth in earlier times, felt it inconvenient to credit Socrates with the new teaching. He chose other persons, named or unnamed: first Parmenides, then an Eleatic Stranger, later Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates, finally the Athenian Stranger in the *Laws*, to represent the author's views. Ueberweg also noticed that the *Sophist* and the *Politicus* resemble the *Timaeus* and the *Laws* in the absence of the dramatic action so characteristic of the *Republic* and earlier dialogues. All these hints taken together constitute a strong plea in favour of the supposition that the *Sophist* and *Politicus* belong to the same period of Plato's life as the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*. The same remark applies to the *Parmenides*, in which Ueberweg also found many indications of a later time, so much so that he believed this dialogue to have been written after Plato's death by one of his pupils. Ueberweg collected many historical indications from Plato's works as well as from other witnesses to show the limits of time within which many dialogues were written. He compared metaphysical, psychological, and ethical theories,

and found in these comparisons a confirmation of the late date of the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, while he had less confidence in assuming a very late date for the *Phaedo*.

Schaarschmidt's doubts and Chaignet's and Grote's confidence reduced by Jowett to a just measure by returning to Schleiermacher's and Hermann's tests.

Ueberweg's doubts as to the authenticity of the *Parmenides* were soon afterwards extended to the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, as well as to many other dialogues, by Schaarschmidt,[90] who left unattacked only nine out of thirty-five works of Plato, while at about the same time Grote,[91] and after him Chaignet,[91] defended the authenticity even of those dialogues which since Schleiermacher have been almost unanimously held for spurious. Jowett[91] reduced these extremes of scepticism on one side and over-confidence on the other to a just measure. Returning to Schleiermacher's verdict as to the authenticity, and rejecting only an insignificant part of the traditional text of Plato, he accepted as authentic all the works of real importance. Though Jowett placed the *Sophist* and *Politicus* after the *Republic* in his translation, and though he refers to them (and in his last edition also to the *Philebus*) as late dialogues, showing upon many occasions their affinity with the *Laws*, he strangely enough protests against every supposition of a change in the fundamental doctrines of Plato, and he invokes against Jackson the authority of Zeller, a position which seems hard to reconcile with his own admission—that the *Sophist* and *Philebus* belong to Plato's old age.

Other philosophers,

After Ueberweg, the philosophical importance of the chronology of Plato's dialogues began to be generally recognised, and we see this problem taken over from the philologers by philosophers. Later on, under Schaar-

[90] C. Schaarschmidt, *Die Sammlung der platonischen Schriften, zur Scheidung der echten von den unechten untersucht*, Bonn 1866. The same scepticism is brought to the last extreme by Krohn, *Der Platonische Staat*, Halle 1876.

[91] G. Grote, *Plato and the other Companions of Sokrates*, London 1865, quoted in the following after the new edition in 4 vols., London 1885. A. E. Chaignet, *La vie et les écrits de Platon*, Paris 1871. B. Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato translated into English*, 5 vols. 3rd ed. Oxford 1892.

schmidt's influence, Ueberweg himself came to doubt the authenticity of the dialectical dialogues. But an Italian philosopher, Felice Tocco,[92] fourteen years after Ueberweg's publication supplemented his arguments in favour of the late date of the *Sophist* and *Philebus*, defending also the authenticity and equally late date of the *Parmenides* on account of the modification of Plato's philosophical doctrines in these dialogues, attributed by Tocco to Pythagorean influence and coinciding with Aristotle's testimony.

as Tocco, Teichmuller, Peipers, continued Ueberweg's work.

Other philosophers became interested in the problem, and sought new arguments by detailed observation, thus dividing the general problem into as many special problems as there are separate works of Plato. Ueberweg's method of fixing what we may know about the date of each dialogue, without prejudging the general plan of all the dialogues, has been developed in an original manner by Teichmüller,[93] who claimed to have been the first to give a clear definition of the literary character of Platonic dialogues. He looked upon them as polemical tracts, and thought that Plato's aim was to ridicule his enemies and to increase the repute of his school. As such literary foes Teichmüller quotes besides Isocrates, in whose relation to Plato Spengel [93] had already seen some indications for Platonic chronology, also Xenophon, Lysias, and even Aristotle. He further sees in Plato's dialogues polemical digressions referring to Antisthenes, Aristophanes, Aristippus, Democritus, and other contemporaries not named by Plato. Many allusions thus conjectured by Teichmüller are of some probability, and his works are a mine of valuable suggestions for the student of Plato. Teichmüller's merit is further enhanced by his rare know-

Teichmüller sees in Plato chiefly a controversialist, but his observations remain valuable independently of his fundamental assumption.

[92] F. Tocco, *Ricerche Platoniche*, Catanzaro 1876, *Del Parmenide, del Sofista e del Filebo*, Firenze 1893, also in vol. ii. pp. 391–469, of the *Studi di Filologia classica*.

[93] Teichmüller, *Literarische Fehden*, Breslau 1881–1884. Spengel, 'Isokrates und Plato,' München 1855, in the *Abh. d. Akad. d. Wissenschaften zu München*, vol. vii. pp. 729–769.

ledge of English, French, and Italian literature on Plato, which had never before been taken so much into consideration by German scholars. And the form of his work makes it still more useful. He has learnt from English writers how indispensable it is to supply the reader with good indices, and his indices make it easy to find at once in his many volumes on Plato what one wants; while it is exceedingly difficult to find a required passage in the volumes of Schleiermacher, Ast, van Heusde, Hermann, Susemihl, and even Ueberweg, none of whom understood the necessity and usefulness of a good alphabetical index in a work containing a mass of various information. In his own country Teichmüller has not been appreciated according to his merits, because he met with a prejudiced critic in Zeller, who reigns as an authority on Plato in Germany. But English, French, and Italian scholars have recognised his great skill and acute judgment, and since his death he has also risen in the opinion of his own countrymen. He was a violent polemical writer himself, and this led him to generalise the polemical digressions found in Plato, and to see in the greatest thinker of humanity a controversialist full of vanity and personal ambition. Such a view of Plato as a general explanation of his literary activity is even more erroneous than the broad assumptions of Schleiermacher and Hermann. But the scattered polemical allusions discovered by Teichmüller lose no importance as chronological indications, even though we admit them to be only of secondary importance in the writer's mind.

He displayed a better knowledge of foreign literature on the subject, and had a very clear form of exposition.

It is significant that Teichmüller, a good logician like Ueberweg, should confirm Ueberweg's conclusions as to the date of the dialectical dialogues. He recognised that the *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and *Politicus* belong to the same epoch as the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*. Some other conclusions of Teichmüller, such as his very late date of the *Gorgias* (375 B.C.) and *Meno* (383 B.C.), are more questionable. Teichmüller dissented from all his predecessors in

From his original point of view Teichmüller gave an independent confir-

his assumption of a very late date for some so-called Socratic dialogues — the *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, *Cratylus*,—which he believed to have been written after the *Theaetetus*. But this opinion, which he advanced chiefly on philological grounds, is less important in its bearing on the question of Plato's philosophical development; while it is of the greatest importance to see how Teichmüller's investigation confirmed Ueberweg's first attempts to prove the late date of the dialectical dialogues.

mation of Ueberweg's conclusions as to the late date of the dialectical dialogues.

Another philosopher who after Teichmüller undertook our problem, Peipers,[94] reached the same conclusions by careful comparison of the ontological theories expressed by Plato. He found that the dialectical dialogues, *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus*, contain an ontological doctrine which can only be explained as a continuation of the standpoint reached in the *Phaedrus* and the *Republic*. Peipers has also succeeded in showing that these dialogues are nearer to the *Laws* than any other writing of Plato, and his argument convinced one of the most competent living investigators of Plato, Susemihl,[55] who publicly acknowledged that he abandoned his former opinions, expressed thirty years earlier, as to the date of the dialectical dialogues. Susemihl's impartiality, which allowed him to make this confession, was compensated by the obstinacy of Zeller, who, in his authoritative work on Plato, in each successive edition maintained the old assumption of a Megaric period to which he referred the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus*, alleging them to have been written before the *Republic*.

Also Peipers came to the same results by his study of Platonic ontology, which convinced Susemihl,

but Zeller and Heinze in the last editions of their histories of philosophy

Also the editor of the later editions of Ueberweg's *History of Greek Philosophy*, M. Heinze, adhered to the old error of Hermann and Schleiermacher, and continued to spread the conviction that the *Sophist* and *Politicus* were written before the *Banquet*. If we take into account that Ueberweg's and Zeller's works on Greek philosophy enjoy up to the present time the greatest

[94] Peipers, *Ontologia Platonica*, Lipsiae 1886.

adhere to the Megaric mythus, as well as Weygoldt and Pfleiderer.

popularity, there will be no exaggeration in saying that Ueberweg's earlier conclusions, which he afterwards abandoned, although confirmed with new arguments by Tocco, Teichmüller, and Peipers, remain almost unknown to general readers of Plato. In a very popular work on Plato, written by Weygoldt, we still find the dialectical dialogues placed before the *Republic*, and the same order occurs[95] in the most recent work of E. Pfleiderer on Socrates and Plato.

While the general reader is thus kept in ignorance of the latest investigations, new detailed inquiries of Bergk, Rohde, Christ, Siebeck, Dümmler

Since Susemihl's conversion, however, many special investigations have fortified Ueberweg's conclusion in favour of a late date for the *Sophist* and *Politicus*. Besides such philological investigations as those of Bergk,[96] Rohde,[97] and Christ,[98] who declared in favour of a very late date for the *Theaetetus* and consequently also for the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, we have in the last ten years a new confirmation, through an investigation by H. Siebeck,[99] author of a history of psychology. Siebeck started from the question whether Plato did not quote his own works, as is frequently done by Aristotle. He observed certain allusions which led him to affirm that Plato not only quotes the *Republic* and the

[95] Weygoldt, *Die platonische Philosophie*, Leipzig 1885; E. Pfleiderer, *Socrates und Plato*, Tübingen 1896. The views of this author have to be specially dealt with in connection with the date of the *Republic*, as he subordinates the whole order of Plato's dialogues to a distinction of some successive stages in the *Republic*, wherein he follows Krohn (see note 90). Pfleiderer's conclusions as to the order of other dialogues are not very distant from Hermann's views, with the difference that Pfleiderer against every probability places the *Euthydemus* after the *Sophist*, and the *Phaedo* before the *Symposium*.

[96] T. Bergk, *Fünf Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie und Astronomie*, Leipzig 1883; *Griechische Literaturgeschichte*, 4er Bd. Berlin 1887.

[97] Rohde, 'Die Abfassungszeit der platonischen *Theätet*' in *Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik*, vol. cxxiii. p. 321, vol. cxxv. p. 80; also in *Philologus*, vol. xlix. p. 2, vol. l. p. 1, vol. li. p. 474 (1890–1892).

[98] W. Christ, 'Platonische Studien,' pp. 453–512 in vol. xvii. of *Abh. der philos. philol. Classe der Königl. bayer. Akad. München*, 1886.

[99] H. Siebeck, *Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen*, Freiburg i. B. 1888.

Politicus in the *Laws*, but that he also in the *Republic* announces a later settling of matters dealt with in the *Sophist* and *Philebus*.

increase the amount of evidence in favour of Ueberweg's opinion.

Also Dümmler,[100] who continued Teichmüller's studies on supposed feuds between Plato and his contemporaries, added to the considerable stock of arguments in favour of a late date of the dialectical dialogues, by a special inquiry into the relations of Plato to Antisthenes, Antiphon, Aristippus, Aristophanes, Aristotle, Empedocles, Euripides, Gorgias, Heraclitus, Hippias, Isocrates, Polycrates, Prodicus, Protagoras, Xenophon, and others.

The necessity of an impartial co-ordination of all detailed investigations has been appreciated by the French *Académie des sciences morales*, but the work of C. Huit awarded a prize does not correspond to the purpose, the author neglecting

Besides these works, which deal with a great number of writings, there are many special dissertations on each dialogue, which constitute, taken together, ample evidence for a definitive solution of the problem of their date. But this literature has grown so much that nobody has attempted to collect all such detailed observations and to give a clear picture of all arguments urged in favour of each hypothesis. We have here specially insisted on the date of the dialectical dialogues because of their exceptional importance for Plato's logic, but on each other work, as the *Republic*, *Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, *Phaedrus*, hundreds of authors have expressed various opinions, generally based only on a very limited knowledge of other investigators. So long as all these separate observations are not summed up, every new writer on this subject runs the risk of repeating discoveries already made, or falling into errors easy to avoid. In these circumstances a new general work on Plato's dialogues, summarising all the separate observations made in this century, becomes indispensable to the progress of further investigations concerning Plato's philosophy. This need has been felt by the French *Académie des Sciences morales et politiques*, a learned society which has awarded many considerable prizes for works on Plato,

[100] Dümmler, *Akademika*, Giessen 1889; *Chronologische Beiträge zu einigen platonischen Dialogen*, Basel 1890.

the problem of chronology.

among which those of Chaignet and Fouillée were not without value. But the last answer to the summons of this Academy, a work in two volumes written by C. Huit under the title *La vie et l'œuvre de Platon*, published in Paris 1893, falls short of the most modest critical requirements, and by no means satisfies its purpose. The author knows so little of the special literature of his subject that he repeats Schaarschmidt's arguments against the authenticity of the most important works of Plato without being aware that these arguments have been often refuted during the last thirty years. He also ignores the steady progress in chronological investigations since Ueberweg, and regards the problem of Platonic chronology as almost insoluble.

Chronology of Plato's works not an insoluble problem, as has been generally thought in France.

Such is not the conviction which results from an impartial survey of what has been already done for our problem. There is a progress in the validity of conclusions, as well as in the method employed from Tennemann to Schleiermacher, from Schleiermacher to Hermann, from Hermann to Susemihl, and from Susemihl to Ueberweg. Besides these inquiries referring to the majority of the works of Plato, there has been real progress also in the special investigations referring to each single dialogue. All these results should be co-ordinated in a general subject index showing all arguments in favour of and against every hypothesis as to the date of each several dialogue. Then only it would be inevitably seen that there is overwhelming evidence in favour of some conclusions and against others.

It is at least easy to prove the late date of the dialectical dialogues.

It is not the purpose of the present work to furnish the reader of Plato with such an extensive index, but chiefly to indicate the agreement of the chief arguments advanced in favour of a late date of the dialectical dialogues, in order to show that the logical science founded by Plato was advanced during his own lifetime by his renewed efforts.

Before we enter upon the task of tracing this logical

development through Plato's works, it is a duty to give the reader some information about a special kind of investigation, subsidiary to the general study of Platonic chronology. We have limited the above review to those authors who sought to establish the order of Plato's dialogues on arguments taken from their contents; because it is our own purpose likewise to compare the contents of a series of Platonic dialogues as to their logical theories. But, admitting all the importance of the contents, we must still contend that the form and style of Plato's writings also give some indications as to their chronological order, and it is useful to compare the conclusions arrived at by both methods. The study of the style of Plato is much more recent than that of Plato's philosophy, but it has led to very important conclusions as to the order of his writings, and it is our duty to consider these conclusions before we venture to represent the origin and growth of Plato's logic.

For this, not only the contents should be compared, but also the style, which has been investigated only in recent times.

CHAPTER III

THE STYLE OF PLATO

Style a mark of the identity of an author independently of the contents of his writings.

If we wish to assure ourselves of the identity of a friend, whose thoughts and actions are familiar to us, the simplest plan is to appreciate his appearance and to verify our impression by the tone of his voice. Could one of our best friends perfectly disguise his voice and his features, it would be difficult to recognise him by the manifestations of his thoughts or by the moral character of his actions. Now the external form of a writer is his style, and it betrays him even when he for some reason may be professing thoughts very different from those which we usually associate with his name.

Great differences of style between one author and another and in the works of the same author.

A thought can be expressed in various ways in the same language; it might even be said that the notion of any one language includes as many languages as there have been original writers in it. This is truer of Greek than of any modern language, and is especially true of Greek prose writing in the fourth century B.C. A student having read and understood all the works of Xenophon might be unable to understand many passages in Plato. Plato's language differs from Xenophon's, though both wrote Attic prose.

That there are peculiarities of style which distinguish a writer among many others is almost self-evident; that the style of some writers has changed in the course of years is a patent fact; yet many objections have been made to stylistic study as a means of settling problems of ascription and chronology. Everybody knows the discussions which this method provoked when applied to

Shakespeare, though, as regards Shakespeare, the difficulty is diminished by the fact that metrical intricacies and the poet's resources are more varied than is the case with prose, even the prose of such a writer as Plato. But it is to be noted on the other hand that Plato's literary activity was continued through a period twice as long as Shakespeare's.

Definition of style difficult, and Plato would have held it to be impossible.

Since most readers think that style is indefinable, they infer that it must afford an insecure basis for scientific reasoning. So Plato thought concerning all physical movements in the universe. According to him, their infinite variety hindered genuine scientific investigation (*Phileb.* 59 A C); they could only be guessed at with some degree of probability (*Tim.* 29 C, 48 D); and such guesses constituted 'a pleasure not to be repented of, and a wise and moderate pastime' (*Tim.* 59 D: *ἀμεταμέλητον ἡδονὴν . . μέτριον παιδιὰν καὶ φρόνιμον*), but they did not admit of accurate determination (*Tim.* 68 C D).

But modern methods enable us to deal with many problems beyond the reach of Plato.

This Platonic view of natural science extended also to linguistics (*Crat.* 421 D), and the Master would have smiled at those who count words in his writings. But if the science of modern mechanics, by application of new infinitesimal methods, unknown to Plato, has reached a degree of certainty by which it claims rank as a more exact science than any investigation of the human soul, then we need not allow Plato's linguistic scepticism to keep us from the 'moderate pastime' of investigating his style. If an exact definition be possible of the notes which distinguish Plato's style from the style of other writers, or by which a work written contemporaneously with the *Laws* differs from a work written at the time when Plato founded the Academy, then we may hope to ascertain the true order of Platonic dialogues according to the stylistic variations observed in them.

Identity of hand-

There is no exaggeration in this pretension, since questions of identification are generally settled by purely

writing no more definite than identity of style.

external tests. The identity of handwriting, consisting in many minute signs difficult of definition, is held to be so far ascertainable, that on an expert's decision in such matters a man's life may sometimes depend. The limited number of marks of identity contained in a signature is sufficient to decide its authenticity for all purposes. A banker requires no further security for paying out the deposits left with him under his responsibility. Documents written by a prisoner, despite his denial of their authenticity, may prove his guilt in the eyes of any magistrate.

It consists in a number of peculiarities, among which only those essential need consideration.

If handwriting can be so exactly determined as to afford certainty as to its identity, so also with style, since style is still more personal and characteristic than handwriting. But the definition of style requires a deeper study, because style is not, like handwriting, accessible to the senses. It may be objected that, since style has an almost infinite number of characteristic notes, it cannot be reduced to one fixed formula. The answer is, that a like infinity of characteristics exists in every object of natural science, and that science is possible only through the distinction of essential marks from those which are unessential.

Essential marks of style may be found first by investigation of the vocabulary of an author.

What, then, are the essential marks of style? Individuality of style is developed along two different lines, each of which requires special study. An author uses words as the raw material for the expression of his thoughts, and the choice of words affords him the most obvious opportunity for displaying his individual taste. There are cases when one given word, and no other, expresses a given idea; but this is not the general rule. In most phrases there are words which might easily be changed for others. In every language there are many words which have never been used by some authors, and other words used only once by their inventor. The contrivance of new compounds, and even of entirely new meanings for old and simple words, is of common occurrence in the

This includes his

style of great writers. A knowledge of the words invented by an author and only once used by him is an important factor in determining questions of style and ascription. We need a full index of such words invented by all authors who lived in Plato's time. In comparing them we should probably find that Plato proceeded in some respects differently from others in his new formations. We should be led to observe what methods of composition were used by him in each of his works. We should be enabled to classify the occasions when he was most inclined to have recourse to such new formations, as, for instance, in employing mathematical, physical, or dialectical terms; and we should remark a difference between the manner of expressing these notions at various epochs of Plato's life, taking as our starting point a few productions undoubtedly written very late, as the *Laws*, and comparing them with other works, as to which there is ample evidence that they date earlier: for example the *Apology*. Nobody doubts that the tenth book of the *Republic* was written after the first book, and many authors agree that it belongs to a much later period. In some cases there is also a general agreement as to the relative date of two dialogues; thus it is certain that Plato wrote the *Politicus* after the *Theaetetus*, the *Timaeus* after the *Republic*, and it is scarcely less certain or less generally admitted that the *Philebus* was written after the *Laches* and *Charmides*. A comparison between such groups would lead to definite conclusions as to the direction taken by Plato in the modifications of his style.

tendency to invent new words or compounds for certain classes of notions.

They vary in various works admitted to have been written at different epochs.

Besides this chapter on new words, we need in Platonic lexicography another chapter on rare words borrowed from poets. It is not usual to introduce into philosophical prose words which have been heretofore used only in poetry. The language of verse always differs from prose language, and the difference is exceptionally manifest if we compare the tragedians with the Attic

Poetical words used by Plato more than by other prose writers.

orators. Plato is known to have used liberally words which before him were peculiar to dramatic poetry, and it is an interesting question to answer, whether this taste be equally prominent in all his works, or be chiefly apparent in some of them.

Use of foreign words.

Words borrowed from a foreign dialect would form a third class of rare words to be classified and enumerated. This classification could be definitely settled only after collecting all the lexicographical evidence, because it would serve no purpose to form classes out of a few chosen examples.

Rare and common words used differently.

In the above three classes we should include first of all such rare words as are used for the expression of some peculiar idea. Their use depends mainly on the thoughts they convey, and is essentially different from that of common words occurring frequently and not generally indispensable in cases where they occur. Among these common words the particles are conspicuous. The new compounds, poetical and foreign words were closely related to the contents of the text; it is not so with particles.

Frequency of each word in Plato not yet investigated.

We are still far from possessing a complete index of the Platonic vocabulary, informing us precisely how often a characteristic word occurs in each dialogue. Assuming that no word used by Plato is missing from Ast's Lexicon[101] and Mitchell's Index,[102] it might be easily ascertained how many different words, and especially how many substantives, verbs, adjectives, etc., he used. But a separate effort would be required to calculate the frequency of each word in each work. Even if we knew the exact number of times each word occurred, there would still remain the special task of calculating the opportunities for its occurrence. Such calculations are needed for but a small part of the vocabulary, because words of rare occurrence in all works form the majority. Ast's

Opportunities for the use of each kind of

[101] F. Ast, *Lexicon Platonicum*, vols. i.-iii. Lipsiae 1835-1836-1838.

[102] T. Mitchell, *Index Graecitatis Platonicae*, 2 vols. Oxonii 1832.

Lexicon contains on 1,975 pages approximatively 10,000 different words used by Plato, while the whole number of words in the text of all the works of Plato amounts roughly to 600,000.[103]

words are not the same.

If each word in Plato's text be used, on an average, sixty times, we might be justified in defining as rare words, words which in all the writings of Plato occur less than sixty times, or on average less than once in twenty pages (ed. Didot). These would form the majority, and a certain natural limit of scarcity would soon be detected, by the absence of certain degrees of recurrence. Suppose for instance that, as appears from some inedited calculations by Tadeusz Miciński, the number of words occurring less than ten times is above 7000, and that x_1 is the number of words occurring between ten and twenty times, generally x_n the number of words occurring between $10n$ and $10(n+1)$ times, then the limit of rare words will be reached when $x_n=0=x_{n+1}=x_{n+2}$ . . . . We should at once observe that there are no words occurring more than m and less than $m+y$ times, and with those occurring $m+y$ times would begin the series of common words up to such words as occur a maximum of times, possibly thousands. Such statistics of Plato's vocabulary would require immense labour. A new *Lexicon Platonicum* with all the above indicated details, in spite of the utmost economy of space, could not occupy less than several volumes like Bonitz's *Index Aristotelicus.*

A limit between rare and common words is given by the average frequency.

Limit of scarcity reached when certain degrees of frequency are missed.

Even this would give us knowledge only of one aspect of Plato's style: its vocabulary. But, as Plato himself observed, we should examine in a speech not only the

Arrangement of words

[103] This number of different words used by Plato has been calculated by Tadeusz Miciński upon the assumption that each 100 entries fills 20 pages of Ast's *Lexicon*, as has been found by counting the entries on 20 pages in twenty-five different parts of the lexicon. The total number of words used by Plato results approximately from the consideration that the text of all the 35 works bearing Plato's name, including the small spurious dialogues and some of doubtful authenticity, fills in Didot's edition only 1245 pages of 54 lines, with 8–11 words in each line.

distinguished already by Plato from their selection. Numerical ratio of the parts of speech intermediate between statistics of frequency and the proper characteristics of arrangement.

choice of words, but also their arrangement (*Phaedr.* 236A). The arrangement of words is more difficult to define than their number. The same thought may be rendered not only by different words but also by a different arrangement of the same words.

One of the characteristics of arrangement is the numerical proportion between verbs, adjectives, substantives, and other kinds of words, because in many cases the same word appears as adjective or verb or substantive; the repetition of a noun can be avoided by a pronoun, and this allows many possible variations. For instance, 'a wise man is unable to become unjust' and 'wisdom forbids injustice' express substantially the same thought, while in the first we have thrice as many adjectives as substantives, and in the second no adjective at all. It is highly probable that Plato did not always preserve the same proportion in the use of various parts of speech. More especially the numerical relations between adjectives and substantives, between substantives and verbs, between these and adverbs, afford very characteristic properties of style, which might enable us to notice similarities or differences between one composition and another.

Inversion very characteristic in Plato's later style, as may be seen from two samples of 500 words in *Protagoras* and *Laws*.

The knowledge of these quantitative relations of every kind of word is intermediate between the lexicographical statistics of the scarcity or frequency of each term and the study of the construction of phrases. Here the immediate object of study would be the relative position of subject and predicate, of nouns and determinatives, adverbs and verbs, which may all occupy the first or the second place. No author follows a uniform practice in this respect, and variation is the rule; but at each period of life an author may show a certain predilection for one or another order in the phrase. Taking only the first five hundred words in the *Laws* and comparing them with the first five hundred words in the *Protagoras*, we may readily see how great are the differences between the two

dialogues as to the use and order of the substantives and the adjectives:

Number of	In *Protagoras*, words 1–500	In *Laws*, words 1–500
Substantives	63	102
Adjectives	13	31
Verbs (including participles) . .	91	79
Adjectives preceding the correlated substantive	7	9
Adjectives following the correlated substantive	0	13

Further calculations required before drawing general conclusions.

If further calculations confirmed these, then it would appear that in his later style Plato used many more substantives and adjectives than in his earlier writings, and that he acquired in old age a predilection for putting the noun before its qualifying words. But in order to draw such conclusions the examination should be extended to all the works of Plato, and should include the position of adverbs before or after the verb, of genitives before or after the noun on which they depend, and of all kinds of words in their mutual interdependence.

Stylistic tests are conclusive if their number be sufficient.

If we observe that the *Philebus* has some hundred peculiarities in common with the *Laws*, and has very few constant characters in common with other dialogues, then we may be justified in ascribing the *Philebus* and the *Laws* to the same epoch of Plato's life, with a certainty scarcely less than that which enables us to recognise that Plato and Demosthenes both wrote Attic prose.

Variety of such tests will be found increasing with the progress of similar inquiries.

But, besides these, there remain some other classes of stylistic peculiarities: the length, construction, and interdependence of phrases; the rhythm produced intentionally or resulting naturally from the order of words selected; the recurrence or exclusion of certain phonetic effects, as, for instance, avoidance of the hiatus or the repetition of syllables with the same vowels or consonants; a preference for certain sounds; the use made of quotations and proverbs; the frequency of

rhetorical figures and tropes; and many other points which would be suggested in the course of such inquiries.

Usefulness of detailed investigations depends upon the importance of the chronology of Plato's writings, and is far greater than that of idle discussion on Plato's philosophy.

Such investigations are useful, inasmuch as they lead us to a better knowledge of the mental development of one of the greatest of all thinkers. Hundreds of German dissertations on Plato contain mere repetitions and vague generalities, of no importance for our knowledge of this philosopher. Had their authors spent the same time in studying some special property of Plato's style, they would have made valuable additions to the positive knowledge of his development. The task of investigating every detail of style seems immense, but the number of persons fit for such work is much greater than the number of those capable of passing judgment on Plato's philosophical doctrine. Any student, with a moderate knowledge of Greek, is made richer for life by a single reading of all Plato's works, and this requires but an hour's study a day during a year. And if in such a reading attention be directed mainly to some special peculiarity of Plato's style, the impression produced by the contents need not be weakened. Each year in all countries hundreds of students dedicate their time to classical philology. If but one in a dozen undertook a study of Plato's style, within ten years our knowledge of Platonic chronology would have progressed more than in these twenty centuries.

Zeller's objections based on insufficient knowledge of the existing stylistic investigations, which are little

Of the foregoing programme of investigation but a very small part has been executed, and this without any systematic common aim. Zeller, criticising chronological conclusions based on stylistic investigations (*Philosophie der Griechen*, II. i. p. 512), objects that the number of characteristics investigated is too small, and that only if it amounted to hundreds could we thence draw inferences as to the chronological order of Plato's dialogues. Of all the investigations made, Zeller quotes only those of Dittenberger, Schanz, Frederking, Gomperz, and Hoefer. He is apparently unaware that besides these authors there

are many others whose study of Plato's style does extend over hundreds of stylistic peculiarities. It is unfortunate that these studies are little known, being chiefly published in school programmes or as university dissertations. The authors, generally unaware of the work of their predecessors, were therefore unable to appreciate the cumulative evidence afforded by the coincidence of results obtained through different methods. A full bibliography of Plato[104] is as necessary and desirable as a complete *Lexicon Platonicum*,[105] and neither is likely to appear very soon, for such works require an amount of material resources which is rarely at the command of Platonic scholars.

known, being usually published in small tracts or in periodicals. No bibliography of Plato exists.

Important contributions to the knowledge of Plato have been buried in introductions to the text of a single dialogue, or in dissertations privately printed for the pur-

A survey and comparison of

[104] The bibliography of Plato is, up to the present time, very incomplete. Besides such general works as those of Ueberweg and Zeller, many indications of older literature are found in: W. S. Teuffel, *Uebersicht der Platonischen Literatur*, Tübingen 1874; J. Vahlen, 'Zur Litteratur des Plato' (*Zeitschrift für Oesterreichische Gymnasien*, 23er Jahrgang, 1872, p. 518); W. Engelmann, *Bibliotheca scriptorum classicorum*, 8th ed. Lipsiae 1880. The current literature is indicated almost exhaustively in the quarterly *Bibliotheca philologica classica*, published since 1873 by S. Calvary in Berlin. For a full Platonic bibliography it would be indispensable to supplement the information contained in these publications by a careful comparison of the catalogues of larger public libraries, and even of smaller university libraries in Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy. Also the numerous antiquarian catalogues issued yearly by many German second-hand booksellers contain titles of some smaller publications not easily found elsewhere. A Platonic bibliography based on all these sources would very much facilitate special investigations, if it contained not only the titles but also a short account of the contents of rare publications. But such a work implies much travelling, because all the materials could nowhere be found together.

[105] The mere cost of reprinting Ast's *Lexicon*, which is now very rare, has been estimated at 700*l.*, and as the work is incomplete, a revision and thorough comparison with the text of the best edition of Plato would be indispensable. The cheapest cost of such a labour has been estimated by Dr. C. Ritter (cf. note 134) at 750*l.*, which raises the expense of a new edition of Ast's work to 1,450*l.*, while the number of buyers for such a work could scarcely exceed a few hundreds. This removes the probability of such a publication being undertaken in the ordinary way.

detailed investigations indispensable as illustration of the above assertions, though it is difficult to make it exhaustive.

pose of obtaining degrees. Many are rarely to be found in circulation or in public libraries, and for this reason writers on Plato often neglect their predecessors. In these circumstances it may be useful to give here a short review of over forty publications referring to Plato's style, and to insist upon the lesson they teach when their conclusions are compared. It is probable that besides these authors others have written on this subject, without being aware of the importance of their investigations. It is common to all these detailed inquiries that, considered separately, they seem inconclusive, while taken together they prepare the way for a complete change of the prevailing views on the matter to which they refer.

First investigations on Plato's style made by Engelhardt of Gdańsk.

I. ENGELHARDT. The merit of priority in considering the question of Plato's style (but without chronological applications) belongs to Friedrich Wilhelm Engelhardt, late director of the gymnasium in Gdańsk (Danzig). He published in the course of thirty years (1834–1864) five dissertations on Plato's style [106] in five school programmes never mentioned in any later work on that subject. His aim was not chronology but grammar, and he undertook in the first three dissertations a very careful study of the examples of anomalous construction in Platonic phraseology. After a long enumeration of all 'anacolutha' found in the works of Plato, he classified these stylistic phenomena, and repeated very carefully for each class the indication of all passages containing an example of that particular construction.

From his work some

From these very interesting tables we can easily gather some indications bearing on the Platonic chrono-

[106] F. G. Engelhardt, *Anacoluthorum Platonicorum specimina*, i. ii. iii. program. Gymnasii Gedanensis 1834, 1838, 1845. The third dissertation contains on pp. 37–46 and 47–48 two indices of the passages enumerated also in the first two. By the same author, also as programme of the same gymnasium in Gdańsk: *De periodorum Platonicarum structura*, dissertatio prima (pp. 1–36), Gedani 1853, dissertatio altera (pp. 1–27), Gedani 1864 (iv–v).

logy. In order not to increase the bulk of our references, we must limit our quotations to those stylistic marks which may be regarded as characteristic of later style, being either limited in their occurrence to the latest dialogues, or at least increasing in their frequency. To exclude characteristics occurring occasionally in earlier dialogues would deprive us of a useful measure of affinity between each of them and the latest group. With a view to clearness of exposition and arrangement we take for granted what will only appear as the ultimate result of our inquiry, namely, that the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and *Laws* form the latest group of Plato's works. This, as will be seen in the course of this exposition, becomes probable beyond reasonable doubt by the totality of stylistic observations, because these six dialogues have hundreds of stylistic peculiarities which occur nowhere else in Plato, and likewise show an increasing frequency of peculiarities which in other dialogues are exceptional. For easy reference the stylistic peculiarities of Plato's later style follow here in the chronologic order of their observation, and are numbered consecutively.* Among the twenty classes of altered construction

peculiarities of later style can be gathered and included in the following list of five hundred peculiarities of Plato's style.

* In the following enumerations the dialogues are quoted in their probable chronological order; the numbers placed after the name of each dialogue indicate the number of occurrences; where no number is given, the occurrences have not been counted. The numbers are printed in different type to show their relative importance. **2**, **3**, &c. mean that a peculiarity is repeated 2 or 3 times in the dialogue named, but is not frequent. *3*, *4*, &c. mean that the same peculiarity, occurring 3 or 4 times, must be looked upon as frequent, in view of the size of the dialogue, if each occurrence is found on average more than once in 12 pages (ed. Didot). Numbers printed thus: **34**, mean that a peculiarity is very frequent, occurring once or more in every two pages. + means a word not used before Plato; (A), a word used by Aristotle; * an ἅπαξ εἰρημένον according to the author from whom the observation is taken. Dialogues of dubious authenticity (*Clitopho*, *Minos*, *Hipparchus*, *Epinomis*, *Theages*, *Hippias Major*, *Alcibiades I.* and *II.*, *Amatores*) or of no logical importance (*Hippias Minor*, *Io*, *Menexenus*, *Lysis*) are omitted in this list. The writings on the style of Plato are numbered consecutively in the notes by small Roman numbers placed after each title: i–xlv.

enumerated by Engelhardt the following characterise the later style:

Changes of construction observed by Engelhardt are specially frequent in the *Laws* and other late dialogues.

1. 'Anacoluthiae genus quod ex symmetriae studio oritur' (*Anacol. Platon. spec.* III. p. 39) is a change of construction produced by Plato's increasing taste for symmetry, and consists in beginning the second part of the phrase in the same manner as the first, as for instance in Phaedr. 233 B: *τοιαῦτα γὰρ ὁ ἔρως ἐπιδείκνυται· δυστυχοῦντας μέν, ἃ μὴ λύπην τοῖς ἄλλοις παρέχει, ἀνιαρὰ ποιεῖ νομίζειν· εὐτυχοῦντας δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ ἡδονῆς ἄξια παρ' ἐκείνων ἐπαίνου ἀναγκάζει τυγχάνειν.* Such changes of construction were observed by Engelhardt in: Gorg. 1 Crat. 2 Phaedo 1; Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1; Soph. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 2 Legg 3.

2. Change of construction in consequence of the more convenient form of the continuation (ex commodiore sequentis structurae forma, p. 39), as, for instance, Euthyd. 281 D: *κινδυνεύει σύμπαντα, ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἔφαμεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, οὐ περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ὅπως αὐτά γε καθ' αὑτὰ πέφυκεν ἀγαθά. . . .* Such anacoluthiæ are found: Meno 1 Euthyd. 1. Symp. 1; Rep. 5; Polit. 1 Phil. 4 Tim. 4 Legg. 4.

3. Two different constructions co-ordinated and dependent on the same enunciation (III. p. 41: anacoluthia fit duabus structuris conjunctis), as for instance, optat. with *ἄν* and infinitive both dependent on *δοκεῖ* in Lach. 184 B, or *ὡς* with genit. partic. and infinitive in Charm. 164 E. Such cases were found: Apol. 1 Charm. 1 Lach. 1 Gorg. 1; Rep. 4; Legg. 9.

4. Anacoluthia ex transitu orationis suspensae in directam vel contra (III. p. 41): Gorg. 1 Symp. 1 Phaedo 4; Rep. 3 Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 2; Soph. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 2.

5. Cases of omitted apodosis are quoted (p. 44) by Engelhardt: Gorg. 2 Symp. 2 Phaedo 2; Rep. 1; Phil. 1 Legg. 8.

Other observations of Engelhardt are not peculiar to later style or do not refer to all the works of Plato.

The other kinds of change of construction enumerated by Engelhardt do not appear to be specially frequent in the latest dialogues. His collections extend over all the works of Plato, and include more than four hundred cases. Being unaware of the chronological application of his work, he perhaps did not attempt a painful completeness of quotations. But even if he collected only those changes of construction which struck his attention in a first reading, we may assume that he had no special reason to notice the actual occurrence of such cases in one work more than in another. His observations are therefore valuable, and they may be accepted as at least approximate.

This author's later investigations on the construction of phrases are limited to the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, so that they afford no matter for comparison. It is interesting, however, to notice that according to Engelhardt co-ordination of phrases prevails in Plato over subordination, and that the principal sentence generally precedes all subordinate clauses. Herein he sees a radical difference between Plato and Demosthenes, who inverted more frequently the natural order. Engelhardt thinks (*Period. Plat.* I. p. 26) that this difference in the order of co-ordinate and subordinate sentences is due to the dialogical character of Plato, as opposed to the rhetorical character of Demosthenes. He would perhaps have been less confident as to the essential difference between the style of Plato and Demosthenes, had he given as much attention to the *Laws* as to the *Republic* and *Phaedo*. It remains an interesting problem to compare the *Laws* and other dialogues as to the construction of phrases, and Engelhardt's classification would be most useful for this purpose.

Other authors of the same epoch are less important.

II. KAYSSLER. Of less importance is a small dissertation by Kayssler[107] (1847) on Platonic terminology. The author accuses Plato of inconsistency in the use of terms, even as defined by himself, and enumerates the terms which he held to be the most important, without any attempt at comparing earlier with later dialogues, or at using the difference in terminology as an instrument of chronological determination.

III.–V. J. BRAUN[108] (1847, 1852) and A. LANGE[109] (1849), quoted by Engelhardt, seem also to have left

[107] Kayssler, *Ueber Plato's philosophische Kunstsprache*, Oppeln (Polish Opole) 1847 (vi). The inexactitude of quotations is seen from the fact that Kayssler affirms p. 13 to have found *συναγωγή* and *διαίρεσις* only in Phaedr. Soph., while they occur also in Theaet. Rep. Phil.

[108] J. Braun, *De hyperbato Platonico* i. ii. progr. gymnas. Culmensis (Chełmno), 1847, 1852 (vii–viii).

[109] A. Lange, *De Constructione periodorum, imprimis Platonis*, Vratislaviae 1849 (ix).

chronology out of the question in their investigations on Plato's phraseology. To the same time belongs the dissertation of F. MICHELIS[110] (1849), which deals more with Plato's views on style and grammar than with any specialities of Plato's own style.

Kopetsch of Łyk published an interesting dissertation on a class of adjectives, among which many have been invented by Plato, but few can be included in this list because Kopetsch's enumeration of passages is incomplete.

VI. KOPETSCH. Some interesting observations are contained in the dissertation of Gustav Kopetsch (1860), teacher in the gymnasium of Łyk.[111] He also had no chronological purpose, but his grammatical aim to collect from Plato's writings every kind of information about the use of adjectives in *τος* and *τέος* gives us an opportunity to select from his enumerations such uses of this class of words as appear to be peculiar to Plato's later style :

6. Adjectives in *τος* composed from a substantive and a verb are very rare. Kopetsch enumerates only (pp. 4 and 19) : Phaedr. 2 (*σφυρήλατος* 236 B, *νυμφόληπτος* 238 D) Tim. 1 (*πυρίκαυτος* 85 C) Critias 1 (*χειροποίητος* 118 C), Legg. 1 (*αἰχμάλωτος* 919 A).

7. Adjectives in *τός*, oxytona, formed from compound verbs (p. 6) : Prot. 2 Meno 3 Phaedo 1 ; Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 ; Polit. 1 Tim. 4 Legg. 3 (*παραιτητός*, *διαβατός*, *ἐκλεκτός*).

8. Superlatives in *τότατος*, beginning with *δυς* or *εὐ* (p. 7) : Phaedo 2 (*δυσελεγκτότατον*, *εὐαρμοστότατον*) Tim. 3 (*δυσαλωτότατον*, *δυσκινητότατον*, *εὐκινητότατον*) Legg. 1 (*δυσμεταχειριστότατον*). Superlatives in *τότατος* of other adjectives occur besides : Apol. 1 Prot. 1 Symp. 3 Rep. 3 Soph. 1 Phil. 3 Tim. 2 (with the preceding Tim. 5).

9. Adjectives in *τος* composed of an adjective and verb : Phaedo 1 (*πολυθρύλητος*) ; Rep. 1 (*πολυθρύλητος*) Phaedr. 1 (*ἰσομέτρητον*) ; Polit. 2 (*ὁλόσχιστος*) Tim. 1 (*νεότμητος*) (p. 19).

Kopetsch quotes many other uses of adjectives in *τος*, but without attempting completeness of quotation except in the above cases of very rare occurrence. Of some hundred adjectives quoted and classified by this author, many might be included in our list, had their

[110] F. Michelis, *De enuntiationis natura, sive de vi quam in grammatica habuit Plato* (pp. 1–68), Doctor's dissertation, Bonn 1849 (x).

[111] G. Kopetsch, *De verbalibus in τος et τέος Platonicis dissertatio, cui intextae sunt breves de Homericis adnotationes*, Lyck 1860, programme of the German Gymnasium in Łyk (xi).

occurrence been completely investigated. This was not the aim of Kopetsch, since he was not aware of any application of his work to Platonic chronology. For his purpose it was sufficient to quote a few characteristic occurrences of each word. A full investigation of the use of adjectives in *τος* and *τέος* in the works of Plato remains a very interesting problem for future special inquiry. Here we quote only two more single words which, according to Kopetsch, as well as Ast, occur but seldom in Plato:

10. *ἀγένητος* (p. 27): Prot. 1; Phaedr. 1; Legg. 1.
11. *μεμπτός* (p. 21): Theaet. 1; Legg. 1.

Schöne recognised the superiority of stylistic tests as means of chronological conclusions, but failed to find the right method of measuring differences of style.

VII. R. SCHÖNE. The first author who insisted energetically on the importance of stylistic observations as leading to chronological conclusions seems to have been R. Schöne[112] (1862) in his dissertation on Plato's *Protagoras*. But he had a very superficial knowledge of Plato and of the means of defining literary style. Schöne, despising enumeration of stylistic characteristics, quotes the authority of art critics, who judge whether a picture has been painted by Raphael or Murillo, without condescending to give special reasons for it, and he wishes to introduce into Platonic chronology such artistic intuitive judgment without the help of reasoned evidence. Still, Schöne is right in his fundamental argument as to the comparative value of style and contents for chronological conclusions. He declares that an author can put in each work such contents as he chooses, while his style will simply be the result of his effort to write as well as he can, if he is so careful about the form of his writings as Plato was. Hence style is the surest measure of the stage of a great writer's evolution. Schöne quotes Lessing and Goethe as competent authorities for such a view on

[112] Richard Schöne, *Ueber Platons Protagoras*, Leipzig 1862 (xii). The author confesses his indebtedness for a great part of his theories to Prof. Weisse's lectures on Plato delivered in 1860-1861 at the University of Leipzig.

the stylistic progress of great writers, and he concludes: 'wir dürfen den Stil als ein schlechthin allgemeines und sicheres Kriterium betrachten, wo es sich um Echtheit und Zeitfolge der platonischen Schriften handelt' (p. 21). But after having thus clearly set forth the importance of stylistic study in determining Platonic chronology, Schöne fails to find a right method for such investigations. He believes an exact analysis of style impossible, ignoring the labours of Engelhardt, Braun, Lange, and Kopetsch; and invokes a mysterious power, the 'feeling of style.'

This 'feeling' led Schöne to see a higher degree of stylistic perfection in narrated conversation than in dramatic dialogue. He inferred that all narrated dialogues—the *Charmides*, *Protagoras*, *Banquet*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Parmenides*—are later than all the works whose form is dramatic. Schöne did not perceive that Plato, after having used the form of narrated dialogues, grew tired of the repetitions which it involves, and returned to the primitive dramatic mode. Had Schöne limited his judgment to the relation between *Protagoras* and the small dramatic works, such as the *Laches*, *Crito*, *Euthyphro*, his observation of the stylistic perfection of a narrated dialogue could not have led him to the absurdity of placing the *Laws* and even *Timaeus* earlier than the *Republic*. Thus he discredited the method which he was the first to propose. He did not understand that for a philosopher contents are more important than form, and that the artistic skill which Plato exercised on his narrated dialogues was peculiar to a time when the deepest problems of thought had not yet absorbed the writer's whole attention and endeavour. Schöne represents Plato as struggling during his maturity for perfection in the form of the philosophical dialogue, after spending earlier years in elaborating philosophical convictions. Thus the *Sophist* and *Philebus* appear to Schöne earlier than the *Protagoras*. He had the merit

and boldness of drawing extreme consequences from his theory, arriving at the untenable conclusion that Plato renounced dialectical aims for the sake of artistic perfection (p. 82).

Martinius knew the right method, but his work remained incomplete, being only a programme deserving the attention of future investigators of Plato's style.

VIII. C. MARTINIUS. What Schöne attempted by a mistaken route has been more successfully carried out as regards a special characteristic of Plato's style by C. Martinius[113] (1866, 1871), who, himself a teacher, began with the conviction that Plato as a teacher must have progressed in the art of interrogating, and that therefore differences in the form of questions might lead to chronological conclusions as to the order of the dialogues. Martinius first collected what Plato himself had said upon the art of asking questions, and then proceeded to classify the interrogations found in Plato's dialogues. Enumerating not less than eighteen different kinds of questions, he invites the reader to continue the inquiry as to the occurrence of each of these in the entire works of Plato, in order to establish the progress made by the philosopher in his practice as a teacher. Martinius himself published, five years after his first effort, a very short summary and continuation,[114] in which he insists on the importance of 'Suggestivfragen,' that is, questions which take for granted something not yet accepted or discussed.

Such questions seek to determine something supposed to be known, while it is really not known, as if a prisoner were asked the time when he committed a crime which he has not admitted. In Plato's dialogues the imputed object is not an action but a knowledge, as, for instance, when (*Phaedr.* 276 A) Socrates asks whether another kind of teaching is not much

[113] C. Martinius, 'Ueber die Fragestellung in den Dialogen Platos,' in the *Zeitschrift für das Gymnasialwesen*, xx^er Jahrgang, Berlin 1866, pp. 97–119, and 497–516 (xiii).

[114] C. Martinius, 'Ueber die Fragestellung in den Dialogen Platos und über eine besondere Eigenthümlichkeit derselben,' *Jahresbericht über das Progymnasium zu Norden*, 1871, 4to., pp. 1–18 (xiv).

better and more powerful, while he had not yet named that other kind and obtained assent as to its existence. Such questions were seen by Martinius (ii. pp. 9–13) in *Gorg.* 486 D, *Rep.* 414 B, 421 C D, *Phaedr.* 276 A, *Theaet.* 158 B, 187 C D, 190 E, *Parm.* 156 D, *Polit.* 278 A, 290 A, 302 B, *Phil.* 38 D E, *Legg.* 646 E, 691 B. We cannot include these quotations in our list of characteristics of later style, because Martinius did not profess to give a complete enumeration but only examples of each kind of questions. He seems not to have continued and completed these investigations, which are remarkable for their method and originality, and might serve as a starting point for anybody who undertook to realise the programme proposed by the ingenious Hanoverian teacher.

The problem of a classification of questions in Plato's dialogues already proposed by Ueberweg.

The problem of defining the differences between various modes of putting a question in Plato's dialogues had been also slightly broached by Ueberweg (*Untersuchungen*, p. 207), who observed that in the *Sophist*, the *Politicus*, and the *Philebus*, as also in the *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Laws*, the play of question and answer becomes more and more conventional and more remote from the tone of natural conversation, approaching to the form of an uninterrupted lecture. The observation of such a peculiarity limited to only six dialogues (*Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg.*) was in so far a very important first step in conscious determination of Plato's later style, since it could not well be attributed to chance.

First attempt of a methodic solution of the problem of Platonic chronology by

IX. LEWIS CAMPBELL. No single characteristic of style, however important, suffices for general conclusions, as the case of Schöne shows. It is edifying to see the great contrast between Schöne's confidence and the modest caution with which stylistic inferences were justified by an author who alone enumerated and compared more characteristics of the style of Plato than all other investigators put together. This contribution to the study of Plato's style, still after thirty years the

most important of all, is contained in the introduction to an edition of the *Sophist* and *Politicus* of Plato by Lewis Campbell, then Professor of Greek in the University of St. Andrews (1867).

means of the study of Plato's style.

Campbell[115] knew none of the authors enumerated above, and he approached the study of Plato's style quite independently, with the special purpose of determining the date of the dialogues which he edited while maintaining their genuineness. He had the original idea of going through Ast's *Lexicon Platonicum* and of finding out what words are peculiar to each dialogue in common with the group of *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Laws*, which are recognised to be the latest works of Plato.

Campbell based his investigation on Ast's *Lexicon*, and had the special purpose of determining the position of the dialogues he edited.

He assumed that a word, for which Ast quotes references only from a few dialogues, does not occur elsewhere. This assumption is probably correct in the great majority of cases, and is quite justifiable in a first general inquiry, though it would be desirable, after collecting such words as Ast quotes only from a few dialogues, to examine the bulk of Plato's text in order to be certain that they occur nowhere else. When Ast prepared his *Lexicon Platonicum*, more than seventy years ago, he could not foresee the importance now attached to precise reference; and for some particles, which have been specially investigated afterwards, and are peculiarly characteristic of Plato's later style (as, for instance, *μήν*), Ast quotes only a small number of the instances remarked by later writers.

In the introduction to an edition of two dialogues, Campbell could not go into so many details as later investigators of Plato's style; he does not quote the single passages in which each word occurs, nor even all the words observed, and he condenses the results of a long and tedious labour into a few pages of dry

[115] *The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato, with a revised text and English notes*, by the Rev. Lewis Campbell, M.A., Professor of Greek in the University of St. Andrews: Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1867 (xv).

enumeration (Introduction, pp. xxv–xxx), which, to be fully appreciated, needs more comments than the author cared to give. His observations are of such novelty, that, giving so many new facts, he left the reader to weigh them and to judge the correctness of the conclusions drawn with admirable sagacity by the author.

His work remained entirely unknown to all later investigators of Plato's style, and he did not insist on the importance of his discoveries.

Such readers as he had did not notice the importance of the evidence collected. Having brought together materials sufficient to prove that the *Sophist* and *Politicus* must have been written in Plato's old age, Campbell concludes with the modest phrase: 'If our hypothesis of the comparatively late origin of these dialogues is correct, the non-appearance of the *Philosopher* coincides with and renders more significant the abandonment of metaphysical inquiry in the *Laws*.' He had laid the first foundations of a new solution of the problem of Platonic chronology. Twenty-two years later, reviewing a German book, which on a much smaller basis proclaimed like results with much greater confidence, Campbell said[116] with equal candour: 'Now, if not before, it is clearly proved that the *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and *Leges*, in this order, or nearly so, form a separate group, and are the latest written . . . inquiries wholly independent of each other have led to this coincidence of result.'

Thus it is necessary to explain his obser-

An author capable of such self-effacement could not impress upon the reader his convictions as definitive truths, and, accordingly, Campbell's investigations remained entirely unnoticed for nigh thirty years.[117] It

[116] *The Classical Review*, February 1889, pp. 28–29, review of C. Ritter, *Untersuchungen über Plato*, by Lewis Campbell.

[117] The first public recognition of the exceptional importance of Campbell's investigations on the style of Plato is contained in the vol. ix. pp. 67–114 of the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* (October 1895) in an article 'Ueber Echtheit Reihenfolge und logische Theorien von Platos drei ersten Tetralogien' and in the *Bulletin de l'Académie des sciences de Cracovie*, October 1895 pp. 268–277, where the Polish work *O pierwszych trzech*

was also not suspected that the introduction to an edition of the text of two isolated dialogues could contain a capital inquiry into the vocabulary of all the works of Plato. Under these circumstances it may be well to recall Campbell's chief observations, the more so as these should be repeated, in order to give them greater exactness than can be afforded by our confidence in the relative completeness of Ast's lexicon.

vations in order to enable others to repeat them.

Assuming, with all competent writers, that the *Laws*, as well as *Timaeus* and *Critias*, belong to Plato's latest period, Campbell sought for peculiarities of style which, being common to these works, are also observed in others. He found the following points in which the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, partly also the *Philebus*, are similar to the *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and *Laws*:

He chiefly sought for peculiarities which denote the similarity of *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus* to *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and *Laws*.

12. The Sophist and Politicus are both the middle pair of an unfinished tetralogy, sketched out in the second dialogue of the series; so are the Timaeus and Critias (Introduction, p. xix). In both tetralogies the plan of the four consecutive dialogues was not indicated in the first of the series. Neither in the Republic is there any hint as to the author's intention of writing the Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates; nor is there in the Theaetetus any clear indication concerning the Sophist, the Politicus, and the Philosopher as an intended continuation. In both tetralogies the fourth dialogue remained unwritten. There is no evidence that Plato ever wrote the Hermocrates announced in the Timaeus, or the Philosopher announced in the Sophist. The first dialogue of both tetralogies is conducted by Socrates, while in the second and third Socrates remains a listener, who merely proposes the subject of conversation at the outset. The idea of planning out four consecutive dialogues as one larger

Analogy between the tetralogy planned in the *Sophist*

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tetralogjach dzieł Platona, by W. Lutosławski, is announced. In France Campbell's discoveries became known only after a lecture delivered on May 16, 1896, in the Institut de France, in Paris, before the Académie des sciences morales et politiques, and published in vol. cxlvi. of the *Compte rendu des séances et travaux de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques*, also apart with an additional preface: W. Lutosławski, *Sur une nouvelle méthode pour déterminer la chronologie des dialogues de Platon*, Paris, H. Welter, 1896. More detailed is the account of Campbell's investigations in the Polish work of the same author, 'O pierwszych trzech tetralogjach dzieł Platona,' published by the Cracow Académie des Sciences in vol. xxvi. pp. 31–195 of the philological memoirs of that society, and also in a separate volume, Cracow 1896.

and that which is sketched in the *Timaeus.*

whole corresponds to the great length of the last work of Plato, the Laws. It is also psychologically plausible that Plato, grown old, had more to say, and said it in an ampler manner. His recognised earliest productions, the so-called Socratic dialogues, are much shorter than the works of his mature age. The most obvious reason which prevented him from finishing the two intended tetralogies is the shortness of life, and this alone would lead us to ascribe the second and third dialogues of these unfinished tetralogies to a later time than both first parts: that is later than the Republic, and later than the Theaetetus. On the other side the Republic and Theaetetus being singled out among all the other works by the circumstance that a continuation to them has been given, it seems probable that this relation of both to later dialogues is due to their relatively late date, because Plato is more likely to have connected his latest works with those preceding them, than with works written very much earlier. If we take into account also that the Laws differ from all earlier dialogues by their volume, and that they may be considered as consisting of at least four parts, we may observe that the late peculiarity of uniting several dialogues into a larger whole extends to **Soph. Polit. Tim. Critias Legg.** (and to a certain degree also to *Rep.* and *Theaet.*)

Socrates is no longer the chief teacher in *Timaeus, Critias, Laws,* nor in the *Sophist* and *Politicus,* and he appears as a pupil of Diotima in the *Symposium,* of Parmenides in the *Parmenides.*

13. The Sophist and Politicus, as well as Timaeus, Critias, Laws, also in some degree the Parmenides and Symposium, are the only works of Plato in which Socrates is not the principal figure in the conversation, and in which other teachers take his place (Introduction, p. xix). While these are named in the Symposium, Parmenides, Timaeus, and Critias, they are but unnamed abstract personalities in Sophist, Politicus, and Laws. The stranger from Elea, the Athenian stranger, are representatives of pure reason and experience, while the Platonic Socrates of other dialogues is generally a concrete personage, with a certain historic idiosyncrasy, although freely adapted to the expression of Plato's theories. The predominance of other teachers over Socrates characterises only seven dialogues: **Soph. Polit. Tim. Critias Legg.** and to a certain degree *Symp.* and *Parm.*

14. The exposition in the latest works is chiefly didactic (Introduction, p. xx), and the Socratic dissimulation of knowledge, still appearing in the Theaetetus, is definitively forgotten. 'The Philosopher guides his pupil by a path familiar to himself to conclusions which he foreknows' (p. xx). 'The speakers are playing at a laborious game (Parm. 137 B) to which they are evidently not unaccustomed, and which proceeds according to certain rules' (p. xxi). With no sudden gust of eloquence as in the Republic or Theaetetus, but with a gravity akin to solemnity, Plato discusses in these works subjects loftier than those proposed at the outset, and displays a fixed conviction of human nothingness.

This refers to: **Parm. Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg.**

The latest seven dialogues have a more pronounced didactic character than all earlier works. We notice in them a methodic proceeding and quotations of earlier works; a special care for form and terminology. Phraseology more elaborate. Inversion frequent. Phonetic effects sought for. Symmetry in the order of words and even in the order of syllables.

15. From the conversational freedom of the Republic we are led to scientific exactness and compression (Introduction, p. xv); there is an air of self-imposed restraint; an appearance of studied order and arrangement becomes manifest also in the occasional reference to earlier dialogues, as in the Soph. 217 C the Parmenides is quoted, in the Soph. 216 A the Theaetetus, in Polit. 284 B the Sophist, in Tim. 17 C the Republic, in the Critias 106 B the Timaeus, and less clearly in the Laws 711 A, 712 A, 739 B C D, the Republic. Also the 'preludes' and 'recapitulations,' disdained in the Phaedrus, are quite as common in the Sophist and Politicus as in the Laws, the Timaeus, and Critias (p. xxiii). This care for form, while the perfection of form wanes, may be best explained by the increasing preoccupation with the philosophical contents, peculiar to the writer's old age. The dry light of reason accompanied the decline of poetical grace and power. A vein of refined and caustic satire succeeds to the simple and playful humour of earlier times (p. xix). This special and evident care for exactness of expression, leading to a fixed terminology, belongs to: **Parm. Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg.**

16. The periods are more elaborate and less regular than in the Republic: (Introduction, p. xxxviii) *Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg.*

17. The natural order of words is more often inverted, and the hyperbaton in the use of particles is specially frequent (p. xxxvii): *Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg.*

18. The monotonous recurrence of a certain rhythmical cadence (Introduction, pp. xx and xl) under the increasing fascination of rhythmical linguistic music: *Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg.*

19. Careful balancing of words so as to relieve the tediousness of a prolonged phrase by the counterposition of noun and epithet, verb and participle, subject and object, and by the alternation of emphatic and unemphatic words (Introduction, p. xli): *Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg.*

20. The adjustment of long and short syllables so as to quicken or retard the movement of the sentence. Sometimes short syllables are accumulated as in choric metres; more often a sentence is concluded with an iambic hemistich, or with a dochmiac, each generally terminating with a dissyllable, which is often divorced from the immediate context (Introduction, p. xlii): *Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg.*

These points

For all these peculiarities Campbell quotes examples which need not be repeated here, because points **16-20**

should be investigated again.

deserve renewed inquiry, as they have not been treated exhaustively.

Avoiding of the hiatus later observed by Blass.

21. The avoiding of the hiatus, a peculiarity of the same order, though not expressly noticed by Campbell in 1867, is implied in the influence of rhetorical artifice on Plato, to which Campbell directs our attention (p. xl). According to later investigations of F. Blass[122] (1874) the avoidance of hiatus is limited to the following dialogues: **Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg.**

22. The use of the Ionic dative plural in σι was indicated by Campbell (p. xxiv) as a characteristic of later style. Its occurrence has been later exactly determined by C. Ritter, and found only in: Rep. 6 Phaedr. 3 Polit. *4* Tim. 2 Legg. *85* (C. Ritter, *Untersuchungen*, p. 9; also Jowett and Campbell, *Republic*, vol. ii. p. 52).

Of many grammatical peculiarities observed and quoted by Campbell only one can be included in our list because he did not attempt completeness of enumeration.

Some other grammatical peculiarities of later style, observed by Campbell, as: perfects with present meaning, participles with auxiliary verb, neuter article with the genitive to express the abstract notion of a thing, ellipse of τὸ μέν etc. with τὸ δέ etc. following, redundant or explicit use of the participle, repetition of a verbal notion which has been already expressed or implied (Introduction, pp. xxiv–xxvii) cannot be included in our list, because they are indicated without a complete quotation of their occurrences in all the writings of Plato. These points ought to be investigated anew by some philologer acquainted with Campbell's work, and they would yield very interesting results.

Lexicography. The vocabulary of Plato's later works is very original, containing many words

The most important peculiarity of Plato's vocabulary in his later works is its originality, leading the author to invent many new words, or to mould old words to new ideas with an affectation of variety and minuteness of distinction (Introduction, p. xxx). In the *Laws* Campbell found 1,065 words occurring nowhere else, on 317 pages of text (ed. Stephani; Campbell quotes 345 pages because he did not take into account the space without text at the end of each book). This yields a proportion of 336 original words to each 100 pages, an originality of vocabulary absent from earlier works of Plato. The *Timaeus* and *Critias* show

the same tendency to the use of rare words, as they have on 90 pages 427 words unused elsewhere by Plato. This raises the proportion to 474 original words in 100 pages. It does not imply that Plato in writing the *Timaeus* and *Critias* tends to a greater use of new and rare words than in writing the *Laws*, for physics exceed politics in the opportunities for such usage. In such a political treatise as the *Laws*, 336 new words to 100 pages show as great a leaning to an original vocabulary as 427 new words to 100 pages in a physical treatise. Turning to the *Sophist* and *Politicus* taken together as one whole, in 107 pages there are 255 new rare words not found elsewhere in Plato, a proportion which corresponds to that of 239 in 100 pages. That this bent towards the use of rare words was increasing we can easily see by comparing the three dialogues which were avowedly written by Plato in succession. In the *Theaetetus* he employs 93 new words unused elsewhere, that is 133 to 100 pages (ed. Steph.), in the *Sophist* 187 to 100 pages, in the *Politicus* 295 to 100 pages; but in the *Philebus* only 100 to 100 pages, and in the *Phaedrus* 326 to 100 pages. (These last numbers are given in vol. ii. of the edition of the *Republic* by Jowett and Campbell, pp. 53-55.) It is to be regretted that nobody has as yet calculated these proportions for the *Parmenides*, *Republic*, and for earlier dialogues. The numbers given by Campbell refer only to: Phaedr. Theaetet. Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg.

used only once.

But this peculiarity has not yet been investigated throughout all the works of Plato like the recurrence of fixed terms.

This originality of vocabulary is a very powerful argument in favour of the late date of the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, but cannot be included in our list of marks of later style, so long as comparative statistics about all the works of Plato in this respect are not established.

The absence of a fixed terminology, which is observed by readers of the earlier dialogues, is less noticeable in the *Sophist* and later works. In all these dialogues a great number of rare words recur, besides those used

only once, and this repetition of new and rare words shows an inclination to 'fix in language some of the leading generalisations of philosophy' (Introduction, p. xxx).

Some words used in *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Laws*, occur besides in only one of the earlier dialogues.

Taking the *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Laws*, as containing Plato's latest terminology, Campbell counted the words which each dialogue shared with this latest group, and which occur nowhere else in Plato. If we reduce the numbers given by Campbell to the proportion of 100 pages, and if we allow a correction consisting in counting as common and peculiar to *Sophist* and the group of the *Laws* also those words which, besides these four dialogues, have been used only in *Politicus*—then we have in the *Sophist* to 100 pages 108 new words common and peculiar to the *Sophist* and to the group of the *Laws*. In the *Politicus* the number of such words rises to 136 in 100 pages, counting also those which besides occur only in the *Sophist*. Of the other Platonic dialogues, the *Phaedrus* alone shows a vocabulary which in almost equal measure approaches that of Plato's recognised latest writings, containing a proportion of 117 rare words to 100 pages (ed. Steph.), which apart from this dialogue are used only in the group of the *Laws*. This does not necessarily prove that the *Phaedrus* belongs to the same epoch, since, the *Phaedrus* being in more senses than one a programme, and a work of rare poetic richness and artistic excellence, it is natural that Plato should have retained in use many words there first employed. Among the other writings, the *Philebus* affords a remarkably low proportion of such words. They are only sixty-two to 100 pages, though in many other respects the *Philebus* is more nearly related to the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, and also to the group of the *Laws*, than the *Phaedrus*. This low figure is explained by the circumstance that no account was taken of such words as occur, besides in *Philebus* and the latest three dialogues, also in *Sophist* and *Politicus*. Assuming that Plato wrote the *Philebus* at about the

This allows a measure of affinity between each dialogue and the latest group.

same time as the *Politicus*, it would be natural that he should use in both some rare words peculiar to the group of the *Laws*. Allowing for such words, the figure rises to ninety-two rare words in 100 pages (ed. Steph.) common and peculiar to the *Philebus* with the latest three dialogues. The importance of these figures is apparent on comparison with those of other works in which Campbell counted the words peculiar to the group of the *Laws*. These are seen from the table on the next page (calculated on Campbell's table, p. xxxiii).

This first table of affinity requires corrections as to the *Parmenides*, *Theaetetus*, and *Philebus*, which have been shown by later investigations to be nearer to the *Laws*.

In this table some anomalies require explanation. The *Protagoras*, being an early dialogue, has more words peculiar to the latest group than could have been expected. To explain this we should require to know what words these are, because if they refer to some special subject treated in the *Laws* as well as in the *Protagoras*, the coincidence would be natural. Later inquiries have not confirmed such an affinity between the *Protagoras* and the latest dialogues. On the other side the numbers for the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides* are remarkably low. This might be explained by the circumstance that Campbell according to his method did not include in these numbers those words which, besides occurring in each of these dialogues, are found in some other dialogue belonging to the same epoch. The correction of the error resulting from this omission can be made here only for the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus*, and has altered very much the proportions given by Campbell. Really, if a word is peculiar to the latest dialogues and is found besides in two other works, the occurrence of this word in these two works is as much a sign of affinity between them and the latest group as (and is perhaps more significant than) if the occurrence were limited to one dialogue besides the three latest works. The *Theaetetus* has many words in common with the *Republic*, the *Parmenides* many words in common with the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*, as later investigations have sufficiently shown. All these words were

Statistics of rare words in Plato according to Lewis Campbell.

Name of Dialogue.[1]	Abbreviation used.	Number of pages.		Number of rare[2] words occurring in each dialogue, and besides only in Timaeus, Critias, Legg.	Proportion to 100 pages.		Number of rare words used only in one dialogue and nowhere else by Plato.	Proportion to 100 pages.	
		ed. Steph.	ed. Didot[3]		ed. Steph.[4]	ed. Didot		ed. Steph.	ed. Didot
Euthyphro .	Euthyph.	14	11½	4 or 3[11]	29 or 21	33 or 25	Unknown, but ascertainable from Ast's 'Lexicon Platonicum.' ?	?	?
Apology . .	Apol. .	25	19½	6	24	31	?	?	?
Crito . . .	Crito. .	12	9½	2	17	22	?	?	?
Charmides .	Charm. .	24	18	2	8	11	?	?	?
Laches . .	Lach. .	23	18	8	35	44	?	?	?
Lysis . . .	Lys. . .	20	15	7	35	46	?	?	?
Protagoras .	Prot. . .	53	39½	18	34	46	?	?	?
Meno . . .	Meno .	30	23	4	13	17	?	?	?
Euthydemus	Euthyd. .	36	28	7	19	25	?	?	?
Gorgias . .	Gorg. .	81	61½	20	25	33	?	?	?
Cratylus . .	Crat. . .	57	42	14	24	33	?	?	?
Symposium .	Symp. .	51	39	33	65	85	?	?	?
Phaedo . .	Phaedo .	60	49	42	70	86	?	?	?
Republic . .	Rep. . .	270	194	246[10]	90	126	?	?	?
Phaedrus .	Phaedr. .	52	39	61	117	156	170	326	436
Theaetetus .	Theaet. .	69	53	27	40	51	93	133	175
Parmenides .	Parm. .	40	31	6	15	16	?	?	?
Sophistes .	Soph. .	53	40	57[7]	108	142	99	187	247
Politicus . .	Polit. .	55	43	75[8]	136	174	162	295	377
Philebus . .	Phil. . .	56	43	52[9]	92	121	55	100	128
Timaeus . .	Tim. . .	75	53	over	over	over	427	474	667
Critias . .	Critias .	15	11	508[5]	564	794			
Laws . . .	Legg. .	317	236½	over 1146[6]	over 361	over 488	1065	317	455
Menexenus .	Menex. .	15	11½	12	80	105	?	?	?
Ion	Ion . .	12	9	7	60	77	?	?	?
Hipp. Minor	Hipp. I.	13	10	2	15	20	?	?	?
Alcibiades I.	Alc. I. .	32	25	4	12	16	?	?	?

Observations.

[1] The dialogues are in their presumed chronological order, as resulting from the sum of stylistic observations, 1834–1896; in some doubtful cases, as for the first six small dialogues, the traditional order preserved in Manuscripts (tetralogies) has been maintained. The *Republic* is placed between *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*, with reference to the greater part of it, though it is supposed that the beginning of the *Rep.* was written before the *Phaedo*, and some other parts after the *Phaedrus*. Those which have no logical importance and will not be dealt with in the present work (Menex., Ion, Hipp. I., Alc.) are omitted and follow only in this table after the *Laws*.

[2] These numbers are not given by Campbell, but are calculated on his 'numerical ratios.'

[3] The pages ed. Didot are more equally printed than in any other edition; and they form the best measure of the amount of text.

[4] Corrected after elimination of an error resulting from the circumstance that Campbell counted in Rep. and Legg. also some pages without text, between every book and the following.

[5] This number contains the words common to Tim. Critias with Legg., and those occurring in Tim. Critias, and nowhere else, according to J. and C., *Rep.* Vol. II. p. 57.

[6] This number contains the words common to Tim. Critias with Legg., and those of Legg. alone.

[7] Including five such words which also occur in Polit.

[8] Including five words which are also found in Soph.

[9] Including eight such words, which are also found in Soph. Polit.

[10] This number results from the ratio ⅓ given by Campbell, counting 295 pp. as he counted. The proportion is increased through the omission of pages without text.

[11] From the ratio given by Campbell the result would be 3½ words; he may have found three or four.

excluded by Campbell from the number of words 'common and peculiar' to each dialogue with the group of the *Laws*. Thence, partly, the low figures for *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*. As to the *Parmenides*, the very peculiar and exceptionally abstract contents of this dialogue also make it impossible to find many rare words in it, because the greatest number of rare words refer to concrete objects. Apart from these easily explained exceptions, Campbell's observations, as represented in the above table, show clearly that the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, also the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, have the greatest affinity in vocabulary to the latest dialogues. There results the following important addition to our list:

The affinity of *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, with *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Laws*, is evident.

23. Occurrence of rare words common and peculiar to each dialogue with the latest group once or more in each page (ed. Didot) is confined to: Rep. **246** Phaedr. **61** Soph. **57** Polit. **75** Phil. **52** Tim. and Critias **508** Legg. **1146**, while such words are scarcer, but still occur more than once in two pages in: Symp. *33* Phaedo *42* Theaet. *27*.

Campbell found by this method over seven hundred characteristics of the later style of Plato, each word recurring in certain dialogues being as much a peculiarity of the style of these dialogues as any of the more general stylistic properties. He inferred that the *Theaetetus* and *Phaedrus* form with the *Republic* an earlier group (p. xxxix) than *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus*, and that these more nearly approach *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Laws* in their style than any other works of Plato. He could not have so correctly recognised the middle group of *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, and *Theaetetus*, had he simply considered the number of characteristic peculiarities, without taking into account also their nature. The weighing of evidence in every kind of statistics is the indispensable condition of correct conclusions, and Campbell has shown a surprising power of divination in connecting the *Theaetetus* and *Phaedrus* with the *Republic* in face of the purely numerical data he

The group of *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, *Theaetetus* also recognised by Campbell, though his evidence at first sight placed the *Phaedrus* much

later and the *Theaetetus* much earlier.

had collected. All later inquiries have confirmed this connection and removed the anomalies which Campbell's statistical table still offered. Had Campbell relied blindly on numbers alone, he would have concluded according to the evidence afforded by his observations that the *Parmenides* is one of the earliest works of Plato, as Schleiermacher imagined; that the *Theaetetus* belongs, as Zeller thinks, to about the same period as the *Protagoras*; and that finally the *Phaedrus* is later than the *Philebus*. These natural errors he happily avoided and this gives to his work a methodic value far above everything done after him in the study of Plato's style, since later inquirers frequently discredited their method by unjustifiable generalisations from a single occurrence of a single expression in a small dialogue, as for instance of τί μήν in the *Lysis*.

But he avoided errors, carefully weighing his evidence, wherein his method surpassed the method of all later investigators.

The *Parmenides* has a poor vocabulary, but it contains, as Campbell has shown, some highly characteristic words (Introduction, pp. xxv–xxx compared with Ast's *Lexicon* as to the number of occurrences).

The *Parmenides* contains some significant terms recurring in later works.

24. γένος as a logical term: Phaedr. 1 Parm. 3 Soph. 4 Polit. 1 Phil. 2 Tim. 7 Legg. 1.

25. δεσμός, as a bond uniting ideas: Parm. Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Legg. (This special meaning has not been distinguished by Ast, and Campbell does not give the number of occurrences.)

26. μέθεξις: Parm. 3 Soph. 2 (A).

27. μερίζω: Parm. 4 Soph. 1 Polit. 2 Tim. 3.

28. πολιός: Parm. 1 Polit. 1 Tim. 1.

Also the vocabulary of the *Philebus*, though less rich than that of the *Politicus*, is quite sufficient to indicate the place of this dialogue. Of words used in the *Philebus*, Campbell enumerates the following as very characteristic terms common to later dialogues (Intro. pp. xxv-xxx):

The vocabulary of the *Philebus* is poor but very charac-

29. γένεσις, in the sense of production in general: Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Legg. (A).

30. σύμμιξις: Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Legg.

31. ὕλη, in the general sense of matter or in a sense approaching this: Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg.

32. σχίζω: Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim.

33. *διαμερίζω*: Polit. Phil. Legg.

34–36. *ἄμετρος, διάκρισις, σῶμα* (= body in general): Soph. Phil. Tim. Legg.

37–38. *σύγκρισις, διάθεσις*: Soph. Phil. Tim. Legg. (A).

39. *διαχωρίζω*: Polit. Phil. Tim.

40–41. *διαλογίζομαι, ἐπίκλην*: Soph. Phil. Tim.

42–43. *στέλλομαι, ἀπιδεῖν*: Soph. Phil. Legg.

44. *ἀγήρως*: Polit. Phil. Tim. Legg.

45. *πλάτος*: Polit. Phil. Critias Legg.

46–48. *συγκεφαλαιοῦμαι, ἐνάριθμος, δοξοσοφία*: Soph. Phil.

49–51. *πῆξις, σύγκρασις, καταπαύω*: Polit. Phil.

52. *ἀνειλίττω*, in Phil. corresponds to *ἀνείλιξις* in Polit.

53. *μέχριπερ*: Soph. 1 Polit. 3 Phil. 1 Tim. 4 Critias 1 Legg. **16.** (The number of occurrences for this word was found later by C. Ritter, see p. 59 of his *Untersuchungen über Plato*. In all other dialogues *ἕως περ* is used, which occurs also concurrently with *μέχριπερ* and oftener than this, except Tim. Critias Legg. in which both words occur an equal number of times, according to Dittenberger.)

teristic, as it contains a great number of logical terms recurring in *Timaeus* or *Laws*.

One glance at these words shows for what kind of notions Plato sought new terms in his later writings. Eight words refer to division and reconstitution of unities (30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 39, 49, 50) which Plato had proclaimed in the *Phaedrus* (266 B) as a divine art, worthy of the greatest admiration. Four words indicate logical operations (40, 42, 43, 46), six physical and mathematical notions (29, 31, 36, 38, 45, 52). This agrees perfectly with what we know of Plato's latest investigations. His dream was a general theory of science and classification of human knowledge.

This shows the influence of logical studies.

Campbell's study of the vocabulary of the *Sophist* and *Politicus* confirms the above enumerated general analogies between these dialogues and the group of the *Laws*. Striking, indeed, is the number of words used by Plato only in the *Laws* and in one of these dialogues.

The following twenty-six words, first used in the *Sophist*, recur in the *Laws* (Intro. pp. xxv-xxx):

The *Sophist* and *Politicus* are still richer in terms proper to Plato's later style, denoting

54. **ἀγκιστρευτικός* in Soph. corresponds to **ἀγκιστρεία* in Legg.

55. **ἐννυροθηρικός* in Soph. corresponds to **ἐννυροθηρευτής* in Legg.

dialectical, physical, and mathematical notions.

56–58. * *νουθετητικός*, * *συνομολογία*, * *συνδιαπονῶ*: Soph. Legg.

59–63. *ἀγωνιστική*, *βιαστικός*, *εἰκαστική*, *εἰρωνικός*, *φαρμακοποσία*.

64. *ὀρνιθευτικός* in Soph. corresponds to *ὀρνιθευτής* in Legg.

65–68. Terms expressing logical operations: *διάγνωσις*, *μερίς*, *παρωνύμιον*, *προσκοινωνῶ*: Soph. Legg.

69–73. Poetical words: *ἀθῷος*, *ἄπλετος*, *ξένιος*, *παραφροσύνη* (in Soph. corresponds to *παράφρων* in Legg.), *πλαστῶς*: Soph. Legg.

74–79. Compounds and derivatives: *ἀκρατής*, *ἀνάστατος*, *ἀφερμηνεύω*, *σκοτοδινία*, *τολμηρός*, *μίσθωσις* (A): Soph. Legg.

The following forty-three words occur in the *Politicus* and in the *Laws* (Intro. pp. xxv-xxix):

80–84. *ἀμυντήριος*, *παίγνιον*, *πλεκτικός*, *σκέπασμα* (A), *στασιαστικός* (in Polit. corresponds to *στασιωτεία* in Legg.): Polit. Legg.

85–89. Dialectical terms: *ἀπομερίζω*, *ἀποσχίζω*, *ἐκκρίνω* (*ἔκκριτος* Legg.), *ἐπινέμω*, + *γνώρισις*: Polit. Legg.

90–100. Physical and mathematical: *ἀνατολή*, *ἄφεσις* (A), *γυμναστής*, * *δρυοτομική* (in Polit. corresponds to * *δρυοτομία* in Legg.), *ἐπισκευάζομαι*, *ἐπισπεύδω*, *μέτρησις*, *μετρητός*, * *συμποδηγοῦμαι* (in Polit. corresponds to *ποδηγεῖν* in Legg.), *ὑπεροχή*, *ὑφή*: Polit. Legg.

101. *ἀθεότης*: Polit. Legg.

102–108. Poetical: *ἀντάξιος*, *γειτονῶ*, *εὐώνυμος*, *ἡσυχαῖος*, *κρηπίς*, *σύνδρομος* (A), *σύντροφος* (A): Polit. Legg.

109–122. Compounds and derivatives: *ἀφύλακτος*, *ἔγκαιρος*, *ἔκδοσις*, *ἐμπορευτικός* (in Polit. corresponds to *ἐμπορεύομαι* in Legg.), *εὐλαβής*, *ἰταμότης* (in Polit. corresponds to *ἰταμῶς* in Legg.), *μηνυτής*, *μοναρχία*, *προσμίγνυμι*, *προστυχής*, *συγκατασκευάζω*, *ἠρεμαῖος* (A), *θυραυλεῖν* (A), *νομοθέτημα* (A): Polit. Legg.

Abundance of words borrowed from the poets and unusual compounds.

The following are found only in the *Sophist* or *Politicus*, and in the *Timaeus* or *Critias*:

123–127. Dialectical: *καθαρτικός* (A), *ἄσχιστος* (A), *διακριβολογοῦμαι*, *προομολογοῦμαι*, *διαθραύω*: Soph. Tim.

128–130. Physical: *διηθεῖν* (A), *εὔκυκλος* (used first in a quotation from the philosopher Parmenides), *ἰσοπαλές* (also from Parmenides): Soph. Tim.

131–132. Poetical: *διαπεράω*, *κρυφαῖος*: Soph. Tim.

133–134. Compounds or derivatives: *μεθημερινός*, *τὰ φωνηθέντα*: Soph. Tim.

135–141. *διαλυτικός*, *κατακόσμησις*, *καταθραύω*, *παράλλαξις*, *συμπιλῶ*, *συνυφαίνω*, *συλλαγχάνω*: Polit. Tim.

142. *ἀνακύκλησις* (in Polit. corresponds to *ἀνακυκλοῦμαι* in Tim.).

143–144. *διορισμός* (A), *συναπεργάζεσθαι* (A): Polit. Tim.

145–146. * *κύκλησις*, * *ῥαφή*: Polit. Tim.

147–148. *βρόχος*, *τηκτός*: Soph. Critias.

149. *διαλαγχάνω*: Polit. Critias.

Many words enumerated by Campbell are not limited to two dialogues, being in different ways characteristic of later style:

Some of these words are found in more than two dialogues.

150–155. * *διαπορῶ*, * *ὅπῃπερ*, *κύρτος*, *παράφορος* (in Soph. Legg. corresponds to *παραφορότης* in Tim.), *συμφυής*, *χερσαῖος*: Soph. Tim. Legg.

156–158. *ἐπεύχομαι*, *ἅγιος*, *χαλεπότης*: Soph. Critias Legg.

159–165. * *διανόησις*, *ἁπλανής*, *προβολή*, *τροπή* (as an astronomical term), *δεσπότις*, *τριπλοῦς*, *πάμπαν* (A): Polit. Tim. Legg.

166–167. *ἀγράμματος*, *στέγασμα*: Polit. Tim. Critias.

168–170. *σύνολος* (A), *ξαίνω*, *εὐπρεπής*: Soph. Polit. Legg.

171. *συνεφέπομαι*: Soph. Tim. Critias Legg.

172–173. *σύννομος* (A), *περιλείπω*: Polit. Tim. Critias Legg.

174–176. *ἔνυδρος* (A), *τομή* (metaphorical), *πλέγμα*: Soph. Polit. Tim. Legg.

Some words are limited to *Sophist* and *Politicus* only (Intro. pp. xxvi-xxix):

177–181. * *ἀμφισβητητικός*, * *γναφευτικός*, *αὐτοπώλης*, *ἀπερημόω*, *συντέμνω*: Soph. Polit.

Words used only in one dialogue have no chronological importance

Here we have a list of 158 characteristic words observed by Campbell in more than one of the six latest dialogues of Plato, and showing clearly the direction of Plato's tendency to use rare and new words in his old age. Besides these Campbell enumerates 93 words used by Plato in the *Sophist* and nowhere else, and 157 words used only in the *Politicus*. Among these 250 words whose use is limited to a single dialogue, 60 have not been used by any other Greek author (14 in *Sophist* and 46 in *Politicus*), and 39 have passed into the language of Aristotle (14 from *Sophist* and 25 from *Politicus*). The numerical proportions of all these peculiarities of vocabulary may readily be seen from the table based on Campbell's enumerations, given on p. 98.

Campbell has thus sufficiently proved the

In addition to these, Campbell gives also a list of fourteen words which, without being peculiar to the later dialogues, occur with greater frequency in them than in Plato's other writings. Among these *φράζω*, *ἀπεργάζομαι*, *προαιρεῖσθαι*, *φῦλον*, *ἐμφανίζω*, *φαντάζεσθαι*, *ἀπόφασις*,

Abbreviations. Leti = Tim. Critias Legg. as one whole. Sopo = Soph. and Polit. as one whole.	NUMBER OF NEW RARE WORDS USED BY PLATO ONLY IN											M	N
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	J	K	L		
	in the Sophist	in Soph. and Legg.	in Soph. and Leti.	in the Politicus	in Polit. and Legg.	in Polit. and Leti.	in Sopo.	in Sopo. and Legg.	in Sopo. and Leti.	in Sopo. and Phil.	in Sopo. Phil. and Leti.	used by Aristotle	not used by any other writer but Plato
I. Dialectical words	9	5	9	13	5	7	23	11	18	2	4		
Including ἅπαξ λεγόμενα	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	2	4	0	0		6
Words used by Aristotle	1	0	1	3	0	1	4	1	3	0	0	7	
II. Physical and mathematical	4	0	9	14	11	22	18	12	33	3	9		
Including ἅπαξ λεγόμενα	0	0	0	4	2	4	4	2	4	0	0		8
Words used by Aristotle	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	0	3	7	
III. Poetical words	14	5	11	25	8	13	39	13	24	1	2		
Including words used by Aristotle	1	0	0	0	2	4	1	2	4	1	0	6	
IV. Unusual compounds	10	8	12	27	14	17	38	23	30	2	2		
Including ἅπαξ λεγόμενα	3	1	1	8	0	0	11	1	1	0	0		12
Used by Aristotle	1	1	1	5	3	4	6	4	5	0	0	11	
V. Other new words	56	9	10	78	5	8	137	14	19	0	0		
Including ἅπαξ λεγόμενα	10	3	3	33	0	0	45	3	3	0	0		48
Used by Aristotle	10	0	1	16	1	1	26	1	4	0	0	30	
All new rare words	93	27	51	157	43	67	255	73	124	8	17		
Including ἅπαξ λεγόμενα	14	5	6	46	3	6	62	8	12	0	0		74
Used by Aristotle	14	1	4	25	7	11	39	9	18	1	3	61	

Explanations.—In column C are added to those of column B the words occurring only in Soph. Tim. (123–134), in Soph. Critias (147–148), in Soph. Tim. Legg. (150–155), in Soph. Critias Legg. (156–158), in Soph. Tim Critias Legg. (171). In column F are added to those of column E the words 135–146, 149, 159–167, 172–173. The column G contains the sum of columns A, D, and words 177–181. In column J are counted, besides those of columns C and F, the words 168–170, 174–176. In column K are under I. the words 46, 48; under II. 49, 50, 52; under III. 53; under IV. 47, 51. In column L under I. 32, 33, 39, 40; under II. 29, 30, 31, 34–38, 45; under III. 42, 44; under IV. 41, 43. This, according to Campbell's classification. Some of the words under IV. and V. might be distributed under I., II., III., but this has been avoided in order to give a correct account of Campbell's views. The words from the *Sophist* later used by Aristotle are: I. φάσις. II. πλαστός. III. καθιδρύω. IV. ἐπάλλαξις. V. ἀνθρωπικός, ἀπατητικός, ἐπιδεικτικός, ἱστορικος, κολαστικός, κτητικός, μεταβλητικός, νευστικός, πληκτικός, συνέχεια (column A). From the *Politicus* are the following used by Aristotle: I. διονομάζω, διχοτομῶ, προσαποφαίνω. II. μεταλλεύω. IV. ἀπόρρημα, ῥητορεία, συγκαταμίγνυμι, συμπαρακολουθῶ, χηνοβωτία. V. ἀκέραστος, ἀκέρατος, ἀκέρως, ἀρχιτεκτονικός, ἄτρητος, διακωλυτικός, ἐπιμελητικός, ἐπιτακτικός, ἐργαστικός, θρεπτικός, ἱπποφορβός, κριτικός, ξηροβατικός, πιλητικός, πλυντικός, τρῆσις.

ῥηθέν, *πρόσρημα*, the indefinite *πότερος*, are characteristic of the increasing logical interest, while *περιέχω*, *περιλαμβάνω*, *μετρητικός*, *μέτοχος* illustrate the fondness for compounds and derivatives. The number of stylistic characteristics observed by Campbell in the latest group thus reaches 434, of which twelve are of a general character, 255 refer only to *Sophist* or *Politicus*, 153 are common to these two with the latest three dialogues (twenty-five to the *Philebus* with the preceding two groups), and fourteen refer to the increased frequency of words also used in earlier dialogues. Till it be shown that as many peculiarities unite the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus* with some other dialogue, we have good reason to follow Campbell in joining them with the group of *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and *Laws*.

late date of the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*.

X. RIDDELL. At the same time, another editor of another dialogue of Plato undertook an almost equally laborious investigation on the style of Plato, with this difference, that the friend who published it took the precaution of mentioning it in the title of the edition. James Riddell,[118] late fellow and tutor of Balliol College, Oxford, buried in his edition of the *Apology* of Plato an appendix of 135 pages under the title *Digest of Platonic Idioms*. He classifies the idioms used by Plato and quotes examples of all dialogues, but without aiming at complete enumeration, and without being aware of the bearing of such stylistic researches on Platonic chronology. Though the *Apology* has more readers than the *Sophist*, Riddell's *Digest of Idioms* remained almost as unnoticed, at least out of England, as Campbell's Introduction to the *Sophist*. As Riddell does not compare the relative frequency of each idiom in each dialogue, little can be gained from his enumerations for the chronology, because idioms are less often limited in their occurrence to a few

Riddell's Digest of Platonic idioms, however valuable, affords no chronological conclusions.

[118] *The Apology of Plato, with a revised text and English Notes, and a digest of Platonic idioms*, by the Rev. James Riddell, M.A., fellow and tutor of Balliol College, Oxford, 1877 (misprinted for 1867) (xvi).

dialogues than peculiar words. Still at least one very characteristic idiom observed by Riddell is peculiar to the latest dialogues alone :

182. The periphrastic use of the participle, with auxiliary verb substantive (p. 167) : Soph. 1 Polit. 4 Tim. 3 Legg. 1.

but confirms the authenticity of the *Sophist* and *Politicus*.

For those who assert with Schaarschmidt that the style of the *Sophist*, the *Politicus*, and *Philebus* is un-Platonic, it may be interesting to learn that Riddell found in the *Sophist* forty Platonic idioms belonging also to other dialogues whose authenticity is beyond even Schaarschmidt's suspicions. In the *Politicus* he found thirty-six such idioms and in the *Philebus* forty-five. Few dialogues are as much quoted in the 325 paragraphs of this interesting monograph as the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, and *Laws*.

Other authors on Plato's style neglected chronology.

XI.–XII. SCHANZ, LINGENBERG. Shortly after the labours of Campbell and Riddell, Schanz[119] (1870) wrote on the hypothetical period in Plato, but at that time he, like Lingenberg[120] in his dissertation (1874) on metaphors and proverbs in Plato, left the question of chronology out of sight.

XIII. IMME. The same indifference to chronological arrangement appears in a dissertation of T. Imme on the forms of interrogation[121] (1873) in Plato. This author limited his work to an attempt at classifying interrogations psychologically, and quoted for each kind only a few examples, insufficient for chronological inferences. In this case the author's ignorance of the work of others on the same subject has done him much wrong. Had

[119] M. Schanz, *Bifurcation der hypothetischen Periode nach Platon*, 1870 (xvii).

[120] W. Lingenberg, *Platonische Bilder und Sprichwörter*, Köln, without date, but published 1874 (xviii). The author enumerates proverbs on God, men, products of human activity, proper names, uses and customs, and literary proverbs.

[121] Th. Imme Culmensis (of Chełmno), *De enuntiationum interrogativarum natura generibusque psychologorum rationibus atque usu maxime platonico illustratis*, doctor. dissert. Lipsiae 1873 (xix).

Imme known the dissertations of Martinius, he might have made an instructive and interesting addition to our knowledge of Plato's style. But he quotes only examples of each kind of interrogation without aiming at an exhaustive enumeration.

XIV. BLASS. Another scholar, F. Blass,[122] the author of the *History of Greek Eloquence* (1874), made a very curious observation, thereby unexpectedly confirming Campbell's conclusions, though unaware of Campbell's work. He remarked that the hiatus is less frequent in the *Phaedrus* than, for instance, in the *Symposium*, and that it is still more rare in *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and *Laws*, where the hiatus is chiefly limited to very frequent words as *καί*, *εἰ*, *ἤ*, *μή* or the article, while all kinds of hiatus are frequent in the *Republic* and earlier works. Blass inferred from this single observation that Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg. were the latest writings of Plato.

XV. ROEPER. When four years later (1878) Roeper[123] published his investigation on the dual number in Plato, he knew none of the twenty contributions to the knowledge of Plato's style which have been mentioned above. He distinguishes two different uses of the dual in Plato: in earlier writings the common use as in the current language of the fifth century B.C., and in later writings, at the time when the dual fell into disuse, Plato employed it intentionally to lend a phrase an air of solemnity. This usage is shown by Roeper to be frequent in Soph. Polit. Phil., though not limited to these dialogues. Very characteristic of a time when the use of the dual began to be abandoned is:

Roeper distinguished a solemn and intentional use of the dual from the primitive common use.

183. δυοῖν with the plural of a substantive (p. 26): Prot. 1; Rep. 1; Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 2 (Prot. 355 B and Rep. 546 C

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[122] F. Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit*, vol. ii. p. 426, Leipzig 1874 (xx); also on Dittenberger in *Bursians Jahresbericht*, vol. xxxiii. p. 234, for 1883.

[123] Augustus Roeper, Gedanensis, *De dualis usu Platonico* (doctor's dissertation univers. Bonn), Gedani 1878 (xxi).

are held doubtful by Roeper, but these passages must be counted on the authority of the best MS.).

Many uses of dual forms are either limited to the latest group or increasing in frequency.

Other peculiarities of later style observed by Roeper, but not singled out as such by him, are :

184. Article *ταῖν* (p. 17) : Polit. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 3.

185. *τὼ δύο* without substantive (p. 25) : Soph. 2 Polit. 1 Legg. 2 (generally in other passages *τὰ δύο*).

186. *νῷν* (p. 16) : Symp. 1 ; Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 1 ; Soph. 1 Polit. 3 Phil. 4 Legg. 2.

187. Adjectives and participles in *-αιν* (p. 5) : Rep. 1 ; Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 3.

188. *τέχνα* as dual of *τέχνη* (p. 5) : Rep. 2 ; Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Legg. 1.

189. Subst. in *-αιν* (p. 6) : Rep. 2 ; Parm. 1 Polit. 2 Legg. 6.

190. Dual of substantives neutr. in *-η* (p. 12) : Rep. 2 Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 1 ; Soph. 4 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 2 Legg. 2 (counting only indubitable dual forms ; besides these Roeper quotes many passages in which such forms may be either plural or dual, occurring chiefly in Soph. Polit. Legg.).

191. Dual in *ᾱ* (p. 3) 'nominum, quorum etiam in *ω* formas licebat praeferre' : Symp. 1 ; Rep. 2 Theaet. 1 ; Polit. 2 Legg. 1.

192. Dual *τούτω* gener. communis (p. 4) : Rep. 2 Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 3 ; Phil. 1 Legg. 2. Similar to this are also *ποίω* Theaet. 175 c and *μόνω* Legg. 777 c.

193. Dual of nouns in *-οιν* II decl. with *ἀμφοῖν* (p. 11) : Prot. 1 ; Rep. 2 ; Parm. 1 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Critias 1.

194. *σφῷν* (p. 16) : Euthyd. 4 ; Theaet. 1 ; Legg. 12. This coincidence between Euthyd. and Legg. Roeper explains by the circumstance that in both dialogues one person is speaking to two others, intimately associated.

195. *δύω* instead of *δύο*, according to the best codices, Clarkianus or Parisinus A (p. 20) : Rep. 2 ; Soph. 1 Phil. 1.

196. *τοῖν δυοῖν* (p. 25) : Crat. 1 ; Soph. 2 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 2.

197. Dual of verb following plural of subject (p. 30) : Euthyd. 2 ; Rep. 1 ; Polit. 1 Tim. 2 Legg. 2.

198. Dual of nouns in *-οιν* with *δυοῖν* (p. 10) : Prot. 1 Meno 2 Euthyd. 2 Gorg. 3 ; Rep. 1 ; Parm. 3 ; Tim. 5 Critias 1 Legg. 2.

Teichmüller believed, like

XVI. TEICHMÜLLER. A counterpart of Schöne's theory of perfection in style was Teichmüller's [124] (1879) stylistic test, according to which the dramatic dialogues are written later than the narrated dialogues, because

[124] Gustav Teichmüller, *Die Reihenfolge der Platonischen Dialoge*, Leipzig 1879 (xxii).

Plato in the *Theaetetus* (143 c) criticises the form of a narrated dialogue and introduces the dramatic form as more convenient. This easy way of classifying the dialogues according to a single peculiarity of style led Teichmüller to some conclusions as strange as those of Schöne, though less extravagant, because all the later dialogues are dramatic in form, and Plato seems actually to have given up the form of a narrated dialogue in his old age. But the dramatic form cannot be treated as a special invention, and to place with Teichmüller the *Meno*, *Gorgias*, and *Cratylus* after the *Theaetetus* is almost as rash as to recognise with Schöne the *Timaeus* as an earlier work than the *Republic*. Still Teichmüller was led by his argument to the correct conclusion that the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus* are later than the *Republic*.

Schöne, one stylistic peculiarity to be decisive.

XVII. DITTENBERGER. A new method of stylistic research was proposed by Dittenberger[125] (1881), who, though knowing none of his predecessors, happily avoided the repetition of work already done, and directed his attention to a subject not yet investigated, namely the relative frequency of synonyms preferred or rejected in Plato's different works. This effort brought into prominence some fresh peculiarities of later style:

Dittenberger introduced the study of prevalence of one synonym over another, and found that certain words are peculiar to one group of dialogues, while other words of the same

199. *καθάπερ* occurs (according to Dittenberger, and for some dialogues according to later corrections of C. Ritter, p. 58): Lach. 1 Meno 1 Euthyd. 1 Gorg. 1 Crat. 2 Symp. 2; Rep. 6 Phaedr. *4* Theaet. 2; Soph. *14* Polit. **34** Phil. **27** Tim. *18* Critias *5* Legg. **148**. In all other dialogues *ὥσπερ* is used instead, and prevails very much over *καθάπερ* even in the *Republic* (212 times against 6 *καθάπερ*), in the *Phaedrus* (27 against 4 *καθάπερ*), and in the *Theaetetus* (47 times against 2 *καθάπερ*).

The prevalence of one synonym over another is a peculiarity of style not less remarkable than the total absence or the appearance of some rare word, and Ditten-

[125] Dittenberger, 'Sprachliche Kriterien für die Chronologie der platonischen Dialoge' in *Hermes*, vol. xvi. p. 321, Berlin 1881 (xxiii). The numbers quoted by Dittenberger have, in some cases, been corrected by C. Ritter, and are given here according to these corrections.

meaning are used in other works.

berger had the great merit of extending the stylistic study to the relative frequency of synonyms; herein he developed independently an idea to which Campbell had alluded in a footnote (p. xxxii) when he quoted fourteen words of increased frequency in the later dialogues.

200. ὥσπερ is scarcer than καθάπερ only in: Soph. *9/14*, Polit. *16/34* Phil. *9/27* Tim. *10/18* Critias *2/5* Legg. *24/148*. This scarcity of ὥσπερ, a word which is very frequent in all other dialogues of Plato, is certainly one of the most characteristic peculiarities of Plato's later style, and coincides with the use of μέχριπερ for ἕωσπερ noticed above (Nr. **53**).

201. τάχα ἴσως: Soph. **2** Polit. **3** Phil. **3** Tim. 1 Legg. 11.

202. τί μήν; Rep. *35* Phaedr. *12* Theaet. *13*; Parm. *6* Soph. *12* Polit. *20* Phil. **26** Legg. *48*.

203. γε μήν: Euthyd. 1 Symp. 1; Rep. **2** Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 1; Parm. *5* Soph. *6* Polit. *8* Phil. *7* Tim. *7* Critias 1 Legg. *25*.

204. ἀλλὰ . . . μήν: Symp. **2**; Rep. **11** Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 1; Parm. **2** Soph. **2** Polit. **3** Phil. **2** Legg. **2**.

205. καὶ μήν: Euthyph. 1 Charm. **2** Lach. *3* Prot. **2** Meno *5* Euthyd. *4* Gorg. *9* Crat. *9* Symp. *9* Phaedo *7* Rep. *44* Phaedr. **3** Theaet. *11* Parm. **25** Soph. **24** Polit. **24** Phil. *20* Tim. 1 Legg. *36*.

This expression, though occurring in so many earlier dialogues, may nevertheless be counted among the peculiarities of later style, because it becomes very frequent only in the later dialogues, in which it supplants ἀλλὰ μήν, preferred to καὶ μήν in earlier writings of Plato.

206. ἀλλὰ μήν is scarcer than καὶ μήν only in: Lach. *2/3* Symp. *2/9*; Theaet. *6/11*; Soph. *10/24* Polit. *7/24* Phil. *7/20* Tim. *0/1* Legg. *8/36*, while in all other dialogues ἀλλὰ μήν prevails over καὶ μήν (except Charm. 2 Meno 5 Crat. 9 Rep. 44 Parm. 25 Critias 0, in which both occur an equal number of times). This relative scarcity of ἀλλὰ μήν is the more striking inasmuch as the strong prevalence of the shorter καὶ μήν cannot be accidental.

He compared the changes in the style of Plato with those occurring in the

Besides these Dittenberger counted οὐδὲ μήν which cannot be looked upon as peculiar to later style. He added to the strength of his conclusions by the observation that μήν occurs with increased frequency also in the works of other authors who wrote about the time when Plato was over sixty. As τί μήν in the meaning of an affirmative answer was not used in the Attic dialect, Dittenberger

inferred that Plato brought it from Sicily. But the occurrence of τί μήν in a work like the *Lysis*, which in all other respects has the style of earlier dialogues, tells against Dittenberger's inference. Even granting the Sicilian origin of the expression, there had been, for some years before the death of Socrates, sufficient intercourse between Sicily and Athens to familiarise Plato with τί μήν before he visited Sicily himself. His predilection for this formula, apparent in all later works, is a result of his increasing tendency to strong affirmation, because τί μήν; has the character of a great logical certainty, excluding every doubt: 'What else?' *i.e.* 'How could it be otherwise?'

style of other authors.

Dittenberger's article was the first investigation of Plato's style which attracted the general attention of German philologers, so much so that, of late, the merit of introducing statistics of style as a method for determining the chronology of Plato's dialogues has been frequently attributed to him. It was a happy circumstance that Dittenberger, in his conclusions from a very small number of observations, committed no greater error than the uncertain assumption that the *Lysis* came among the dialogues of the second group, between the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*. But he correctly recognised the group of the latest six dialogues, and admitted that the *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, *Theaetetus* preceding these are later than the *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, *Cratylus*, and all Socratic dialogues.

Dittenberger's inferences were correct though based on quite insufficient evidence.

XVIII. JECHT. Since Dittenberger's publication the subject of the statistics of Plato's vocabulary has been widely discussed by writers on the chronology of Plato. Blass[122] recognised the new method as leading to the surest results, while Zeller opposed it as too superficial. Dittenberger's pupil Jecht[126] (1881) chose as the subject for his doctor's dissertation the use of ἤδη in Plato's

Jecht investigated the use of ἤδη in Plato's works, and found

[126] Ricardus Jecht, *De usu particulae ἤδη in Platonis dialogis qui feruntur* (Doctor's diss. Univ. Halle a. S.), Halis Saxonum 1881 (xxiv).

some differences between the various dialogues. But he did not draw the inferences resulting from his observations.

dialogues. From his observations it results that the following uses prevail in later dialogues :

207. οὐκ ἤδη ; ἤδη ... οὐκ or οὐκ ... ἤδη ; (p 12) : Lach. 1 Meno 1 Gorg. 1 ; Rep. 3 Parm. 4 ; Soph. 2 Phil. 1 Legg. 1.

208. ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη (p. 50) : Theaet. 1 Polit. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 1.

209. ἤδη τὸ (or τὰ) μετὰ τοῦτο (or ταῦτα) to effect a transition (p. 50) : Soph. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 1.

210. ἤδη πᾶς (p. 8) : Euthyd. 1 ; Rep. 4 Phaedr. 2 ; Soph. 1 Polit. 6 Phil. 2 Tim. 3 Legg. 6, including also passages, where ἤδη is separated by other words from πᾶς, ξύμπας, ξύναπας, πάμπας in their various cases, with or without preposition.

211. πᾶς ἤδη (p. 8) : Euthyd. 1 Crat. 1 ; Rep. 1 ; Parm. 1 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 2.

212. αὐτός ἤδη or ἤδη αὐτός (p. 9) : Crat. 1 Rep. 3 Theaet. 1 Parm. 3 Phil. 1 Critias 1 Legg. 1, including also such passages where a δέ or γε separates ἤδη from αὐτός.

213. ἤδη with perfect designing an action terminated only in the present time (p. 21), with the meaning of 'by this time' (*nunmehr*) : Rep. 2 Soph. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 1.

214. νῦν ἤδη (p. 44) : Phaedo 1 Rep. 2 Phaedr. 1 ; Soph. 1 Phil. 2 Tim. 1 Legg. 2 (ἤδη νῦν does not occur).

215. νῦν ... ἤδη separated by one or more words (p. 45) : Charm. 1 Prot. 1 Meno 1 ; Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 1 ; Soph. 2 Polit. 2 Phil. 1 Legg. 4.

216. τότ' ἤδη meaning 'then already' (*damals bereits*, p. 46) : Rep. 2 Phaedr. 1 ; Parm. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Critias 1 Legg. 3, while in some earlier passages as Lach. 181 D, Gorg. 527 D, Phaedo 87 E the meaning is 'not until then' ('*dann erst*' = *tum demum*), which meaning occurs also in Theaet. and Legg. This difference of meaning, similar to the difference appearing in the use of οὕτως ἤδη (see below Nr. **220**), is very characteristic. Impatient youth complains that things were 'not done until then' (Fr. *enfin*) ; resigned old age is fain to be content that they are 'done so soon,' or 'already' (Fr. *déjà*).

217. τότ' ἤδη in apodosi (p. 46) : Lach. 2 Prot. 1 ; Rep. 2 Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 1 ; Tim. 1 Critias 1 Legg. 1.

218. ἤδη between a participle and an adjective belonging to it (p. 4) : Rep. 1 Theaet. 1 Legg. 2.

219. μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη (p. 9) : Rep. 2 Tim. 1 Legg. 3.

220. οὕτως ἤδη (p. 9) : Crat. 1 Symp. 2 Phaedo 2 ; Rep. 1 ; Parm. 1 Polit. 1 Tim. 1, including one instance of οὕτως ἂν ἤδη in Parm. 145 C. It is important to notice that in the passages of Crat. Symp. Phaedo the meaning is 'then' or 'not until then' ('*dann erst*'), while beginning with the Republic the four later passages are best translated by 'thus already' (*so bereits*), which is parallel to the use of τότ' ἤδη.

221. ἤδη καὶ (p. 13) : Charm. 2 Prot. 2 Meno 1 Crat. 1 Symp. 1 Phaedo 1 ; Rep. 3 ; Parm. 1 Soph. 2 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Critias 1 Legg. 3.

222. ἤδη with plusquam-perfectum (p. 21) : Euthyph. 1 Prot. 1 Crat. 1 ; Rep. 1 ; Polit. 2 Tim. 2 Legg. 1.

Frederking's objections overthrown by a more exact inquiry of Hoefer, who independently, and without knowing Frederking, counted the same particles, and found some uses of τε and τοι limited to the same dialogues in which καθάπερ prevails over ὥσπερ.

XIX.–XX. FREDERKING and HOEFER. Dittenberger's article aroused opposition. In order to show that statistics of particles are at times inconsistent, Frederking of Dorpat undertook (1882) to count how many times Plato used τε and some other words.[127] He counted roughly and failed to distinguish the various uses of τε. Hence his investigation loses all importance, all the more that the counting has been better done by Hoefer[128] (1882), who also studied the use of τε and some other particles, adding to the stock of peculiarities distinctive of Plato's later style. Hoefer, as his dissertation shows, knew none of his predecessors save Dittenberger, though he occasionally quotes Campbell's emendations of the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, probably from the original edition. Obviously he had not read Campbell's Introduction, yet he perceived the importance of stylistic studies for Platonic chronology. Moreover, he recognised that his observations were too few to allow of definite conclusions as to the order of the dialogues, wherein he has shown greater caution than some other authors. His careful and complete enumerations yield the following data :

223. τοιγαροῦν (p. 40) : Soph. 3 Legg. 2, while in some earlier dialogues τοιγάρτοι is used instead, occurring Lach. 1 Euthyd. 1 Gorg. 2 Symp. 1 Phaedo 1 ; Rep. 3 Theaet. 1, and never later. Hoefer points out that Thucydides always used τοιγάρτοι and never τοιγαροῦν, while in Aristotle only the second form is used. Isocrates, Xenophon, and Demosthenes use both.

224. καὶ μὴν οὐδέ (p. 40) : Rep. 2 ; Parm. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Legg. 1.

225. γάρ . . . δή separated by a verb (p. 25) : Parm. 1 Legg. 2.

226. μέν . . . τε (p. 17) : Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 ; Tim. 1 Legg. 2.

227. τε used after a single word (not a sentence), adding a third object after two enumerated (p. 9) : Rep. 3 Theaet. 3 ; Polit. 1 Tim. 9.

[127] A. Frederking, 'Sprachliche Kriterien für die Chronologie der platonischen Dialoge,' in *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, 28er Jahrgang, p. 534, 1882 (xxv).

[128] Hermann Hoefer, *De particulis platonicis capita selecta* (Doctor's diss. Univers. Bonn), Bonn 1882 (xxvi).

228. τε ... τε (p. 11): Charm. 1 Gorg. 1 Crat. 1 Symp. 2 Phaedo 2; Rep. *35* Phaedr. *12* Theaet. *5*; Parm. 1 Soph. 3 Polit. 3 Phil. 2 Tim. *11* Critias 1 Legg. *50*.

229. τε ... τε connecting single words, not phrases (p. 11): Rep. 5 Phaedr. *5*; Polit. 1 Tim. 3 Critias 1 Legg. 16. Here we see how by distinguishing the various uses of a word the affinity of dialogues belonging to the later time is made evident, even if at first sight a word's use is not limited to them. This becomes still more instructive by the following distinction:

230. τε ... τε connecting two words not separated by any other part of the phrase, as in Tim. 37 E: τό τ' ἦν τό τ' ἔσται or Critias 121 B: παγκαλοί τε μακάριοί τε (p. 12): Tim. 1 Critias 1 Legg. 1. In this way sometimes an expression which at first sight appears not to be peculiar to a group of dialogues, may by subsequent distinctions be used to characterise several groups. According to Frederking τε ... τε was used indistinguishably in early and late dialogues, while according to the above distinctions established by Hoefer one particular use is limited to the Republic and dialogues later than the Republic, while another particular use exists only in the three latest dialogues, Timaeus, Critias, Laws.

Even the simple τε, which at first sight occurs indifferently in early and late dialogues, may be used for chronological conclusions if some distinctions are made between the different uses.

231. The simple τε, whose frequent occurrence according to Frederking gave no chronological indications, is also shown by Hoefer to furnish some chronological distinctions. It occurs (pp. 5–6): Apol. 1 Crito 1 Charm. 2 Prot. 1 Gorg. 1 Symp. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. *25* Phaedr. **23** Theaet. *6*; Parm. 2 Soph. 3 Polit. *6* Phil. 1 Tim. **198** Critias **27** Legg. **155**. It results that it is used more than twice only in Rep. Phaedr. Theaet. Soph. Polit. Tim. Critias Legg., and more than twice in every five pages only in Tim. Critias Legg. This word appears to have two epochs of greatest frequency, the proportion being in Rep. 13 times to 100 pp. (ed. Didot), rising in Phaedr. to 54 times in 100 pp., rapidly declining in the later dialogues until in Phil. it occurred only once (corresponding to a proportion of 2 in 100 pp.), to rise again to a maximum of 373 times in 100 pp. in Tim., 245 times in 100 pp. in Critias, and to decline once more in the Laws to 65 times in 100 pp. There is no reason whatever to doubt that Plato might have twice increased and then diminished the use of a word. τε being frequent in all books of the Laws, it tells against C. Ritter's opinion that the Philebus was written at the same time as the earlier books of the Laws. Although no positive chronological inferences can be drawn from a single stylistic peculiarity, we may doubt whether Plato avoided almost completely in one work the use of a word frequently used by him at the same time in another work, especially as the use of this word is entirely independent of the contents. But such observations are never decisive so long as they remain isolated. If some other equally important stylistic differences between Phil. and Legg. are found,

then only the presently observed difference will acquire its full value.

232. *τε* connecting phrases, placed immediately after the verb (p. 7): Crito 1 Rep. 3 Phaedr. 1; Parm. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. *8* Critias 1 Legg. 5.

233. *τε* adding a third phrase to two preceding phrases, which are united by *καὶ*, *τε*, *τε* . . . *καί*, *μέν* . . . *τε*, or *μέν* . . . *δέ* (p. 7): Phaedr. 3 Tim. *5* Critias 1 Legg. 9. Hoefer (p. 7) quotes also two other cases of *τε* peculiar to Timaeus and Laws only, too special for inclusion in our list, but very instructive as samples of acute distinction in stylistic statistics, showing the close relation between these two dialogues.

234. *τε* used *ἀνακολούθως* (p. 13): Gorg. 1 Phaedo 2 Rep. 4 Phaedr. 2 Theaet. 1 Tim. 1.

235. *τε* . . . *καί* . . . *δέ* (p. 15): Critias 1 (118 D) Legg. 1 (708 A).

Other particles investigated by Hoefer, as *γάρ*, *τοι*, *που*, *δή*, *μέντοι*, and their various combinations are more characteristic of the earlier than of the later style.

Peipers found some peculiarities of Plato's later style, though style was not the object of his study.

XXI. PEIPERS. Following closely upon these statistics of the use of particles appeared the first special work concerning an important part of Plato's terminology, the use of the words *ὄν* and *οὐσία*. This philological inquiry is contained in Peipers' [94] Platonic ontology (1883), and exceeds in volume all preceding treatises on Plato's style. Of his predecessors, Peipers only knew Dittenberger, though he quotes Campbell's commentary to the *Sophist*, which he used without examining the Introduction. He observed some differences in the use of the terms investigated, but did not build on such stylistic tests any chronological conclusions, while he correctly inferred the very late date of Parm. Soph. Polit. Phil. from their philosophical contents. From his exhaustive enumerations it results that many expressions may be looked upon as peculiarities of later style.

He classified the various meanings of the words *ὄν* and *οὐσία*,

236. *ὄντως ὄν*, in the meaning of metaphysical being, or *οὐσία ὄντως*, in the same meaning, generally *ὄντως* as a metaphysical term, are found by Peipers (pp. 30–31, 514, 540) in: Rep. 3 Phaedr. 3; Soph. *8* Polit. *7* Phil. 2 Tim. 3 Legg. 3.

237. *οὐσία* meaning 'aliquid totum et absolutum, rebus nascentibus et incrementa capientibus oppositum' (pp. 88–108, 515), which is a mixed substance between ideal and material being (of *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον*, *ἀμέριστον* and *μεριστόν*, *ταὐτόν* and *θάτερον*). This

and found certain meanings of these terms very frequent in the latest works.

notion is, according to Peipers, very near to the Aristotelian conception of substance, and is found only in Phil. *8* Tim. **2** Legg. **2**.

238. *οὐσία* = complexus omnium rerum, quas entium nomine appellare homines solent (pp. 28–29 and 512): Rep. 1 (486 A) Soph. 1 (261 E) Tim. **2** (35 A, 37 A).

239. *ὁ ἔστι* (pp. 38–41 and 541): Crat. 2 Symp. 1 Phaedo *7*; Rep. **8** Phaedr. 1 (247 E); Parm. *9* Tim. 1 (39 E).

240. *ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς* (p. 124): Rep. 1 Soph. 1 Phil. 1.

241. *ὄντως* meaning *ἀληθῶς* (pp. 125 and 513): Crat. 1 Rep. **3** Phaedr. **2** Theaet. 1; Soph. *6* Polit. *4* Phil. *11* Tim. *6* Legg. *49*.

242. *ὄν* or *οὐσία* = res vera, opposita fictitiæ (pp. 132–152 and 513): Euthyd. 1 (290 C) Gorg. **2** (472 B, 495 A) Symp. 1 (202 A) Phaedo *7*; Rep. **9** Theaet. *7*; Soph. *13* Polit. 1 Phil. **3** Legg. *25*.

243. *τὸ ὄν* = id quod tam a loci quam a temporis conditionibus liberum, neque nascitur, neque interit, sed immutabile et constans eodem modo semper se habet, objectum philosophandi (pp. 50 and 514): Crat. 1 (424 A) Rep. *22* Phaedr. *4* Theaet. 1 Soph. **36** Phil. **2** Tim. **2** Legg. **2**.

244. *τὰ ὄντα* in the same meaning as above (pp. 63–66): Crat. **2** Phaedo **2**; Rep. **5** Phaedr. **3** Theaet. 1; Parm. **2** Soph. *5* Phil. **2** Tim. **4**.

245. *οὐσία* = substance as object of knowledge (pp. 67 and 515): Crat. *9*; Rep. **11** Phaedr. *4* Theaet. *8*; Parm. **3** Soph. *6* Polit. **3** Tim. 1 Legg. **5**. Some isolated passages quoted by Peipers from other dialogues, as Euthyph. 11 A Charm. 168 C D Prot. 349 B Meno 72 B, seem not to belong here, as they offer a different meaning of *οὐσία*, as 'nature,' 'object,' 'property,' 'definition.'

246. *τὸ ὄν* = what exists, opposed to *μηδέν* (pp. 11–16 and 512): Euthyd. **3** Crat. **2** Symp. 1 (205 B); Rep. **11** Theaet. *11*; Soph. **31** Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. **5**.

247. *οὐσία* = what exists (pp. 17 and 539): Rep. **2** Theaet. *5*; Soph. *7* Polit. **1** Tim. 1.

248. *τὰ ὄντα* = *τὰ πράγματα* (pp. 19–28, 512, 540): Charm. *3* Meno **3** Euthyd. *6* Gorg. *5* Crat. **25** Symp. **2** Phaedo *9*; Rep. **4** Phaedr. *6* Theaet. *8*; Parm. *5* Soph. *4* Polit. **3** Phil. *6* Tim. **3** Legg. **6**.

249. *τὸ ὄν* = veritas cognitione aut oratione expressa (pp. 222–230): Euthyd. *4* Gorg. 1 Crat. **2**; Rep. **4** Phaedr. **3** Theaet. *5*; Parm. 1 Soph. *4*.

Peipers' distinctions obscure; his work should be repeated from the stand-

Peipers' distinctions are sometimes obscure, and the numerous quotations collected in his work are not conveniently arranged. The *Laws* are treated apart in a few pages towards the end of the work (pp. 512-516). Peipers did not count the passages quoted, nor did he distinguish the number of occurrences in a single passage. His work remains a valuable collection of texts, which calls for a complete digest by some clearer expositor.

His conclusions on the order of dialogues do not precisely correspond to considerations of style. Against the purely statistical evidence, Peipers separates the *Phaedrus* from the *Republic* by the *Banquet*, and puts the *Theaetetus* later than the *Timaeus*, following alleged differences of ontological doctrines not easily definable. But he had the great merit of recognising the very late date of Soph. Polit. Phil., as written after the *Republic*.

point of stylistic investigation.

XXII. P. WEBER. After so many investigations on Plato's vocabulary, P. Weber [129] (1884) returned to the old problem of the construction of phrases in Plato. But he seems to have wholly ignored the relation between the style and the chronology of Plato's writings, and he neither distinguishes the single dialogues nor enumerates the passages, except when dealing with some very rare stylistic peculiarity. Under these circumstances Weber's dissertation is chiefly of interest as contributing to the stylistic definition of Plato's works as a whole, for comparison with other authors, but containing very few hints for distinctions between early and later style:

P. Weber also ignored the relation between the style and the chronology, and gave only in a few instances complete enumerations of passages, by which omission he deprived us of many useful indications.

250. ἵνα with conjunct. '*nach Nebenzeiten*,' and referring to a design lasting up to the present time (p. 11): Crito 1 Prot. 2 Meno 1 Crat. 1 Symp. 2; Rep. 1 Theaet. 3 Parm. 1; Tim. 3 Legg. 3.

251. ὅπως with conjunct. '*nach Hauptzeiten, in vollständigen Finalsätzen*' (p. 13): Symp. 1 Legg. 9.

252. ὅπως with optativ. praes. '*nach Nebenzeiten, in vollständigen Finalsätzen*' (p. 14): Prot. 1 Phaedr. 1 Tim. *5*.

253. ὅπως ἄν with conjunct. '*in vollständigen und unvollständigen Finalsätzen*' (pp. 14, 21): Lach. 1 Prot. 1 Gorg. *6* Symp. 1 Phaedo 1; Rep. 9 Phaedr. 1; Tim. 1 Legg. *22*.

Weber also gives the number of all occurrences of final sentences with μή, ἵνα, ὅπως, ὡς, with various tenses and moods, but without distinction of single dialogues, so that his work must be repeated if it is to afford chronological distinctions.

XXIII. DROSTE. A marked contrast to both the

Droste first distinguished

[129] Dr. Philipp Weber, *Der Absichtssatz bei Plato*, Würzburg 1884. A Doctor's dissertation of the university of Würzburg. This is the xxviiith publication on this subject, Peipers' being the xxviith.

classes of rare words according to the mode of their formation, so effecting a progress in the method of stylistic investigations.

preceding writers as to the clearness of exposition and excellent method of investigation is presented in the dissertation of P. Droste [130] of Düsseldorf (1886), who undertook to represent Plato's use of adjectives terminating in *ειδής* and *ώδης*. Since Campbell nobody had examined the formation of new rare words by Plato, and Droste knew none of his predecessors except Dittenberger, yet he unconsciously perfected the Scotch investigator's method, distinguishing classes of new rare words according to the mode of their formation, and not only according to their meaning or origin. This endows Droste with a merit scarcely dreamed of by him, and manifests at the same time how progress in scientific method may be realised apart from wide knowledge. Droste dissects Plato's art of word-building under one of its aspects, dealing with words mostly very rare and invented by Plato for the expression of his thoughts against the general usage of his times: of seventy given adjectives, forty-six are never used before (13 in *ειδής* and 33 in *ώδης*), and thirty-seven are later accepted by Aristotle (7 in *ειδής* and 30 in *ώδης*). Droste minutely compared Plato's use of such adjectives with their employment by earlier and later authors. Before Plato these words were rare, and since Plato they became very common, as is easily seen from the following table:

Number of different	used by poets:								historians:			philosophers:		
	Homer	Hesiod	Æschylus	Sophocles	Euripides	Aristoph.	Pindar	Theognis	Herodotus	Thucydid.	Xenophon	Plato	Aristotle	Later authors
adjj. in ειδής	7	4	3	1	5	1	1	2	7	3	6	22	48	430
adjj. in ώδης except those derived from δζω	4	1	2	10	22	10	2	0	7	11	17	48	152	900

This table is re-arranged according to the table given by Droste (p. 39). It follows that Æschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Pindar, Herodotus, and Thucydides taken all together had used a smaller number of adjj. in ειδής than Plato alone, while after Plato the use of both kinds of adjj. rapidly increased.

[130] P. Droste, *De adjectivorum in ειδής et in ώδης desinentium apud Platonem usu* (Doctor's diss. Univ. Marburg), Marpurgi, without date, published 1886 according to Hinrich's Catalogue (xxix).

This interesting comparison proves how well chosen was the use of such adjectives, as constituting an important peculiarity of Plato's style. The relative occurrence in various dialogues is seen from the following table, constructed from the materials given by Droste, pp. 18–19, 37–41, re-arranged in a more systematic manner than in his tables:

In	Number of different adjectives terminating in		Total of occurrences of all adjectives terminating in		OBSERVATIONS.—All quoted adjectives are used only once by Plato, unless the number of occurrences in each dialogue is shown. Adjectives invented by Plato and used for the first time are printed in heavy type + = not used before Plato; * = not used before nor after Plato; A = accepted by Aristotle; Aesch. = used by Aeschylus; Eur. = used by Euripides, Her. = used by Herodotus; Xen. = used by Xenophon; Hom. = used by Homer; Hes. = used by Hesiod; Iso. = used by Isocrates
	-ειδής	-ώδης	-ειδής	-ώδης	
Crito . .	1	1	1	1	(1) εὐειδής (Aesch. Eur. Her. Xenoph.) occurs Crito 1 Rep. 2, A.—[1] νοσώδης (Iso.) is found in Plato more often than any other adjective in ώδης, occurring 24 times: Crito 1 Charm. 3 Lach. 1 Symp. 2 Rep. 9 Theaet. 1 Polit. 3 Legg. 3 (Alc. I. 1) A.
Charm. .	—	2	—	4	[1].—[2] + αἰνιγματώδης, A, seems to be the first adjective in ώδης invented by Plato, occurs Charm. 1 Theaet. 1 and Alc. II. 1.
Lach. .	—	1	—	1	[1] 195 c.
Meno. .	—	1	—	1	[3] ὀγκώδης (Xen.) A.
Euthyd..	—	1	—	1	[4] τερατώδης (Aristophanes) A.
Gorg. .	1	—	1	—	(2) + ἀειδής occurs Gorg. 1 Crat. 1 Phaedo 12, A.
Crat. . .	2	8	2	12	+ (2).—(3) * τραγοειδής—[5] + γλοιώδης, A —[6] + κολλώδης, A,—[7] + φυσώδης, A.—[8] + σκοτώδης, A, occurs Crat. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. 2 Legg. 1—[9] + ζημιώδης, A, occurs Crat. 5 Legg. 2—[10] + διθυραμβώδης—[11] θηριώδης (Eur. Xen.), A, occurs Crat. 1 Rep. 1 Polit. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 3.—[12] πνευματώδης, A. Only these 8 adjectives in ώδης are enumerated, occurring 12 times, while according to Droste's table 9 different adjectives are used in the Cratylus 13 times.
Symp. .	1	3	2	4	(4) + μονοειδής, A, used Symp. 2 Phaedo 3 Rep. 1 Theaet. 1 Tim. 1—[13] εὐώδης (Hom.), used Symp. 1 Phaedr. 1 Tim. 1 Critias 1, A.—[14] ἀνδραποδώδης (Xen.) used Symp. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 Legg. 1, A.
Phaedo .	8	5	25	5	+ (2)—+ (4)—(5) πολυειδής (Thucydides) occurs Phaedo 1 Rep. 3 Phaedr. 3 Soph. 1, A.—(6) θεοειδής (Hom. Hes.) occurs Phaedo 1 Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1, Epinomis.—(7) χρυσοειδής (Xen.) A—(8) σκιοειδής (Aristoph.) A—(9) + θνητοειδής—(10) + σωματοειδής, used Phaedo 5 Rep. 1 Polit. 1 Tim. 2, A—[14]—[15] πηλώδης (Thucyd.) A—[16] + δημώδης: Phaedo 1 Legg. 1—[17] + βορβορώδης, A.—[18] + γεώδης: Phaedo 2 Tim. 3 Critias 1, A.

In	Number of different adjectives terminating in -ειδής	Number of different adjectives terminating in -ώδης	Total of occurrences of all adjectives terminating in -ειδής	Total of occurrences of all adjectives terminating in -ώδης	OBSERVATIONS.—All quoted adjectives are used only once by Plato, unless the number of occurrences in each dialogue is shown. Adjectives invented by Plato and used for the first time are printed in heavy type. + = not used before Plato; * = not used before nor after Plato; A = accepted by Aristotle; Aesch. = used by Aeschylus; Eur = used by Euripides; Her. = used by Herodotus; Xen. = used by Xenophon; Hom. = used by Homer; Hes. = used by Hesiod; Iso. = used by Isocrates.
Rep. . .	8	16	39	28	(1)—+ (4)—(5)—(6)—+ (10)—(11): *θυμοειδής* (Xen.) used in the meaning 'hot-tempered,' chiefly of restive horses: Rep. 8 Legg. 2, distinguished from the philosophical term + **θυμοειδής**: Rep. 19 Tim. 1, A—(12) + **ἀγαθοειδής**—(13) + **ἡλιοειδής**: Rep. 2, A—[1]—+ [8]—[11]—[14]—[19] + **θρηνώδης** Rep. 3 Legg. 1—[20] *ὑπνώδης* (Eur.) A—[21] + **φλεγματώδης**, A—[22] + **μειρακιώδης**, Rep. 2, A—[23] + **ἀλιτηριώδης**, Rep. 1 Legg. 2—[24] + **σπηλαιώδης**—[25] *μυθώδης* (Isocr.) A—[26] + **κηφηνώδης**—[27] + **λεοντώδης**, A—[28] + **ὀφεώδης**, A—[29] + **ὀχλώδης**—[30] *πετρώδης* (Sophocl.) A, in the order of occurrences; Droste counted 26 instead of 28.
Phaedr. .	2	2	4	2	(5)—(6)—[13]—[14], as in Phaedo and Symposium.
Theaet. .	1	4	1	4	+(4)—+ [2]—[31] + **κοπρώδης**, A—[32] + **ληρώδης**, A—[33] + **λιθώδης**, A.
Parm. .	—	1	—	1	[34] + **πραγματειώδης**.
Soph. .	2	—	2	—	(5)—(14) *δυσειδής* (Sophocl. Her.).
Polit. .	1	3	1	5	+ (10)—[11]—[1]—[35] + **κροκώδης**.
Phil. . .	1	1	1	1	(15) * **περατοειδής**—[36] + **παιδαριώδης**, A.
Tim. . .	9	12	13	16	+ (4) —+ (10) — + (11) — (16) *σφαιροειδής* (Xen.) Tim. 4, A—(17) + **λιθοειδής**—(18) + **ἀεροειδής**, A—(19) + **κηροειδής**—(20) + **σαρκοειδής**, A—(21) * *στερεοειδής*—[11]—[13]—+ [18]—[37] *ἀώδης*—[38] *σαρκώδης* (Her. Xen.) A—[39] *χολώδης*, Tim. 3, A—[40] + **ἱμαντώδης**—[41] + **οἰστρώδης**, Tim. 1 Legg. 1—[42] + **λιτρώδης**—[43] + **ῥυώδης**, A—[44] + **θορυβώδης**, Tim. 1 Legg. 1, A—[48] + **νευρώδης** has not been counted by Droste, though it is quoted p. 34; this increases the number of adjectives to 12, of occurrences to 16.
Critias .	—	3	—	3	[13]—+ [18]—[45] *πυρώδης* (Aristoph.) A.
Laws .	2	12	3	18	(11)—(22) * **πυροειδής**—[1]—+ [8]—+ [9]—[11]—[14]—+ [16]—+ [19]—+ [23]—+ [41]—+ [44]—[46] + **γοώδης**, A—[47] + **αἱμασιώδης**.

In no other dialogue adjectives in *ειδής* or *ώδης* are found, except Epinomis (6) Alc. I. [1] [14] and Alc. II. [2], in each of which occur only 1-2 adjectives used by Plato in authentic dialogues, and in Alc. I. *πρεπώδης*, taken from Aristophanes.

New-invented adjectives

The most interesting general result of Droste's investigation is that not one of the spurious dialogues contains new-invented adjectives in *ειδής* or *ώδης*, and

that even those introduced by Plato are used only in four isolated instances in probably spurious dialogues, as *Alcibiades I.* and *II.* and *Epinomis*. This shows the originality of vocabulary to be an inimitable peculiarity of Plato's style, and further increases the improbability of anybody but Plato having written such original works as the *Parmenides, Sophist,* and *Politicus*. In these dialectical dialogues adjj. in *ειδής* and *ώδης* are scarce, while many new-formed adjectives in *ικός* abound; Droste counted 224 such adjectives in the *Sophist*, and 320 in the *Politicus*, while only 12 occur in the *Phaedo*. Droste's dissertation offers important additions to our list of peculiarities of later style:

in *ειδής* and *ώδης* do not occur in spurious dialogues, while they are frequent in authentic works.

254. New-invented adjj. in *ειδής* occur (p. 18): Gorg. 1 Crat. 2 Symp. 2 Phaedo *21*; Rep. *24* Theaet. 1; Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. *8* Legg. 1. (These numbers are not given by Droste; they result from the above table.)

255. New-invented adjj. in *ώδης* (pp. 38 and 31–35): Charm. 1 Crat. *10* Phaedo *4*; Rep. 14 Theaet. 4; Parm. 1 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. *9* Critias 1 Legg. 11.

256. *πολυειδής*: Phaedo 1 Rep. 3 Phaedr. 3; Soph. 1, A (Table (5), Droste, p. 11).

257. *+μονοειδής*: Symp. 2 Phaedo 3; Rep. 1 Theaet. 1; Tim. 1, A (Table (4), Droste, p. 11).

In these adjectives the primitive meaning of the termination is preserved, though here, too, *εἶδος* often means species and not form. This use of adjj. in *ειδής* to designate a species corresponds to a logical tendency, as Droste well observed, and was never attempted before Plato. Plato introduced it into the Greek language 'ex necessitate quadam et ex philosophandi angustiis' (p. 19).

Plato first introduced the use of such adjectives to designate a species, and he used them frequently also in other meanings well defined by Droste.

258. Adjj. in *ειδής* designating a species (p. 14): Phaedo ((6) (8) (9) (10)) *8* Rep. ((10) (11) (12) (13)) *23* Polit. ((10)) 1 Phil. ((15)) 1 Tim. ((10) (11) (18) (19) (20) (21)) *7* Legg. ((22)) 1.

Among these adjectives some are specially characteristic:

259. *+σωματοειδής* (p. 15): Phaedo *5* Rep. 1 Polit. 1 Tim. 2, A.

260. *θυμοειδής* (p. 16), in the same meaning as in Xenophon: Rep. 8 Legg. 2 (see table (11)).

261. +*θυμοειδής* (p. 15), as philosophical term, used also later by A.: Rep. *19* Tim. 1.

262. Adjectives in *ειδής* or *ώδης* designating form or colour (including *ἀειδής*) (pp. 10, 13–14, 31): Crito ((1)) 1 Gorg. ((2)) 1 Crat. ((2) (3)) 2 Phaedo ((2) (7)) *13* Rep. ((1) (6)) 3 Phaedr. ((6)) 1 Soph. ((14)) 1 Tim. ((16) (17) [39]) *7*. (*θεοειδής* is used in this meaning only Rep. 501 B Phaedr. 251 A, while in Phaedo 95 C and Epinomis it designates a species.)

More frequent are the adjectives in *ώδης*, which are classified by Droste according to their meaning. Those derived from *ὄζω* form one class, containing only *εὐώδης* and *ἀώδης*, of which the second is used only once (*Tim.* 50 E).

263. *εὐώδης*: Symp. 1 Phaedr. 1 Tim. 1 Critias 1, A (Droste, p. 31, table [13]).

264. Adjectives in *ώδης* designating similarity (pp. 31–32): Crat. ([10] [11]) 2 Phaedo ([16]) 1 Rep. ([11] [14] [22] [26–30]) 9 Phaedr. ([14]) 1 Theaet. ([31] [33]) 2 Polit. ([11]) 1 Phil. ([36]) 1 Tim. ([40] [41]) 2 Critias ([45]) 1 Legg. ([11] [16] [41]) 5. Among these the following are characteristic:

265. *θηριώδης*: Crat. 1 Rep. 1 Polit. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 3.—A. (in Tim. 91 E it designates a species, while in Legg. 909 A it means 'like brutes,' and in other passages, as Rep. 571 C, Legg. 906 B, it has a similar meaning).

266. +*δημώδης*: Phaedo 1 Legg. 1.

267. *ἀνδραποδώδης* (p. 32): Symp. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 Legg. 1 (in Symp. 215 E and Legg. 880 A it designates a species. Droste omitted Phaedo 69 B, where it means similarity).

268. +*οἰστρώδης*: Tim. 1 Legg. 1.

269. Adjectives in *ώδης* designating a species (pp. 32–33): Crito ([1]) 1 Charm. ([1] [2]) *4* Lach. ([1]) 1 Crat. ([5–8] [12]) *5* Symp. ([1] [14]) 2 Phaedo ([17] [18]) 3 Rep. ([1] [24] 6 Theaet. ([1] [2]) 2 Polit. ([1] [35]) *4* Tim. ([11] [18] [42] [43]) *5* Critias ([18]) 1 Legg. ([14] [47]) 2.

270. +*νοσώδης*, designating a species: Crito 1 Charm *3* Lach. 1 Symp. 1 Rep. 5 Theaet. 1 Polit. 3, A. This meaning, as for instance Rep. 488 E, is different from the following:

271. *νοσώδης*: meaning sickly, diseased, opposed to *ὑγιεινός*: Symp. 1 Rep. 4 Legg. 3, A. (Droste omitted Rep. 556 E, and quotes therefore only three passages in Rep.)

272. *γεώδης*: Phaedo 2 Tim. 3 Critias 1, A (in Tim. 66 B it does not designate a species, but local connection).

273. σκοτώδης: Crat. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. 2 Legg. 1, A (of these only in Crat. 412 B is a species designated, while the other passages use that word in the meaning called by Droste 'of local connection,' as 'full of darkness').

274. Adjectives in ώδης indicating local connection (p. 34) meaning 'full of . . .': Meno ([3]) 1 Euthyd. ([4]) 1 Crat. ([8]) 1 Symp. ([1]) 1 Phaedo ([8] [15]) 2 Rep. ([1] [8] [25]) 7 Theaet. ([32]) 1 Parm. ([34]) 1 Tim. ([18] [38] [39] [48]) 5 Legg. ([1] [8] [19] [46]) 6. This use is distinguished by Droste from the preceding, and also from the following, as may be seen by comparing the meaning of θρηνώδης in Legg. 792 B (**274**) and Rep. 398 E (**275**), of χολώδης in Tim. 86 E (**274**) and Tim. 71 B, 83 B (**262**).

275. Adjectives in ώδης denoting causal relations (p. 34): Crat. [9] 5 Rep. [19, 20, 21, 23] 6 Tim. [44] (42 D) 1 Legg. [9] (650 A, 690 E) [23] (854 B, 881 E) [44] (671 A) 5.

Among these the following occur in more than one dialogue:

276. ἀλιτηριώδης (p. 34): Rep. 1 Legg. 2.

277. ζημιώδης (p. 34): Crat. 5 Legg. 2 (Droste omitted Crat. 418 A, B).

278. θορυβώδης (p. 35): Tim. 1 Legg. 1.

Droste's dissertation is a model of stylistic investigation made for the purposes of Platonic chronology. We see that in the above enumeration the *Phaedo* very frequently occurs together with later works, and Droste inferred that the *Phaedo* was written after the *Phaedrus*. But this cannot be decided without considering many other peculiarities of vocabulary and style, besides the adjectives investigated by Droste; it will then appear that the *Phaedrus* is much nearer to the *Republic* as well as to the latest six dialogues than the *Phaedo*, though in some respects the *Phaedo* may approach the style of the *Republic* more nearly than does the *Phaedrus*. The natural explanation is that the *Phaedo* immediately preceded the *Republic*, while the *Phaedrus* followed it.

Droste's dissertation a model of method, though one of his conclusions is erroneous.

The *Phaedo* not later than the *Phaedrus*, as Droste believed.

XXIV. F. KUGLER. A dissertation published at the same time as Droste's, by F. Kugler,[131] of Basel, on τοί and its compounds, shows also certain analogies between

Kugler found many uses

[131] F. Kugler, *Dissertatio inauguralis de particulae τοί ejusque compositorum apud Platonem usu* (Doct. diss. Univ. Basel), Trogen 1886 (xxx).

of τοίνυν prevailing in the latest group; especially the syllogistic use in conclusions, while μέντοι became scarcer.

the *Phaedrus* and the latest group which are lacking in the *Phaedo*, and many others between the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*.

279. μέντοι used to oppose to each other two parts of the same phrase (p. 26): Prot. *4* Meno 1 Euthyd. 1 Gorg. **2** Symp. 1 Phaedo **2**; Rep. 4 Phaedr. **2** Theaet. 1; Parm. 1 Polit. 1 Phil. 1, including also some cases of opposition by means of οὐ μέντοι, and μὴ μέντοι.

280. γὲ . . . μέντοι (p. 27): Crito 1 Euthyd. 1 Gorg. **2**; Rep. **3** Phaedr. 1 Theaet. **4**; Soph. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 1.

281. τοι between article and substantive (p. 7): Symp. 1 Theaet. 1 Soph. 1 Phil. 1.

282. τοι after the verb (p. 7): Gorg. 1 Phaedo 1; Theaet. 1 Soph. 1.

283. καίτοι = et vero (pp. 17–18): Gorg. **2**; Rep. 1 Theaet. 1; Phil. 1 Legg. **3**.

284. τοίνυν in the conclusion of a syllogism or of a similar argument (p 32): Crito 1 (44 A) Charm. **2** (162 B syll.) Meno **2** Gorg. **4** Crat. 1 (432 D syll.) Phaedo **3** (62 C syll.) Rep. *18* (368 E, 603 A syll.) Phaedr. *4* Theaet. 1 (192 E syll.) Soph. *8* Polit. *4* Phil. *10* (including three syll. 33 E, 41 D, 56 C) Legg. **14**.

This increasing use of a word which was afterwards so much used by Aristotle in logical conclusions is very characteristic of the progress made by Plato in his logical terminology.

285. τοίνυν ἔτι in transitions (p. 34): Charm. 1 Phaedo 1; Soph. **3** Polit. **2** Phil. **2** (the form ἔτι τοίνυν is much more often used).

286. ἔτι δὴ τοίνυν: Phil. 1 (52 A) Legg. 1 (817 E).

287. καὶ τοίνυν (p. 34): Soph. **2** Polit. 1 Legg. **3** (while καὶ . . . τοίνυν was used earlier, in Charm. 1 Gorg. 1 Rep. 4 Theaet. 1 and also in Phil. 1).

288. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν (p. 35): Crat. 1 (426 C) Phaedo 1 (90 D) Rep. 1 Polit. 1 Phil. **2** Legg. **3**.

289. τοίνυν begins a new argument (p. 35): Apol. 1 Euthyph. 1 Crito 1 Charm. *3* Gorg. 1 Crat. *9* Symp. 1 Phaedo *6*; Rep. **13** Phaedr. *6* Theaet. *6*; Parm. 1 Soph. *10* Polit. *13* Phil. *9* Legg. *21*.

290. τοίνυν in transitions (p. 35): Crito 1 Crat. *9* Symp. 1 Phaedo 1; Rep. **14** Theaet. **4**; Soph. *4* Polit. 1 Phil. *4* Legg. **9**.

291. δὴ τοίνυν (p. 36): Rep. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. **5**.

292. τοίνυν δή: Gorg. 1 Legg. 1.

293. ἤδη τοίνυν (p. 36): Meno 1 Crat. 1; Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 1.

294. μὴ τοίνυν (p. 36): Crito 1 Charm. 1 Lach. 1 Meno 1 Symp. 1 Phaedo 1; Rep. **4** Theaet. **3**; Soph. *7* Polit. 1 Phil. **2** Legg. **6**.

295. *οὐ—τοίνυν* (p. 36): Soph. 1 Legg. 1.

296. *τοίνυν*, instead of being the second word of the phrase as usual, is placed in the third place or further (p. 36): Apol. 1 Euthyph. 1 Charm. 1 Meno 1 Euthyd. 1 Crat. 1 Phaedo 1; Rep. **10** Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 1; Soph. *5* Polit. *7* Phil. **3** Legg. **8**.

297. *ὡς δή τοι* (p. 12), beginning an evident conclusion: Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 Tim. 1.

298. *καίτοι . . . δέ* or *ὅμως δέ* (p. 19): Apol. 1 Lach. 1 Meno 1 Euthyd. 1 Gorg. 1; Rep. **3** Phaedr. **2**; Parm. 1 Phil. 1 Critias 1 Legg. **3**.

299. *ἀληθῆ μέντοι* (in affirmative answers, p. 23): Lach. 1 Rep. 1 Soph. 1 Legg. **5**.

300. *ἤτοι . . . ἤ* (p. 14): Prot. **2** Meno **2** Gorg. **2** Crat. *5* Phaedo **2**; Rep. **2** Phaedr. 1 Theaet. **3**; Parm. **3** Phil. **2** Legg. **2**.

301. *καίτοι . . . ἀλλά* (p. 19): Lach. *3* Gorg. 1 Crat. 1 Phaedo 1; Parm. 1; Polit. 1 Legg. **2**.

302. Simple *μῶν* (p. 40): Prot. 1 Meno **2** Euthyd. **2**; Rep. 1 Theaet. 1; Soph. **2** Polit. **2** Phil. 1 Legg. **5**.

303. *μῶν οὖν* (p. 40): Soph. **2** Polit. **2** Phil. *4* Legg. **10** (including one *οὖν μῶν*).

304. *μῶν οὐ* (p. 40): Soph. **3** Polit. **2** Phil. *4* Legg. **10**.

305. *μῶν μή* (p. 40): Phaedo 1 Rep. **2** Soph. 1 Phil. 1.

306. *τοίνυν* more than four times oftener than *μέντοι* (p. 45): Soph. *55/13* Polit. *46/7* Phil. *52/8* Legg. *120/17* while in all other works *τοίνυν* is much scarcer, occurring in no other dialogue twice as often as *μέντοι*, the proportion to *μέντοι* being in Rep. Phaedr. Theaet. $\frac{188}{158}$, in Euthyphr. Apol. Crito Charm. Lach. Prot. $\frac{53}{88}$, in Meno Euthyd. Gorg. Crat. Symp. Phaedo $\frac{123}{125}$, in Parm. $\frac{3}{13}$, in Tim. Critias $\frac{0}{8}$.

It would be unjustifiable to draw any inference from the absence of both particles in Tim. Critias, or from the scarcity of *τοίνυν* in Parm. The only conclusion allowed is, that Soph. Polit. Phil. Legg. have the peculiarity in common of an exceptional predominance of *τοίνυν* over *μέντοι*. From a single peculiarity no chronological conclusions can be drawn, but this peculiarity, joined to many others, offers a measure of affinity between the dialogues in question.

These observations are valuable, but Kugler attributed too great importance to the scarcity of *τοίνυν* in the *Parmenides*.

307. *μέντοι* occurs less than once in two pages only in (p. 45): Crito *2* Prot. *19* Meno *6* Gorg. *23* Symp. *18*; Phaedr. *16* Parm. *13*; Soph. *13* Polit. **7** Phil. **8** Tim. **0** Critias **0** Legg. **17** being less than once in five pages only in Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg. This acquires a special importance if we consider that *μέντοι* went

out of frequent use in Plato's time as Kugler has shown by comparing other authors, from Xenophon, in whose writings μέντοι greatly prevails over τοίνυν, down to Demosthenes, who uses μέντοι very rarely.

308. τοίνυν is very frequent, occurring once in two pages or oftener in: Crito *5* Charm. *20* Lach. *10* Meno *13* Crat. *32*; Rep. *133* Theaet. *39*; Soph. *55* Polit. *46* Phil. *52* Legg. *120*.

From these and many other uses of τοι Kugler inferred quite correctly that the *Sophist, Politicus, Philebus* belong to the same period as *Timaeus, Critias, Laws*.

Schanz independently confirmed Campbell's conclusions.

XXV. M. SCHANZ. The same conclusion is also reached by Martin Schanz,[132] the editor of Plato, who simultaneously with the dissertations of Kugler and Droste published his article on the development of Plato's style. Though he quotes Campbell's emendations to the *Sophist* in his critical edition of the same dialogue, Schanz seems not to have read Campbell's Introduction. Directing his attention to expressions designating truth and being, he found:

309. ὄντως: Euthyd. **1** Crat. **1**; Rep. **9** Phaedr. *6* Theaet. **1**; Soph. **21** Polit. *11* Phil. *15* Tim. *8* Legg. *50*, while in earlier works τῷ ὄντι is used instead, which is entirely absent from Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg., and occurs but once in Soph.

310. ἀληθείᾳ (used instead of τῇ ἀληθείᾳ) only in Prot. **3** Phil. **1** Tim. **1** Legg. **3**.

311. ἀληθῶς (instead of ὡς ἀληθῶς): Apol. **1** Euthyph. **1** Prot. **1** Meno **2** Euthyd. **1** Phaedo **2**; Rep. **8** Phaedr. **1** Theaet. **1**; Soph. *6* Polit. *4* Phil. *7* Tim. **3** Legg. **6**.

Gomperz recognised the conclusions reached by both Dittenberger and Schanz,

XXVI. GOMPERZ. Only these few observations of Schanz, with those of Dittenberger, became generally known to German philologers. They did not convince Zeller, but they were held sufficient for the stylistic definition of the latest group of Plato's works by another most competent historian of Greek philosophy, Theodor Gomperz[133] (1887), of the University of Vienna. He

[132] Martin Schanz, 'Zur Entwickelung des platonischen Stils' in *Hermes*, vol. xxvi. pp. 437–459, for 1886 (xxxi).

[133] Th. Gomperz, 'Platonische Aufsätze,' in *Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Wien*, vol. cxiv. pp. 741–766, Vienna 1887 (xxxii).

repeated Dittenberger's observations, and insisted on their decisive importance as to the order of the Platonic dialogues. Gomperz argued that the more or less frequent recurrence of words does not lead to such certain conclusions as does the complete absence of certain words in certain dialogues; and in this he unconsciously agreed with Campbell, who also had chiefly directed his attention to the presence or absence of certain words in some dialogues. Yet it cannot be denied that observations on the comparative frequency or rarity of words give valuable confirmation of conclusions obtained from complete changes of vocabulary, and also that the number of words increasing in frequency is vastly greater than the number of expressions replaced by synonyms. We have no reason to disdain supplementary evidence on a matter in which, as in other historical problems, even the greatest amount of testimony leads only to progressive probability.

and he insisted upon the importance of negative evidence.

XXVII. C. RITTER. The question of comparative recurrence was the object of the first book on Plato's style, a monument of patient labour, by Constantin Ritter[134] (1888), now teacher at the gymnasium of Ellwangen in Würtemberg. Until the publication of this book the investigations on the style of Plato were published as academic dissertations, articles in reviews, or as with Campbell, Riddell, Blass, and Peipers, in volumes on a different subject. Ritter was the first to write a special work on the matter, but he likewise knew only a few among his predecessors. He quotes Blass, Dittenberger, Frederking, Schanz, and Roeper, out of all the authors who had preceded him in studying Plato's style. But, again, as with Droste, this incomplete bibliographical equipment did not prevent Ritter from achieving a great progress towards the full solution of our problem, and even perfecting earlier methods. He not only corrected numerical errors committed by Ditten-

C. Ritter knew only five out of his predecessors, but he achieved a great progress in the study of Plato's style by measuring the opportunities for the occurrence of different assertions and negations.

[134] C. Ritter, *Untersuchungen über Plato*, Stuttgart 1888 (xxxiii).

berger, Frederking, and Schanz: he introduced a new method of estimating the recurrence of words, undertaking to calculate the number of opportunities for the introduction of at least one important class of words used by Plato. Previous writers had only reckoned the words occurring—or the number of times each word recurred in each dialogue—or the proportion of occurrences to a page of text. Nobody had counted the number of opportunities for using a given word. This Ritter did, and found for various kinds of affirmative and negative answers a better basis of comparison than that of the proportion to a page of text. He accepted the sum of all such forms of answer as the number of opportunities for the occurrence of each special form of answer, and referred to this number the particular observations of each form.

This was an important step in advance as regards method, to which corresponded also a remarkable progress in the knowledge of Platonic chronology. Before Ritter only the order of the last six dialogues was well ascertained. His merit lies in giving a detailed justification of Campbell's earlier supposition that the group preceding the *Sophist* consisted of the *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, and *Theaetetus*. From the numerous observations of Ritter the following more especially characterise the latest group of six dialogues:

C. Ritter investigated a greater number of stylistic peculiarities than any of his German predecessors, and, though he did not

312. *πρέπον ἂν εἴη* (p. 6): Tim. **2** Legg. **16**.

313. *πῶς καὶ πῇ* (p. 67): Phil. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. **2**.

314. *ὡς δυνατόν* (p. 6): Phil. 1 Legg. **4**.

315. *καθαπερεί* (p. 58): Polit. 1 Phil. **3** Tim. 1 Legg. 1.

316. *χρεών* (p. 6): Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Tim. **3** Critias **2** Legg. *57*.

317. *εἶπον* predominates over *ἔλεγον* (p. 10): Symp. *3/2* Parm. *5/3* Soph. *4/1* Polit. *5/4* Phil. *5/4* Tim. *3/0* Critias *1/0* Legg. *24/6*.

318. Answers such as *ἔγωγε*, *ἔμοιγε*, and the like (*δοκεῖ μοι, ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ*) which denote a subjective assent, are very rare, occurring less than once in sixty answers (p. 17): Phaedr. *1/69* Parm. *7/486* Soph. *1/215* Polit. *3/251* Phil. *3/314* Tim. **0/13** Critias **0/0** Legg. **0/568** (in earlier dialogues they occur very often, namely, once in five answers in Euthyph. Meno, once in six answers in Lach. Euthyd. Gorg., once in seven to ten answers in Apol. Crito Charm. Crat.

Theaet., once in sixteen to eighteen answers in Prot. Phaedo Rep.).

319. *κατά γε τὴν ἐμήν* (p. 68): Polit. **2** Phil. **1** Tim. **1** Legg. **1.**

320. Inversion of the ordinary position of *λέγεις*, as for instance *λέγεις ἀληθέστατα* instead of *ἀληθέστατα λέγεις* (p. 56): Soph. *4* Polit. **2** Legg. **3.**

321. *τὸ πάμπαν* (p. 72): Polit. **2** Tim. **2** Legg. **3.**

322. *εἰκὸς γοῦν* (p. 57): Parm. 1 Soph. *4* Polit. *7* Phil. *5* Legg. **16.**

know Campbell, reached similar conclusions.

Other peculiarities of later style extend also over the group of Rep. Phaedr. Theaet.:

323. *πάντῃ πάντως* (pp. 67, 101): Phaedr. 1 Parm. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 2.

324. *εἴρηται* (p. 10): Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. **2** Tim. **3** Legg. **11.**

325. Superlatives *ἀληθέστατα, ὀρθότατα λέγεις* prevail over corresponding positives in affirmative answers (Ritter, p. 19, corrected by Tiemann, [137] p. 586) only in: Phil. **22/6** Legg **36/22** and are half as frequent or oftener in Phaedo *4/8* Rep. *29/48* Phaedr. *2/2* Theaet. *8/14* Soph. *6/10* Polit. *7/8.*

326. *γὰρ οὖν* in short answers (pp. 57, 100): Rep. **4** Theaet. 1 Parm. **22** Soph. *6* Polit. *5* Phil. 1 Legg. 1.

327. *πάντως καὶ πάντῃ* (p. 67): Rep. 1 Phil. 1.

328. *ἢ πῶς . . . ἢ πῶς* (p. 57): Rep. 1 Phil. *5* Legg. **6.**

329. *μυρίῳ* (p. 5): Rep. 1 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 2.

330. *ἀναγκαῖον, ἀναγκαιότατα* (p. 20): Rep. **3** Soph. 1 Phil. *7* Legg. **4.**

331. *ἢ πῶς;* (p. 24, in questions exacting affirmative answers): Rep. 1 Parm. 1 Soph. *4* Polit. **3** Phil. *5* Legg. **3.**

332. *πῇ;* (p. 25): Rep. **4** Parm. **3** Soph. *7* Polit. *6* Phil. **3** Legg. **3.**

333. *πῶς εἶπες;* (p. 25): Rep. 1 Polit. **3** Phil. 1 Legg. 1.

334. *δῆλον ὡς* (pp. 2-3): Rep. **2** Phaedr. **3** Soph. *8* Polit. **2** Phil. *5* Tim. **4** Critias 1 Legg. **14.**

335. *μακρῷ* (p. 5): Rep. **2** Theaet. 1 Phil. **2** Tim. 1 Legg. **4.**

336. *ἐῤῥήθη* (p. 10): Rep. 1 Theaet. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. *6* Phil. 1 Tim. 1 Critias **2** Legg. **8.**

337. *ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ* (p. 17): Rep. **4** Theaet. 1 Phil. **2** Legg. 1.

338. *οὐκοῦν χρή* or *ἀλλὰ χρή* (p. 22): Rep. **4** Theaet. 1 Parm. 1 Soph. **2** Polit. *4* Phil. **3** Legg. 1.

339. *καὶ πῶς;* (p. 23): Rep. **6** Theaet. **2** Parm. 1 Soph. *6* Polit. 1 Phil. *6* Legg. **11.**

340. *καὶ πῶς ἄν;* (p. 24): Rep. **2** Theaet. **2** Parm. 1 Soph. 1 Phil. 1.

341. *ἐξ ἀνάγκης* (p. 67): Rep. **6** Phaedr. **2** Theaet. 1 Soph. *5* Polit. *4* Phil. **2** Tim. *13* Legg. *22.*

342. *ἀληθέστατα, ὀρθῶς, ὀρθότατα* without *λέγεις* and *ὀρθότατα λέγεις* in affirmative answers (pp. 17, 56): Rep. *57* Phaedr. **1** Theaet. *6*; Parm. **22** Soph. *16* Polit. **26** Phil. **32** Legg. *38*. (Arnim: Soph. 18 Polit. 29 Legg. 40; Tiemann: Rep. 55 Polit. 28 Phil. 31 Legg. 35.)

343. *δῆλον* (pp. 20, and 36, 100): Rep. *24* Phaedr. **1** Theaet. **2** Parm. **2** Polit. *4* Phil. **1** Legg. **4**.

This coincidence shows the superiority of stylistic determination of chronology over other methods which constantly contradict each other.

There remain some peculiarities, which, though more frequent in the later dialogues, occur also exceptionally in one or other of the earlier works:

344. *οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς* or *μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς* (p. 66): Phaedo **1** Theaet. **1** Parm. **3** Phil. **2** Tim. **2** Legg. **8**.

345. *κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος* (p. 7): Symp. **1** Phaedr. **1** Tim. **4** Legg. **4**.

346. *εἰς* or *κατὰ δύναμιν* (p. 6): Crat. **1** Rep. **6** Phaedr. **1** Soph. **3** Polit. *11* Phil. *4* Tim. *10* Critias **1** Legg. *63*.

347. *εἴπες* or *εἴρηκας* in answers (p. 19): Gorg. **1** Rep. **1** Theaet. **1** Soph. **2** Polit. *7* Phil. *8* Legg. **11**.

348. *ὑπέλαβες* (p. 20): Rep. **2** Theaet. **1** Legg. **5**.

349. *παντάπασι μὲν οὖν* (pp. 23, 36): Lach. **1** Rep. *38* Phaedr. **3** Theaet. *9* Parm. *7* Soph. *10* Polit. *4* Phil. *4* Tim. **1** Legg. **13**.

350. *σχεδόν* without *τι* (p. 3): Apol. **2** Crito **1** Charm. **1** Gorg. **3** Phaedo **2** Rep. **7** Phaedr. *4* Soph. **26** Polit. *13* Phil. *14* Tim. *9* Critias *4* Legg. **122**.

351. *τὰ νῦν* as adverb (p. 7): Charm. **1** Prot. **1** Phaedo **1** Rep. **1** Soph. *5* Polit. *5* Phil. *9* Tim. *5* Critias *3* Legg. *79*.

352. *καὶ μάλα* (p. 23): Euthyph. **1** Euthyd. **1** Phaedo **1** Rep. *47* Phaedr. **3** Theaet. **4**; Parm. **2** Soph. *4* Polit. **2** Phil. *7* Legg. **6**.

353. Questions by means of *ποῖος* (p. 25): Lach. **1** Crat. **2** Phaedo **1** Rep. *48* Phaedr. *4* Theaet. *13* Parm. **3** Soph. **32** Polit. **36** Phil. **33** Legg. *47*.

354. *πάνυ μὲν οὖν* prevails over *πάνυ γε* in (Ritter, pp. 22–23, corrected by Arnim,[144] p. 6): Crito *1/0* Rep. *64/40* Phaedr. *3/1* Theaet. *16/5* Soph. *14/10* Polit. *18/7* Phil. *23/9* Legg. *49/4*, and is over half as frequent in Lach. **6/10** Prot. **3/3** Phaedo **21/23** Parm. **15/28**.

355. *χάριν* (p. 59): Prot. **1** Gorg. **3** Symp. **1** Rep. **12** Phaedr. *8* Theaet. **4** Soph. **1** Polit. **3** Phil. **3** Tim. *7* Critias **2** Legg. *33*.

These considerable additions to the number of peculiarities of Plato's later style led C. Ritter to the same general conclusions as those arrived at by Campbell twenty years earlier, namely that Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg. are the last works of Plato, and that

Rep. Phaedr. Theaet. form a group preceding them. At the same time, other inquirers added new observations, all confirming this distinction of the above two groups of Plato's works, and happily avoiding repetition of work already done.

XXVIII. WALBE. The philological seminary of Bonn University, where the dissertations of Roeper and Hoefer were written, produced in 1888 a third doctoral dissertation on the style of Plato, by E. Walbe[135] (1888) who counted the occurrences of *πᾶς*, its compounds and the expressions containing it. Of his predecessors he only knew Roeper, Dittenberger, Hoefer, and Schanz. Among over a hundred uses of *πᾶς* enumerated by Walbe, the following deserve our special attention:

Walbe's observations on *πᾶς* and compounds lead to the same results, though he made no methodic use of them, attaching chronological importance only to the frequency of a few words.

356. *ξυνάπας* (p. 3): Soph. **3** Polit. 1 Phil. **2** Tim. **3** Legg. **1.**

357. *οἱ ξύμπαντες* or *τὰ ξύμπαντα* (p. 11): Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. **3.**

358. *πᾶς οὗτος* or *οὗτος πᾶς* (p. 36): Crat. 1; Soph. **2** Parm. **2** Phil. 1 Tim. **2** Critias 1 Legg. **5.**

359. *πᾶς ὁστισοῦν* (p. 37): Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. **1.**

360. *τὰ πάντα γένη* (p. 35): Soph. 1 Tim. **2.**

361. *τὰ πάντα εἴδη* or *μέρη* (p. 35): Rep. 1 Theaet. *6* Parm. *4* Legg. **1.**

362. *τοὐναντίον ἅπαν* or *ἅπαν τοὐναντίον* (p. 16): Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. **3.**

363. *τὸ ξύμπαν* (p. 9): Phaedr. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. **1.**

364. *πᾶν ζῷον*, meaning 'every animal' (p. 20): Rep. 1 Polit. 1 Phil. **2** Tim. **2** Legg. **5.**

365. *ξύμπας* prevails over *ἅπας* only (p. 4): Soph. *20/8* Polit. *45/18* Phil. *21/19*, while in all other dialogues *ἅπας* is more frequent, being in Tim. Legg. over twice as frequent as *ξύμπας*.

366. *πᾶς* and its compounds occur over four times in a page ed. Didot (p. 4) in: Soph. *181* Polit. **239** Phil. *209* Tim. **375** Critias **67** Legg. **1290**, rising in Polit. Tim. Critias Legg. to more than five and even up to seven times in a page, while in all other dialogues they are much scarcer (Euthyd. 102 Crat. 137 Symp. 142 Rep. 601 Theaet. 188 Parm. 91, elsewhere less).

367. *ἅπας*, *ξύμπας*, *ξυνάπας* occur over once in two pages in (p. 4): Apol. *12* Crito *7* Lach. *10* Prot. *22* Euthyd. *17* Parm. *17* Soph. *31* Phil. *42*, and over once in a page in: Polit. **64** Tim. **62**

[135] E. Walbe, Silesius, *Syntaxis Platonicae Specimen* (Doctor's diss.), Bonn 1888 (xxxiv).

Critias **11** Legg. **255**, in all other dialogues less, being over once in three pages only in: Meno **8** Gorg. **28** Phaedo **17** Rep. **73** Phaedr. **17** Theaet. **20**.

368. πᾶν ὅσον (p. 7): Symp. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Tim. **4** Legg. **3**.

369. πάντα ζῷα or ζῷα πάντα (p. 31): Phaedo **2** Rep. **2** Soph. **1** Phil. **3** Tim. **2** Legg. **3** (including two occurrences of ζῷα ξύμπαντα in Legg.).

370. ἅπας or ἅπαν without article or substantive (pp. 5, 7): Symp. 1 Phaedo 1 Phaedr. 1 Parm. **3** Tim. **2** Legg. **4**.

371. τὸ πᾶν, meaning the universe (*omnium rerum universitas*, p. 10), is limited to: Crat. **3** Symp. 1 Rep. 1 Theaet. **3** Parm. 1 Soph. *8* Polit. *7* Phil. *10* Tim. **38** Legg. **11**.

372. τὸ πᾶν διαφέρειν (pp. 10–11): Polit. 1 Legg. **2**.

373. πᾶσα or ἅπασα ἀνάγκη (p. 23): Phaedo **2** Rep. **5** Phaedr. **2** Theaet. **2** Soph. **2** Phil. 1 Tim. **4** Legg. **2**.

374. πᾶς or compounds used together with ἕκαστος (p. 37): Euthyd. 1 Rep. **2** Theaet. 1 Parm. 1 Soph. 1 Tim. *6* Legg. 1.

375. πᾶς used with ὅλος (p. 38): Rep. **2** Soph. 1 Legg. **3**.

Siebeck's observations on peculiarities of style explained by Plato's psychological evolution.

XXIX. SIEBECK. In the same year as Walbe's dissertation and Ritter's work was published an original investigation on Plato's style by H. Siebeck,[136] author of the *History of Psychology*. Siebeck, as a psychologist, sought for characteristics of Plato's style revealing changes in the author's state of mind which are capable of psychological explanation. He chose for his purpose the different classes of affirmative answers, and made a step further in the right method of calculating opportunities for the occurrence of each particular answer, not taking, as Ritter did, the sum of all answers as a comparative measure, but the sum of all affirmative answers only. Siebeck, moreover, classified all these answers and distinguished problematic, assertive, and apodictic affirmations. The apodictic affirmations, as for instance ἀληθέστατα, ὀρθότατα, παντάπασι, &c., are, as Siebeck shows, in all cases when the chronological order of two dialogues is known from other certain sources, more numerous in the later works. They form in the *Republic*

This is a progress in the

[136] H. Siebeck, *Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen*, 2ᵉ A., Freiburg in B., 1888, pp. 253–266: 'Nachträge die platonische Frage betreffend, I. Sprachstatistisches' (xxxv). Siebeck knew among his predecessors Dittenberger, Frederking, Hoefer, Schanz, and Gomperz.

fifty per cent. of all affirmative answers, and in the *Laws* fifty-four per cent. A similar relation is observed in the dialectic trilogy. In the *Theaetetus* Siebeck found thirty-eight per cent. apodictic answers, in the *Sophist* forty-two per cent., in the *Politicus* forty-nine per cent.—while in the *Protagoras*, generally recognised as an early dialogue, such answers form only fifteen per cent. of all. Moreover, in the separate books of the *Republic* we notice the like progress from a more problematic to an apodictic certainty. In Book I we find thirty-eight per cent. apodictic affirmations, as in the *Theaetetus*; in Books II–IV they rise to forty-six per cent.; in Books V–IX to fifty-four per cent.; in Book X they decline a little, being fifty-three per cent. of all affirmative answers. It would be an exaggeration to affirm that these numbers correspond precisely to the chronological order, because the special subject of each work gives greater or fewer opportunities for apodictic certainty, and if the *Phaedo* contains forty-nine per cent. apodictic replies, this is no sufficient reason for inferring that this dialogue was written after the *Sophist*; still, Siebeck's method of calculating the opportunities for different kinds of answers marks a progress over Ritter's first attempt. Siebeck also counted the number of simple direct questions, without any interrogative particle, or with ἦ or ἆρα or μῶν only, in order to find the relative recurrence of these particles; and he found the percentage of questions with ἆρα or μῶν to be very high in the dialogues of the latest group. These investigations increase our list by some characteristics whose importance outweighs their number:

method of stylistic study for chronological purposes, as can be tested on those works whose chronological order is otherwise known.

Siebeck's calculations add very important information to our knowledge of Plato's style.

376. Over forty in each hundred affirmative answers are apodictic (p. 260) only in: Phaedo **83/168** Rep. **669/1342** Phaedr. **42/76** Parm. **159/394** Soph. **140/329** Polit. **130/268** Phil. **198/323** Legg. **312/578.** In other dialogues the proportion is much smaller, coming nearest to the later style in Euthyd. *45/130* Gorg. *105/321* Crat. *77/238* Theaet. *101/263* (in these dialogues over 80 %).

They show that apodictic affirmations and certain kinds of

377. To each problematic answer correspond at least four

interrogations increase in frequency in the latest group.

apodictic answers or more: Phaedo **20/83** Rep. **141/669** Phaedr. **10/42** Soph. **31/140** Phil. **32/198** Legg. **69/312**. In other dialogues the problematic answers occur much oftener, being less than one to three apodictic answers only in Euthyd. *12/45* Gorg. *32/105* Parm. *52/159* Polit. *35/130*.

378. Interrogations by means of ἄρα form 24 % or more of all simple interrogations: Parm. **50/207** Soph. **46/171** Polit. **31/106** Phil. **56/186** Legg. **95/329**, while in all other dialogues ἄρα is much scarcer, the proportion being above 15 % only in: Prot. *27/140* Crat. *34/172* Phaedo *31/161* Rep. *183/931* Phaedr. *11/72* Theaet. *39/229*, and in other dialogues less.

Tiemann supplemented Ritter's observations and corrected them on some points, giving more detailed information on the use of participles and of some kinds of answers peculiar to later style.

XXX. TIEMANN. Stylistic investigations on Plato became better known after 1888; those of Dittenberger, Schanz, Ritter, and Siebeck receiving most attention, but still they met with obstinate opposition, and Zeller continued to disdain them. J. Tiemann,[137] under the influence of Ritter's work, investigated the use of some participles with *εἶναι*, and noticed among others the following peculiarities:

379. Particip. aorist. with *εἶναι* (p. 559): Polit. **2** Tim. 1 Legg. 1.

380. *πρέπον* with *εἶναι*: Lach. 1 Gorg. 1 Symp. 1 Tim. **2** Critias **2** Legg. **7**.

381. *προσήκων* with *εἶναι*: Rep. **3** Phaedr. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. **2**.

382. Part. praes. with *εἶναι*: Euthyph. 1 Prot. 1 Meno **2** Gorg. **2** Crat. **2** Symp. 1 Phaedo 1; Rep. **8** Phaedr. **3** Theaet. **3**; Soph. *6* Polit. *8* Phil. *8* Tim. **4** Critias 1 Legg. **11**.

383. Pleonastic use of participles (p. 556): Lach. 1 Prot. 1 Meno **3** Euthyd. 1 Gorg. **3** Crat. 1 Symp. **2** Phaedo **2**; Rep. **14** Phaedr. *4* Theaet. **3**; Soph. *7* Polit. *12* Phil. *7* Tim. *12* Critias *4* Legg. *24*.

384. Periphrastic impersonal expressions (p. 556): Symp. 1 Rep. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. **2** Tim. *7* Critias **2** Legg. **10**.

385. *ἀληθῆ* without *λέγεις* in affirmative answers (p. 586): Charm. *3* Lach. 1 Prot. 1 Gorg. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. *29* Theaet. *9* Parm. **18** Soph. *7* Polit. *5* Phil. **2** Legg. **4**. (The occurrence of *ἀληθῆ* in Prot. and Gorg. has not been noticed by Tiemann, nor by C. Ritter, but is mentioned by von Arnim[144] p. 9, and has been admitted here on his testimony, because an involuntary omission

[137] J. Tiemann, 'Zum Sprachgebrauch Platos' in *Wochenschrift für klassische Philosophie*, 1889, columns 248–253, 362–366; also in his extensive review of C. Ritter's work in the same journal, columns 791–797, 839–842, Berlin 1889 (xxxvi). The numbers for *Parmenides* omitted by Tiemann have been in some cases added from Arnim's (see note 144) publication.

appears more probable than a wrong observation, unless Arnim counted as simple ἀληθῆ some ἀληθῆ λέγεις.) ἀληθῆ λέγεις, very common in earlier dialogues, is scarcer afterwards.

Already C. Ritter had noticed that the abridged forms ὀρθῶς, ἀληθέστατα, ὀρθότατα without λέγεις, as well as ὀρθότατα even with λέγεις, were limited to Rep. Phaedr. Theaet. Parm., and to the six latest dialogues, occurring nowhere earlier (342). Tiemann counted the occurrences of each of these forms of affirmative answers, and found that ὀρθῶς, ὀρθότατα, and ἀληθέστατα, with or without λέγεις, though not limited to the latest works, occur in them with increased frequency, and may therefore be looked upon as peculiarities of later style:

386. ὀρθῶς with or without λέγεις in affirmative answers (p. 586): Euthyph. 1 Charm. 1 Meno 1 Crat. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. *35* Phaedr. 1 Theaet. *5* Parm. **18** Soph. *10* Polit. *17* Phil. *13* Legg. *24*. (Arnim agrees generally with these numbers, but he found no ὀρθῶς in Meno and Crat., and only two in Phil., 25–26 in Legg.)

387. ἀληθέστατα with or without λέγεις in affirmative answers (p. 586): Lach. 1 Crat. 1 Symp. 1 Phaedo *4* Rep. *28* Phaedr. **2** Theaet. *7* Parm. *6* Soph. *5* Polit. *7* Phil. *16* Legg. *23* (Arnim Legg. 24).

388. ὀρθότατα with or without λέγεις in affirmative answers (p. 586): Rep. **10** Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 1 Parm. 1 Soph. *4* Polit. *8* Phil. *10* Legg. **12**. Arnim: Rep. 11 Phaedr. 2 Soph. 5 Polit. 12 Phil. 12 Legg. 15 or 16. (In this and the preceding Nos. **385–387** the numbers for Parmenides, omitted by Tiemann, are quoted from Arnim, who slightly differs from Tiemann and Ritter in other numbers.)

XXXI. LINA. Simultaneously with Tiemann, Lina[138] published at Marburg a dissertation wherein he classifies no fewer than twenty-one thousand eight hundred and eighty-one occurrences of prepositions in Plato's works. From his lists the following confirmation of earlier results is gathered:

Lina counted all uses of prepositions but failed to find a

[138] T. Lina, *De praepositionum usu platonico*; dissertatio inauguralis Marpurgi 1889 (xxxvii). Of his predecessors Lina knew Dittenberger, Schanz, and Ritter.

difference of frequency in their use between early and late dialogues, because he used a wrong measure of text. His observations teach us, however, a great number of peculiarities of later style, among which various kinds of interpositions are prominent.

389. *κατὰ* with the accusative prevails over all other prepositions except *ἐν* (p. 9): Crat. *75* Polit. *130* Critias *50* Legg. *697*, and over *ἐν* in Soph. **115** Tim. **253**. In these dialogues *κατὰ* cum acc. forms 12–15 % of the whole number of prepositions, while in other works it is much scarcer, reaching 9 % only in the Theaet. and falling to the fourth rank in Parm. (after *ἐν*, *πρός*, *ἐκ*), Phil. (after *ἐν*, *εἰς*, *περί*), Legg. B. vi. x. xii. (after *ἐν*, *εἰς* and *ἐκ* or *περί*). The prevalence of *κατά* in some dialogues is so much the more characteristic, as in the whole of Plato's text *ἐν* (4143), *περί* (3267), *πρός* (2292), prevail much over *κατά* (2065).

390. Twenty-one or more prepositions on each page (ed. Didot) occur only in: Phaedr. **819** Polit. **916** Tim. **1733** (32 in one page) Critias **363** (33 in one page) Legg. **5249** (22 in one page), over 19 in: Lach. *352* Phaedo *945* Rep. *3865* Soph. *757*; over 33 in two pages in: Prot. **678** Symp. **737** Theaet. **885** Parm. **512** Phil. **778**, elsewhere less. (In this case the superiority of Didot's edition over Teubner's, as a measure of text, is manifest. Lina gives for Polit. the proportion of 11 prepositions to one page, the same as for Prot., while from the numbers he quotes it results that one page ed. Didot contains in Prot. 17·4 prepositions, in Polit. 21·3. This should be carefully borne in mind by all future inquirers, who wish to determine how often per page a word occurs. The proportion of 11 prepositions to one page ed. Teubner is given by Lina also for Lach., with 19·5 prepositions on one page ed. Didot; according to his calculations Symp. [18·9 prepositions on one page ed. Didot] and Phaedo [19·3 prepositions on one page ed. Didot] would contain more prepositions [12 on each page ed. Teubner] than the Politicus [11 prepositions on one page ed. Teubner, and 21·3 prepositions on one page ed. Didot], while they really contain two prepositions less on each page ed. Didot. It follows that the standard of a page varies, and that we must be cautious in selecting a measure of text. So long as the ideal measure, the number of words of each dialogue, remains unknown, there is no safer standard than the pages of Didot's edition for measuring Plato's text.)

391. *περὶ* c. accus. prevails over *περὶ* c. gen. (p. 12): Symp. *40|39* Soph. *76|71* Polit. *92|53* Tim. *116|88* Critias *29|21* Legg. iii. v. vi. vii. *182|147*. This is a very characteristic peculiarity, because in all other dialogues the predominance of *περὶ* c. gen. over *περὶ* c. acc. is so great that in the dialogues not specified by Lina 1552 *περὶ* c. gen. correspond to 804 *περὶ* c. acc.

392. *κατά* sundered from the corresponding accus. by *δή* (p. 14): Meno 1 Rep. 1 Parm. 2 Soph. 2 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 1.

393. idem, by *μέν* (p. 14): Gorg. 1 Rep. 2 Theaet. 2 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 2.

394. idem, by *δέ* (p. 14): Gorg. 1 Crat. 2 Rep. 4 Theaet. 4 Parm. 3 Soph. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. *5* Critias *3* Legg. 2.

395. idem, by τέ (p. 14): Rep. **2** Phaedr. **1** Theaet. **1** Polit. **1** Phil. 1 Tim. **4** Legg. **8**.

396. idem, by γέ (pp. 14, 75): Charm. **2** Gorg. 1 Crat. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. 1 Theaet. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. *4* Phil. *5* Tim. 1 Legg. **4**.

397. idem, by a genitive (p. 14): Crat. 1 Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 Parm. 1 Polit. 1 Legg. **3**.

398. idem, by more than one word (p. 15): Gorg. 1 Crat. 1 Symp. 1 Parm. 1 Polit. 1 Critias 1 Legg. **2**.

399. περί sundered from the corresponding genitive by δή (p. 16): Theaet. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Tim. **2** Legg. **2**.

400. idem, by δέ (p. 16): Lach. **2** Prot. **3** Crat. **2** Symp. **2** Rep. 1 Phaedr. **2** Theaet. **2** Soph. **2** Polit. **2** Phil. **2** Tim. **2** Legg. **12**.

401. idem, by γέ (p. 16): Euthyph. **2** Phaedo 1 Rep. 1 Theaet. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. **4**.

402. idem, by τέ (p. 16): Euthyph. 1 Crito 1 Charm. 1 Symp. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. **7** Theaet. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. **3** Phil. **2** Tim. **2** Critias 1 Legg. **4**.

403. idem, by a genitive (p. 16): Euthyd. **3** Gorg. **3** Phaedo 1 Phaedr. **2** Theaet. **2** Polit. **2** Critias 1 Legg. **4**.

404. idem, by μὲν γάρ (p. 17): Rep. 1 Theaet. 1 Polit. 1.

405. idem, by three to five words (p. 17): Crat. **2** Rep. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. **2** Legg. **3**.

406. περί, sundered from the corresponding accus. by γέ (p. 18): Crat. 1 Legg. **2**.

407. idem, by δέ (p. 18): Gorg. **3** Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 Theaet. **2** Soph. **3** Polit. **3** Phil. **2** Critias **2** Legg. **2**.

408. idem, by μέν (p. 19): Gorg. **2** Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 Theaet. **2** Soph. **3** Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. **3**.

409. idem, by τέ (p. 19): Phaedo 1 Rep. **2** Phaedr. 1 Polit. *4* Phil. 1 Tim. **4** Legg. **9**.

410. idem, by a genitive (p. 19): Euthyph. 1 Lach. 1 Euthyd. 1 Crat. 1 Symp. 1 Rep. **3** Phaedr. **2** Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. **3**.

411. idem, by two or three words (p. 19): Symp. 1 Rep. **2** Phaedr. 1 Tim. 1.

412. περί placed after the substantive which depends on it (anastrophe) was not very much used by writers earlier than Plato (as for instance Thucydides), while in Plato it forms over 17 % of all occurrences of this preposition, and after Plato it became still more common. But this use is not equally frequent in all dialogues; it does not occur in Crito Charm., forms under 5 % of all occurrences of περί in Prot. Euthyd. Crat. Phaedo, rises above 6 % in Apol. **2/24** Euthyph. **3/37** Meno **5/50** Gorg. **9/92** Symp. **3/39** Parm. **2/30** Critias **2/21**, above 10 % in Lach. *10/78* Theaet. *14/123* Tim. *13/88*; and above 20 % only in: Rep. **60**

The very frequent use of περί in anastrophe begins with the *Republic*, and some

special interpositions are later more frequent.

(22 %) Phaedr. **18** (21 %) Soph. **16** (22 %) Polit. **11** (21 %) Phil. **21** (32 %) Legg. **139** (29 %) (calculated from the table given by Lina on p. 29).

413. Between a genitive and a following *πέρι* belonging to it, is placed a *γέ* (p. 26) : Gorg. 1 Phil. 1.

414. idem, *δέ* (p. 27) : Gorg. 1 Rep. 1 Legg. 9.

415. idem, *δή* (p. 27) : Prot. 1 Phaedr. 2 Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 8.

416. idem, *τέ* (p. 27) : Euthyph. 1 Gorg. 1 Symp. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. *17* Theaet. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. 2 Phil. 3 Tim. 1 Critias 1 Legg. 12.

417. idem, a genitive (p. 27) : Phil. 1 Legg. 2.

418. Between a genitive depending on *πέρι* and the following *πέρι* is placed another word (not one of the above particles (**413**–**416**), but including the genitives counted in **417**) or more words (p. 27) : Apol. 1 Lach. 1 Rep. 1 Phaedr. 3 Theaet. 1 Soph. 3 Polit. 1 Phil. 3 Legg. 17.

419. *ἀνὰ λόγον* (in the same meaning as *κατὰ λόγον* = in proportion) or *ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον* (p. 35) : Phaedo 2 Rep. 2 Tim. *6* Legg. 1.

420. *κατὰ* c. genit. after a *verbum dicendi* in the same meaning as *περί* (p. 37) : Charm. 1 Meno 2 Euthyd. 1 Crat. 1 Symp. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 Soph. 1 Legg. 2.

421. idem, after a *verbum agendi* (p. 37) : Meno 2 Phaedo 1 ; Soph. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 1.

Also some meanings are prevalent in the latest works, as it results from Lina's enumerations.

422. *κατὰ* c. accus. to designate the direction of a movement (for which generally the genitive is used) meaning towards or to or in (pp. 39, 40) : Symp. 1 (190 E : *κατὰ τὴν γαστέρα*) Phaedo 1 (114 A : *κατὰ τὴν λίμνην*) Rep. 1 (614 D) Tim. *8* Critias *4* Legg. 1 (905 A).

423. idem, metaphorically (pp. 39-41) : Crat. 1 Symp. *4* (205 D : *κατὰ χρηματισμόν* etc.) Rep. 1 (396 D) Phaedr. 2 Theaet. 2 Parm. 2 Soph. *4* Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 2 Legg. 4.

424. *κατὰ* c. accus. to designate the diffusion of something over or through some space or place (p. 41) : Prot. 1 (313 D : *κατὰ τὰς πόλεις*) Crat. 1 Symp. 1 Phaedo 2 Rep. 1 Phaedr. 2 Theaet. 1 Tim. *18* Critias 1 Legg. 2 (*indicatur aliquid per aliquem locum diffundi*).

425. idem, metaphorically : Rep. 1 Theaet. 1 Parm. 1 Soph. 2 Polit. 1 Phil. 2 Legg. 6.

426. *κατὰ* c. acc. to designate a place (= in) in such phrases as *κατὰ τόπον*, or *κατὰ χώραν*, or *κατ' ἄστυ* (*κατὰ πόλιν* is not counted, because Lina does not quote all the numerous occurrences of this phrase) (p. 43) : Gorg. 1 Rep. 1 Tim. 4 Critias *4* Legg. 6.

427. *κατὰ μέσον* (p. 43) : Phaedo 1 (113 A) Rep. 1 Soph. 1 Tim. 1 Critias *4* Legg. 2.

428. *κατὰ θάλατταν* (p. 44) : Rep. 1 Polit. 1 Legg. 9.

429. *κατ' ἀγοράν* or *κατ' ἀγοράς* (p. 44): Rep. 2 Theaet. 1 Parm. 1 Polit. 1 Legg. 7.

430. *κατὰ καιρόν* (p. 47): Polit. 1 Legg. 2.

431. *κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον* (p. 47): Polit. 2 Tim. 3 Legg. 5.

432. *καθ' ὕπνον* (p. 47): Tim. 3 Legg. 1.

433. *κατὰ βραχύ* = *paulum, non multum* (p. 57): Soph. 2 Tim. 1 Legg. 2 (In Prot. and Gorg. the same words mean according to Lina *breviter*).

434. *κατὰ (τὸ) ὀρθόν* (p. 57): Soph. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 1.

435. *κατὰ μέρος* (p. 59): Soph. 1 Legg. 2.

436. *κατὰ μέρη* (p. 59): Rep. 1 Theaet. 1 Parm. 4 Tim. 3 Legg. 2.

437. *κατὰ μῆνα* (p. 60): Rep. 1 Legg. 3.

438. *κατὰ τύχην* (p. 63): Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 Soph. 1 Legg. 2.

439. *ὅμοιον κατά τινα* (p. 67): Phaedo 1 Polit. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 1.

440. *τὸ* (or *τὰ*) *κατά τι* (*τὸ σῶμα, τὰς ἐπιστήμας*, &c.), meaning '*ampliorem quam simplex substantivum notionem*' (p. 71): Euthyd. 1 Gorg. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 Soph. 1 Critias 1 Legg. 8.

441. *κατὰ* c. accus. without any grammatical relation to any part of the phrase, and meaning '*quod attinet ad*,' is found only (p. 72): Meno 1 (72 A: *κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα*) Rep. 1 (614 D: *κατὰ τὼ ἑτέρω*) Theaet. 1 (153 D: *κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα*) Phil. 1 (17 C: *κατὰ τέχνην*) Critias 1 (109 C: *κατ' ἄλλους τόπους*) Legg. 1 (812 A: *κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν*).

442. *κατὰ* c. acc. meaning '*quantum attinet ad*' (p. 72): Symp. 1 (185 B: *καθ' αὑτὸν*) Legg. 2 (715 D, 928 B).

443. *κατὰ* with the accus. meaning 'according to somebody,' or after somebody's fashion (p. 56): Apol. 1 Meno 1 Euthyd. 1 Gorg. 2 Symp. 2 Phaedr. 3 Theaet. 1 Parm. 1 Legg. 2.

444. *κατὰ παράδειγμα* or *κατὰ συνήθειαν* after a *verbum dicendi* or *agendi* (p. 52): Meno 2 Soph. 1 Polit. 2 Tim. 2 Legg. 1.

445. *κατὰ* forming a hiatus with a following *α*, *ε*, *η* or *ο* (pp. 22-23): Meno 2 Gorg. 1 Symp. 1 Rep. 5 Phaedr. 2 Parm. 3 Polit. 1 Critias 1 Legg. 5.

446. *κατὰ θεόν* (p. 63 *divina quadam sorte*): Euthyd. 1 Rep. 1 Soph. 1 Legg. 3.

447. *κατὰ* c. acc. in the distributive meaning after a *verbum dividendi* (except *κατ' εἴδη διαιρεῖσθαι* which is too frequent for enumeration, p. 58): Meno 1 Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 Soph. 3 Polit. 3 Tim. 3 Legg. 3.

But he has made no chronological use of these observations, as generally all his predecessors except Campbell ignored the methodical value of apparently accidental peculiarities.

XXXII.–XXXIII. BARON. VAN CLEEF. After so many investigations on the Platonic vocabulary in three years (1886–1889), the subject remained untouched during the following seven years, though some authors wrote on

Van Cleef's investigations on

the use of attraction in Plato are very valuable, but as he did not distinguish the single dialogues he prevented our applying his work to chronology.

other aspects of Plato's style, ignoring the relation between style and chronology. Compared with the laborious German dissertations, the French *thèse* of C. Baron[139] on the form of Plato's writings appears almost a rhetorical exercise. A student of the University of Bonn, Van Cleef,[140] of Ohio, spent much time in minute research on the use of attraction in Plato, but he deprived us of some additional characteristics of Plato's later style by mixing in his statistical tables dialogues of different dates without any distinction of single works. He followed Christ in uniting Rep. Parm. Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg. into one class of so-called constructive dialogues; and he observed that the use of attraction, while occurring in the sum of Plato's works about thirty-eight times in every one hundred pages, is reduced in this group to only fourteen cases in one hundred pages of text. This result tends to show that attraction generally was not a peculiarity of later style, but we are left uncertain whether this refers equally to all the eight dialogues of the group, or only to some of them. The group which Van Cleef calls constructive dialogues contains, besides the recognised six latest dialogues, only *Republic* and *Parmenides*, so that we may admit as probable that the use of attraction decreased in Plato's later style; and as all the passages are enumerated by Van Cleef, whoever cared to undertake the task of a new classification and methodic disposition of the materials collected by him might draw very interesting chronological conclusions, or at least afford fresh confirmation to the chronological conclusions arrived at otherwise.

The same applies

XXXIV.–XXXV. GRÜNWALD. BERTRAM. From the instructive collection of proverbs found in Plato by

[139] C. Baron, *De Platonis dicendi genere*, Paris 1891 (xxxviii).

[140] F. L. van Cleef, Ohianus, *De attractionis in enuntiationibus relativis usu platonico* (Doctor's diss. Bonn University), Bonn 1890 (xxxix).

E. Grünwald [141] it is again impossible to draw any chronological inferences, because proverbs are seldom repeated, and cannot be regarded as peculiar to any given period of Plato's style. Also Bertram's interesting contribution on the use of metaphor in Plato [142] contains nothing that could be included in our list.

also to publications by Grunwald and Bertram.

XXXVI. CAMPBELL. All the foregoing writers on Plato's language, from Roeper to Van Cleef, ignored Campbell's Introduction to the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, though after the publication of Ritter's book Campbell again on several occasions recalled his first investigations. But he published these later articles in journals of limited circulation on the Continent, as the *Transactions of the Oxford Philological Society*, or the *Bibliotheca Platonica*. [143] Consequently the coincidence of results between Campbell and the German style statisticians was known to none but the Scotch philologer himself, while the few generally known German dissertations naturally failed to secure a general recognition of the results obtained by them alone. There is reason to think that Campbell's more recent investigations on Plato's use of language, filling 175 pages in the second volume of the monumental edition of the *Republic* by Jowett and Campbell (3 vols., Oxford 1894), will likewise escape the attention of German and French students of Platonic style, unaccustomed to look for such original

Campbell's recent publications deserve the attention of Platonic scholars not less than his first contributions to Platonic literature thirty-five years ago.

[141] Dr. Eugen Grünwald, *Sprichwörter und sprichwörtliche Redensarten bei Plato*, Berlin 1893. (Programme des Cours du Collège Royal Français de Berlin) (xl).

[142] Heinrich Bertram, 'Die Bildersprache Platons,' *Beilage zum Jahresbericht der königlichen Landesschule Pforta*, Naumburg a. S. 1895 (xli).

[143] *Transactions of the Oxford Philological Society*, 1888–1889, pp. 25–42, June 14, 'On the position of the *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus* in the order of the Platonic Dialogues, and on some characteristics of Plato's latest writings,' by Professor Lewis Campbell of St. Andrews (xlii); and on the same subject in *Bibliotheca Platonica*, an exposition of the Platonic Philosophy edited by Thos. M. Johnson, Osceola, Mo. U.S.A. vol. i. July, August 1889, N. 1, pp. 1–28: Prof. L. Campbell: 'On some recent attempt towards ascertaining the chronological order of the composition of Plato's dialogues' (xliii).

labours in the Appendices to an edition of a single dialogue. It would, however, exceed the limits of the present survey to epitomise this last work of Campbell, which should stand on the shelves of every philological library. Enough to state that this new publication of Campbell is of no less importance for our knowledge of Plato's style than his Introduction to the *Sophist* and *Politicus* written thirty years ago, and forms a splendid continuation of the work he began in 1861 by his edition of the *Theaetetus*. A full syntax of Plato's language, illustrated by quotations not only from the *Republic* but from other dialogues, it confirms in many details the close relation of the *Phaedrus* and *Theaetetus* to the *Republic* on one side, and of the *Sophist, Politicus, Philebus* to *Timaeus, Critias, Laws* on the other side.

Von Arnim, without knowing Campbell or even Ritter, came to the same results, though his method of joining

XXXVII. VON ARNIM. The want of centralisation in Platonic studies is illustrated by the curious fact that quite recently an author who undertook researches on one aspect of Plato's vocabulary, J. von Arnim[144] (1896), Professor at the University of Rostock, not only knew nothing of Campbell's publications, but even ignored Ritter's book, having read nothing on the style of Plato but the articles of Dittenberger and Schanz.

On the other hand, it is very instructive to note that von Arnim, after careful comparison of twenty-six cha-

[144] Joannis ab Arnim, *De Platonis dialogis, Quaestiones chronologicae, ad scholas quae in hac universitate Rostochiensi per semestre hibernum inde a d. XVI M. Octobris A. MDCCCXCVI habebuntur invitant Rector et concilium.* Rostock 1896 (xliv). The numbers given by Arnim are in some cases different from the numbers given by C. Ritter. In such cases the larger number has been included in our list, because an omission is more likely to happen than that one passage should be counted as two, if the work is done carefully. But von Arnim sometimes changes his classification, so that he quotes different numbers for the same dialogue, as, for instance, twelve *ὀρθότατα λέγεις* in the *Laws* in § 13, and thirteen in § 14; two *ἀληθέστατα λέγεις* in the *Politicus* in § 10, and five in § 14; one *ὀρθῶς λέγεις* in the *Politicus* in § 14, and none in § 11, &c. Also his numbers for the peculiarities which have been collected by C. Ritter and Tiemann show some considerable differences, as, for instance, he did not find *ὀρθῶς* in the *Philebus*, while C. Ritter and Tiemann found it eleven times.

racteristic marks of Plato's style, came independently to the same conclusions as Campbell in 1867, and as Ritter in 1888. He recognised that Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg. are the latest of Plato's works, and that the group preceding them contains the *Republic, Phaedrus, Theaetetus,* and *Parmenides.* Many of Arnim's observations are new, and furnish us with several additional peculiarities of Plato's later style:

many expressions in one class and counting them together is somewhat arbitrary. He found that rhetorical interrogations and also interrogations asking for a better explanation of something said before are peculiar to later style.

448. *ναί, πάνυ γε, πάνυ μὲν οὖν* form less than one-third of all affirmative answers (p. 6): Rep. *195* Phaedr. *11* Theaet. **58** Parm. **97** Soph. **71** Polit. **54** Phil. *52* Legg. *76*, being in Rep. Phaedr. Phil. Legg. even less than one-fourth of all affirmative answers, while they form in all earlier dialogues over one-third, and in Meno Euthyd. Gorg. Crat. even over one-half of all answers.

449. *καλῶς* and *καλῶς ταῦτά γε*, as affirmative answers (p. 9): Rep. 1 Soph. **2** Polit. *6* Legg. **6**.

450. *κάλλιστα* and *κάλλιστά γε* as affirmative answers (p. 9): Phil. 1 Legg. 1.

451. Rhetorical interrogations meaning affirmative answers (as: *τί μήν; ἀλλὰ τί μήν; τί γὰρ κωλύει; ἀλλὰ τί μέλλει; τί γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; τί δὴ γὰρ οὔ; τί γὰρ οὔ; τί δ' οὐ μέλλει; τί δ' οὔ; πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως; πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; πῶς δ' οὐ μέλλει; καὶ πῶς οὔ; πῶς δ' οὔ;*) were increasing in Plato's later works. They form over 20 % of all interrogations in (p. 14): Phaedr. **14/62** Soph. **49/240** Polit. **46/210** Phil. **59/257** Legg. **105/409**, over one-tenth in Euthyph. *6/44* Crito *2/14* Rep. *125/925* Theaet. *23/198* Parm. *38/298*, over 5 % in Lach. **4/49** Gorg. **16/239** Phaedo **12/131** and less in Charm. 3/67 Meno 3/130 Euthyd. 1/68 Crat. 6/176.

452. Interrogations by *τί* prevail over those by *πῶς* only in (p. 15): Phaedr. *12/2* Theaet. *15/8* Phil. *34/25* Legg. *58/55*, while they are in all other dialogues much scarcer (being in Rep. 49/71 Parm. 9/29 Soph. 15/34 Polit. 22/24).

453. Interrogations asking for a better explanation of something said before (p. 16) are missed in many dialogues. They are found in: Lach. *4* Gorg. 1 Crat. *7* Rep. *62* Phaedr. *6* Theaet. *15* Parm. **3** Soph. **37** Polit. **41** Phil. **43** Legg. *63*.

454. *καλῶς, κάλλιστα, ἄριστα, ὀρθῶς, ὀρθότατα, δικαιότατα, καὶ μάλ' εἰκότως* in affirmative answers with other verbs than *λέγεις*, namely, with *εἶπες, εἴρηκας, ἂν λέγοις, εἰπών, εἴρηται*, form a class missed in earlier dialogues, but found in (p. 11): Rep. **3** Phaedr. **2** Soph. **3** Polit. *7* Phil. *8* Legg. **17**.

455. *καλῶς, κάλλιστα, ἄριστα, ὀρθῶς, · ὀρθότατα, σαφέστατα, ἀληθέστατα, ἀναγκαιότατα*, used as affirmative answers without verb,

are limited to (p. 11): Rep. *59* Phaedr. **2** Theaet. *7* Parm. **18** Soph. **23** Polit. **38** Phil. *19* Tim. 1 Legg. *36*.

456. *εἰκός* used in affirmative answers (p. 12): Lach. 1 Prot. 1 Meno 1 Gorg. 1 Crat. 3 Phaedo *5* Rep. *20* Theaet. 3 Parm. **2** Polit. *5* Phil. 3 Legg. 12 (in earlier dialogues *ἔοικεν* prevails).

457. Instead of the ordinary formula *ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ* appear later a class of other similar expressions (*δοκεῖ μοι, δοκεῖ γάρ μοι, μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω δοκεῖ, οὐδ' ἐμοὶ ἄλλως δοκεῖ, ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ*), which are found in (p. 12): Lach. 1 Meno 3 Crat. 7 Symp. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. *18* Theaet. 2 Phil. 2 Legg. 1. (See above No. **337**.)

Campbell's recent paper on the *Parmenides* shows that this dialogue has many words recurring only in the latest group and characteristic of Plato's later studies or of his inclination to introduce poetical

XXXVIII. CAMPBELL'S LAST OBSERVATIONS. As Campbell was the first to apply the study of Plato's vocabulary to Platonic chronology, so it happens that he also added thirty years later the final supplement to these investigations.[145] The position of the *Parmenides* had been one of the most difficult problems, and had been recognised as such by C. Ritter, who was even led to doubt the authenticity of this dialogue. Campbell recently undertook to prove that, however exceptional the stylistic character of this dialogue may be, it contains a considerable number of words peculiar to the latest group, or at least not used before the *Republic*, namely:

458. *ἀπειρία* meaning *infinitas*: Parm. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 1 (numbers according to Ast).

459. *διαμελετῶ*: Parm. 1 Critias 1 Legg. 1.

460. *ἴσον* as adverb: Parm. 2 Tim. 2 Critias 1.

461. *ἱστίον*: Parm. 1 Legg. 1.

462. *σύνδυο*: Parm. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 1 (in Symp. *σύν τε δύ'* quoted from Homer).

463. *μεριστός*: Parm. 2 Tim. 1.

464. *μόνως*: Parm. 1 Tim. 1.

465. *παμμεγέθης*: Parm. 2 Legg. 1.

466. *παντοδαπῶς*: Parm. 1 Legg. 1.

467. *γυμνασία*: Theaet. 1 Parm. 1 Legg. 2.

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[145] L. Campbell, 'On the place of the *Parmenides* in the order of the Platonic Dialogues,' in the *Classical Review* for April 1896, vol. x. pp. 129–136. This closes the list of forty-five publications on the style of Plato here reviewed, out of which only twenty contained materials suitable for our chronological purposes, and included in our list of peculiarities.

468. ὁμοίωμα: Phaedr. **2** Parm. **2** Soph. **1** Legg. **1.**

469. ἀκίνητος: Rep. **2** Theaet. **2** Parm. **2** Soph. *4* Tim. *6* Legg. **8.**

470. ἀνάπαυλα: Rep. **1** Parm. **1** Phil. **1** Legg. **3.**

471. ἀνομοιότης: Rep. **2** Phaedr. **2** Theaet. **1** Parm. *8* Polit. **3** Tim. **2** Legg. **1.**

472. ἀνομοιῶ: Rep. **1** Theaet. **3** Parm. **3** Tim. **1.**

473. ἄπειρος = *infinitus*: Rep. **5** Phaedr. **1** Theaet. **3** Parm. *9* Soph. **2** Polit. **2** Phil. *13* Legg. **3.**

474. ἀπέραντος: Rep. **1** Theaet. **2** Parm. **1** Soph. **3** Polit. **1** Phil. **1** Tim. **1** Critias **1** Legg. **1.**

475. ἀπέχω = *disto*: Rep. **1** Parm. **2** Tim. **1** Critias **2** Legg. **2.**

476. ἀπίθανος: Phaedr. **1** Parm. **1** Legg. **1.**

477. ἀπρεπής: Rep. **1** Parm. **2** Legg. **1.**

478. βέβηκα = *insisto*: Rep. **1** Parm. **1** Tim. **2** Critias **1.**

479. γράμμα = *liber*: Rep. **1** Phaedr. **3** Parm. *7* Polit. **2** Phil. **1** Tim. *5* Critias *4* Legg. **10.**

480. δεσποτεία: Rep. **1** Parm. **3** Legg. **1.**

481. διακούω: Rep. **1** Parm. **2** Soph. **1** Polit. **1** Tim. **1.**

482. διαφορότης: Rep. **1** Theaet. **4** Parm. **1** Phil. **2.**

483. ἐξισοῦμαι: Rep. **1** Parm. **1** Legg. **1.**

484. ἐπάνειμι = *revertor*, *repeto*: Rep. **3** Theaet. **2** Parm. **1** Polit. **3** Tim. **1** Legg. **4.**

485. οὐκ εὔκολος = difficult: Rep. **1** Parm. **1** Legg. **2** (while in Rep. I 329 D, 330 A, εὔκολος is used in another meaning).

486. εὐπετής: Rep. **3** Phaedr. **1** Parm. **1** Soph. **2** Legg. **2.**

487. ἰχνεύω: Rep. **1** Phaedr. **1** Parm. **1** Polit. **1** Legg. **2.**

488. μεθίσταμαι: Rep. **4** Parm. **1** Legg. **1.**

489. μηδαμοῦ: Rep. **1** Parm. **2** Soph. **1** Phil. **1** Legg. **3.**

490. μικτός: Rep. **2** Parm. **1** Phil. *5* Tim. **1** Legg. **1.**

491. πάππος: Rep. **3** Theaet. **2** Parm. **1** Legg. **3.**

492. ἐσκιαγραφημένος: Rep. **3** Parm. **1** Legg. **1.**

493. στέρομαι, Med.: Rep. **4** Phaedr. **2** Theaet. **1** Parm. **2** Soph. **1** Phil. **1** Legg. **4.**

The following words occur also exceptionally in some earlier dialogue:

494. ἄνισος: Phaedo **1** Rep. **2** Parm. *5* Phil. **1** Tim. *5* Legg. **5.**

495. ἀνισότης: Phaedo **1** Parm. **3** Tim. **2.**

496. δεσπόζω: Phaedo **3** Rep. **2** Parm. **1** Polit. **1** Legg. **5.**

497. παντελῶς: Phaedo **2** Rep. **9** Parm. **2** Soph. **1** Polit. **1** Phil. **1** Tim. **1** Legg. **2.**

498. συγκρίνεσθαι: Phaedo **2** Parm. **2** Tim. **4** Legg. **2.**

499. ὅσοσπερ: Gorg. **2** Rep. **2** Parm. **3** Soph. **1** Tim. **1** Legg. **1.**

500. σύμμετρος: Meno **1** Theaet. **3** Parm. **2** Phil. *4* Tim. *5* Critias **1** Legg. **7.**

words into the language of prose. This valuable addition to our list makes the number sufficient for a more methodic interpretation of stylistic observations than has been attempted heretofore.

Some other words quoted by Campbell, as *μέτρον*, *ὁμοιῶ*, *ὁρμή*, *πέρας*, *περιέχω*, might be included in our list, as they occur besides the *Parmenides* only in later dialogues and occasionally in *Meno* and *Cratylus*. But for the purpose of drawing our conclusions from these long enumerations, a round number of five hundred stylistic peculiarities (including more than fifty-eight thousand observations) is more convenient, and suffices to show by what method correct chronological conclusions can be obtained from such observations.

On the interpretation of stylistic observations.

Limitation of our choice of peculiarities of later style to those for which complete enumeration of occurrences might be found in the authors to whom we owe our facts.

In selecting the above five hundred peculiarities of Plato's style from the much greater number found in the writings of so many authors, the choice has been limited to characteristics occurring in one or more of the six dialogues held independently by Campbell, Dittenberger, Schanz, C. Ritter, and von Arnim to be the latest. Another limitation was imposed by the circumstance that the great majority of authors, ignoring the chronological bearing of their researches, often failed to state expressly whether a collection of passages containing a certain word or expression was intended to be exhaustive, and such enumerations could not be included in our list, though they might have been very suitable for our purpose, and were perhaps looked upon as complete by the investigators. A further deficiency of our list results from the circumstance that nobody has made such a special study of the vocabulary of other dialogues as Campbell has of the *Sophist* and *Politicus*. This gives in the above enumeration a prominence to these two dialogues slightly exceeding the real proportional measure.

Otherwise we may offer the above list as a fair and impartial sample of observations made on Plato's style, prepared without any preconceived aim other than the knowledge of facts necessary for a methodical inquiry

into the question as to how far stylistic observations afford means of settling chronological difficulties.

We need a better method for the interpretation of facts than our predecessors, who did not apply much logic to philological labour.

The method of interpreting stylistic observations has been heretofore very defective in almost all the authors reviewed. Generally little care or thought has been given to the logical co-ordination of results obtained through tiresome philological labour. It seems that the elementary conditions of a calculation of probabilities by their numerical evaluation were utterly ignored by all except Lewis Campbell. This discredited the stylistic method in the eyes of impartial thinkers like Zeller. In order to obtain correct conclusions, future inquirers should avoid the following errors common to the majority of the authors above mentioned:

No uniform measure of text has been used, the pages of the editions generally quoted being unequal. Of all existing editions that of Didot has been found to afford the most uniform measure of text.

1. While a general notion of the necessity of measuring the length of each dialogue before comparing stylistic peculiarities was universally accepted, nobody tried to compare methodically the different possible measures; and the pages of Stephanus or of Teubner were considered nearly uniform, while they differ widely, according to the number of notes in Stephanus and the more or less dramatic character of the text in Teubner's edition: so much so that in the latter one page may contain twice as many words as another (see, for instance, p. 7 or 48, ed. Teubner, in *Parmenides* corresponding to thirty-four lines in Didot, and p. 425 in *Politicus*, occupying only twenty-one lines in Didot's edition). That this may greatly influence our conclusions, we have seen specially in the case of Lina's statistics of prepositions. Here for the first time a more precise measure has been found by comparing all the editions of Plato from Stephanus up to the present time. The pages of the editio princeps (Aldina 1503), though uniformly printed, are too large for a measure. Among modern editions the most equal pages convenient for comparison are those of the edition of Didot. These are used in the following calculations; though the best measure would

be a hundred or a thousand words. This has not yet been applied to the text of Plato.

The number of peculiarities compared by most authors was insufficient for valid conclusions. Isolated observations were given an exaggerated importance regardless of the nature of statistical evidence which always requires great numbers. Even the greatest number of observations used heretofore by Campbell would have been insufficient if

2. Nobody except Campbell had a correct idea as to the number of peculiarities required for correct conclusions. Campbell had compared hundreds of peculiarities and he was cautious enough to look upon his conclusions as only probable, not certain. Dittenberger and Schanz believed that a few important observations were sufficient for a stylistic classification of dialogues, wherein they came near to Teichmüller and Schoene, who decided the question of style on a single stylistic peculiarity. C. Ritter was so confident after an observation of forty peculiarities of later style that he declined further discussion with those who did not recognise the correctness of his view. Even such a methodical author as Droste was led to a wrong conclusion about the *Phaedo* by a very small number of observations. Kugler doubted the authenticity of the *Parmenides* because he found a dozen more occurrences of *μέντοι* than he expected in this dialogue. Von Arnim placed the *Lysis* after *Symposium* and *Phaedo* because he found *τί μήν* once used in this small dialogue. All such conclusions are based on an erroneous conception of the use of statistics. Style statistics, like all statistics, require great numbers. Even nearly seven hundred peculiarities observed by Campbell were insufficient to determine the place of *Theaetetus*, *Phaedrus*, and *Philebus*. If Campbell avoided in an admirable way the smallest error in his conclusions, he owes it not alone to the number of his observations, but to his intuitive estimate of their importance. He dealt chiefly with very accidental peculiarities, words occurring only in two or three dialogues; and this explains why his great numbers were only sufficient for a determination of the latest group. In our own list we have many peculiarities of great importance, and thus, though the total number of peculiarities is smaller than in Campbell's calculations, our conclusions

not only confirm his results, but extend over some earlier dialogues, as to the order of which nothing could be inferred by previous authors from stylistic observations. We must lay it down as a rule for future inquirers that no inferences from less than some hundred peculiarities are valid, and that the correctness of the inferences from smaller numbers of observations made by Dittenberger, Schanz, C. Ritter, von Arnim, is due to the circumstance that they selected exceptionally important peculiarities.

not supplemented by a keen appreciation of their relative importance.

3. Nobody has hitherto observed that only exactly equal amounts of text should be compared in order to give precise conclusions. Dialogues of different size were compared, instead of taking as a standard measure a certain amount of text of each dialogue. For this purpose it is necessary to quote the passages in which every observed peculiarity occurs. As this has been done neither by Campbell, nor by Dittenberger, nor Schanz, nor C. Ritter, nor Tiemann, nor Siebeck, on whose observations a great part of our list is based, we are unable to introduce the required completeness into our calculations, but we shall make due allowance for the size of the compared dialogues, admitting as a rule that the stylistic comparisons are inconclusive unless the presumed later work is equal or smaller in size. A greater number of later peculiarities in a longer work can lead to valid conclusions only under exceptional circumstances.

Samples of text differing in extent were compared while only equal portions of text are comparable. A greater number of peculiarities of style may be expected in a larger work.

4. The different importance of stylistic peculiarities has not been accounted for, except by Campbell in one way, and by C. Ritter to a certain extent, when he distinguished the repeated peculiarities contained in *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, and *Theaetetus*, as well as in the latest group. This distinction is quite insufficient; and at least four degrees of importance must be accepted in order to give us the full advantage of the existing observations.

A classification of peculiarities according to their degree of importance is necessary.

5. Nobody except Campbell made a proper use of accidental peculiarities, which are far the most numerous

Accidental peculiarities were

generally disregarded, though they afford very valuable material for statistical calculations.

class of observations. Very important peculiarities are very few, while accidental coincidences may be found by the thousand. And their accidental character, even if fully recognised as accidental, does not deprive them of chronological importance, if sufficient numbers of such accidental coincidences are taken into consideration. The single occurrence is accidental, though it may be exceedingly significant, as, for instance, the occurrence of *μέθεξις* in *Parmenides* and *Sophist*. But if one dialogue has twice as many accidental coincidences with the *Laws* as another, this result is no more accidental than the difference of mortality between England and Spain.

Each peculiarity should be observed apart, not united with many others into one artificial class, except when the class as such is characteristic. This has been found only in a few cases, while some peculiarities counted together differ widely

6. The tendency to limit observation to peculiarities appearing to be important had the result that artificial classes of similar peculiarities were counted together. Sometimes such divisions are justified, as, for instance, Siebeck's classification of answers into apodictic, problematic, and assertive, or von Arnim's rhetorical interrogations and interrogations asking for a better explanation. Also the classes of newly invented adjectives, or of adjectives designating a species, are perfectly natural and characteristic. But in all such cases the single peculiarities forming a class should also be counted apart, whereby a much more exact numerical evaluation of affinity between different works might be secured. This has not been done by C. Ritter, nor by von Arnim, or at least they only give the total number of occurrences of different expressions not forming a natural class, as, for instance, *ναί*, *πάνυ γε*, *πάνυ μὲν οὖν*, which have nothing else in common than that they are the most frequent answers. This should be avoided in future investigations. Many very valuable observations were cast away as useless, because they did not show at once an evident difference between one group of dialogues and another. C. Ritter confesses to having traced through all the works of Plato many expressions, which he did not include in his tables, merely because they appeared not to be peculiar to well-marked

groups. All these observations have their value if they are treated by the right method.

from each other.

Method of measuring stylistic affinities.

The above critical observations on the work of our predecessors are made in the hope that future inquirers will turn them to account. Our aim is not to add new facts, nor even to give an exhaustive survey of facts found by others. From Riddell's digest of idioms, from van Cleef's long enumerations, specially from Ast's *Lexicon*, and from nearly all the publications above quoted, it would be easy to collect some thousands of style-characteristics, instead of the half thousand included in our list. But the mere enumeration leads to no valid conclusions, unless we attempt an exact numerical definition of the affinities existing between several dialogues. For a first attempt to find a numerical equivalent of stylistic affinity between various works not by mere counting but also by weighing of the evidence, we needed a greater number of facts than has been known heretofore to any single author; but we found that five hundred peculiarities, selected at random from the special investigations, were sufficient for our purpose. We feel also justified in limiting the comparison to twenty-two dialogues of unquestionable authenticity, which at the same time happen to be the only works containing some hints as to the logical theories of Plato, while the remaining spurious or doubtful dialogues are of no logical importance. Still, so far as these other dialogues have been taken into account by some of the authors to whom we owe our facts, it appears that they contain a surprisingly small number of Platonic idioms. It is extremely exceptional to find a rare use of language illustrated by examples from other dialogues than those of admitted authenticity, even on the part of inquirers who had

A much greater number of peculiarities could easily be gathered from the authors reviewed, and a perusal of Ast's *Lexicon* would raise the number to some thousands. But the aim of the present investigation is only to improve the method of interpretation of facts, not to give an exhaustive

survey of the facts observed.

searched all the texts bearing Plato's name, including those which are generally recognised to be spurious.

In order to draw our conclusions, we begin by recognising four degrees of importance, distinguishing stylistic peculiarities:

The most numerous class is formed by accidental peculiarities, occurring only once in a dialogue. Such peculiarities acquire a chronological importance only when found in great numbers, though even a single occurrence is sometimes more or less significant according to the meaning of the word, and to the as-

I. The most numerous class are *accidental* peculiarities, such as words or idioms occurring only once in a dialogue. As a word cannot occur less than once, it is not less rare or less accidental when occurring once in a small dialogue than in a large one. In all such cases the observed coincidence is liable to be removed by some emendation, or might be due to an alteration of text, this being less improbable with small words than with longer ones. Therefore great numbers of such accidental peculiarities are needed to afford a measure of comparison. Within this class it would be easy to distinguish several degrees of importance. Really accidental is the recurrence of a word which was generally used by other authors, but which denotes some object about which Plato had no opportunity of writing except in two or three of his works. If, for instance, Plato uses φιάλη only in *Symposium*, *Critias*, and *Laws*, this has no deeper reason than the accidental opportunity for the use of a word denoting a thing not usually spoken of by Plato. Such words have been generally excluded from our list, though they are not quite without value if they occur in very great numbers, as in every epoch the familiar circle of objects selected for examples is characteristic of the author's turn of thought. It is, for instance, not quite accidental that χαλκός is used six times in works later than the *Republic*, and only once in a work earlier than the *Republic*. Sometimes a word used only once in a dialogue may be very significant, as, for instance, μετάσχεσις in the *Phaedo* (101 c). This is highly characteristic of a time when Plato was fond of inventing new logical terms, many of which were soon abandoned, like εἰκασία, διάνοια, πίστις in the special logical meaning which was given to these terms

in the *Republic*. This period could not be that immediately following the death of Socrates, and it would be impossible to find a similar accidental occurrence in the *Apology*, while such new-formed words abound in the *Phaedrus* much more than in the *Phaedo*. A word occurring only once in a dialogue is still more characteristic if it is of constant use in some other work recognised as late. But in order to avoid complicating our evaluations, and to eliminate from them as much as possible every subjective element, we count as accidental all peculiarities occurring only once in one dialogue, including in this class also those peculiarities whose number of occurrences is unknown, as for instance all rare words observed by Campbell in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*.

sociations it evokes. But these distinctions must be left for more special investigations, as they would introduce a subjective element.

II. The next degree of importance belongs to peculiarities *repeated*, or occurring twice in a small dialogue (Euthyph. Apol. Crito Charm. Lach. Critias), twice or thrice in an ordinary dialogue (Prot. Meno Euthyd. Crat. Symp. Phaedo Phaedr. Parm. Soph. Polit, Phil.), and two to four times in a large dialogue, such as the *Gorgias*, the *Theaetetus*, and the *Timaeus*. As to the *Republic* and the *Laws*, in dealing with these exceptionally large works we include in the class of repeated peculiarities every word or idiom which occurs twice or more, but less than once in twelve pages, as then it will be termed frequent. Thus the difference of extent is taken into account, although imperfectly, because the best method would be to take as a sample of style exactly the same amount of text from each dialogue. So long as we deal with each dialogue as a whole—and we are obliged to do so in consequence of the absence of detailed indications of passages in most of our sources—we are bound to the inconsequence of including in one class peculiarities of widely different degrees of frequency. A peculiarity occurring twice in the *Euthyphro* is found on average once in five pages, while one occurring twice in the *Phaedo* is found once in twenty-five pages. But all these repeated

Another class is formed by repeated occurrences. This class includes different degrees of repetition according to the length of each dialogue. It will involve no exaggeration to count each repeated peculiarity as equivalent to two

accidental peculiarities. There is also included a greater frequency of some very common expressions.

peculiarities may be assumed to be more important than the accidental peculiarities, and for the sake of simplicity we count each as equivalent to two accidental peculiarities. If two hundred peculiarities of the first class were admitted as denoting a certain degree of affinity between two dialogues in which they are found, then we shall estimate a common occurrence of a hundred peculiarities of the second class as equivalent evidence for an equal affinity. Here we include also the following special peculiarities :

354. *πάνυ μὲν οὖν* more than half as frequent as *πάνυ γε*, but not prevailing over it.

367. *ἅπας, σύμπας, συνάπας* more than once in three pages, and less than once in two pages.

390. Between 33 and 38 prepositions in every two pages.

412. *πέρι* after the substantive, forming between 6 and 10 % of all occurrences of *περί*.

448. *ναί, πάνυ γε, πάνυ μὲν οὖν* being less than one-third but more than one-quarter of all affirmative answers.

451. Rhetorical interrogations between 5 and 10 % of all interrogations.

These peculiarities might easily be thought more important than other repeated peculiarities, so that we do not incur the danger of exaggerating observed affinities if we count each of them as equivalent to two accidental coincidences between an earlier dialogue and the latest group.

Important peculiarities are words occurring frequently and a number of special observations on the prevalence of one

III. There must be recognised a difference between a peculiarity occurring repeatedly and one that occurs much oftener. Peculiarities occurring more than twice in a small dialogue (Apol. Euthyph. Crito Charm. Lach. Critias), more than thrice in an ordinary dialogue (Prot. Meno Euthyd. Crat. Symp. Phaedo Phaedr. Parm. Soph. Polit. Phil.), more than four times in a large dialogue (*Gorgias*, *Theaetetus*, *Timaeus*), once in twelve pages or more in *Republic* or *Laws*, form a class of *important* peculiarities. This class will include a word occurring 20–117 times in the *Laws*, 5-26 times in *Theaetetus* or *Timaeus*, and generally any frequent repetition up to

once in two pages (ed. Didot), when we shall call it very frequent. Besides such peculiarities we include here the following special observations whenever they refer to a dialogue:

synonym over another or on some ger ral properties of style or literary composition. This class includes also higher degrees of frequency of very common words, and other peculiarities enumerated, observed by various authors. Each of such important peculiarities will be counted as equivalent to three accidental or to one repeated and one accidental peculiarity.

12. Being the first member of a tetralogy projected later—this refers only to Republic and Theaetetus.

13. Partial prevalence of other teachers over Socrates. This refers only to Symposium and Parmenides. For in Sophist Politicus Timaeus Critias Laws Socrates is already completely supplanted by other teachers, and this constitutes a more important characteristic.

16. Periods less regular.

17. Natural order of words inverted, as generally observed by Campbell.

18. Recurrence of rhythmical cadence, as generally observed by Campbell.

19. Balancing of words to achieve harmony and symmetry.

20. Adjustment of longer and shorter syllables, idem.

23. Words common and peculiar to Timaeus, Critias, Laws more than once in two pages, but less than once in a page.

200. *ὥσπερ* less frequent than *καθάπερ*.

206. *ἀλλὰ μήν* less frequent than *καὶ μήν*.

306. *τοίνυν* more than four times oftener than *μέντοι*.

307. *μέντοι* less than once in two pages, but over once in five pages.

308. *τοίνυν* more than once in two pages.

317. *εἶπον* prevailing over *ἔλεγον*.

318. Answers denoting subjective assent less than once in sixty answers.

325. Superlatives in affirmative answers more than half as frequent as positives, but not prevailing over positives.

354. *πάνυ μὲν οὖν* prevailing over *πάνυ γε*.

365. *ξύμπας* prevailing over *ἅπας*.

366. *πᾶς* and compounds between four and five times in one page.

367. *ἅπας, ξύμπας, ξυνάπας* more than once in two pages, but less than once in a page.

376. Apodictic answers between 30 and 40 % of all answers.

377. To each problematic answer between three and four apodictic answers.

378. Interrogations by means of *ἆρα* between 15 and 24 % of all interrogations.

389. *κατὰ* c. accus. prevailing over all other prepositions except *ἐν*.

390. Between 19 and 21 prepositions in one page (ed. Didot).

391. *περὶ* c. accus. prevailing over *περὶ* c. genitive.

412. *πέρι* placed after the substantive between 10 and 20 % of all occurrences of *περί*.

448. *ναί, πάνυ γε, πάνυ μὲν οὖν* less than one-quarter of all affirmative answers.

451. Rhetorical interrogations between 10 and 20 % of all interrogations.

452. Interrogations by *τί* prevailing over those by *πῶς*.

All these peculiarities are much more important than those of class II, and each of them will be estimated as equivalent to three peculiarities of class I, or to one of class II and one of class I.

A fourth class is formed by a very frequent occurrence of any word. Very frequent we term the occurrence of any word once in two pages. To this class belong also some special observations enumerated. Each very important peculiarity will be counted

IV. There remains a class of peculiarities still more significant, of which a small number is equivalent to more than thrice that number of peculiarities of class I. To this belongs first a very frequent occurrence of any word or idiom, as for instance, 118 times or more in the *Laws*, 97 times or more in the *Republic*, generally more than once in every two pages (ed. Didot). Besides, we include here a small number of the most characteristic peculiarities of style, namely:

12. Belonging to a tetralogy as second or third member.

13. Complete substitution of other teachers for Socrates.

14. Didactic and authoritative character.

15. Quotations of earlier dialogues, preludes and recapitulations.

21. Avoiding of hiatus.

23. Occurrence more than once in a page (ed. Didot) of rare words common and peculiar to a dialogue with Timaeus, Critias, Laws.

307. *μέντοι* less than once in five pages.

318. Answers of subjective assent entirely absent.

325. Superlatives in affirmative answers prevailing over corresponding positives.

366. *πᾶς* and its compounds over five times in a page.

367. *ἅπας, ξύμπας, ξυνάπας* more than once in a page.

376. Apodictic answers more than 40 % of all answers.

377. Problematic answers fewer than one to four apodictic answers.

378. Interrogations by *ἄρα* more than 24 % of all interrogations.

389. *κατὰ* with the accusative prevailing over *ἐν*.

390. More than 21 prepositions in a page.

412. *πέρι* placed after the word to which it belongs forming more than 20 % of all occurrences of *περί*.

451. Rhetorical interrogations forming more than 20 % of all interrogations.

as equivalent to four accidental peculiarities.

All these peculiarities being *very important*, it will be fair to count each as equivalent to two repeated, or to three accidental, or to one accidental and one important peculiarity.

The above standards of equivalence are minimal, in order to avoid exaggeration of affinities. Importance is not proportional to frequency, and increases at a much smaller rate. The above classification is not definitive, and aims at determining the minimal value of affinities.

In the above classification of peculiarities we have endeavoured to reduce to a minimum the relative importance of each peculiarity, in order to avoid every exaggeration of the measure of affinity uniting two dialogues. Any error committed will thus rather diminish the apparent affinities than increase them. If a word occurs once in each page, or more than two hundred times in the *Laws*, this will be counted as only four times more important than a single occurrence. Later inquiries may prove that this is a very low estimate of the importance of frequency. But any classification of stylistic peculiarities according to their importance must take into account that importance is very far from being proportional to frequency. If one word occurs ten times in one dialogue and ten times in another, this is very far from being a link equivalent to ten single occurrences of ten different words in both dialogues. Our classification is here proposed not as definitive, but only as a first attempt at a numerical evaluation of stylistic affinities. Future inquirers dealing with many thousands of compared peculiarities may find reasons for a different classification. As our purpose is only to find the lowest figures, which may be increased later, but can never be diminished, the above distinction of four degrees of frequency and importance is sufficient.

Now, in order to apply our method, we must state clearly the highest hypothesis on which it is founded and define its terms. This highest hypothesis has been here-

tofore tacitly admitted, but has not been methodically discussed. It is the following LAW OF STYLISTIC AFFINITY.

Law of stylistic affinity. The numbers of observed peculiarities in two works must differ at least by one tenth for valid chronological inferences. The total number of peculiarities dealt with should exceed 150 in a dialogue of ordinary length. The *Laws* standard of comparison.

Of two works of the same author and of the same size, that is nearer in time to a third, which shares with it the greater number of stylistic peculiarities, provided that their different importance is taken into account, and that the number of observed peculiarities is sufficient to determine the stylistic character of all the three works.

As to the meaning of terms in this psychological law the following may be observed:

1. *Nearer in time* implies nothing as to priority, unless independent evidence is forthcoming that some one work of the author is the latest. In Plato's case the *Laws* are generally admitted to be such a work. But even were this doubted, a very great number of peculiarities observed would finally lead also to the determination of an order of priority, because the more varied style of an author has every chance of belonging to a later time.

2. A *greater number* of peculiarities does not mean any greater number, because if the difference is insignificant, no valid inference is allowed. We accept provisionally, as a minimum of difference between two works justifying chronological inferences, a difference of one-tenth of the observed peculiarities, and in some special cases we shall even require a greater difference.

3. A *sufficient number to determine the stylistic character* must be a greater number than has been used generally heretofore, except by Campbell. But this depends upon the importance of each peculiarity. In the present case we shall assume that the occurrence of fifty out of five hundred peculiarities allows a probable inference, but that this probability approaches certainty only when a hundred and fifty peculiarities of later style are found in an ordinary dialogue.

4. The *Laws* are our standard of comparison for the next latest five dialogues, and for earlier works the group

of the six latest dialogues, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Laws*.

If now we ask how the law of stylistic affinity can be verified, the first and nearest answer lies in the psychological property of style as a mark of identity, entirely depending on the totality of familiar expressions at any time in the writer's consciousness. Every writer could find easily in his own experience sufficient evidence in favour of this psychological law. It has been suggested that it ought to be tested on the writings of a great modern writer like Goethe, as we know exactly when he wrote each of his works. But this way of testing it would cost an immense additional labour, and would still remain inconclusive, since an obstinate sceptic might object that the psychological development of Goethe differed from that of Plato—that the German language has peculiarities distinct from those of the Greek language, &c.

The law of stylistic affinities must be tested. A test on another author than the author to whom we apply it would be inconclusive.

We propose, therefore, another and better way of testing, with special reference to Plato, the law of stylistic affinity, and at the same time also our own classification of stylistic peculiarities, which is subsidiary to our chronological conclusions, and requires even more strict verification than the psychological law, which will appear obvious to many readers.

We have means of testing our principles and their consistency on the works of Plato, among which some are positively known to be later than others, for instance, the continuation of a larger work is later than

We have sufficient means of testing our method, if we take into account that, however little is positively known in Platonic chronology, there are some works connected by Plato himself into tetralogies, and therefore necessarily following each other, though perhaps at intervals. Further, there can be no doubt that the successive parts of a larger work, as a rule, must have followed each other, at least if the later part contains clear allusions to the preceding text. If, then, our method yields conclusions in agreement with these evident facts, we may confidently apply it to the solution of more difficult problems in Platonic chronology. We submit,

its beginning.

Such tests could be collected in great numbers if all the authors had quoted the passages counted. A certain number of tests is taken from the comparison between earlier and later books of the *Republic* except the sixth and seventh books, with the following eighth and ninth, as their order is not quite certain. Any book is later than the first, the

therefore, to the impartial judgment of our readers the following tests :

1. The first tetralogy sketched out by Plato consists of *Republic, Timaeus, Critias* (unfinished), with the *Hermocrates,* which was projected but never written. We begin by comparing the first with the last book of the *Republic,* because some intermediate books have been considered by certain critics as later additions, while nobody doubts that the tenth book must be somewhat later than the first. We find in the first book 28 accidental, 6 repeated, and 3 important peculiarities of later style, amounting together to 49 units of affinity. In the tenth book, which is a little smaller and offers therefore even fewer opportunities for the occurrence of each peculiarity, we find 35 accidental, 14 repeated, 15 important, and 6 very important peculiarities of later style, equivalent to 132 units. For the sake of conciseness and easy comparison we express this stylistic relation in the following formula :

1. Rep. I 327–354 (20½ pp. Did.) : 28 (I) 6 (II) 3 (III) = 49 (I)
→Rep. X 595–621 (19½ pp. Did.) : 35 (I) 14 (II) 15 (III) 6 (IV) = 132 (I).

2. It is equally certain that the fourth book of the *Republic* must be written later than the second. If we take for comparison two samples of text of a size nearly equal to the *Symposium,* we find the following stylistic relation :

[Symposium 172 A–223 D (39 pp. Did.) : 42 (I) 16 (II) 8 (III) = 98 (I).]

2. Rep. II 357 A—III 412 A (37½ pp. Did.) : 47 (I) 20 (II) 22 (III) 2 (IV) = 161 (I).
→Rep. III 412 B—V 471 C (39 pp. Did.) : 45 (I) 23 (II) 31 (III) 2 (IV) = 192 (I).
[Cf. Phaedrus (39 pp. Did.) : 54 (I) 36 (II) 22 (III) 7 (IV) = 220 (I).]

3. The above two tests can be confirmed also by comparison of larger samples. If we compare the last three

books of the *Republic*, equal in size to the *Theaetetus*, with an exactly equal amount of B. II–IV, we find the following stylistic relation (the indications about the style of other dialogues are of course quoted here not as tests, but only for comparison) :

fourth is later than the second, etc. In each case the earlier text has fewer peculiarities of later style, the evidence as to priority being given by Plato himself.

3. Rep. II 368 A—IV 445 E (53 pp. Did.) : 47 (I) 30 (II) 32 (III) 2 (IV) = 211 (I).
→Rep. VIII–X (53½ pp. Did.) : 54 (I) 36 (II) 29 (III) 5 (IV) = 233 (I).
[Theaetetus (53 pp. Did.) : 58 (I) 41 (II) 31 (III) = 233 (I).]

4–7. As there is no doubt that the single books of the *Republic* were written in their present order (except B. V–VII, which are supposed to have been completed last of all), we may compare different parts of almost equal length, in order to see whether the later text always offers more peculiarities of later style. Such comparison will be easily appreciated in the following short enumeration :

4. Rep. I 327–II 367 E (28 pp. Did.) : 36 (I) 10 (II) 3 (III) = 65 (I).
→Rep. II 368 A–412 A (30 pp. Did.) : 42 (I) 17 (II) 22 (III) 2 (IV) = 150 (I).
Cf. Euthydemus (28 pp. Did.) : 22 (I) 5 (II) 7 (III) = 53 (I).

5. Rep. II–IV (60½ pp. Did.) : 47 (I) 37 (II) 32 (III) 2 (IV) = 225 (I).
→Rep. V–VII (60 pp. Did.) : 56 (I) 29 (II) 40 (III) 7 (IV) = 262 (I).
Cf. Gorgias (60 pp. Did.) : 31 (I) 20 (II) 6 (III) = 89 (I).
Cf. Phaedo (49 pp. Did.) : 43 (I) 26 (II) 17 (III) 2 (IV) = 154 (I).

6. Rep. II 357 A–III 412 A (37½ pp. Did.) : 47 (I) 20 (II) 22 (III) 2 (IV) = 161 (I).
→Rep. VIII–IX (34 pp. Did.) : 47 (I) 22 (II) 27 (III) 3 (IV) = 184 (I).

7. Rep. II 368–IV 445 E (53 pp. Did.) : 47 (I) 30 (II) 32 (III) 2 (IV) = 211 (I).
Rep. V 471 D–VII 541 (44 pp. Did.) : 50 (I) 21 (II) 38 (III) 7 (IV) = 234 (I).

In the above seven test cases the earlier part has always fewer peculiarities of later style, and in every case

the evidence of priority is given by Plato himself, as we compared the acknowledged continuation with the preceding text. We excluded from our comparisons the relation of B. V–VII to the following books, because this part of the *Republic* in its present form has been supposed to be later, and cannot therefore be used as a test case. Many other parts of the *Republic* could be compared with equal lengths of text undoubtedly later, but the above seven samples give a sufficient notion of the text of the *Republic*, and we may now proceed to compare the *Republic* with *Timaeus* and *Critias*. A direct comparison between *Timaeus* and *Critias* is impossible, because the size of the two dialogues differs too much.

The same results from a comparison between parts of the *Republic* and the dialogues which are later, for instance, the *Timaeus* and *Critias*. The *Critias* being much smaller than any book of the

8. In order to compare the *Republic* with the *Timaeus*, a good test is afforded by the last three books, which are equal in size to the *Timaeus*:

8. Rep. VIII–X (53½ pp. Did.): 54 (I) 36 (II) 29 (III) 5 (IV) = 233 (I).

→Timaeus (53 pp. Did.): 123 (I) 58 (II) 44 (III) 14 (IV) = 427 (I).

9. The *Critias* is almost too small for any comparison, being scarcely longer than half a book of the *Republic*. It is certain that the *Critias* is later than the last book of the *Republic*, and if notwithstanding its small size the *Critias* has more peculiarities of later style, this gives an evident confirmation to the law of stylistic affinity, and to the rules above admitted. We find:

9. Rep. X (19½ pp. Did.): 35 (I) 14 (II) 15 (III) 6 (IV) = 132 (I).

→Critias (11 pp. Did.): 51 (I) 8 (II) 18 (III) 12 (IV) = 169 (I).

This test is specially important, because we have taken the last book of the *Republic*, apparently separated from the *Critias* only by the length of the *Timaeus*, and we have found that to the chronologic distance there corresponds a considerable stylistic distance between the

two works. We might add as test comparisons each of the other books of the *Republic*, and we should find that the *Critias* exceeds them all in number and importance of peculiarities of later style. But this being evident after our preceding comparisons, we need not insist upon it.

Republic shows a style later than even the last book of the larger but earlier work.

10. In order to compare the *Laws* with the *Republic*, we must allow for the difference of size, the *Laws* being 43 pp. (Did.) longer. If we add the *Gorgias* to the *Republic*, we obtain a whole slightly exceeding the *Laws* in size and affording a convenient comparison, because nobody doubts that the *Gorgias* and *Republic* are both earlier than the *Laws*. It results:

To compare the *Republic* with the *Laws*, we must add some text to the smaller dialogue.

10. Gorg. + Rep. as one whole (256 pp. Did.): 76 (I) 124 (II) 30 (III) 4 (IV) = 430 (I).
→Laws (238 pp. Did.): 175 (1) 176 (II) 37 (III) 20 (IV) = 718 (I).

The *Laws* being acknowledged as the latest work of Plato, many new tests would result from a comparison of the *Laws* with different combinations of other dialogues equal together in size to the *Laws*. But as our list has been compiled on the principle of a selection of peculiarities of later style, and the standard of later style has been taken from the *Laws* and those other works which in style come nearest to the *Laws*, it might be denied that such tests confirm the law of stylistic affinity.

Then we find that the style of the *Republic* is much earlier than the style of the *Laws*.

11. We turn to the other tetralogy indicated by Plato himself, and beginning with the *Theaetetus*. We compare first the *Theaetetus* with the *Sophist*, which is its recognised continuation according to Plato's own indisputable testimony:

The two dialogues which were written by Plato as continuation of the *Theaetetus* also show a

11. Theaet. (53 pp. Did.): 58 (I) 41 (II) 31 (III) = 233 (I).
→Soph. (40 pp. Did.): 139 (I) 36 (II) 59 (III) 20 (IV) = 468 (I)

12. The *Sophist* and *Politicus* are as closely connected as if they were one dialogue, and still there is a difference

much later style.

of style between them, the latter having more peculiarities of later style :

12. Soph. (40 pp. Did.): 139 (I) 36 (II) 59 (III) 20 (IV) = 468 (I).
→Polit. (43 pp. Did.): 163 (I) 43 (II) 56 (III) 19 (IV) = 493 (I).

Further tests are given by comparing those dialogues about the relative date of which there is a general agreement, for instance *Phaedo* with the preceding *Meno*, or *Philebus* with the preceding *Parmenides*. Also in this case our method confirms the best information obtained otherwise.

13-14. The above twelve test comparisons refer to samples of text, for whose chronological order Plato himself has given clear indications. They confirm the law of stylistic affinity as well as the rules laid down for the application of this psychological law, including our classification of stylistic peculiarities according to the degree of their importance. We need not pause here to test our fundamental principles. There are some pairs of dialogues, which, though not forming one whole or not continuing each other as the above, are recognised as standing in a certain chronological relation because one of them contains allusions to an exposition which appears in the other. Many of such allusions are disputable, but there are at least two which are sufficiently recognised by all competent authors, including Zeller, to justify their use as tests. These are the allusion found in the *Phaedo* (72 E) to the theory of reminiscence first set forth in the *Meno* (82 B-86 A), and the allusion of the *Philebus* (14 C) to the difficulties of defining the relation between the One and the Many which are nowhere treated with such consciousness of the complexity of the problem as in the *Parmenides* (129 B–E and the whole dialogue). If now we compare the style of these four dialogues we find again a complete agreement between our own method of settling chronological difficulties and the most certain hints about the order of some dialogues obtained otherwise:

13. Meno (23 pp. Did.): 20 (I) 16 (II) 8 (III) = 61 (I).
→Phaedo (49 pp. Did.): 43 (I) 26 (II) 17 (III) 2 (IV) = 154 (I).

Here the difference of size could not be accounted for, but is compensated by the very great difference of style.

14. Parmenides (31 pp. Did.): 56 (I) 42 (II) 21 (III) 10 (IV) = 243 (I).
→Philebus (43 pp. Did.): 100 (I) 38 (II) 55 (III) 16 (IV) = 405 (I).

Here also the difference of size is more than compensated by the great difference of style.

15. Other similar allusions are too uncertain, and sometimes evidently mistaken, so that we cannot use them as tests. But to remain within the limits of the greatest probability, we may take for granted that the three small dialogues referring to the death of Socrates—*Apology*, *Euthyphro*, *Crito*—are earlier than the *Symposium* which nearly equals them in size. We find:

A similar test is offered by the three short dialogues referring to the death of Socrates, which are earlier than the *Symposium*.

15. Apology Euthyphro Crito as one whole (41 pp. Did.): 21 (I) 7 (II) 6 (III) = 53.
→Symposium (39 pp. Did.): 42 (I) 16 (II) 8 (III) = 98.

16. It were easy to increase the number of similar tests by many others, taking the whole of Socratic dialogues as certainly earlier than *Philebus*, *Timaeus* and *Critias*, and our list offers sufficient material for comparisons which can be readily made by those of our readers who think that the above fifteen trustworthy tests are insufficient. We add only one test of a different character, in order to show how the coincidence of accidental characters operates on greater agglomerations of texts. Were our method wrong, it might happen that a certain number of single dialogues, each of which has been found earlier than one of the dialogues of another group, taken together as one whole and treated as to the distinction of degrees of importance in the same way as the *Republic*, would appear later than the group consisting of dialogues which taken individually are later. Now, a good test of the consistency of our method

An important test of consistency is found by comparing groups of dialogues

A group of dialogues which individually contain more peculiarities of style need not neces-

sarily contain also a greater number of peculiarities if the greater number were not caused by the later date.

is to form two groups of dialogues, one consisting of dialogues which by individual comparison have been found to be earlier than the *Republic*, and the other of those which have been found to be later. Then, if our method and our rules are correct, the later group must show a greater number of peculiarities of later style than the *Republic*, while the earlier group must also have a smaller equivalent of affinity with the later style. Those dialogues which according to individual stylistic tests precede the *Republic* are the *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, *Cratylus*, *Gorgias*, amounting together very nearly to the size of the *Republic*. On the other side, the *Theaetetus*, *Parmenides*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus* and *Critias* form a group also equal in size to the *Republic*, and consisting of dialogues of which each has been found later than some part of the *Republic*. If we compare both groups with the *Republic*, counting as important only the peculiarities which occur in each group, at least so many times (17) as is needed to call them important, if they occurred in the *Republic*, then we find the following results:

16. Gorg. Crat. Symp. and Phaedo as one whole (191 pp. Did.): 50 (I) 84 (II) 8 (III) = 242 (I).

→Republic I–X (195 pp. Did.): 81 (I) 110 (II) 30 (III) 4 (IV) = 407 (I).

→Theaet. Parm. Phil. Tim. and Critias as one whole (191 pp. Did.): 107 (I) 210 (II) 40 (III) 9 (IV) = 683.

This test of consistency has also an independent value for many competent Platonists who recognise that the *Republic* is later than *Gorgias*, *Cratylus*, *Symposium* and *Phaedo*, but earlier than *Theaetetus*, *Parmenides*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus* and *Critias*.

Our method thoroughly tested, as no stylistic

Now, having thoroughly tested our instrument of inquiry, it is fair to apply it to those more difficult problems of Platonic chronology, on which other investigators have heretofore failed to agree. First as to the date of the *Theaetetus* tetralogy, it results from the above,

that the *Theaetetus* must at least be later than the first books of the *Republic* (see test comparison No. 3). The difference of style between the *Theaetetus* and the last books of the *Republic* is too insignificant to allow direct chronological conclusions, though it shows also that the *Theaetetus* has a greater number of peculiarities than B. VIII–X. In order to decide whether the *Theaetetus* is later than the whole of the *Republic*, we shall be obliged to have recourse to a 'longer way' than our present method. For the present we must be content to say that the *Theaetetus* is evidently later than the *Symposium* and *Phaedo*, as can be seen from the above tests 3 and 5. A further important result from the validity of our method is that the *Phaedrus* is undoubtedly later than the *Phaedo*, and the *Phaedo* later than the *Symposium* (see above tests 2 and 5). For the relation between the *Phaedrus* and *Theaetetus* the above observations afford no sufficient basis.

method before, has been found consistent and trustworthy. It holds good in doubtful cases. But certain difficulties remain unsettled. What our calculations prove may be seen from the following table of affinities, a condensed expression of over fifty-eight thousand facts hitherto little known.

Many new investigations are needed to settle all details with the complete certainty which the above reasoning shows to be possible in chronological inferences from stylistic observations. The present calculations, based on the work of others, are by no means sufficient to determine the order of all the works of Plato. For this it would be necessary to have a list of stylistic peculiarities ten times longer than our list of 500 stylistic characters, among which only very few are important, the majority being accidental. In order to enable the reader to extend comparisons similar to the above to other dialogues and groups of dialogues, the measure of relative stylistic affinities is given in the following table, which supplements Campbell's and C. Ritter's similar tables by a methodic co-ordination of over fifty-eight thousand facts, collected by twenty authors, of whom none knew more than a few of his fellows :

TABLE OF STYLISTIC AFFINITY FOR TWENTY-TWO DIALOGUES OF PLATO.

Names of the dialogues in their presumed chronological order, and abbreviations used for them in this table.	*Number of peculiarities* of later style found in each dialogue. I. Accidental.	II. Repeated.	III. Important.	IV. Very important.	Total equivalent to the following number of *units of affinity*.	*Relative affinity* to the latest group measured on the Laws.	*Enumeration of peculiarities appearing in each Dialogue for the first time.* Each peculiarity is designated by its current number in the above list of five hundred stylistic peculiarities. Behind this number appear the abbreviated names of the two next dialogues in which the same peculiarity recurs. Also the occurrence of each peculiarity in each part of the Republic is marked by small letters added in brackets. a = Rep. Book I, b = Books II–IV, c = Books V–VII, d = Books VIII–IX, e = Book X. For other details see explanations following the table.
I. Socratic Group							
1. *Apology* = Apol. 19·7 pp. ed. Did.	**9**	**2**	*1*	—	**16**	0·02	I.— **3**: Charm. Lach. (a b_2 c_1 d). **8**: Prot. Symp.^{II} (a b^{II}_3). **231**: Crito Charm.^{II} ($b^{II.III.I}_{1.2.3}$ $c^{I.III}_{1.2}$ d^{III} e^{III}). **289**: Euthyph. Crito ($b^{I.II}_{2.3}$ $c^{II}_{1.2}$ d^{II} e). **296**: Euthyph. Charm. (a b $c^{I.III}_{1.2}$ d). **298**: Lach. Meno (a^{II} c_2). **311**: Euthyph. Prot. (a c^{II}_2 d^{II}). **418**: Lach. Phaedr.^{II} (b_2). **443**: Meno Euthyd. II.—**350**: Crito Charm. ($b_{2.3}$ c_2 d^{II} e). **412**: Euthyph.^{II} Lach.^{III} (Rep.^{IV}). Passages not quoted in Rep. III.—*367*: Crito^{III} Lach.^{III} ($b^{II}_{2.3}$ $c^{II}_{1.2}$ d^{II} e^{III}).
	Peculiarities occurring 8–9 times important.						

2. *Euthyphro* = Euthyph. 11·7 pp. ed. Did.	11	2	*1*	—	18	0·03	I.—**205**: Charm.^{II} Lach.^{III} (a^{II} $b^{II}_{1\ 2}$ $^{III}_{3}$ $c^{III}_{1\ 2}$ d^{III} e^{II}). **222**: Prot. Crat. (e). **352**: Euthyd. Phaedo ($b^{III}_{2.3}$ $c^{III}_{1.2}$ d^{III} e^{II}). **382**: Prot. Meno^{II} (Rep.^{II}). **386**: Charm. Meno (a $b^{III}_{2.3}$ $c^{III}_{1\ 2}$ d^{II} e^{II}). **402**: Crito Charm. (a $b_{2.3}$ $c^{I.II}_{1\ 2}$ d). **410**: Lach. Euthyd. (b^{II}_{3} c_1). **416**: Gorg. Symp. (b^{II}_{3} $c^{III}_{1\ 2}$ d e^{II}). II.—**401**: Phaedo Theaet. (c_1). III.—*451*: Crito^{III} Charm. (a^{II} $b^{III}_{2.3}$ $c^{III}_{1.2}$ d^{III} e^{III}). Total of new peculiarities: *8* accidental, *1* repeated, *1* important.
	Peculiarities occurring 3–5 times important.						
3. *Crito* 9·5 pp. ed. Did.	13	—	*5*	—	28	0·04	I.—**232**: Phaedr. Parm. ($b_{1.2}$ d). **250**: Prot.^{II} Meno (c_3). **262**: Gorg. Crat.^{II} (c^{II}_{2}). **269**: Charm.^{III} Lach. (b^{III}_{3} c_2). **270**: Charm.^{III} Lach. (b^{III}_{3}). **280**: Euthyd. Gorg.^{II} (b_3 c^{II}_{2}). **284**: Charm.^{II} Meno^{II} (a^{III} b_2 c^{III}_{2} d e^{II}). **290**: Crat.^{III} Symp. (b^{II}_{3} c^{II}_{1} $^{III}_{2}$ d^{II} e^{II}). **294**: Charm. Lach. ($b_{2\ 3}$ e^{II}). III.—*307*: Prot.^{III} Meno^{III} (d^{III}). *308*: Charm.^{III} Lach.^{III} (b^{III}_{3} $c^{III}_{1\ 2}$ d^{III} e^{III}). *354*: Lach.^{II} Prot.^{II} ($b^{III}_{2.3}$ $c^{III}_{1.2}$ d^{III} e^{III}). Total of new peculiarities: *9* accidental, *3* important.
	Peculiarities occurring 3–4 times important.						

TABLE OF STYLISTIC AFFINITY FOR TWENTY-TWO DIALOGUES OF PLATO—*continued.*

Names of the dialogues in their presumed chronological order, and abbreviations used for them in this table.	*Number of peculiarities* of later style found in each dialogue.				Total equivalent to the following number of *units of affinity.*	*Relative affinity* to the latest group measured on the Laws.	*Enumeration of peculiarities appearing in each Dialogue for the first time.* Each peculiarity is designated by its current number in the above list of five hundred stylistic peculiarities. Behind this number appear the abbreviated names of the two next dialogues in which the same peculiarity recurs. Also the occurrence of each peculiarity in each part of the Republic is marked by small letters added in brackets. a = Rep. Book I, b = Books II–IV, c = Books V–VII, d = Books VIII–IX, e = Book X. For other details see explanations following the table.
	I. Accidental.	II. Repeated.	III. Important.	IV. Very important.			
4. *Charmides* = Charm. 18·1 pp. ed. Did.	**13**	**5**	*6*	—	**41**	**0·06**	I.—**215**: Prot. Meno (a). **228**: Gorg. Crat. (a $b_{2\ 8}^{II}$ $c_{1\ 2}^{III}$ d^{III} e^{III}). **255**: Crat.^{III} Phaedo^{III} (b_2^{II} $c_{1\ .\ 2}^{II\ .\ III}$ d^{III} e). **285**: Phaedo Soph.^{II} **351**: Prot. Phaedo (c_2). **420**: Meno^{II} Euthyd. (b_1). II.—**221**: Prot.^{II} Meno (a $c_{1\ .\ 2}$). **396**: Gorg. Crat. (b_2). III.—*248*: Meno^{II} Euthyd.^{III} (a c_2 d e). *385*: Lach. Prot. (a^{III} $b_{2\ .\ 3}^{III}$ $c_{1\ .\ 2}^{III}$ d^{II} e^{II}). Total of new peculiarities: *6* accidental, *2* repeated, *2* important.
	Peculiarities occurring 3–8 times important.						
5. *Laches* = Lach. 17·8 pp. ed. Did.	**19**	**4**	*8*	—	**51**	**0·07**	I.—**199**: Meno Euthyd. (b_3 d^{II} e^{II}). **207**: Meno Gorg. (b_2 e^{II}). **253**: Prot. Gorg.^{III} ($b_{2\ .\ 3}$ c_1^{II} $_2^{III}$ d^{II} e). **299**: Soph. Legg.^{II} (b_3). **349**: Phaedr.^{II} Theaet.^{III} (a $b_{2\ 3}^{III}$ $c_{1\ 2}^{III}$ d^{III} e^{II}). **353**: Crat.^{II} Phaedo (b_1^{I} $_2^{II}$ $_4^{III}$ $c_{1\ .\ 2}^{III\ IV}$ d^{III} e^{III}).
	Peculiarities occurring 3–8 times important.						

							380: Gorg. Symp. **383**: Prot. Meno^{II} (Rep.^{II}). **387**: Crat. Symp. (a $b^{III}_{2\cdot 3}$ $c^{III}_{1\cdot 2}$ d^{III} e^{III}). **456**: Prot. Meno ($b^{III}_{2\cdot 3}$ $c^{II\cdot III}_{1\cdot 2}$ d^{III}). **457**: Meno^{II} Crat.^{III} (a $b^{III}_{2\cdot 3}$ c^{III}_{2} d^{II}). II.—**217**: Prot. Phaedr. (c_2 d). **400**: Prot.^{II} Crat.^{II} (e). III.—*206*: Symp.^{III} Theaet.^{III} *301*: Gorg. Crat. *390*: Prot.^{II} Symp.^{II} ($b^{II}_{2\cdot 3}$ $c^{II\cdot IV}_{1\cdot 2}$ d^{III} e^{IV}). *453*: Gorg. Crat.^{III} ($b^{II\cdot III}_{1\cdot 2\cdot 3}$ $c^{III\cdot IV}_{1\cdot 2}$ d^{III} e^{IV}). Total of new peculiarities: *11* accidental, *2* repeated, *4* important.
6. *Protagoras* =Prot. 39·5 pp. ed. Did.	**21**	**9**	*4*	—	**51**	**0·07**	I.— **10**: Phaedr. Legg. **183**: Soph. Polit. (d). **193**: Parm. Polit. (c_1 d). **198**: Meno^{II} Euthyd.^{II} (b_3). **252**: Phaedr. Tim.^{III} **302**: Meno^{II} Euthyd.^{II} (c_3). **355**: Gorg.^{II} Symp. (b^{II}_{2} $c^{II\cdot III}_{1\cdot 2}$). **415**: Phaedr.^{II} Soph. **424**: Crat. Symp. (b_1). II.— **7**: Meno^{II} Phaedo (b_2). **300**: Meno^{II} Gorg.^{II} (a c_1). **310**: Phil. Tim. III.—*279*: Meno Euthyd. (b_1 c_2 e^{II}). *378*: Crat.^{III} Phaedo^{III} ($b^{III}_{2\cdot 3}$ $c^{III}_{1\cdot 2}$ d^{III} e^{III}). Total of new peculiarities: *9* accidental, *3* repeated, *2* important.
	Peculiarities occurring 4–19 times important.						

TABLE OF STYLISTIC AFFINITY FOR TWENTY-TWO DIALOGUES OF PLATO – *continued.*

Names of the dialogues in their presumed chronological order, and abbreviations used for them in this table.	*Number of peculiarities* of later style found in each dialogue.				Total equivalent to the following number of *units of affinity.*	*Relative affinity* to the latest group measured on the Laws.	*Enumeration of peculiarities appearing in each Dialogue for the first time.* Each peculiarity is designated by its current number in the above list of five hundred stylistic peculiarities. Behind this number appear the abbreviated names of the two next dialogues in which the same peculiarity recurs. Also the occurrence of each peculiarity in each part of the Republic is marked by small letters added in brackets. a = Rep. Book I, b = Books II–IV, c = Books V–VII, d = Books VIII–IX, e = Book X. For other details see explanations following the table.
	I. Accidental.	II. Repeated.	III. Important.	IV. Very important.			
7. *Meno.* 23·3 pp. ed. Did.	**20**	**16**	*3*	—	**61**	**0·08**	I.— **2**: Euthyd. Symp. (b_2 c_2^{II} e). **274**: Euthyd. Crat. (b_2^{II} c_2^{II} d). **293**: Crat. Polit. **392**: Parm.^{II} Soph.^{II} (a). **441**: Theaet. Phil. (e). **447**: Phaedr. Soph.^{II} (c_2). **500**: Theaet.^{II} Parm.^{II} II.—**421**: Phaedo Soph. **444**: Soph. Polit.^{II} **445**: Gorg. Symp. (b_2^{II} $_3^{I}$ d e). Total of new peculiarities: *7* accidental, *3* repeated.
	Peculiarities occurring 4–11 times important.						
8. *Euthydemus* = Euthyd. 27·9 pp. ed. Did.	**22**	**5**	*7*	—	**53**	**0·08**	I.—**203**: Symp. Phaedr. (a c_1). **210**: Phaedr.^{II} Soph. ($b_{1.3}$ $c_{1.2}$). **211**: Crat. Parm. (b_2). **242**: Gorg.^{II} Symp. (b_2 c_2^{III} e^{III}). **309**: Crat. Phaedr.^{III} (c_2^{III} d^{II} e). **374**: Theaet. Parm. (c_2 e). **440**: Gorg. Phaedo (c_2). **446**: Soph. Legg.^{II} (b_3).
	Peculiarities occurring 4–13 times important.						

							II.—**197**: Polit. Tim.^{II} (c_2). **246**: Crat.^{II} Symp. (c^{III}_{2} d^{II}). **403**: Gorg.^{II} Phaedo. III.—*194*: Theaet. Legg.^{II} *249*: Gorg. Crat.^{II} ($b_{2.3}$ c_2 e). *376*: Gorg.^{III} Crat.^{III} (a^{III} $b^{IV}_{2.3}$ $c^{IV}_{1.2}$ d^{IV} e^{IV}). *377*: Gorg.^{III} Phaedo^{IV} ($b^{III}_{2.3}$ $c^{III.IV}_{1.2}$ d^{IV} e^{IV}). Total of new peculiarities: *8* accidental, *3* repeated, *4* important.
9. *Gorgias* = Gorg. 61·6 pp. ed. Did.	**31**	**20**	*6*	—	**89**	**0·12**	I.— **1**: Crat.^{II} Phaedo (c_2). **4**: Symp. Phaedo^{III} ($b_{2.3}$ d). **234**: Phaedo^{II} Phaedr.^{II} (b_2 $c_{1.2}$ d). **254**: Crat.^{II} Symp.^{II} ($b^{III}_{2.3}$ c^{III}_{2} d^{III}). **282**: Phaedo Tim. **292**: Legg. **347**: Theaet. Soph.^{II} (a). **393**: Theaet.^{II} Polit. ($b_{2.3}$). **394**: Crat.^{II} Theaet.^{II} ($b_{2.3}$ d e). **398**: Crat. Symp. **413**: Phil. **414**: Legg.^{II} (c_2). **426**: Tim.^{II} Critias^{III} (b_1). II.— **5**: Symp.^{II} Phaedo^{II} (c_2). **283**: Theaet. Phil. (d). **407**: Phaedr. Theaet.^{II} (c_2). **408**: Phaedr. Theaet.^{II} (c_2). **499**: Parm.^{II} Soph. (d^{II}). Total of new peculiarities: 13 accidental, 5 repeated.
	Peculiarities occurring 5–30 times important.						

TABLE OF STYLISTIC AFFINITY FOR TWENTY-TWO DIALOGUES OF PLATO—*continued.*

Names of the dialogues in their presumed chronological order, and abbreviations used for them in this table.	*Number of peculiarities* of later style found in each dialogue. I. Accidental.	II. Repeated.	III. Important.	IV. Very important.	Total equivalent to the following number of *units of affinity.*	*Relative affinity* to the latest group measured on the Laws.	*Enumeration of peculiarities appearing in each Dialogue for the first time.* Each peculiarity is designated by its current number in the above list of five hundred stylistic peculiarities. Behind this number appear the abbreviated names of the two next dialogues in which the same peculiarity recurs. Also the occurrence of each peculiarity in each part of the Republic is marked by small letters added in brackets. a = Rep. Book I, b = Books II–IV, c = Books V–VII, d = Books VIII–IX, e = Book X. For other details see explanations following the table.
Gorgias, Cratylus, Symposium, Phaedo, as one whole. 191 pp. ed. Did.	50	84	*8*	—	242	0·34	In this group, taken as one continuous whole, the total number of new peculiarities is *37* accidental, *41* repeated, *2* important (28 and 254).
	Peculiarities occurring 17–95 times important.						
Republic B. I–X, 194 pp.	81	110	*30*	4	407	0·57	Out of the peculiarities appearing for the first time in the Republic, *37* are accidental, *42* repeated, *7* important (455, 448, 202, 261, 342, 343, 12).
	Peculiarities occurring 17–96 times important.						
II. FIRST PLATONIC GROUP.							
10. *Cratylus* = Crat. 42·3 pp. ed. Did.	33	16	*15*	1	114	0·16	I.—**196**: Soph.^{II} Polit. **212**: Theaet. Parm.^{II} (c_2^{II}). **220**: Symp.^{II} Phaedo^{II} (e). **241**: Phaedr.^{II} Theaet. (c_2^{II}). **243**: Phaedr.^{III} Theaet. (c_2^{III} d^{II} e^{III}). **265**: Polit. Tim. (d). **273**: Phaedo Legg. (c_2^{II}).
	Peculiarities occurring 4–20 times important.						

							288: Phaedo Polit. (c_2). **346**: Phaedr. Soph.^{II} (b_3^{II} c_1^{I} $_2^{II}$ d). **358**: Soph.^{II} Polit.^{II} **397**: Phaedr. Parm. (b_2). **406**: Legg.^{II} **423**: Symp.^{III} Phaedr.^{II} (b_2). II.—**239**: Symp. Phaedo^{III} (c_2^{III} e^{III}). **244**: Phaedo^{II} Phaedr.^{II} (c_2^{III}). **264**: Phaedo Phaedr. (b_3 $c_{1.2}$ d^{III} e). **371**: Symp. Theaet.^{II} (c_2). **405**: Phil. Tim.^{II} (d). III.—*245*: Phaedr.^{III} Theaet.^{III} (b_1 c_2^{III} d). *275*: Tim. Legg.^{II} (b_2^{III} c_1 e). *277*: Legg.^{II} *389*: Soph.^{IV} Polit.^{III} Total of new peculiarities: *13* accidental, *5* repeated, *4* important.
11. *Symposium* = Symp. 39·3 pp. ed. Did.	**42**	**16**	*8*	—	**98**	**0·14**	I.—**186**: Phaedr. Theaet. **191**: Theaet. Polit.^{II} ($b_{2\ 3}$). **251**: Legg.^{II} **263**: Phaedr. Tim. **267**: Phaedo Phaedr. (b_3). **271**: Legg.^{II} (b_2^{II} d). **281**: Theaet. Soph. **345**: Phaedr. Tim.^{II} **368**: Soph. Polit. **370**: Phaedo Phaedr. **384**: Soph. Polit.^{II} (Rep.). **411**: Phaedr. Tim. (c_1^{II}). **422**: Phaedo Tim.^{III} (e). **442**: Legg.^{II} II.—**204**: Phaedr. Theaet. (a $b_2^{II}{}_3$ c_2 d^{II}). **257**: Phaedo^{II} Theaet. (e). III.— *13*: Parm.^{III} Soph.^{IV} *23*: Phaedo^{III} Phaedr.^{IV} ($b_2^{IV}{}_3$ $c_1^{IV}{}_2$ d^{IV} e^{IV}). *317*: Parm.^{III} Soph.^{III} *391*: Soph.^{III} Polit.^{III} Total of new peculiarities: *14* accidental, *2* repeated, *4* important.
	Peculiarities occurring 4–19 times important.						

TABLE OF STYLISTIC AFFINITY FOR TWENTY-TWO DIALOGUES OF PLATO—*continued.*

Names of the dialogues in their presumed chronological order, and abbreviations used for them in this table.	*Number of peculiarities* of later style found in each dialogue.				Total equivalent to the following number of *units of affinity.*	*Relative affinity* to the latest group measured on the Laws.	*Enumeration of peculiarities appearing in each Dialogue for the first time.* Each peculiarity is designated by its current number in the above list of five hundred stylistic peculiarities. Behind this number appear the abbreviated names of the two next dialogues in which the same peculiarity recurs. Also the occurrence of each peculiarity in each part of the Republic is marked by small letters added in brackets. a = Rep. Book I, b = Books II–IV, c = Books V–VII, d = Books VIII–IX, e = Book X. For other details see explanations following the table.
	I. Accidental.	II. Repeated.	III. Important.	IV. Very important.			
12. *Phaedo.* 49·2 pp. ed. Did.	**43**	**26**	*17*	**2**	**154**	**0·21**	I.— **9**: Phaedr. Polit.^{II} (d). **214**: Phaedr. Soph. (d e). **256**: Phaedr.^{II} Soph. (d e). **266**: Legg. **305**: Soph. Phil. (a c_2). **344**: Theaet. Parm.^{II} **409**: Phaedr. Polit.^{III} (a c_1). **427**: Soph. Tim. (e). **439**: Polit. Tim. **494**: Parm.^{III} Phil. (c_2 d). **495**: Parm.^{II} Tim.^{II} II.—**272**: Tim.^{II} Critias. **369**: Soph. Phil.^{II} (e^{II}). **373**: Phaedr.^{II} Theaet.^{II} ($b^{I}_{2}\cdot{}^{II}_{3}$ c_2).
	Peculiarities occurring 4–24 times important.						

							419: Tim.^{III} Legg. (c^{II}_{2}). **496**: Parm. Polit. (d^{II}). **497**: Parm.^{II} Soph. ($b^{II \cdot I}_{3}\, c^{II}_{2}\, d$). **498**: Parm.^{II} Tim.^{II} III.—*258*: Polit. Phil. ($b^{III}_{2.3}\, c^{III}_{2}\, d^{III}$). *259*: Polit. Tim.^{II} (c_{2}). *325*: Phaedr.^{III} Theaet.^{III} ($b^{III}_{2.3}\, c^{III}_{1\ 2}\, d^{III}\, e^{IV}$). Total of new peculiarities: *11* accidental, *7* repeated, *3* important.
13. *Republic* B. I = a. 20·5 pp. ed. Did.	28	6	*3*	—	49	0·07	I.— **22**: Phaedr.^{II} Polit.^{III} ($b^{II}_{2}\, d^{II}$). **340**: Theaet.^{II} Parm. (b_{3}). **436**: Theaet. Parm.^{III} **449**: Soph.^{II} Polit.^{III} **454**: Phaedr.^{II} Soph.^{II} **481**: Parm.^{II} Soph. **493**: Phaedr.^{II} Theaet. ($b^{I\ II}_{2\ 3}$). II.—**455**: Phaedr.^{II} Theaet.^{III} ($b^{III}_{2\ 3}\, c^{III\ IV}_{1\ .\ 2}\, d^{III}\, e^{III}$). **491**: Theaet.^{II} Parm. (c_{1}). Total of new peculiarities: *7* accidental, *2* repeated. If written before the Gorgias, then it would contain besides *4* accidental new peculiarities.
	Peculiarities occurring 3–10 times important.						

TABLE OF STYLISTIC AFFINITY FOR TWENTY-TWO DIALOGUES OF PLATO *continued.*

Names of the dialogues in their presumed chronological order, and abbreviations used for them in this table.	*Number of peculiarities* of later style found in each dialogue.				Total equivalent to the following number of *units of affinity.*	*Relative affinity* to the latest group measured on the Laws.	*Enumeration of peculiarities appearing in each Dialogue for the first time.* Each peculiarity is designated by its current number in the above list of five hundred stylistic peculiarities. Behind this number appear the abbreviated names of the two next dialogues in which the same peculiarity recurs. Also the occurrence of each peculiarity in each part of the Republic is marked by small letters added in brackets. a = Rep. Book I, b = Books II–IV, c = Books V–VII, d = Books VIII–IX, e = Book X. For other details see explanations following the table.
	I. Accidental.	II. Repeated.	III. Important.	IV. Very important.			
III. MIDDLE PLATONIC GROUP							
14. *Republic* B. II–IV. $= b = b_1 + b_2 + b_3$ 60 pp. ed. Did.	47	37	*32*	2	225	0·31	
	Peculiarities occurring 5–29 times important.						
$b_1 = 357A—367E$ $= 7\frac{1}{2}$ pp. ed. Did.	11	5	—	—	21	0·03	$b_1 = 357A—367E$ ($7\frac{1}{2}$ pp.): I.—**297**: Phaedr. Tim. **334**: Phaedr.^{II} Soph.^{III} (b_2). **437**: Legg.^{II} II.—**448**: Phaedr.^{III} Theaet.^{II} ($b_{2.3}^{III}$ $c_{1.2}^{III}$ d^{III} e^{II}). **486**: Phaedr. Parm. (c_2).
$b_2 = 368A—412A$ $= 29\frac{1}{2}$ pp. ed. Did.	42	17	*22*	2	150	0·21	$b_2 = 368A—412A$ ($29\frac{1}{2}$ pp.): I.—**188**: Soph. Polit. (c_1). **192**: Phaedr. Theaet.^{II} (c_1). **213**: Soph. Phil. (b_3). **218**: Theaet. Legg.^{II} **219**: Tim. Legg.^{II} (d). **337**: Theaet. Phil.^{II} (c_2).

							338: Theaet. Parm. (c_2 d e). **425**: Theaet. Parm. **428**: Polit. Legg.^{II} **473**: Phaedr. Theaet.^{II} (b_3 c_2^{II} d). **477**: Parm.^{II} Legg. **487**: Phaedr. Parm. **488**: Parm. Legg. (c_2^{II} d). **489**: Parm.^{II} Soph. II.—**343**: Phaedr. Theaet.^{II} (b_3^{II} $c_{1.2}^{II}$ d^{III} e). **348**: Theaet. Legg.^{II} **381**: Phaedr. Tim. (c_2). **388**: Phaedr. Theaet. (b_3^{II} $c_{1\,2}^{III\,II}$ d). III.—*202*: Phaedr.^{III} Theaet.^{III} (b_3^{III} $c_{1\,2}^{II\,III}$ d^{III} e). *260*: Legg.^{II} (c_2^{II} d). *261*: Tim. (b_3^{III} d^{III}). *342*: Phaedr. Theaet.^{III} (b_3^{III} $c_{1\,2}^{III}$ d^{III} e^{III}).
b_3 = 412B—445E = 23 pp. ed. Did.	**32**	**16**	*24*	**2**	**144**	**0·20**	b_3 = 412B—445E (23 pp.): I.—**189**: Parm. Polit.^{II} (c_1). **216**: Phaedr. Parm. **224**: Parm. Soph. (c_1). **331**: Parm. Soph.^{III} **333**: Polit.^{II} Phil. **339**: Theaet.^{II} Parm. ($c_{1.}^{I}$ $_{2}^{III}$). **479**: Phaedr.^{II} Parm.^{III} **484**: Theaet.^{II} Parm. ($c_{1.2}$). II.—**429**: Theaet. Parm. New peculiarities: *3* accidental, *2* repeated in b_1; *14* accidental, *4* repeated, *4* important in b_2; *8* accidental, *1* repeated in b_3. In b_1 peculiarities occurring 3 times are important, in b_2 peculiarities occurring 4–14 times, in b_3 4–11 times. In b as one whole ($b_1 + b_2 + b_3$) occur *22* accidental, *9* repeated, *5* important new peculiarities.

TABLE OF STYLISTIC AFFINITY FOR TWENTY-TWO DIALOGUES OF PLATO—*continued.*

Names of the dialogues in their presumed chronological order, and abbreviations used for them in this table.	*Number of peculiarities* of later style found in each dialogue.				Total equivalent to the following number of *units of affinity.*	*Relative affinity* to the latest group measured on the Laws.	*Enumeration of peculiarities appearing in each Dialogue for the first time.* Each peculiarity is designated by its current number in the above list of five hundred stylistic peculiarities. Behind this number appear the abbreviated names of the two next dialogues in which the same peculiarity recurs. Also the occurrence of each peculiarity in each part of the Republic is marked by small letters added in brackets. a = Rep. Book I, b = Books II–IV, c = Books V–VII, d = Books VIII–IX, e = Book X. For other details see explanations following the table.
	I. Accidental.	II. Repeated.	III. Important.	IV. Very important.			
15. *Republic* B. V–VII. $= c = c_1 + c_2$ 60·4 pp. ed. Did.	56	29	*40*	7	262	0·36	
	Peculiarities occurring 5–29 times important.						
$c_1 = 449A—471B$ = 15·9 pp. ed. Did.	32	11	*20*	2	122	0·17	$c_1 = 449A—471B$ (15·9 pp.): I.—**236**: Phaedr.^{II} Soph.^{III} (c_2 e). **276**: Legg.^{II} **326**: Theaet. Parm.^{IV} (c_2 e). **332**: Parm.^{II} Soph.^{III} (c_2^{II} e). **364**: Polit. Phil.^{II} **375**: Soph. Legg.^{II} (c_2). **395**: Phaedr. Theaet. (c_2). **404**: Theaet. Polit. **485**: Parm. Legg.^{II} II.—**229**: Phaedr.^{III} Polit. (c_2^{II} d).
$c_2 = 471C—541B$ = 44·5 pp. ed. Did.	50	21	*38*	7	234	0·32	$c_2 = 471C—541B$ (44½ pp. ed. Did.): I.—**226**: Phaedr. Tim. **227**: Theaet.^{II} Polit. (d e).

							238: Soph. Tim.^{II} **247**: Theaet.^{III} Soph.^{III} (d). **327**: Phil. **329**: Polit. Phil. **330**: Soph. Phil.^{III} (d^{II}). **336**: Theaet. Soph. **361**: Theaet.^{III} Parm.^{III} **470**: Parm. Phil. **492**: Parm. Legg. (d^{II}). II.—**195**: Soph. Phil. **469**: Theaet.^{II} Parm.^{II} New peculiarities: *9* accidental, *1* repeated in c_1; *11* accidental, *2* repeated in c_2; *15* accidental, *7* repeated, *1* important in c.
16. *Republic* B. VIII–IX = d. 88·7 pp. ed. Did.	**47**	**22**	*27*	**3**	**184**	**0·26**	I.—**187**: Soph. Polit. **240**: Soph. Phil. **291**: Phil. Legg.^{II} **328**: Phil.^{III} Legg.^{II} **471**: Phaedr.^{II} Theaet. (e). **472**: Theaet.^{II} Parm.^{II} **474**: Theaet.^{II} Parm. **480**: Parm.^{II} Legg. **482**: Theaet.^{II} Parm. **483**: Parm. Legg. **490**: Parm. Phil.^{III} (e). II.—**190**: Phaedr. Theaet. **335**: Theaet. Phil.^{II} New peculiarities: *11* accidental, *2* repeated.
	Peculiarities occurring 4–16 times important.						

TABLE OF STYLISTIC AFFINITY FOR TWENTY-TWO DIALOGUES OF PLATO—*continued.*

Names of the dialogues in their presumed chronological order, and abbreviations used for them in this table.	*Number of peculiarities* of later style found in each dialogue.				Total equivalent to the following number of *units of affinity.*	*Relative affinity* to the latest group measured on the Laws.	*Enumeration of peculiarities appearing in each Dialogue for the first time.* Each peculiarity is designated by its current number in the above list of five hundred stylistic peculiarities. Behind this number appear the abbreviated names of the two next dialogues in which the same peculiarity recurs. Also the occurrence of each peculiarity in each part of the Republic is marked by small letters added in brackets. a = Rep. Book I, b = Books II–IV, c = Books V–VII, d = Books VIII–IX, e = Book X. For other details see explanations following the table.
	I. Accidental.	II. Repeated.	III. Important.	IV. Very important.			
17. *Republic* B. X = e. 19·8 pp. ed. Did.	**35**	**14**	*15*	**6**	**132**	**0·18**	I.—**438**: Phaedr. Soph. **475**: Parm.^{II} Tim. **478**: Parm. Tim.^{II} New peculiarities in e: *3* accidental. There also appear in the Republic two new peculiarities which cannot be referred to a part:— II.—**341**: Phaedr.^{II} Theaet. III.— *12*: Theaet.^{III} Soph.^{IV}
	Peculiarities occurring 3–9 times important.						
18. *Phaedrus* = Phaedr. 39·0 pp. ed. Did.	**54**	**36**	*22*	**7**	**220**	**0·31**	I.— **24**: Parm.^{II} Soph.^{III} **323**: Parm. Tim. **324**: Theaet. Soph. **363**: Soph. Polit. **476**: Parm. Legg. II.— **6**: Tim. Critias. **233**: Tim.^{III} Critias. **468**: Parm.^{II} Soph. III.—*318*: Parm.^{III} Soph.^{III} *452*: Theaet.^{III} Phil.^{III} New peculiarities: 5 accidental, *3* repeated, *2* important. If written before c, then *9* accidental, *5* repeated, and *3* important peculiarities are new.
	Peculiarities occurring 4–19 times important.						

19. *Theaetetus* = Theaet. 53·0 pp. ed. Did.	**58**	**41**	*31*	—	**233**	**0·32**	I.— **11**: Legg. **208**: Polit. Tim. **399**: Soph. Polit. **467**: Parm. Legg.[II] Only 4 accidental peculiarities count as new. But if Theaetetus is written before c, then it contains *11* accidental, *5* repeated, *1* important new peculiarities.
	Peculiarities occurring 5–26 times important.						
20. *Parmenides* = Parm. 31·2 pp. ed. Did.	**56**	**42**	*21*	**10**	**243**	**0·34**	I.— **25**: Soph. Polit. **28**: Polit. Tim. **225**: Legg.[II] **322**: Soph.[III] Polit.[III] **458**: Phil. Legg. **459**: Critias Legg. **461**: Legg. **462**: Tim. Legg. **464**: Tim. **466**: Legg. II.— **26**: Soph.[II] **460**: Tim.[II] Critias. **463**: Tim. **465**: Legg. III.— *27*: Soph. Polit.[II] IV.—**14–15**: Soph.[IV] Polit.[IV] New peculiarities: *10* accidental, *4* repeated, *1* important, *2* very important.
	Peculiarities occurring 4–15 times important.						

TABLE OF STYLISTIC AFFINITY FOR TWENTY-TWO DIALOGUES OF PLATO—*continued.*

Names of the dialogues in their presumed chronological order, and abbreviations used for them in this table.	*Number of peculiarities* of later style found in each dialogue. I. Accidental.	II. Repeated.	III. Important.	IV. Very important.	Total equivalent to the following number of *units of affinity.*	*Relative affinity* to the latest group measured on the Laws.	*Enumeration of peculiarities appearing in each Dialogue for the first time.* Each peculiarity is designated by its current number in the above list of five hundred stylistic peculiarities. Behind this number appear the abbreviated names of the two next dialogues in which the same peculiarity recurs Also the occurrence of each peculiarity in each part of the Republic is marked by small letters added in brackets. a = Rep. Book I, b = Books II–IV, c = Books V–VII, d = Books VIII–IX, e = Book X. For other details see explanations following the table.
Theaetetus, Parmenides, Philebus, Timaeus, Critias, as one whole, 191 pp.	107	210	*40*	9	683	0·95	
	Peculiarities occurring 17–95 times important.						
IV. LATEST GROUP							
21. *Sophist* = Soph. 39·6 pp. ed. Did.	139	36	*59*	20	468	0·65	I.— 29–30, 32 : Polit. Phil. 34–38, 40, 41 : Phil. Tim. 42–43 : Phil. Legg. 46–48 : Phil. 53 : Polit.^{II} Phil. 54–79 : Legg. 123–134 : Tim. 147–148 : Critias. 150–155 : Tim. Legg. 156–158 : Critias Legg.
	of which recur in the Laws :						
	100	34	55	20	413	0·58	
	Peculiarities occurring 4–9 times important.						

	168–170	Polit. Legg.
	171	Tim. Critias.
	174–176	Polit. Tim.
	177–181	Polit.
	182	Polit.^{III} Tim.^{II}
	209	Phil. Tim.
	295	Legg.
	316	Polit. Tim.^{II}
	357	Polit. Phil.
	360	Tim.^{II}
	434	Tim. Legg.
	435	Legg.^{II}
II.—	**185**	Polit. Legg.^{II}
	201	Polit.^{II} Phil.^{II}
	223	Legg.^{II}
	287	Polit. Legg.^{II}
	303	Polit.^{II} Phil.^{III}
	304	Polit.^{II} Phil.^{III}
	356	Polit. Phil.^{II}
	433	Tim. Legg.^{II}
III.—	*16–20*	Polit.^{III} Phil.^{III}
	200	Polit.^{III} Phil.^{III}
	306	Polit.^{III} Phil.^{III}
	320	Polit.^{II} Legg.^{II}
	365	Polit.^{III} Phil.^{III}
	366	Polit.^{IV} Phil.^{III}
IV.—	**21**	Polit.^{IV} Phil.^{IV}

Total of new peculiarities: *85* accidental, *8* repeated, *10* important, *1* very important.

TABLE OF STYLISTIC AFFINITY FOR TWENTY-TWO DIALOGUES OF PLATO—*continued.*

Names of the dialogues in their presumed chronological order, and abbreviations used for them in this table.	*Number of peculiarities* of later style found in each dialogue.				Total equivalent to the following number of *units of affinity.*	*Relative affinity* to the latest group measured on the Laws.	*Enumeration of peculiarities appearing in each Dialogue for the first time.* Each peculiarity is designated by its current number in the above list of five hundred stylistic peculiarities. Behind this number appear the abbreviated names of the two next dialogues in which the same peculiarity recurs. Also the occurrence of each peculiarity in each part of the Republic is marked by small letters added in brackets. a = Rep. Book I, b = Books II–IV, c = Books V–VII, d = Books VIII–IX, e = Book X. For other details see explanations following the table.
	I. Accidental.	II. Repeated.	III. Important.	IV. Very important.			
22. *Politicus* = Polit. 43·2 pp. ed. Did.	163	43	*56*	19	493	0·69	I.— 31: Phil. Tim. 33: Phil. Legg. 39: Phil. Tim. 44: Phil. Tim. 45: Phil. Critias. 49–52: Phil. 80–122: Legg. 135–146: Tim. 149: Critias. 159–165: Tim. Legg. 166: Tim. Critias. 167: Tim. Critias. 172: Tim. Critias. 173: Tim. Critias. 184: Tim. Legg.^{II} 315: Phil.^{II} Tim. 359: Phil. Legg. 362: Phil. Legg.^{II}
	of which recur in the Laws:						
	127	39	55	19	446	0·62	
	Peculiarities occurring 4–21 times important.						

							372: Legg.[II] **430**: Legg.[II] II.—**319**: Phil. Tim. **321**: Tim.[II] Legg.[II] **379**: Tim. Legg. **431**: Tim.[II] Legg.[II] New peculiarities: 82 accidental, 4 repeated.
23. *Philebus* = Phil. 43·2 pp. ed. Did.	**100**	**38**	*55*	**16**	**405**	**0·56**	I.—**286**: Legg. **313**: Tim. Legg.[II] **314**: Legg.[II] **417**: Legg.[II] **450**: Legg. III.—**237**: Tim.[II] Legg.[II] New peculiarities: *5* accidental, *1* important. Besides these Campbell has found *35* rare words appearing first in the Philebus and recurring later, not included in our list because they were not enumerated.
	of which recur in the Laws:						
	79	**35**	**54**	**16**	**375**	**0·52**	
	Peculiarities occurring 4–21 times important.						
24. *Timaeus* = Tim. 53·3 pp. ed. Did.	**123**	**58**	*44*	**14**	**427**	**0·60**	I.—**230**: Critias Legg. **268**: Legg. **278**: Legg. II.—**312**: Legg.[II] **432**: Legg.
	of which recur in the Laws:						
	77	**49**	**41**	**14**	**354**	**0·49**	
	Peculiarities occurring 5–26 times important.						

TABLE OF STYLISTIC AFFINITY FOR TWENTY-TWO DIALOGUES OF PLATO—*continued.*

Names of the dialogues in their presumed chronological order, and abbreviations used for them in this table.	*Number of peculiarities* of later style found in each dialogue.				Total equivalent to the following number of *units of affinity.*	*Relative affinity* to the latest group measured on the Laws.	*Enumeration of peculiarities appearing in each Dialogue for the first time.* Each peculiarity is designated by its current number in the above list of five hundred stylistic peculiarities. Behind this number appear the abbreviated names of the two next dialogues in which the same peculiarity recurs. Also the occurrence of each peculiarity in each part of the Republic is marked by small letters added in brackets. a = Rep. Book I, b = Books II–IV, c = Books V–VII, d = Books VIII–IX, e = Book X. For other details see explanations following the table.
	I. Accidental.	II. Repeated.	III. Important.	IV. Very important.			
25. *Critias.* 11·2 pp. ed. Did.	51	8	*18*	12	169	0·24	I.—235: Legg.
	of which recur in the Laws:						
	41	8	18	12	159	0·22	
	Peculiarities occurring 3–5 times important.						
26. *Laws* = Legg. 236·4 pp. ed. Did.	175	176	*37*	20	718	1·00	
	Peculiarities occurring 20–117 times important.						

There might be added *68* words common to Timaeus and Laws only, according to Campbell (*Rep.* vol. ii. p. 58), and *13* words common to Critias and Laws only, which have not been included in our list because they were not enumerated by Campbell. These additions raise the relative affinity to the latest group, measured on the Laws as unity, for the Philebus to 0·*58*, for the Timaeus to 0·*63*, for the Critias to 0·*25*. But if all the three additions are made simultaneously, the relative affinity will be for Philebus 0·*53*, for Timaeus 0·*59*, for Critias 0·*22*.

EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE OF AFFINITY.—*Accidental* peculiarities are words or idioms occurring once in a dialogue: *repeated*, those occurring more than once and less than makes it necessary, according to the size of the dialogue, to call them important. The number of occurrences termed *important* varies according to the size of the dialogue, and is indicated for each dialogue. *Very important* is any occurrence exceeding this number. The equivalent of affinity is calculated by counting each repeated peculiarity for two, each important for three, each very important for four units of affinity. The relative affinity is the proportion of the equivalent of a dialogue to the equivalent of the Laws for the same number of peculiarities observed. For instance, in the Apology 9 accidental, 2 repeated, 1 important peculiarities of later style are equivalent to 16 units. The equivalent of the Laws being 718, it follows that the relative affinity of the Apology is 16/718 = 0·02. The same calculation is made for each dialogue.

In the enumeration of peculiarities appearing for the first time in each dialogue, the 500 observed peculiarities follow in their presumed chronological order. The next two dialogues in which each peculiarity recurs are given behind each number, in order to show the degree of importance the new peculiarity acquired in the next time after its first appearance. An index appended means the degree of frequency of this peculiarity in the dialogue named. Where no index is given the peculiarity is accidental. For instance, **291**: Phil. Legg.^{II} means that peculiarity 291 (first occurring accidentally in the Republic, part d) recurs once in the Philebus and repeatedly in the Laws. Peculiarities occurring in the Republic are marked with the abbreviations of each part of the Republic in which they occur. For instance, **243**: Phaedr.^{III} Theaet. (c_2^{III} d^{II} e^{III}) means that peculiarity 243 (first occurring accidentally in the Cratylus) recurs as important in the Phaedrus, as accidental in Theaetetus, important in Republic part c_2, repeated in d, important in e. If the degree of frequency is different in two subdivisions of one part of the Republic, two indexes are given: $b_2^{II.I}$ means repeated in b_2, accidental in b_3.

ABBREVIATIONS.—Apol. = Apology, Crat. = Cratylus, Charm. = Charmides, Euthyph. = Euthyphro, Euthyd. = Euthydemus, Gorg. = Gorgias, Lach. = Laches, Legg. = Laws, Parm. = Parmenides, Prot. = Protagoras, Phil. = Philebus, Polit. = Politicus, Phaedr. = Phaedrus, Rep. = Republic, Soph. = Sophist, Symp. = Symposium, Tim. = Timaeus, Theaet. = Theaetetus.

I = accidental, II = repeated, III = important, IV = very important peculiarities.

The length has a great influence on the equivalent of affinity, but the number of peculiarities found in each sample of text is not proportional to the size. Single peculiarities are insignificant, and the order of small dialogues remains uncertain.

Among the inferences which can be drawn from the above table, nothing is of greater importance than the great influence of the size of a dialogue on the number of stylistic peculiarities found in it. We see that the *Critias* on its eleven pages contains less than half the number of peculiarities found in the *Timaeus*, which, being nearly five times larger, was written immediately before the *Critias*. Hence it results that eleven pages, being more than the size of the *Crito* and some other small dialogues, are insufficient for a stylistic determination, so long as we deal only with a few hundred stylistic tests. The difficulty might be removed by extending stylistic observation over a far greater number of particulars, a task which requires only additional research. But we understand at once that our equivalents of affinity for such small dialogues as the *Euthyphro* or *Crito* are very far from the truth, and that for instance no valid inference can be drawn from the apparently greater affinity of the *Crito* with the later style. This shows also the insignificance of a single test applied to such a complicated problem. One *τί μήν;* or one *καθάπερ* occurring anywhere proves nothing, if even seventeen peculiarities of later style found in the *Laches* and missing in *Charmides* are according to our rules no sufficient evidence for the priority of *Charmides*.

The increase of the equivalent of affinity is not proportional to the size of the sample of text investigated. Only equal amounts

We are warned also against the error of supposing the opportunities for the occurrence of a greater number of peculiarities to be proportional to volume. In this respect the subdivision of each part of the *Republic* into several samples of text is very instructive. Even those who believe the *Republic* to have been written during many years cannot deny that B III–IV are the immediate continuation of B. II, and with it form one whole. The style of equal samples of text in these books is also very uniform. But the influence of the size becomes evident if we compare a small sample with a larger one. Part b_1 (357 A—367 E) of 7½ pp. (ed. Didot) contains only an

equivalent of 21 units of affinity, while the following 29½ pages, being four times larger, have seven times more peculiarities. In another case two succeeding samples of text differ much less, namely, c_2 (471 C—541 B), being nearly thrice as long as c_1 (449 A—471 B), has less than twice as many peculiarities of later style. The whole of the *Republic*, being ten times larger than the tenth book, contains only a little more than thrice as many peculiarities of later style. From these examples, which might be indefinitely multiplied, it becomes evident that only equal amounts of text should be compared. Future inquirers should base their calculations on an amount of text equal for each dialogue, or divide each dialogue into such equal samples of text, for instance, of ten thousand words each.

of text are comparable so long as we deal with a few hundred peculiarities observed.

Another lesson of the highest importance is taught by the stylistic comparison of the first book of the *Republic* with the following books. Nobody doubts that the *Republic* in its present shape is one whole, and that the first book, even if mainly composed much earlier, has been revised and worked into unity with the following text. Now it has a surprisingly early style, having less than half as many peculiarities of later style as the first sixteen pages of the fifth book, even fewer than the *Laches*, which is inferior in size. This shows on one side the early date of the first book, and on the other side it shows that no revision can substantially alter those peculiarities of style which are the subject of our investigation. Therefore all explaining away of the late style of the *Phaedrus* and *Theaetetus* by the supposition that we possess these dialogues in a late and revised edition is of no value whatever for chronological purposes. If later revision could alter stylistic affinities, then the first book of the *Republic*, which must have been revised, emended, and corrected in order to be absorbed into the larger work, could not have remained as remote from the later style as the *Laches*, while already the

The author's revision does not alter the essential stylistic character of the text, and stylistic comparison shows the relative date of a work even if applied to a later edition corrected by the author. This is very

important for a knowledge of the date of the *Phaedrus* and *Theaetetus* which were revised by Plato later. The first book of the *Republic* undoubtedly revised and corrected has a surprisingly early style.

second book shows a style later than the *Phaedo* and *Symposium*. This conclusion is quite independent of any speculation on the exact date of the *Republic*, or on the date of the *Laches*. If anybody supposes that the first book of the *Republic* could have been written as early as the *Laches* (as Siebeck does), then he is bound to account for the difference of style between the *Laches* and the second book of the *Republic*. At all events, we have here a work which has been left by Plato as one whole, and which nevertheless betrays by stylistic tests the difference of the times in which it was begun and continued. According to our rules the number of peculiarities of later style found in the first book of the *Republic* is insufficient for an exact determination of its place among the early dialogues, and it may be even later than the *Gorgias*. To settle this question it would be necessary to collect a much greater number of observations, and to compare with the first book of the *Republic* a part of the *Gorgias* exactly equal in size. This we are unable to do, as a great number of authors from whom we have taken the number of occurrences of each peculiarity did not enumerate all the passages.

Relation between *Philebus*, *Timaeus* and dialectical dialogues remains also uncertain because so many special peculiarities of the *Sophist* and *Poli-*

The relation between the *Philebus* and *Timaeus* on one side and *Sophist* and *Politicus* on the other side cannot be decided according to our table, because we have included in our list more than one hundred words observed by Campbell in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, while no such special study has been made of the *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, and *Critias*. These words were included in the list because the late date of the *Sophist* and *Politicus* is less generally recognised than the late date of the *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and *Philebus*; it therefore appeared necessary to bring out with the greatest clearness this late character of the two dialectical dialogues, even at the risk of making them appear later than the *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, and *Critias*. As soon as these later dialogues shall have been investigated with as much care as Campbell spent on the two

continuations of the *Theaetetus*, the true chronological order will not be obscured as it is now in the later part of our table. Even now it is easy to eliminate a part of the error by excluding a number of peculiarities which have been first observed in *Sophist* and *Politicus*. If we omit peculiarities 12, 13, 54-181 of our list, reducing thus the total number to 370 peculiarities under investigation, then the *Philebus* will not be affected by this change, while the *Laws* lose 102 units of affinity, the *Timaeus* 53, the *Politicus* 86, and the *Sophist* 69.

ticus have been included in our list.

The relative affinity calculated on these reduced numbers will be 0·65 for the *Sophist*, 0·66 for the *Politicus*, 0·66 for the *Philebus*, and 0·61 for the *Timaeus*. This calculation shows that the most important figures of our table are those of the relative affinity, which are very constant, and change little if they are calculated on a very much reduced or very much increased number of observations, changing less with the increasing number of observations. We see that the relative affinity of the *Sophist*, which was found to be 0·65 for 500 peculiarities, is just the same for 370 peculiarities. It is probable that increasing our list to 5,000 peculiarities, this constant relation would not be altered by more than a small percentage. We have therefore in the relative affinity a powerful instrument for chronological purposes, of the same constant character as the physical constants measured in natural science. If the density of pure iron has been found by a series of experiments to be 7·8, everybody understands that further experiments of a greater exactness can only alter this constant relation very slightly, adding new decimals and showing it to be more exactly 7·84, but never 7·5 or 8·0. We claim the same permanent character for the relative affinity, calculated on a sufficient number of observations. Comparing these numbers, calculated on a smaller or greater part of our materials, we have found that relative affinities under 0·1 have no value whatever, and can be changed to the

Reducing our list by 130 peculiarities, the relative affinity of the *Sophist* will not be affected, and that of the *Philebus* rises above the *Sophist* and even the *Timaeus*. The relative affinity has the character of a natural constant like the constants in physical

science. This gives an unprecedented strength to our conclusions.

extent of at least half their value by calculations based on a greater number of observations. But the remaining relative affinities in our list are exact in their first decimal, and any number of observations added can increase them only in the second decimal, except in the *Philebus* for the reasons explained above. But even the *Philebus*, if we measure its relative affinity by one decimal, will maintain it, whatever number of new observations may be added. Thus we claim to have proved the following general conclusions about the order of the works of Plato:

The latest group of Plato's works consists of the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and *Laws*, with a relative affinity of over 0·5 in samples of text exceeding forty pages.

1. The latest works of Plato are: the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Laws*. This group is distinguished from all other works by a relative affinity of over 0·5 in samples of text exceeding 40 pages (ed. Didot). This means that out of any number of stylistic peculiarities investigated (provided those peculiarities are selected which are not limited to one dialogue, and provided the number of peculiarities so investigated exceeds 300) more than half the number found in the *Laws* will be found in any sample of text of 40 pages of these dialogues. As the *Critias* has only 11 pages, for the investigation of the *Critias* the preceding 29 pages of the *Timaeus* must be added. Or, if we calculate the relative affinity of the *Critias* apart, it must be compared with an exactly equal amount of text of the *Timaeus*; then it cannot be expected that the relative affinity of such a small portion of text should exceed half the value of the affinity of larger units, as the relative affinity is in close relation to the amount of text to which it is applied. With an increasing number of peculiarities observed, the influence of the size of a sample of text would be less important, and the size of the *Critias* is insufficient to define its stylistic affinity only so long as we deal with a reduced number of observations. The number of possible peculiarities of style is practically infinite, and may easily exceed the number of words contained in a sample of text.

2. The latest group is preceded by a middle group, consisting of *Republic* B. II–X, *Phaedrus*, *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*. In these the relative affinity is under 0·5, and even under 0·4 for samples of text of 30–60 pages. The mean affinity of dialogues belonging to this group is only 0·3, or only half as much as the affinity of equal dialogues of the latest group. The middle group is distinguished from all earlier dialogues by a great number of important and very important peculiarities appearing here for the first time, as may be seen from the table.

The middle group shows a relative affinity of about 0·3.

3. The middle group is preceded by a first Platonic group, consisting of three dialogues, *Cratylus*, *Symposium*, and *Phaedo*, which are characterised by a relative affinity inferior to that of equal samples of text of the middle group, being about 0·2, and not exceeding 0·21 for samples of text of 40–50 pages. The first Platonic group is distinguished from all Socratic dialogues by many special peculiarities appearing here for the first time, and indicated in our table.

The *Cratylus*, *Symposium*, *Phaedo* are earlier, having a relative affinity of only 0·2.

4. Among the Socratic dialogues, which show an apparent relative affinity of 0·1, or even less, the *Gorgias* appears with probability to be the latest, having 18 peculiarities in common with the first Platonic and later groups, which are missed in other Socratic dialogues. But this number, which was held to be sufficient by C. Ritter to define the middle group, is according to our improved method insufficient, and affords only a certain probability, increased by internal evidence resulting from the comparison of contents, but requiring further support by a much greater number of observations.

That the *Gorgias* is the latest of all Socratic dialogues is probable.

5. Last, not least, we repeat the important conclusion, which is perhaps the greatest gain of our investigations, viz. that stylistic tests if properly directed afford *certainty* as to the chronological order of Plato's dialogues; and conclusions from stylistic comparisons cannot be invalidated by assuming fictitious later editions, corrections

Certainty of stylistic conclusions independent of

supposed revisions.

and revisions, as it has been seen on the first book of the *Republic* that such later changes cannot affect the essential characteristics of style as these are now known.

Phaedo later than *Symposium* and *Cratylus*; *Parmenides* later than *Theaetetus* and *Phaedrus*; *Philebus* later than *Sophist*. Other minor questions will easily be decided by the same method if applied on a larger scale. Our conclusions confirm earlier conclusions arrived at by stylistic study and completely change

The above five conclusions are worth the labour spent on our study of Plato's style. We do not pretend to give for certain anything more about the order of dialogues within each group, except that the *Phaedo* is later than *Symposium* and *Cratylus*, the *Parmenides* later than *Theaetetus* and *Phaedrus*, the *Philebus* later than the *Sophist*. The relative position of *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, and *Theaetetus*, of *Politicus*, *Philebus*, and *Timaeus*, cannot be decided on the above observations alone. These problems are of less importance than the distinction of groups, and now that the method of stylistic calculation has been shown on a small example of five hundred peculiarities, it will be very easy to apply it on a much larger scale, and to settle all the minor difficulties left to future inquirers. It is to be hoped that nobody hereafter will attempt to judge about Plato's style from small numbers of observations. Any new observations ought to be added to those existing, in order to achieve a progress of knowledge in these matters. The group of the latest six dialogues, recognised independently by Campbell, Dittenberger, C. Ritter, and von Arnim, is now still better defined and is established beyond all reasonable doubt. The anomaly observed by Campbell as to the *Philebus*, *Parmenides*, and *Theaetetus*, is removed, and the true place of these three dialogues found in accordance with their style. This entirely changes the current traditional conception of Platonism, as taught by Schleiermacher and Hermann, and still in our own day represented by the great name of Zeller. The differences between these authors become insignificant in view of their grave and common error in placing the dialectical dialogues before the *Symposium* and *Republic*. This error produces a complete distortion of the true view of Plato's philo-

sophical career. It is as if some eminent critics proposed to look upon Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* as a juvenile eccentricity, and to seek the chief contents of Kant's philosophy in his *Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio*, published in 1755, and written under the influence of the then prevailing philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff.

the current conception of Platonism.

We should fall into the error of premature generalisation if we pretended to go further in our conclusions and to decide anything about the order of Socratic dialogues in which the relative affinity sinks below 0·1. Our instrument is not fine enough for these small differences between dialogues probably removed forty years from the *Critias* and from the latest books of the *Laws*. To determine their order, another standard is required than the *Laws*, with which they have too little in common. The *Gorgias* being the latest and also the longest of the group of Socratic dialogues, the best plan would be to collect and classify peculiarities common to each of them with the *Gorgias*. But if five hundred peculiarities were needed to fix the order of dialogues later than the *Gorgias*, for those earlier a much greater number of observations is required, and can be reached only through well-organised labour of many scholars.

Proposed subjects for future inquirers. They must compare each dialogue with all others, and specially all Socratic dialogues with the *Gorgias*.

A distinction of only four degrees of importance of stylistic marks might ultimately prove insufficient, but even if we classify the peculiarities observed otherwise, it will always be indispensable to make due allowance for the different importance of accidental, repeated, frequent, and very frequent peculiarities, as well as for the more or less essential character of certain observations.

The classification of peculiarities can be improved.

One of the most immediate aims for further inquiry is to investigate peculiarities in the order of words and in the construction of phrases. By means of a great number of such peculiarities it will be possible to determine the relative affinity of all dialogues among each other, and this alone will probably lead to the

The order of words and construction of phrases should be

investigated.

A revision of work already done is also necessary. Number of words in each work should be counted. Our method can easily be applied to other problems than Platonic chronology, and leads to a new science of stylometry subsidiary to historical research, like palaeography. Greater certainty of results obtained by the investigation of style than

definitive solution of all difficulties of the Platonic chronology.

There is no reason to fear that the amount of time spent on such inquiries will be lost. In every science there arises at certain points a necessity for much detailed research leading to no new conclusions, and only confirming previous generalisations. The familiar example of modern organic chemistry shows that valuable investigations were made by beginners, following a method already fixed, with results foreseen by general theory. Such investigations, though they teach us few new truths, increase the certitude of the general theory which they illustrate. Further study of Plato's style will probably not change our knowledge as to the order of the three groups which are now found, but it may modify our views concerning the order of dialogues within each group, and may help to fix the order of earlier dialogues, which is at present uncertain.

Besides further research on the lines here indicated a systematic co-ordination of the results already obtained is also necessary. There are discrepancies between the numbers given by various authors for the occurrence of the same peculiarity, and the calculation of proportions between different uses might be very much improved. The number of words contained in each dialogue should be taken as the true measure of text and of the opportunity for the occurrence of expressions for which no better calculation of opportunities can be found.

When once the importance of this field of research is generally recognised, it will very soon appear that the exact determination of style is the safest way of settling the difficulties, not only of Platonic chronology, but also of the chronology of other authors, the date of whose writings is unknown. There will be scarcely another case in which the mere question of the chronology of some writings would be of such unparalleled importance for the history of human thought as in the question of

Platonic chronology. This exceptional importance of one particular case will have produced a new science of style, which will enable us to decide questions of authenticity and chronology of literary works with the same certainty as palaeographers now know the age and authenticity of manuscripts. This future science of *stylometry* may improve our methods beyond the limits of imagination, but our chief conclusions can only be confirmed, never contradicted by further research. That the dialectical dialogues are later than the *Republic* is now as clearly demonstrated as any other fact in history can be. Equally certain is the conclusion that the *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, *Theaetetus*, and *Parmenides* are later than the *Phaedo* and *Symposium*. These facts must be accepted now as if they were supported by the clearest testimony. The certitude attainable by a consistent theory is even much greater than the certitude of the best evidence; every astronomer believes himself to know more of the present and past movements of the moon than an historian can know of the movements of Caesar's army. Historical testimonies have always but the value of the sensible evidence on which they are based, while our results as to the order of Plato's works rely on the higher authority of reason, producing, according to Plato, infallible knowledge whenever a good method is followed.

by any information based on mere testimonies.

CHAPTER IV

SOCRATIC STAGE OF PLATO'S LOGIC

Small dialogues distinguished from other works of Plato.

WHEN the Platonic works are compared with regard to their volume, we find a numerous class of dialogues which do not attain to half the size of the *Protagoras*, and which can be distinguished from the rest as small dialogues. No fewer than eight among them, the *Clitopho*, *Minos*, *Hipparchus*, *Epinomis*, *Theages*, *Amatores*, *Alcibiades II.* and the *Greater Hippias*, have since Schleiermacher been generally regarded as spurious. They represent seventy-two pages of text (ed. Didot), less than one-third of the *Laws*, and contain nothing that could be included in Plato's logic.

Their chronological order very difficult to determine on account of their size.

The *Io*, *Hippias Minor*, *Lysis* and *Menexenus*, though successfully defended against doubts as to their authenticity, remain outside the pale of our inquiry. All these small dialogues offer greater difficulties than larger works, because their limited volume makes a complete appreciation of their style and doctrine less easy. They require a special study through which their mutual relations might be determined and a certain place assigned to each of them. Such an inquiry would alone fill a volume, if it were intended to lead to definitive conclusions, based on a careful weighing of many details. So long as their chronological order has not been determined by patient and impartial stylometric inquiry, we must for our part abstain from all attempt to fix this order from the few logical hints which they contain.

A Socratic stage in

The existence of a Socratic stage in Plato's logic is far more probable than the myth of a Megaric period.

We have the clear testimony of Aristotle (*Metaph.* 987 b 1) that Plato owed to Socrates the tendency to form exact definitions of ethical notions. It is precisely in the small dialogues that we see the illustration of this tendency. In another passage Aristotle teaches us that the direct philosophical merits of Socrates were inductive reasoning and definition by means of general notions (*Metaph.* 1078 b 27). In the small dialogues we find accordingly the constant employment of inductive reasoning and repeated attempts to define by means of the nearest general notion, in application chiefly to ethical purposes. Though faithful even in his later period to induction as a method of investigation, Plato gave in his dialectical works a far greater importance to deductive classification. The thoroughly inductive character of the small dialogues is more Socratic than Platonic. The influence of Socrates on Plato is not, like the alleged Megarian influence, attested only by a late and untrustworthy witness: it is known from numerous passages in the writings of Aristotle, and results also from the manner in which Socrates is again and again represented by Plato as the teacher of true wisdom.

Plato's development very probable, because we know from Aristotle that Plato owes much to Socrates,

Were it not for Plato's strange desire to represent, in more than twenty literary masterpieces, his own thoughts as enunciated by Socrates, we might have given to the latter no more credit than to Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, or Parmenides, nor would his name even to-day be synonymous with Sage. Hence it is natural to suppose a Socratic stage in the development of Plato's philosophy, and to seek for the vestiges of this period in his works.

and it results also from the picture of Plato's teacher in his dialogues

These vestiges are precisely found in the small dialogues, and in the four works in which Socrates is represented as triumphant over the sophists. These are the traditional sixth tetralogy, consisting of *Protagoras*, *Meno*, *Euthydemus* and *Gorgias*, which form a natural group, though they have not been connected by

Socratic influence specially visible in the small dialogues and in

the sixth tetralogy. All these works have chiefly moral aims.

Plato himself into one series. They have in common with the small dialogues the predominating ethical aim, and they deal with the definition of virtue and various parts of virtue, as well as with the question whether virtue can be taught. Such ethical questions are abandoned in later works: even in the *Philebus*, where the avowed aim is the solution of an ethical problem, the whole argumentation takes a metaphysical and logical turn, which is wholly absent from the small dialogues and from the four others above named.

Also Socrates' philosophy had a predominant ethical character.

The character of Socrates' philosophy was also mainly ethical, and this authorises us to see the predominance of Socratic influence in those dialogues which are limited to ethical inquiry. Plato's own philosophy had another character: he was rather a politician, a metaphysician, and a logician, than a simple moralist. He set perfection above mere virtue, and even despised the traditional virtue of the common citizen, which was the starting point of Socratic ethics.

Socratic dialogues are the earliest.

We shall not be far from the truth, if we admit that the small dialogues are earlier than the logical investigations which commence with the *Cratylus*, and are continued in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. For an exact determination of their order the data are not yet collected, because their style is very much less characteristic than the style of the latest group. We can only observe, that of all peculiarities of later style only very few and unimportant examples are to be found in the small dialogues.

Of all small dialogues only *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*,

For the investigation of the development of Plato's logic only five among them are of any importance: the trilogy about the death of Socrates, consisting of the *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, and the two companion dialogues of the *Protagoras*, namely the *Laches* and *Charmides*. We omit the first *Alcibiades*, though its authenticity has been sustained by Socher, Stallbaum,

Hermann, Steinhart, Andreatta,[146] and Kophiniotes,[147] against Schleiermacher, Ast, Susemihl,[148] R. Hirzel[149] and many others. Strong suspicion is roused by the noticeable contradiction between style and contents in this dialogue. According to its style the *Alcibiades* would be later than the *Symposium*, while the general contents place it among the small dialogues, as has been recognised by all defenders of its authenticity. Quite recently Ivo Bruns,[150] by comparing the characterisation of persons in Plato's dialogues, came also to the conclusion that the first *Alcibiades* could not have been written by Plato.

Charmides, Laches, contain logical hints.

Alcibiades is probably spurious.

As to logical contents, the *Alcibiades* presents, besides some theories sufficiently known from other works of Plato, a singular identification of the soul with man (130 C: *μηδὲν ἄλλο τὸν ἄνθρωπον λείπεται συμβαίνειν ἢ ψυχήν*), which recalls a passage from a notoriously spurious dialogue (*Axiochus* 365 E : *ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν ψυχή*). In the *Gorgias* (464 A) every man is supposed to consist of soul and body, and at all times Plato defined man as an animal (*Crat.* 399 C, *Polit.* 271 E, *Legg.* 765 E, &c.), with a soul (*ψυχὴ ἀνθρώπου Prot.* 312 B, *Symp.* 192 D, *Phaedr.* 249 E, *Rep.* 590 A, &c.) ; the identification of man and soul seems to belong to some later Academicians. This contradiction between the first *Alcibiades* and the current Platonic teaching on an essential point is not of the same kind as many quite superficial contradictions quoted by those who oppose the authenticity of some of Plato's other works. Man as consisting of body and soul is a familiar notion to Plato's readers, and if the author of

Identity of man and soul as presented in the *Alcibiades* is unplatonic, and contradicts the permanent teaching of Plato.

[146] Andreatta, *Sull' autenticità dell' Alcibiade primo*, Roveredo 1876.

[147] J. K. Kophiniotes in vol. iv. pp. 289–296, 310–315 of the *Ephemeris*, Athens 1881.

[148] *Platons Alkibiades I. und II. übersetzt von F. Susemihl*, Stuttgart 1864.

[149] R. Hirzel, 'Aristoxenos und Platons erster Alkibiades,' in *Rhein. Museum*, vol. 45, pp. 419–435, Frankfurt a. M. 1890.

[150] I. Bruns, *Das literarische Porträt der Griechen* Berlin 1896, p. 339.

the *Alcibiades* takes the trouble to give a demonstration of the identity between man and soul, he must have felt that this was an innovation against the general opinion. If Plato had given this demonstration himself, he could scarcely have disregarded it throughout his other works, from the *Protagoras* to the *Laws*. Therefore we are justified in excluding the first *Alcibiades*, as well as the second, from the list of Plato's works.

Authenticity of *Euthyphro* successfully defended against doubts.

The doubts raised against the authenticity of the *Euthyphro*, chiefly by Ast, Ueberweg, Schaarschmidt, and J. Wagner,[151] have been sufficiently refuted by Stallbaum, Hermann, Yxem,[152] Wells,[153] Adam,[154] and Jezierski,[155] so that there is no need to return to this question. All arguments against the authenticity of this and many other works can be reduced to two principal heads: 1. Plato would have written otherwise; 2. Analogies with other dialogues show an imitator's hand. Such arguments are necessarily subjective, and we can only affirm with certainty that Plato would have written otherwise, if we notice, as in the *Alcibiades*, some essential contradiction to well-known and constantly expressed Platonic teaching. Nothing of that kind can be said of the *Euthyphro*.

Logical contents of *Euthyphro*.

The logical contents of this little dialogue[156] correspond to what might be expected of a work written while the influence of Socrates on Plato still remained unaltered by further philosophical progress. The rule of definition of terms by general notion and specific difference is applied to a particular case: (12 D: *εἰ μέρος*

[151] J. Wagner, *Zur Athetese des Dialogs Euthyphron*, Brünn 1883.

[152] Yxem, *Ueber Platos Euthyphron*, Berlin 1842.

[153] *The Euthyphro of Plato*, with an introduction and notes, by George Henry Wells, London 1881.

[154] *The Euthyphro of Plato*, with introduction and notes, by J. Adam, Cambridge 1890.

[155] A. Jezierski, *Platona Eutyfron*, Tarnopol 1890.

[156] On the logic of the *Euthyphro*, see also V. Poggi, *L' Eutifrone di Platone*, Roma 1891.

τὸ ὅσιον τοῦ δικαίου, δεῖ . . ἐξευρεῖν τὸ ποῖον μέρος), but without any methodic digression on logical theory such as appears in all the dialectical dialogues. Induction and analogy are used frequently (as 13 A, 14 A, &c.) and the necessity of establishing permanent notions is insisted upon (11 D: ἐβουλόμην ἄν μοι τοὺς λόγους μένειν καὶ ἀκινήτως ἱδρῦσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τῇ Δαιδάλου σοφίᾳ τὰ Ταντάλου χρήματα γενέσθαι: see also 5 D). Enumeration of examples is shown to be insufficient to give such permanence to a notion (6 D: οὐχ ἕν τι ἢ δύο τῶν πολλῶν ὁσίων, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν) and the characteristic mark is sought for.

Induction and definitions, frequent use of analogy.

This characteristic mark is here named εἶδος, in the sense in which Thucydides used this word when he spoke of an εἶδος νόσου (Thucyd. 2, 50). Some authors, as for instance M. Waddington,[157] thought it possible to draw chronological inferences from the absence of the words εἶδος or ἰδέα in many small dialogues. M. Waddington is evidently not aware of the fact that both words are anterior to Plato, and are used by Thucydides and other earlier writers in the same sense as by Plato in his early dialogues. In the *Euthyphro* as in the *Charmides* they both occur, ἰδέα in the meaning of form, property, or characteristic mark (6 E: μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ τά τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι), but not in the later meaning of a metaphysical entity. From the occurrence of these words, which are not yet used as logical terms, we cannot infer that the *Euthyphro* is later than any other small dialogue, such as the *Apology* or *Crito*, from which these words are absent.

Though εἶδος and ἰδέα both occur in the *Euthyphro*, these words have not yet their technical meaning.

There is a greater difficulty in the circumstance that in the *Euthyphro* (6 E: χρώμενος αὐτῇ (τῇ ἰδέᾳ) παραδείγματι) the idea is said to be a paradeigma, as this seems at first sight to approach the later theory of eternal forms or paradeigmatic ideas. But such eternal

The same refers to παράδειγμα.

[157] C. Waddington, 'Observations sur le Mémoire de W. Lutosławski,' *Compte rendu des séances et travaux de l'académie des sciences morales et politiques*, vol. cxlvi°. N. 7. See above, note 49.

forms are '*παραδείγματα ἐν τῇ φύσει*' (*Parm.* 132 D =*Rep.* 597 B, cf. *Theaet.* 176 E), while here Plato only speaks of using the characteristic of holiness as a standard for distinguishing holy actions from sinful deeds. Such a use of the word *παράδειγμα* does not essentially differ from that of Thucydides and the early orators; it cannot be regarded as peculiar to Plato.

Qualities distinguished from causes.

An important logical distinction is made in the *Euthyphro* between activity and quality: the quality is a result of a determinate activity, but never cause or ground of this activity (10 C: *εἴ τι γίγνεται, ἤ τι πάσχει, οὐχ ὅτι γιγνόμενόν ἐστι, γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι γίγνεται, γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν· οὐδ' ὅτι πάσχον ἐστί, πάσχει, ἀλλ' ὅτι πάσχει, πάσχον ἐστίν*). This is here explained by a number of analogies before it is expressed in a general form.

Date early but uncertain.

These few hints of a logical character offer no means of determining the date of the *Euthyphro*. The scene of the dialogue proves that it could not have been written before the accusation of Socrates. With regard to the later limit of time we can infer nothing beyond that the *Euthyphro* precedes the *Meno* and *Gorgias* on grounds of style,[158] composition, and contents.[159]

[158] Stylistic observations place the *Euthyphro* at the beginning of Plato's literary career. It contains many peculiarities of earlier style: *ὥσπερ* used always instead of *καθάπερ*, *τῷ ὄντι* instead of *ὄντως*, *μέντοι* prevailing over *τοίνυν*; *ἔγωγε*, *ἔμοιγε*, *δοκεῖ μοι* forming 19 per cent. of all answers, *περί* with the genitive prevailing over all other prepositions, &c. (See table of affinity, p. 163.)

[159] Schleiermacher, Socher, Schierenberg (*Ueber die Zeit der Abfassung des platonischen Euthyphro*, Lemgau 1830), Stallbaum, Steinhart, Zeller agree in placing the *Euthyphro* before the death of Socrates; Susemihl, Georgii (*Platos Euthyphron übersetzt von Georgii*, Stuttgart 1875), Bergk, Dümmler believe the *Euthyphro* to be written some years later chiefly on account of holiness being here a part of justice, while in the *Gorgias* it is a fifth virtue besides justice. Also H. Ritter, Brandis, Michelis, Ribbing, Mistriotes, Peipers, Weygoldt, Windelband, Christ, who admit the date of the *Euthyphro* as uncertain, agree, however, as to the Socratic character and early origin of this work. Only Teichmüller (ii. 355) places the *Euthyphro*

The *Apology* shows, like the *Euthyphro*, a frequent use of induction and analogy (e.g. 25 B C), and contains several repetitions of the well-known Socratic principle, that he who knows his own ignorance is wiser than those who believe themselves to know what they do not know (21 C D, 22 C, 29 A, 33 C, 41 B). This principle is carried to the extreme consequence, that all human knowledge is of little worth and that only God is wise and infallible (21 B, 23 A). Such a scepticism, bearing even upon the future life (29 A: *οἶδε οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον* . . . . also 42 A), does not extend to ethical convictions (30 D: to do injustice is worse than death—30 B: virtue imports more than all besides).

In the *Apology* we find a frequent use of analogy.

The uncertainty manifested as to a future life shows that the *Apology* was written earlier than the *Meno* and *Gorgias*, in which as in all later dialogues Plato professes the greatest certainty on this subject. Also the style of the *Apology*, very similar to the style of the *Euthyphro*, makes it probable that both dialogues were written not later than within the first years after the death of Socrates, and though the *Euthyphro* represents an earlier scene, there is no decisive reason to place it before the *Apology*.[160]

Characteristic uncertainty about future life.

The *Crito* forms the third act in the tragedy of which the *Euthyphro* and *Apology* represent the first scenes. We remark here a curious distinction between honest (*χρηστάς*) and immoral opinions (47 A: *πονηρὰς δόξας*), which is parallel to the later constantly repeated contrast between mere opinion and knowledge. This way of estimating a judgment according to its moral value, without asking for a logical standard of truth, is peculiar to the Socratic stage of Plato's logic, and shows us how

In the *Crito* honest and wicked opinions distinguished.

after the *Symposium* and even after the *Theaetetus*, under the influence of his wrong theory of the stylistic criterion (see above, p. 102).

[160] Zeller and Ueberweg believed the *Apology* to be a faithful account of what Socrates said before his judges. But Riddell (see above, p. 99) and Stock (*The Apology of Plato*, with introduction and notes by S. G. Stock, Oxford 1887) have sufficiently demonstrated the improbability of this supposition.

Plato was led from the moral teaching of his master to his own logical investigations. When he wrote the *Crito*, he seems not yet to have arrived at his later ideal of objective knowledge: he is satisfied with an 'honest' opinion of a competent expert (ἐπαίων 47 D) whom he trusts more than the opinion of the many (δόξα τῶν πολλῶν 47 C).

Competent authorities trusted.

In agreement with such a practical standpoint, fundamental differences of opinion between men are recognised as inevitable, and here, as in the *Euthyphro*, are admitted to produce hatred and contempt, if they touch upon ethical subjects (*Crito* 49 C D, *Euthyphro* 7 D). This view is very characteristic, because in the *Gorgias* and all later dialogues the Platonic Socrates is represented as possessing objective truth about ethical as well as about other matters, a truth which can be proved and communicated even to such enemies of philosophy as Kallikles. Here we see only competent opinion or the authority of the 'best' reason (46 B: μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ ὃς ἄν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται). This 'best' reason is not yet 'the reason' familiar to the readers of later dialogues.

The absolute authority of reason not yet established.

From these logical particulars we can only infer that the *Crito*,[161] forming with the preceding two dialogues a natural group, is earlier than the *Meno* and *Gorgias*. There is a great probability that the *Crito* is later than the *Apology*, because in p. 45 B Plato makes a clear allusion to his *Apology*. This allusion might also refer to a coincidence between the Platonic *Apology* and the historical defence of Socrates, but if we consider that also the style

Crito probably later than *Apology*.

[161] The doubts as to the authenticity of the *Crito* expressed by Ast, and later by Schaarschmidt, have been sufficiently refuted by J. H. Bremi (*Philologische Beiträge aus der Schweiz*, Zürich 1819, vol. i. p. 131 *sqq.*), Georgii (*Apologie und Krito übersetzt von L. Georgii*, Stuttgart 1883), J. Adam (*Platonis Crito*, with introduction, notes, and Appendix, Cambridge 1888), and many others. The relation of the *Crito* to the *Gorgias* is dealt with also in *Plato's Apology of Socrates and Crito, on the basis of Cron's edition*, by L. Dyer, Boston 1885.

of the *Crito* shows a slight advance over the style of the two preceding dialogues (see above, p. 163), we have good reason to admit that Plato himself intended this work as the supplement of the preceding.

In the *Charmides* the term *συλλογισάμενος*.

Less evident is the chronological relation of the *Charmides*[162] to the above three dialogues. It is characteristic of the stage of logical advance which Plato had reached when he wrote this small work, that his Socrates commits a paralogism, inferring from the beauty of both temperance and quickness that quickness is temperate (159 D). Such logical blunders occur also in other small dialogues, and we have no reason to suppose that Plato was conscious of them. So long as the logical interest was not awakened, even a thinker like Plato might unconsciously commit logical errors. On the other hand, we notice a correct syllogism (161 A: *αἰδὼς οὐκ ἀγαθόν . . . σωφροσύνη ἀγαθόν . . . οὐκ ἄρα σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη αἰδώς*) of the form Cesare, introduced by the word *συλλογισάμενος* (160 E), which, however, has not yet the meaning of a logical term.

Importance of theoretical knowledge recognised.

The allusion made by Critias to a possible division of sciences into practical and theoretical (165 E: *τῆς λογιστικῆς . . τί ἐστιν τοιοῦτον ἔργον οἷον οἰκία οἰκοδομικῆς*), carried out later in the *Gorgias*, is not developed here; *ἐπιστήμη* and *τέχνη* are used as synonyms (165 E), but theoretical knowledge, independent of personal considerations, is recognised as a great advantage to mankind

[162] Doubts as to the authenticity of the *Charmides* put forth by Ast, Socher, Suckow, Schaarschmidt, and recently by Troost (*Inhalt und Echtheit der platonischen Dialoge auf Grund logischer Analyse*, Berlin 1889) have been sufficiently refuted by Schleiermacher, Ochmann (*Charmides Platonis num sit genuinus quaeritur*, Vratislaviæ 1827), Stallbaum, H. Ritter, Hermann, Steinhart, Munk, Susemihl, Spielmann (*Die Echtheit des platonischen Dialogs Charmides*, Innsbruck 1875), Alberti ('Gesichtspunkte für angezweifelte Platonische Gespräche,' *Philologus*, 3er Suppl. Bd. p. 101, Göttingen 1878), and Georgii (*Laches und Charmides, übers. von L. Georgii*, Stuttgart 1882). Also Zeller, who formerly believed the *Charmides* to be spurious, has since defended the authenticity against Troost (*Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos.* vol. iv. p. 134).

(166 D: *κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι σχεδόν τι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, γίγνεσθαι καταφανὲς ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ὅπῃ ἔχει*).

But certitude of knowledge doubted.

Again, a sceptical tone is perceptible in the doubt whether certitude as to knowledge is possible (172 A: *ἀγαθὸν εἴη τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδέν τις καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν . . . . οὐδαμοῦ ἐπιστήμη οὐδεμία τοιαύτη οὖσα πέφανται*). Very characteristic of the Socratic stage of Plato's logic is the appreciation of the knowledge of knowledge according to a standard of usefulness (169 B: *οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι . . . πρὶν ἂν ἐπισκέψωμαι, εἴτε τι ἂν ἡμᾶς ὠφελοῖ*, 172 D: *σκεψώμεθα, εἰ ἄρα τι καὶ ἡμᾶς ὀνήσει . . τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν*). This would not occur in any dialogue after the *Meno*, but is very natural at the time when Plato had not entirely emancipated himself from the prevailing ethical preoccupations of his teacher.

General logical question about activities acting on themselves adjourned as requiring a future great thinker.

A beginning of later Platonic tendencies appears in the care with which the question, whether an activity can have itself as its object, is discussed. By many examples Plato tries to prove that most human activities have not this property, that, for instance, there is no perception of perception (167 C), no desire of a desire, no will of a willing (167 E), no love of love, no fear of fear, because each of these activities has an object different from itself, but the general question of the existence and possibility of a knowledge of knowledge is here not settled, only adjourned as a problem requiring for its solution a great thinker (169 A).

Charmides is early, though the exact date uncertain.

Nearly all investigators agree in placing the *Charmides* among Plato's early works. Many believe that it may have been written even before the death of Socrates, to which it contains not the slightest allusion. But an exact chronological determination in this case requires further stylistic research, and the attempt of Teichmüller to discover in the *Charmides* allusions to the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon has failed.

Laches belongs to

At all events the *Laches* [163] belongs to the same period.

[163] Ast, Schaarschmidt, and to a certain extent Giltbauer (*Philologische Streifzüge*, Freiburg 1886) doubted the authenticity of the *Laches*, but

It is noteworthy that Plato mentions here as objects of knowledge truths which are conceived as independent of time (198 D: *περὶ ὅσων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν εἶναι περὶ γεγονότος, εἰδέναι ὅπῃ γέγονεν, ἄλλη δὲ περὶ γιγνομένων, ὅπῃ γίγνεται . . . ἀλλ' ἡ αὐτή*). Such truths are found more easily by a single competent man than by an incompetent majority (185 A: *εἰ ἔστιν τις τεχνικὸς . . . ἐκείνῳ πείθεσθαι ἑνὶ ὄντι, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἐᾶν*), because knowledge is a safer criterion than great number (184 E: *ἐπιστήμῃ δεῖ κρίνεσθαι ἀλλ' οὐ πλήθει τὸ μέλλον καλῶς κριθήσεσθαι*). the same period.

This short acknowledgment of knowledge as superior to opinion rises above the moral standard of honest opinions required in the *Crito*. But Plato does not yet pretend, as in later works, to possess such a knowledge. He advises his readers to seek the best teacher, without sparing money or anything else (201 A), but he offers no definitive solution of the proposed difficulties. In all the above small dialogues we see discussions leading to a Socratic confession of ignorance, and not to a definite doctrine. Opinions of others are criticised, but not definitely corrected. Personal authority of the best teacher.

The character of Socrates is similar in these works to what we know about the historical Socrates: he is represented as a friend of young men, detecting their errors, not yet as the ideal master of wisdom. Of a similar critical character is the first larger work written by Plato, the *Protagoras*. In this dialogue also logical questions are only incidentally touched upon, and it is evident that the author cares chiefly for ethical problems. These are treated in a manner which presupposes the previous particular inquiries given in the small dialogues, and the logical power also appears increased. The inconvertibility of general affirmative judgments is insisted upon In the small dialogues no definitive doctrine. Also the *Protagoras* has a polemical character.

these suspicions have been refuted by Stallbaum, Georgii, Bonitz, and Tatham (*The Laches of Plato*, with introduction and notes, London 1888). Also Zeller abandoned his earlier doubts as to the authenticity of the *Laches*.

Inconvertibility of general affirmations.

(350 C-351 B) by means of several analogies. If we observe that this logical lesson is put into the mouth of Protagoras, and not of Socrates, we must admit as probable, that the discovery was made outside of the Socratic society. The perfect knowledge vainly sought for in the *Charmides* is not yet found by Plato. He still expects progress from discussion (348 D). His certitude is increased by the acquiescence of others, and not by its own absolute infallibility, as in later times, when he condemned to death those who thought otherwise (*Laws* 909 A, 958 A: cf. *Polit.* 308 E). Still he recognises knowledge as the chief power in man, reigning over all feelings (352 C, 357 C), and settling all doubts (356 E: *δηλώσασα τὸ ἀληθὲς ἡσυχίαν ἂν ἐποίησεν ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ . . .*).

Law of contradiction prepared.

As one of the logical means of arriving at knowledge, Plato states the principle that each notion has only one contradictory to itself (332 C: *ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἐναντίων ἓν μόνον ἐστὶν ἐναντίον καὶ οὐ πολλά*) and exemplifies this rule by many instances, but without making any distinction between contrary and contradictory terms.

The *Protagoras* seems to be later than the small dialogues.

These observations seem to indicate a further stage of logical development than is seen in the small dialogues. In the *Charmides* the subject, though restricted to one form of virtue, was to a great extent the same as in the *Protagoras*, and it seems more plausible that the greater work should contain no allusion to the smaller than that Plato should have written the *Charmides* after the *Protagoras* without some allusion to the more general discussion on the same problem. The special subject of the *Laches* also is contained in the *Protagoras*, and the definition of courage (*Lach.* 195 A: *τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμη*), arrived at in the *Laches* after a long conversation, and shown by Socrates to refer not only to courage but to every virtue, is repeated in the *Protagoras* (360 D: *ἡ σοφία τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν*), and remains unrefuted (see also *Rep.* 429 C).

Definitions of courage.

Allusions to known events as chronological indications confirm the later date.

Some allusions to contemporaneous facts, contained in the *Protagoras*, seem to show that this dialogue was written at least seven years after the death of Socrates. Kroschel [164] and after him Teichmüller have supposed that the mention of πελταστική (350 A) as a familiar example was not probable before the introduction of this arm into the Athenian army by Iphikrates, between 393–391 B.C. Also Teichmüller and after him Dümmler see in the *Protagoras* (347 C–350 B) allusions to Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, which appear to have been published some years after the death of Socrates. This agrees with our supposition that the *Protagoras* followed the above five small dialogues, and also with the observations on the style, according to which the *Protagoras* is intermediate between the small dialogues and the *Gorgias* (see above, p. 165).

Meno continues the question raised in the *Protagoras*.

The *Meno* is generally held to be a continuation of the *Protagoras*.[165] Theories of the greatest importance, amounting to logical discoveries, are for the first time expressed in the *Meno*, which in size exceeds only by a very little the limits of a small dialogue, and amounts to less than two-thirds of the volume of the *Protagoras*. Logical exercise, so often recommended in the dialectical works, is here first introduced as a methodical way of progressing on the path of truth (75 A: in order to enable Meno to find the definition of virtue, Socrates proposes the definition of form: ἵνα καὶ γένηταί σοι μελέτη). The aim of logical definition is indicated as the determination of the substance (72 B: οὐσία) of things, that

[164] J. S. Kroschel, 'Studien zu Platons Protagoras' (*Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, vol. 87, p. 825, 1863), also in his review of Cron's edition of the *Protagoras* (*Zeitschrift für das Gymnasialwesen*, vol. xx., for 1866), and in his edition of this dialogue (Gotha 1865, as 3d ed. of Stallbaum).

[165] Nearly all investigators agree that the *Meno* is later than the *Protagoras*: Tennemann, Schleiermacher, Hermann, Susemihl, Ribbing, Steinhart, Zeller, Ueberweg, Pfleiderer, Natorp, Siebeck, Gomperz, Ritter, J. Bartunek (*Ueber die Aufeinanderfolge der Dialoge Protagoras, Gorgias und Menon*, Progr. Rzeszów 1897) &c.; only Stallbaum, Schöne, and F. Horn advocated the priority of the *Meno* on quite insufficient grounds; R. Hirzel (*Rheinisches Museum*, vol. 42, p. 249) sees in the *Meno* allusions to Polykrates' κατηγορία Σωκράτους.

Unity of species.

which brings unity among the variety of external appearances (72 C: *αὐτὸ τοῦτο ᾧ οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι, ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν εἰσιν ἅπασαι*). This unity is called *εἶδος*, not yet the later Platonic idea, but already a distinct logical term, corresponding to species (72 C: *ἕν γέ τι εἶδος ταὐτὸν ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν, δι' ὃ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί*). The unity of species is the true essence of the things which it embodies (100 B: *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετή*).

Dialectical requirements.

Having thus established the aim of research, Plato proceeds to give some rules as to the method. Here appear for the first time the 'dialectical' requirements. Xenophon had once applied (*Memor.* iv. 5, 12: *ἄνδρας διαλεκτικωτάτους*) the word 'dialectical' in the sense of 'best able to conduct conversation,' but Plato, converting it into a logical term, requires of all who wish to discuss dialectically that they should base their reasoning on recognised notions or premisses (75 D: *ἔστι δὲ ἴσως τὸ διαλεκτικώτερον μὴ μόνον τἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἐκείνων ὧν ἂν προσομολογῇ εἰδέναι ὁ ἐρόμενος*).

Hypothetical method of investigation.

As a method of verifying doubtful suppositions, Plato proposes to look for the consequences following from each hypothesis. This method he describes as hypothetical argument (86 E: *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως σκοπεῖσθαι . . . ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι*), and transfers it from geometry to philosophical inquiry. He applies it successfully to the problem which he could not yet resolve in the *Protagoras*, and finds that virtue, so long as it is not taught, but merely practised according to common traditional experience, appears not to be, as was supposed in *Charmides*, *Laches*, and *Protagoras*, a kind of knowledge.

Opposition of general and particular judgments.

Another sign of the awakened logical interest is the careful distinction between particular and general affirmation (73 E, 89 A). Such progress in respect of formal reasoning corresponds to an equally remarkable development of some fundamental logical doctrines about which neither in the *Protagoras* nor in any of the small dialogues had Plato expressed any opinion. The theory of innate

ideas is not only introduced with a striking audacity, but founded on so general a metaphysical axiom as the unity of nature (81 D: *ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἁπάσης συγγενοῦς οὔσης, καὶ μεμαθηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἓν μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα . . . τἆλλα πάντα . . . ἀνευρεῖν*).

Innate ideas.

The metaphysical certainty of *a priori* knowledge, proclaimed by Plato in the *Meno*, is a new principle in the light of which the old Socratic irony and ignorance are disappearing. Still the author condescends to give an experimental and inductive proof of his assumption, after the caution that such a proof is not easy (82 A). The choice of the experiment and the manner in which it is executed show an educational mastery far greater than that visible in the small dialogues (82 B–85 C).

A priori knowledge made probable by experiment.

All doubts about the possibility and reality of infallible science have been removed; the Platonic Socrates boldly asserts his absolute certainty of the existence of a science far above right opinion (98 B: *ὅτι δέ ἐστίν τι ἀλλοῖον ὀρθὴ δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ τοῦτο εἰκάζειν, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἰδέναι, ὀλίγα δ' ἂν φαίην, ἓν δ' οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνων θείην ἂν ὧν οἶδα*), and that this science may be awakened in everybody by means of skilful interrogations (86 A: *ἀληθεῖς δόξαι ἐρωτήσει ἐπεγερθεῖσαι ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται*). The difference between right belief and scientific knowledge consists in the co-ordination and causal relation peculiar to true knowledge (98 A: *ἀληθεῖς δόξαι . . . οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ . . . ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθῶσιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα . . . διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης*). Science is therefore more valuable than mere belief, even if it be right belief. Armed with his new weapon, Plato enters upon its application to the ethical field, and introduces the immortality of the soul first as a true and beautiful tale of priests and poets (81 A), which he then confirms by a reflection on the nature of human thought (86 B: *οὐκοῦν*

Knowledge proclaimed as essentially different from opinions because it is founded on grounds.

Application to immortality.

εἰ ἀεὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀθάνατος ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη).

Date of the *Meno* after 395 B.C.

This far-reaching logical importance of the *Meno*, noticed already by Guggenheim[166] and Oldenberg,[167] tells against those who like Socher and Stallbaum believe that the *Meno* could have been written before the death of Socrates. The allusion to the bribery of Ismenias, indicated by Boeckh and Schleiermacher, shows that the *Meno* is later than 395 B.C. Less evident is another allusion to Polykrates, maintained by Hirzel and Dümmler, who place the *Meno* after the *Symposium*, an order which appears impossible, if we take into account the stylistic tests (see above, p. 166). What may be safely affirmed is that the *Meno* is later than the *Protagoras* and all smaller dialogues.

The *Euthydemus* directed against unknown enemies.

The logical interest awakened in the *Meno* bursts out only occasionally, but with great intensity in the *Euthydemus*,[168] which has all the appearance of a polemical work written for a certain practical purpose, and against enemies whom it is not quite easy for us to identify. Plato is so proud of his acquired certainty of knowledge that he would not give it up even for immortality, if not accompanied by knowledge how to use it (289 B). While in the *Protagoras* the word philosophy was still used in the meaning of love of wisdom (335 D, 342 D), here we see it defined as acquisition of knowledge (288 D: *φιλοσοφία κτῆσις ἐπιστήμης*), and the dialectician, who had received his first rules in the *Meno*, becomes the highest judge of every particular knowledge (290 C).

Philosophy and dialectic

[166] M. Guggenheim, *Die Lehre vom apriorischen Wissen in ihrer Bedeutung für die Entwickelung der Ethik und Erkenntnisstheorie in der Sokratisch-Platonischen Philosophie*, Berlin 1885.

[167] H. Oldenberg, *De Platonis arte dialectica*, Göttingen 1873.

[168] Doubts as to the authenticity of the *Euthydemus*, emitted by Ast and later by Schaarschmidt, have been sufficiently refuted by A. Polzer (*Ueber die Echtheit des Euthydemos*, Olmütz 1874) and Bonitz (*Platonische Studien*, Berlin 1886). Bonitz gives also an elaborate classification of more than twenty sophisms contained in the *Euthydemus*.

These dialecticians, thus placed so high above the mathematicians and all other inquirers, are evidently Plato himself and his school. For the writer of the *Euthydemus* is clearly a teacher, though probably not yet the head of the Academy. Philosophy is the subject of his teaching, and he passionately defends his science against those who call philosophy a worthless and vain occupation (304 E).

defended and placed above particular sciences.

To the right belief, explained in the *Meno*, Plato adds in the *Euthydemus* his explanation of error and wrong belief, whose existence is proved against the Sophists by the hypothetical method taught in the *Meno* (*Euthyd.* 284 A, 287 E). Plato gives an interesting collection of current sophisms resulting from the use of the same word in two different meanings, the misinterpretation of predication, the omission of limiting determinations, and the double meaning of phrases according to their grammatical construction.

Many sophisms refuted and their origin explained.

The date of the *Euthydemus* can be approximately determined by its admission of the possibility of teaching virtue (as in the *Republic* and *Laws*), whence we conclude that it was written after the *Protagoras* and *Meno*, in which the same question is discussed. Those who, like Tennemann, Stallbaum, Steinhart, C. Ritter, believe the *Euthydemus* to have been written before the death of Socrates cannot account for the logical enthusiasm which is here manifested and is absent from all earlier dialogues. Those who, like Bergk, Siebeck, and Weygoldt, place the *Euthydemus* after the *Symposium* are not aware of the great difference in style between the *Euthydemus* and all dialogues later than the *Cratylus* and *Symposium* (see above, p. 166).

Date of the *Euthydemus* has been supposed by some writers to be very early.

There is no contradiction from the standpoint either of logical or of stylistic development in admitting the close relation between the *Euthydemus* and Isocrates' discourse against the Sophists. This relation, first

Allusion to Isocrates' discourse against

the Sophists is a safe indication, and this confirms inferences from style.

noticed by Spengel,[169] and Thompson,[170] has been since investigated by Teichmüller, Sudhaus,[171] Dümmler, and recognised by Zeller and Susemihl, without any noteworthy opposition. According to these investigations, the *Euthydemus* must have been published not before 390 and probably not much later. Another allusion to Lysias, although supported with great ingenuity by Teichmüller, is not quite so evident, and also the references to Antisthenes, alleged by Teichmüller, Urban,[172] and Dümmler, are possible, but not certain. If we admit that Plato wrote the *Euthydemus*[173] about 390 B.C., this agrees very well with the general character of the dialogue, which directs the most acute polemic against wrong education, thus seeming to indicate that the author had already acquired some educational experience, and gathered around him a number of pupils, preparing the foundation of that philosophical school which achieved such an unparalleled importance in the history of human thought.

Gorgias represents the transition from the Socratic

This educational character reaches a still higher level in the *Gorgias*, which represents the transition from the Socratic to the peculiar Platonic philosophy. In its ethical character the *Gorgias* is still Socratic, but the method of argumentation and the apodictic certainty with

[169] Spengel, 'Isokrates und Plato,' *Abhandlungen der Akademie zu München*, vol. vii. pp. 729–769, München 1855.

[170] *The Phaedrus of Plato, with English notes and dissertations*, by W. H. Thompson, London 1868, p. 179.

[171] Sudhaus, 'Zur Zeitbestimmung des Euthydem, des Gorgias und der Republik,' *Rheinisches Museum*, vol. xliv. p. 52, Frankfurt a. M. 1889.

[172] Urban, *Ueber die Erwähnungen der Philosophie des Antisthenes in den platonischen Schriften*, Königsberg 1882.

[173] Some authors inferred from the use of πάρεστι *Euthyd.* 301 A that Plato when he wrote the *Euthydemus* had already produced his theory of ideas. But this is by no means probable, because παρεῖναι is used in exactly the same manner in some of the small dialogues, as *Charm.* 159 A and *Lys.* 217 D, like παραγίγνεσθαι in the *Laches* 189 E. This use does not correspond to the terminology of ideas. Instead of πάρεστι κάλλος τι (*Euthyd.* 301 A) Plato would have said later πάρεστι τὸ κάλλος (αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό). Generally παρεῖναι is very little used by Plato in connection with ideas.

which ethical principles are proclaimed (509 A: *οὐδεὶς οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἄλλως λέγων μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος εἶναι*) belong to Plato, are his own creation, and are manifested constantly in all his later works. The literary skill displayed in the *Gorgias* reaches a higher perfection than in the small dialogues, and even than in the *Protagoras*, *Meno*, or *Euthydemus*. Plato has now arrived at a mastery of form, which approaches to the highest beauty attained by human language, and has been exceeded perhaps only by Plato himself in the *Phaedo*, the *Phaedrus*, and parts of the *Symposium*, the *Republic*, and the *Theaetetus*.

Stage to original Platonic philosophy.

The teaching of those dialecticians, who were indicated in the *Euthydemus* as treasurers of knowledge, is now personified and attributed to 'Philosophy.' This Philosophy is loved more than all human beings, and is credited with eternal truths, which never change (482 A: *ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐστὶ λόγων*). The power of these truths is based on our own consciousness, nor can any man contradict them without contradicting himself (482 B: *ἣ φιλοσοφίαν ἐξέλεγξον . . . ἣ οὔ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ διαφωνήσει ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ*). And to all faithful followers of this his Queen, Plato promises after death a happy life, apart from other human beings (526 C). In this he still betrays a juvenile egoism, which was abandoned later, when he bade the philosophers descend like gods among mortals to teach them a better life.

Philosophy personified. Philosopher's immortality.

The difference between right belief and scientific knowledge, found in the *Meno*, is here applied to the art of persuasion, and leads to the distinction of two kinds of rhetoric, one based on knowledge, the other on faith (454 E: *δύο εἴδη θῶμεν πειθοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμην*): knowledge alone is infallible (454 D: *ἐπιστήμη οὐδαμῶς ἐστὶν ψευδής*), while belief may be true or false. In full accordance with this increasing separation between science and opinion, Plato distinguishes more clearly than in the *Charmides* between

Difference between belief and knowledge recognised and applied.

theoretical and applied or practical sciences (450 C–451 D), and he insists on the importance of the division of concepts (500 D: *βέλτιστόν ἐστιν . . . διαιρεῖσθαι, διελομένους δὲ καὶ ὁμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλοις . . . σκέψασθαι, τί τε διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν*).

Logical terms.

The reasoning proceeds on granted premisses, according to the rule given in the *Meno*, and the logical connection is carefully shown by means of logical terms (498 E: *συλλόγισαι, τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων*). Inevitable repetitions are excused by the logical aim (499 A: *καὶ δὶς γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς φασιν καλὸν εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι*, cf. 508 D). This gives the impression of an author who is used to personal teaching, and has already found the truths he wishes to convey to his hearers, but professes to seek them again in company with his pupils. What in the *Apology* (30 D) and *Crito* (49 AC) has been expressed as a personal belief, that one should by no means do wrong, is here affirmed as a well-founded scientific truth (509 A: *ταῦτα . . . ἡμῖν οὕτω φανέντα κατέχεται καὶ δέδεται σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις*), and is so far extended as to imply even the necessity of punishment if one has done wrong (482 B, 527 B). The aim of human life is not, as it seemed to be in the *Protagoras*, pleasure but 'the good' (513 D: *δύ' ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ ἕκαστον θεραπεύειν, . . . μίαν μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν, τὴν ἑτέραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον*). The politician's duty is to make better the people whom he leads.

To do wrong is worse than to suffer wrong. Pleasure is not the aim of life.

Great politicians treated with contempt. This shows independence of tradition

In the *Protagoras* and *Meno* Plato still maintained the popular belief that Pericles and Themistocles were great and wise men. He only complained that they were unable to impart their greatness and wisdom to their children or others. But now, from the height of the newly founded philosophy, Plato dares to say that these idols of the Athenians were bad politicians and corrupters of the people (515 E). This bold contempt of the men who had generally been esteemed greatest among the

citizens of Athens shows how rapidly the breach is widening for Plato between vulgar common sense and the teachings of philosophy. He has risen from Socratic ignorance and irony to that full independence of tradition and public opinion which in all ages characterises a great philosopher.

and public opinion.

Another indication of the later date of the *Gorgias* is the hatred of tyranny (525 D) here expressed and henceforth maintained by Plato throughout his life. Stylistic inquiry places this dialogue after all the above-mentioned works, and between the *Euthydemus* and the *Cratylus* (see above, p. 167). If we admit with Teichmüller that the *Protagoras* and *Euthydemus* were written between 393-390 B.C., we are not obliged to accept his supposition that the *Gorgias* is fifteen years later. Teichmüller (ii. 357) as well as Sudhaus [171] place the *Gorgias* after Isocrates' discourse to Nicocles, which is supposed to have been written 376 B.C. But the allusions to this discourse supposed to be contained in the *Gorgias* are not evident, while Dümmler, who also specially investigated Plato's relation to Isocrates, assigns to the *Gorgias* a much earlier date. The most certain conclusions as to the date of the *Gorgias* that can be drawn from the contents have been indicated by Natorp [174]: the *Gorgias* is probably later than the *Protagoras*, *Meno*, and all above-mentioned small dialogues. This is also the result reached by Horn in his comparison of the ethical theories of these works. The *Gorgias* [175] closes the Socratic stage of Plato's

Gorgias the latest of all Socratic dialogues, as results from its contents and style.

This confirms the conclusions of Natorp and Horn.

[174] P. Natorp, 'Ueber Grundansicht und Entstehungszeit von Platos Gorgias' (*Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. ii. p. 394, Berlin 1889).

[175] The *Gorgias* is one of the few works of Plato which has escaped the searching criticism of those who have doubted the authenticity of many other dialogues. Voluminous and instructive commentaries on the *Gorgias* have been published by Findeisen (*Platonis Gorgias*, Gothae 1796, 624 pp.), D. Coray (*Ξενοφῶντος Ἀπομνημονεύματα καὶ Πλάτωνος Γόργιας ἐκδίδοντος καὶ διορθοῦντος Ἀδαμαντίου Κοραῆ, ἐν Παρισίοις* 1825), Ast (*Annotationes in Platonis Opera*, tom. ii. Lipsiae 1832), Woolsey (*The Gorgias of Plato*, Boston 1842), Cron (*Beiträge zur Erklärung des Platonischen Gorgias*, Leipzig

philosophy, and leads from the ethical problems which occupied him in the first years after the death of his master to the logical and metaphysical inquiries which filled the greatest part of his manhood.

Plato's progress from moral problems to logical investigations. His discovery of scientific certainty.

Looking back over the above survey of Plato's first steps in logic, we see that he started from ethical problems, agitated by his teacher, and that his first attempts to find a definition of particular virtues and of virtue generally were made with moral purposes. In order to be temperate it seems to be indispensable to know what temperance is, and where is the limit separating this virtue from intemperance. Among such inquiries on particular virtues Plato became interested in the more general problem of a definition of virtue. This he began to seek, and after some vacillation recognised the identity of virtue and knowledge. But he was still unable to attain certainty of knowledge ; only after years of educational practice he found that such certainty is possible, and not to be sought for in the assent of any majority, nor in tradition, nor in idle discussion, but in the inward power of the soul which sees the truth with absolute certainty. To trace the origin of this power, felt by him when he imparted his moral convictions to his pupils, he recurred to the hypothesis of a previous existence of the soul, and deduced also the soul's immortality.

Rules for dialectical discussion. Infallible knowledge attained.

We see the influence of his activity as a teacher in the rules for dialectic discussion, consisting in starting from recognised premisses, in dividing and distinguishing notions, in following up the consequences of each hypothesis, and avoiding unjustifiable generalisation. By these means Plato reached a degree of certitude not experienced before. He created an ideal of infallible knowledge, far above traditional opinions, and he distinguished this scientific knowledge from common belief by his ability to show a reason for each assertion. The methodic connection of

1870, G. Lodge (*Gorgias*, edited on the basis of the Deuschle Cron's edition, Boston 1891, 308 pp.), and many others.

thought gave to his conclusions a permanence and consistency which unscientific opinion never reaches.

New method first applied to the theory of virtue led then to other subjects.

The new power of philosophy, acquired by logical exercises undertaken with ethical purposes, reacted first on the moral problems from which Plato started. He applied his logical method first to the great questions which had been unsuccessfully discussed in his earlier writings, and he produced a consistent theory of virtue and of the aims of life in the *Gorgias*. But the logical progress achieved will not be limited in its effect to the subject for which it has been devised. We see already in the *Meno*, in the *Euthydemus*, and in the *Gorgias*, that Plato begins to feel an interest in logical method independently of its applications, and this logical interest, once awakened, will lead him to special logical investigations, and to further development of methods in order to acquire and communicate to others an infallible knowledge.

Reality of the world of thought prepared in the *Gorgias*.

An almost fanatical enthusiasm and love of absolute science explains certain exaggerations: the new knowledge referred only to very few principles, but Plato is as proud of it as if he had already extended it to all departments of Being. He obtained a glimpse of a world different from the world in which he lived, and he had the audacity to believe more in the reality of this new world of his thoughts than in all other authorities. Thus he progressed out of the Socratic stage to his own philosophy, and created the theory of ideas, which has been so often identified with Platonism.

But theory of ideas not yet expressed. Its germ is the consciousness of intuitive

We cannot agree with Zeller who sees vestiges of this theory of ideas already in the *Meno*, *Euthydemus*, and *Gorgias*. Here we have only the germ from which the theory of ideas was afterwards developed. This germ is the consciousness of infallible knowledge arrived at when Plato wrote the *Meno*, becoming a special science in the *Euthydemus*, and in the *Gorgias* entrusted with the direction of human life. This consciousness was in the

infallible knowledge.

beginning purely personal and based on experience in teaching. Plato enjoyed it as a new sense, a feeling of higher life, and he did not yet undertake to explain it fully. The absolute certainty was reached in his own mind, and referred really only to a few ethical truths; he had imparted it to some of his pupils, and he generalised the faculty of absolute knowledge, postulating such knowledge for all departments of being. The complete theoretical explanation of the possibility of such knowledge was not yet given—scarcely asked for. But the consciousness of absolute knowledge, created in the soul of Plato, was transmitted from generation to generation, and since his time has never deserted European philosophy.

CHAPTER V

ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS

Certainty of knowledge first accepted as a psychological fact, then investigated as a logical problem.

WHEN Plato had discovered in his own consciousness the existence of an infallible knowledge (*a priori*) and applied this knowledge to the ethical problems which were the chief subject of his teacher's philosophy, it was natural for him to seek an explanation of the nature of knowledge itself. A priority of knowledge with its accompanying certainty appeared to him first as a psychological fact, a feeling concerning certain thoughts. This feeling from a psychological point of view might still be an illusion. The logical standpoint was not yet reached, or at least is not known to have been reached by anybody before Plato. The fact of an *a priori* knowledge proclaimed by Plato in the *Meno* was for him a psychological fact, the difference between the state of mind of one who knows and knows reasons of his knowledge, and that of one who believes, and does not care to find out why he believes. The dialectician, whom Plato had described in the *Euthydemus* as the master of every knowledge, distinguished his knowledge from other people's opinions by the circumstance, that he had reasons to quote for his judgments. The doctrine of an absolute morality was presented in the *Gorgias* as a knowledge above and beyond all changes of opinion; but Plato had not yet inquired into the ultimate foundations of the certainty which he experienced and imparted to his pupils. The antenatal existence mentioned in the *Meno* was rather an inference from the fact of *a priori* knowledge than the explanation of it.

Not all the steps of the inquiry recorded.

This explanation was the next task undertaken by Plato after giving his definitive solution of the moral problem in the *Gorgias*. We cannot expect Plato to record for us every step of his new investigations. We must ourselves supply the connection between one work and another, because the works themselves do not exhibit a continuity of evolution. The dialogues were not intended as a diary of investigations, but as an artistic embodiment of certain conclusions with an ideal indication of a method by which they might have been reached, not necessarily coinciding with the actual steps through which the author had arrived at them.

Three points of view appearing in the *Cratylus*, *Symposium*, *Phaedo*.

Such artistic reminiscences of a long inquiry were the *Protagoras*, *Meno*, *Euthydemus*, and *Gorgias*; they were never connected by Plato into one whole, nor are they a progressive account of the development of the author's theories, but represent only occasional manifestations of his original thoughts. The next movement in advance of these ethical dialogues is visible in the *Cratylus* and *Symposium*, which approach the solution of the logical problem of *a priori* knowledge from two different sides, which may be described as the linguistic and the esthetical. A third note is struck in the *Phaedo*, and it is really only in the *Phaedo* that the theory of ideas takes a definitive shape, and is based on metaphysical considerations. All these three dialogues are undoubtedly later than the ethical series, because their style has many more characteristics peculiar to the latest group (see above, pp. 168-169).

I. *The Cratylus.*

(Relative affinity to the latest group, measured on the *Laws* as unity, = 0·16; see above, p. 168.)

***Cratylus* presents difficulties**

The *Cratylus*, which recalls the *Euthydemus* by the humour displayed in it, offers many difficulties to the interpreter, because it is not quite easy to distinguish

what is meant seriously from what is a parody of contemporary linguistics. Cratylus, who is here represented as debating with Socrates, might be the same about whom Aristotle[176] says that he was a follower of Heraclitus and a teacher of Plato. But while Aristotle represents Plato as faithful in an essential point to the doctrine of this his first teacher, we see in the present dialogue how he frees himself from a prejudice maintained by Cratylus, according to which philology took the place of philosophy, and the truth about being was to be sought in etymology.

of interpretation.

It is very characteristic of the dialogue which makes the starting point of Plato's logic, that in order to prove that things are not necessarily as they appear, that there is an existence independent of appearance, and a certainty not liable to doubt, Plato uses an ethical example, and quotes as one of such certainties the existence of bad and good men (386 B). Thus the existence of things is treated as independent of the words we use to define them, and they are viewed as having their own permanence of substance (386 A: *ἔχειν αὐτὰ αὑτῶν τινὰ βεβαιότητα τῆς οὐσίας*—423 D: *οὐσία δοκεῖ εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ χρῶμα . . . πρῶτον αὐτῷ τῷ χρώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ ἔστιν οὐσία τις ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅσα ἠξίωται ταύτης τῆς προσρήσεως τοῦ εἶναι*). Neither is Protagoras right in affirming that everything is as it appears to everybody (386 C), nor Euthydemus in believing that everything is for everybody the same always (386 D), for in either case no room would be left for the distinction between good and bad, and this distinction Plato since writing the *Gorgias* looked upon as incontestable. The opinion here ascribed to Euthydemus is found in the dialogue of

Moral judgments taken as standard of certainty.

Protagoras and Euthydemus condemned; with a reference to the dialogue

[176] Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* (987 a 32) quotes Cratylus as Plato's teacher, and says that he was a follower of Heraclitus. Proclus in his commentary on the *Cratylus* of Plato (ed. J. F. Boissonade, p. 4) identifies with this Heraclitean Cratylus the Cratylus of Plato's dialogue.

Euthydemus.

this name, and if we compare the passages, the *Cratylus* seems to refer to the *Euthydemus*:

Euthyd. 294 E: *πότερον πάντα νῦν μόνον ἐπίστασθον ἢ καὶ ἀεί;—καὶ ἀεί*—answers Euthyd. and he says: 295 A: *ἐπιδείξω καὶ σὲ ταῦτα τὰ θαυμαστὰ ἔχοντα.* After a sophistical argument he concludes with saying to Socrates: 296 D: *ἀεὶ γὰρ ὡμολόγηκας ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἅμα πάντα.* This is then proved by Socrates to be wrong 297 A by the example of the evident falsehood of a judgment such as 'good men are unjust.'

Cratyl. 386 D: *οὐδὲ καθ' Εὐθύδημόν γε οἶμαι σοὶ δοκεῖ πᾶσι πάντα ὁμοίως εἶναι ἅμα καὶ ἀεί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως εἶεν οἱ μὲν χρηστοί, οἱ δὲ πονηροί, εἰ ὁμοίως ἅπασι καὶ ἀεὶ ἀρετή τε καὶ κακία εἴη.*

Substance permanent, while appearances are changing. Permanence of notions a condition of knowledge.

What this substance or nature of things and even of actions (387 D) is, Plato does not yet fully explain. His first step is only to ascertain that it must be permanent, while appearance is changing. The permanence of the substance of things results from the possibility of knowledge, which, since it has been established in the *Meno*, is no more liable to doubt, and is here accepted as a basis of reasoning. If things never remained the same, there would be nothing in them whereof Being might be predicated (439 E: *πῶς οὖν ἂν εἴη τὶ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ μηδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει; . . . εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι, πῶς ἂν τοῦτό γε μεταβάλλοι ἢ κινοῖτο μηδὲν ἐξιστάμενον τῆς αὑτοῦ ἰδέας;*). When a thing changes it becomes another, and no longer corresponds to the idea we first conceived of it. In such continuous changes knowledge becomes impossible, because knowledge refers to a determinate being, and if that being becomes another, then our knowledge can no more refer to it, since knowledge cannot know an indeterminate object (440 A: *γνῶσις δή που οὐδεμία γιγνώσκει ὃ γιγνώσκει μηδαμῶς ἔχον*). Knowledge itself, if it be knowledge, must remain unaltered and without change, because if it changes and no longer corresponds to the notion of knowledge, then it ceases to be knowledge at all (440 A B: *ἀλλ' οὐδὲ γνῶσιν εἶναι φάναι εἰκός, εἰ μεταπίπτει πάντα χρήματα*

καὶ μηδὲν μένει . . . ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὔτε τὸ γνωσόμενον οὔτε τὸ γνωσθησόμενον ἂν εἴη). This reasoning is of fundamental importance for Plato's logic, and for the origin of logic generally. It returns many times in later writings; the existence of a knowledge that is different from mere opinion is an axiom and the foundation of science. But knowledge cannot deal with ever-changing matter. The aim is to discover fixity in its objects, and these, the notions of our mind, if grasped by real knowledge, cannot undergo change. If they change, then they were not at first obtained by knowledge but by a wrong opinion.

Knowledge cannot deal with ever-changing matter.

It is inconceivable how Schaarschmidt (pp. 262–263) could believe that the objects of knowledge referred to so frequently (as *τὰ ὄντα*) in the *Cratylus* were material things. Plato says clearly that the substance of things, as being invariable, is different from material appearances, and he quotes as illustrations of such substances the knowing subject, the known object, the beautiful, the good (440 B: *εἰ δὲ ἔστι μὲν ἀεὶ τὸ γιγνῶσκον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ καλόν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔστι δὲ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, οὔ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα ὅμοια ὄντα, ἃ νῦν ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, ῥοῇ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ φορᾷ*). He expressly warns his disciples that the beautiful is not the same as a beautiful face, since the beautiful face can change, while the beautiful remains always the same (439 D: *αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν τοιοῦτον ἀεί ἐστιν οἷόν ἐστιν*). If it did not remain the same, we could not even name it or think of it.

Material things are not true Being. Only general notions or the knowing subject exist really.

The negative determination of the substance as different from particular things leaves open the inquiry whether this substance has an ideal or a real existence. The beautiful might be independent of our own individual reason, and might still exist only in some personal reason, being a necessary form of thought, as has been admitted by Kant. Or the beautiful might have a separate existence as a power independent of any personal

Substance determined negatively.

being, the origin and cause not only of all beautiful particular things, but also of our personal notion of the beautiful.

No trace of substantial ideas in the *Cratylus*.

If we look at all the places in the *Cratylus* where the existence of an idea is postulated, we find in none of them any hint as to whether Plato in writing this dialogue was aware of the above alternative and whether he had already made a choice between the two possible answers to the question in which manner the substance of things exists. In every passage where he uses the words *εἶδος*, *ἰδέα* or similar expressions (as 389 D: *αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἔστιν*, 389 A: *τοιοῦτόν τι ὃ πέφυκε*) we can render them by 'notion,' 'form,' 'idea,' and we need not have recourse to the supposition that Plato had already imagined a world of self-existing ideas, as in his later teaching.

Further investigation invited.

He is very cautious in taking his first steps in logic, and he confesses that the definitive solution of these problems is very difficult (440 C), but he exhorts his readers to investigate courageously and well, and not to desist from that investigation (440 D). He seems to promise further exposition, because Socrates and Cratylus at the end of the dialogue mutually advise each other to consider the matter. This is in perfect accordance with the position of this dialogue as introductory to Plato's special logical studies.

Allusions to earlier exposition uncertain, and could not refer to *Phaedrus* or *Theaetetus*.

Use of the words

The necessity of a substance of things, as the true object of knowledge, is here alluded to as dreamt of many times (439 C: *πολλάκις ὀνειρώττω*). Some interpreters have inferred that this implies earlier expositions of the same problem, and have accordingly placed the *Cratylus* after other dialogues, as for instance Pfleiderer [177] held it to be 'indubitable' that the *Phaedrus* and even *Theaetetus* preceded the *Cratylus*. But we must be cautious in such inferences, because Plato did not look upon his works as a continuous series

[177] E. Pfleiderer, *Socrates und Plato*, Tübingen 1896, p. 318 *sqq*.

of handbooks, in which each presupposes all that precede. An allusion to frequent discussions on a particular subject may refer much more probably to Plato's oral teaching than to his previous works. The use of *οὐσία* in the meaning of the true substance of a thing as opposed to its appearance is not found in the ethical dialogues preceding the *Cratylus*, and appears here for the first time.[178] It cannot easily be taken in the later meaning of a transcendental idea, because the only marks of substance here insisted upon are its permanence, and its difference from appearance and opinion. Both can be predicated of concepts of our mind, and when Plato began to understand something else by an idea, he said so expressly in quite different terms. If anybody from the mention of the form of a shuttle (389 B: *εἶδος κερκίδος*) infers that Plato in the *Cratylus* admitted ideas of manufactured articles, then of course he would find the Platonic theory of ideas already in Thucydides. But in the light of an impartial interpretation, the theory of ideas is only prepared in the *Cratylus*, not yet formulated.[179]

εἶδος and *ἰδέα* not technical.

The power of the dialectician, assumed in the *Euthydemus*, is again asserted in the *Cratylus*. The dialectician, however, is here defined as 'he who knows how to ask and to answer questions' (390 C: *ὁ ἐρωτᾶν ἐπιστάμενος καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι*); this definition is not given here as something new, but as well known and

The dialectician directs the creation of new words.

[178] Peipers (*Ontologia Platonica*, p. 67) quotes some passages from earlier dialogues, where according to him *οὐσία* refers to ideas, but on consideration, in all these passages another meaning is obvious. *Euthyph.* 11 A *οὐσία ὁσίου* = definition of holiness (Jowett: essence); *Charm.* 168 D *οὐσία* = nature (Jowett) or quality; *Protag.* 349 B *οὐσία (ὀνόματος) καὶ πρᾶγμα* = object and thing (Jowett: 'essence and thing'); *Meno* 72 B *οὐσία μελίττης* = definition of a bee (Jowett: nature of a bee); *Gorg.* 472 B *ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας* (Jowett: inheritance). In none of these passages is *οὐσία* opposed to appearance, as in the *Cratylus* and in many later works.

[179] That the *Cratylus* is introductory to the theory of ideas has been also recognised by Susemihl (see note 54), who observed that the words *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* have in all passages of the *Cratylus* whenever they occur the meaning of 'species,' 'kind,' 'form,' but not the later meaning of Platonic ideas (*Genetische Entwickelung*, vol. i. p. 161).

recognised, though it had not been given in any earlier work of Plato. In the *Euthydemus*, the only earlier dialogue where the dialectician is mentioned, the term was also assumed as known, and it may have been used by Socrates, as it occurs in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. But here the privilege of the dialectician to judge every kind of knowledge is extended also to the art of creating words. The maker of words has to recognise as his master the dialectician (390 D: *νομοθέτου ἔργον ὄνομα, ἐπιστάτην ἔχοντος διαλεκτικὸν ἄνδρα*), and here Plato is clearly conscious of his dialectical superiority over contemporary philologers, and, as he expressly states, over the sophists (391 C) and poets (391 D–393 B).

First elements of everything must be first explained. Natural divisions of things.

Related to this is the demand that the first elements of everything must be explained unless the whole is to remain unexplained; which is here applied to the origin of language (426 A: *περὶ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων . . μάλιστά τε καὶ καθαρώτατα δεῖ ἔχειν ἀποδεῖξαι, ἢ εὖ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τά γε ὕστερα ἤδη φλυαρήσει*). Things have their natural divisions, according to which we must divide them if we do not wish to err (387 A: *κατὰ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τέμνειν τε καὶ τέμνεσθαι καὶ ᾧ πέφυκε*). Things are as they are, according to their own nature (386 E: *καθ' αὑτὰ πρὸς τὴν αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ᾗπερ πέφυκεν*) and not according to our imaginations (386 E: *οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ἑλκόμενα ἄνω καὶ κάτω τῷ ἡμετέρῳ φαντάσματι*), which produce error and wrong belief as opposed to truth (385 B). Against those who pretended that error is impossible (429 D) Plato shows the origin of error in the incompetent use of language. Words are instruments (388 A: *ὄργανον*) of thought, for educational purposes and for logical distinctions (388 C: *διδασκαλικὸν καὶ διακριτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας*); they imitate things (430 B: *ὄνομα μίμημα τοῦ πράγματος*) as their symbols (433 B: *δήλωμα συλλαβαῖς καὶ γράμμασι πράγματος*, also 435 B), and yet are not always similar to them (432 D), because a good word-maker is the rarest of all artisans (389 A:

Origin of error in the wrong use of language: it is the privilege of the dialectician to use words

δημιουργῶν σπανιώτατος), and if he does not work after the dialectician's directions, he may have named things not according to their nature (432 E). The competent use of right words is the dialectician's privilege (390 C) and those who do not possess the dialectical power are liable to employ words in a manner contrary to their intention, whence mistakes arise (431 B). Thus truth differs from falsehood (385 B). The worst source of error is self-deception, because the deceiver never abandons the deceived (428 D) and makes him disagree with himself (433 B: cf. *Gorg.* 482 B).

in the proper way.

Here Plato confirms what he said in the *Gorgias* about contradiction as the mark of error, and consistency as the condition of truth. Truth is found in the unity and similarity of things (438 E: *μαθεῖν* (*τὰ ὄντα*) . . . *δι' ἀλλήλων, εἴ πῃ ξυγγενῆ ἐστιν, καὶ αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν*). What method should be used for ascertaining truth Plato declines to explain (439 B: *μεῖζον ἴσως ἐστὶν ἐγνωκέναι ἢ κατ' ἐμὲ καὶ σέ*), but he insists that knowledge is not to be gathered from words (439 B: *ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὁμολογήσασθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἐξ ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ μαθητέον καὶ ζητητέον*), for the first word-maker, if he named things according to their nature, must have had a knowledge of them not gained through words (438 B).

Consistency a condition of truth.

Plato thus claims for his philosophical pursuit the authority to judge about the propriety of words (425 A), to change their meaning and to make new words according to the requirements of his dialectic. He has largely used that liberty in his later works, whereas but few new words occur in the Socratic dialogues. The *Cratylus* proclaims the philosopher's independence of and power over language. Faithful to the *a priori* character of his knowledge, Plato despises statistics (437 D) and inferences from a majority of cases. He wants a sound basis and beginning for each theory (436 D: *δεῖ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς παντὸς πράγματος παντὶ ἀνδρὶ τὸν πολὺν λόγον εἶναι καὶ*

Philosopher's independence of language, and power over language.

τὴν πολλὴν σκέψιν) and betrays his geometrical predilections by adducing the familiar analogy of a small error unnoticed in the commencement of a geometrical construction (436 D: διαγραμμάτων ἐνίοτε τοῦ πρώτου σμικροῦ καὶ ἀδήλου ψεύδους γενομένου, τὰ λοιπὰ πάμπολλα ἤδη ὄντα ἑπόμενα ὁμολογεῖν ἀλλήλοις). He does not recognise a reference to divine origin as an explanation of anything, comparing it with the introduction of gods on the dramatic stage, when no better solution is forthcoming (425 D), and calling it a clever evasion of the duty of giving reasons and proofs (426 A). Still, the religious spirit of the *Gorgias* is not extinct, and God remains free from human contradictions (438 C), while the future life is assumed as a matter of course (403 D), with the addition, that it is dominated by philosophy (404 A).

Divine origin of language not accepted as sufficient explanation.

It is curious, however, to see that this increasing confidence in the power of dialectic and philosophy seems to fail him in the concrete problems with which he is chiefly concerned in the *Cratylus*. The avowed purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain the origin of language, and the discussion, not invariably quite serious, of many etymologies ends in a compromise between two conflicting theories. As a result of the *Cratylus* we must recognise the view that there is a certain natural phonetic expression of thoughts, but that this is adulterated through the word-maker's errors, which remain in the language by tacit consent of the people speaking any dialect. Both extreme theories of language, as the result of an agreement, or as a product of divine inspiration, are here repudiated. Plato in this dialogue employs a method very familiar to the readers of his later writings, consisting in beginning a discussion with some secondary topic, and passing from this to a deeper consideration of some problem not thought of at the outset. Here the question of the origin of language is a pretext leading to the metaphysical distinction between substance and appearance, and identifying the substance of a thing with the object of true knowledge.

The special problem here brought forward is not decided. Only extremes repudiated.

This is a logical investigation, widely different from the simpler ethical inquiries which pervade the Socratic dialogues.

Logical consistency explained by a geometrical analogy.

The importance of the *Cratylus* as a first chapter in Platonic logic has not been always recognised. Plato has even been supposed to imply that consistency is no test of truth (Jowett, i. 263). This inference is based on the passage in which Plato explains by a geometrical analogy the possibility of concealing an initial error of reasoning beneath a subsequent 'enforced' consistency (436 D: *τὸ πρῶτον σφαλεὶς ὁ τιθέμενος τἆλλα ἤδη πρὸς τοῦτ' ἐβιάζετο καὶ ξυμφωνεῖν ἠνάγκαζεν*). Such an artificial and only apparent consistency was clearly distinguished by Plato from true self-consistency, which had been proclaimed already in the *Gorgias* (482 B: *οὔ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις*) as a test of truth, and is again used as such a test in the *Cratylus* (433 B: *εἰ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα ἐρεῖς, οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσει συμφωνεῖν σαυτῷ*). The familiar example of a wrong consistency was adduced only in order to show the decisive importance of the first principles in every science (436 D). The ideal consistency required by philosophy is not expected by Plato to be found in a language (435 C), though he affirmed that language to be the most beautiful in which the greatest consistency reigned (435 D). To build such an ideal language by creating a philosophical terminology was a task which Plato subsequently undertook in part, but which he almost ridiculed when he wrote the *Cratylus* (433 E; cf. *Polit.* 261 E: *μὴ σπουδάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι*).

Only artificial and wrong consistency is not a test of truth.

Ideal consistency not found in language.

The *Cratylus* has been esteemed by many commen-

The *Cratylus*, a literary masterpiece comparable in its originality to the *Parmenides*, was held by the successors of Plato in an esteem attested by the commentary of Proklos,[180] and has up to the present day exercised the perspicacity of numerous commentators, as can be seen

[180] *Ex Procli scholiis in Cratylum Platonis excerpta e. codd. edit.* J. F. Boissonade, Lipsiae 1820.

tators, and its authenticity certain.

from the writings of Dittrich,[181] Benfey,[182] Hayduck,[183] Rosenstock,[184] Heath,[185] P. Meyer,[186] and Bonitz[187] on this dialogue. What Schaarschmidt (p. 245 sqq.) said against the authenticity of the *Cratylus* has been sufficiently refuted by Alberti,[188] Lehrs,[189] Luckow,[190] Dreykorn,[191] and H. Schmidt,[192] so that even Huit (ii. p. 187), who popularised in France Schaarschmidt's doubts as to many other dialogues, thought it advisable to dissent in this respect from his master, and to defend the authenticity of the *Cratylus*.

Etymologies quoted to a great extent justified by the state of linguistic knowledge

One of the grounds alleged by Schaarschmidt, the apparent absurdity of the etymologies proposed, has been explained by Schäublin,[193] who compared these etymologies with other evidence about the knowledge of etymology accessible to Plato, and found that among 120 etymologies attempted by Plato over sixty were perfectly justified according to the knowledge of his times, and twenty stand even the test of our present knowledge of Greek. Schäublin has also carefully compared the

[181] E. M. Dittrich, *De Cratylo Platonis*, Berolini 1841.

[182] T. Benfey, *Ueber die Aufgabe des platonischen Dialogs Cratylus*, Göttingen 1866.

[183] W. Hayduck, *De Cratyli Platonici fine et consilio*, Vratislaviae 1868.

[184] P. E. Rosenstock, *Platos Cratylus und die Sprachphilosophie der Neuzeit*, Strassburg 1893.

[185] D. Heath, 'On Plato's Cratylus,' in the *Journ. of Philol.* for 1888, vol. xvii. p. 192.

[186] P. Meyer, *Quaestiones Platonicae*, Leipzig 1889, pp. 12-25.

[187] Bonitz, 'Ueber Platos Cratylus,' *Monatsber. Berliner Akadem.* 1869, p. 703.

[188] Alberti, 'Ist der dem Plato zugeschriebene Dialog Cratylus acht?' in *Rheinisches Museum*, vol. xxi. p. 180 *sqq.*, and vol. xxii. p. 477 *sqq.* 1866–67.

[189] Lehrs in *Rheinisches Museum*, vol. xxii. p. 436, 1867.

[190] R. Luckow, *De Platonis Cratylo*, Treptow 1868.

[191] Dreykorn, *Der Kratylus ein Dialog Platos*, Zweibrücken 1869.

[192] H. Schmidt, *Platos Kratylus im Zusammenhange dargestellt*, Halle 1869, an excellent commentary.

[193] F. Schäublin, *Ueber den platonischen Dialog Kratylos*, Basel 1891. The same subject had been treated very differently by C. Lenormant (*Commentaire sur le Cratyle de Platon*, 316 pp., Athènes 1861), in his voluminous edition and commentary.

etymologies given in the *Cratylus* with other etymologies occasionally indicated by Plato, and he demonstrates their similarity and good faith against Steinthal[194] who believed all the etymologies given in the *Cratylus* to be arbitrary.

in Plato's times

Competent writers disagree widely as to the date of the *Cratylus*. Even C. Ritter, notwithstanding his stylistic observations, believed it possible for the *Cratylus* to have been written before the death of Socrates, as has been thought also by the poet Gray,[195] by Socher, Stallbaum, and others. This opinion is opposed by those who believe the *Cratylus* to be later than the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*, as for example by Ast, and in recent times by Peipers and Bergk. The style would (see above, p. 168) place this dialogue clearly between the *Gorgias* and *Phaedo*, and the logical contents also point to the same result, the *Cratylus* being introductory to the logical theories of the *Phaedo*, while presupposing the conclusion of ethical inquiries summed up in the *Gorgias*. Some other hints confirm the position here given to the *Cratylus* as the first logical work subsequent to the complete series of ethical dialogues. Dümmler[196] observes that the allusion (433 A) to the early closing of the gates in Aegina presupposes a time of peace in which Athenians and more especially Plato's students could make excursions to the neighbouring town. But such a time of peaceable intercourse between Athens and Aegina was not possible, so Dümmler thinks, before the peace of Antalcidas, or 387 B.C. The *Cratylus* must then have been written later, after Plato's return from his

The date of the *Cratylus* has been differently determined. Mention of Aegina gives a useful indication.

[194] Steinthal, *Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen and Römern*, Berlin 1862.

[195] Thomas Gray, *Notes on Plato*, in vol. iv. pp. 67–338 of the Works, edited by E. Gosse, London 1884 (first published 1814), p. 164, calls the *Cratylus* 'the least considerable' of the works of Plato.

[196] Dümmler, *Chronologische Beiträge zu einigen platonischen Dialogen aus den Reden des Isokrates*, Basel 1890, p. 48; Christ, *Platonische Studien*, p. 8, made it probable that Plato had money transactions in Aegina.

first voyage to Sicily, and also after his captivity in Aegina,—if the story of this captivity is true.

Hellenes and foreign nations spoken of as equal, as in later dialogues. This seems to imply that the *Cratylus* was written after Plato's voyages, perhaps at the beginning of his teaching activity.

Another confirmation of this view is given by the impartiality with which Plato treats foreign nations in the *Cratylus* as equal to the Greeks (383 A: *ὀρθότητα ὀνομάτων καὶ* "Ελλησι *καὶ βαρβάροις τὴν αὐτὴν ἅπασιν* . . . . 390 A: *τὸν νομοθέτην τόν τε ἐνθάδε καὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις* . . . . 425 E: *εἰσὶ δὲ ἡμῶν ἀρχαιότεροι βάρβαροι*, see also 385 E, 390 C, 409 E). This conception remains unchanged in many later works, as the *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*, *Theaetetus*, *Politicus*, *Timaeus*, while it is opposed to the narrow Greek and even Athenian patriotism, shown in the *Protagoras*, in which Athens is called the seat of wisdom (*Prot.* 337 D: *πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας*) by the non-Athenian Hippias. In the *Gorgias* Athens is praised as the place in Hellas where the greatest freedom of speech is to be found (461 E: *Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν*), without any mention of foreign countries, such as occurs repeatedly in the *Cratylus*, whenever the whole of Greece or the Greeks are named. This frequent mention of foreign nations in the *Cratylus* seems to belong to a time when the horizon of Plato's experience had been considerably enlarged by his travels abroad, while the subject of the origin of Greek language, generalised into the inquiry about the origin of human speech and the relation of thought to it, would seem to have been specially debated in Plato's school. The moral problems discussed in the preceding dialogues were inherited from Socrates, though their solution in the *Gorgias* is already Platonic: the problem of language as a source of knowledge has been attributed to Antisthenes,[197] and the peculiar proof that philosophic truth is independent of

[197] The very uncertain allusions of the *Cratylus* to this philosopher are treated by Dümmler, *Akademika*, pp. 148–161; K. Barlen, *Antisthenes und Plato*, Progr. Neuwied 1881; K. Urban, *Ueber die Erwähnungen der Philosophie des Antisthenes in den platonischen Schriften*, Königsberg 1882

language, contained in the *Cratylus*, is a worthy inauguration of Plato's own philosophical career, in which he was distinguished from all predecessors by his power over language as an external instrument for conveying thought. Plato, the great word-maker, could not better begin his new philosophy than by this inquiry into the relation between thought and speech. The counterpart of this, the inauguration of Plato's logic, is to be found in the *Symposium*, where the philosopher was led to a new vision of truth as consisting in eternal and self-existent, independent ideas, those Platonic 'ideas' which have been accepted by so many readers as the quintessence of Platonism.

II. *The Symposium.*

(Relative affinity to the latest group, measured on the *Laws* as unity, = 0·14; see above, p. 169.)

Chief subject of the *Symposium* love, but a new kind of love, leading to knowledge.

Nearly every other work of Plato admitted of discussion as to the author's purpose and the chief contents. The *Symposium*, however, is distinguished by a clear announcement of its aim, and deals apparently only with one subject, love, teaching the first lesson of that new feeling discovered by Plato and in its first stage known even to-day as Platonic by some people who know nothing else of Plato. It would appear that in this lesson of love no room could be left for logic. But Plato, who is at once a great poet and a great logician, initiates us into the mystery of his first logical discovery through this triumphant poem of victorious love. It is love, he says, that leads to the highest knowledge of truth. But not the love of a single person, however pure, nor the love of a single city, be it the greatest on earth, nor the love of a single science. There is far above all these feelings a new and powerful love, difficult to understand even for Socrates, who has heretofore been represented as the wisest of men. The explanation of this feeling, expressed by nobody before Plato, he puts

For the first time Socrates is supplanted by another teacher, but not a historical person.

poetically in the mouth of a woman. This woman, Diotima of Mantinea, is invented by Plato, though he gives her an historic appearance by the assertion that through her prayers she preserved the Athenians from the plague. If she had been, as Plato makes his readers believe, a well-known and inspired priestess, Thucydides could not have failed to mention her. But no Greek writer[198] before Plato knows anything about a Diotima of Mantinea, and all later mentions of her are based on the *Symposium*.

Diotima unknown to Thucydides: probably invented by Plato in order to give apparent historical authority to his own teaching.

We may therefore assume that the new theory, here ascribed to Diotima, is Plato's own invention. For the first time in all Plato's dialogues, Socrates ceases to be the sole teacher of wisdom, and Plato unmistakably implies that his new wisdom may be above the understanding even of his teacher (210 A: *ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἂν σὺ μυηθείης· τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά, ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς μετίῃ, οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ οἷός τ' ἂν εἴης . . . . πειρῶ ἕπεσθαι, ἂν οἷός τε ᾖς*). He clearly hesitates to expose the treasure found in solitary meditation to the unprepared adherents of vulgar love. He apologises repeatedly for the admitted obscurity of his teaching (201 D: *πειράσομαι διελθεῖν . . . , ὅπως ἂν δύνωμαι.* 204 D: *πειράσομαι διδάξαι . . . σαφέστερον ἐρῶ* (also 206 C) . . . 206 B: *μαντείας δεῖται ὅ τί ποτε λέγεις . . .* 207 C: *μὴ θαύμαζε* (also 208 B) 210 A: *ἐρῶ μὲν οὖν καὶ προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω . . .* 210 E: *πειρῶ δέ μοι τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα*). It is evident that the new-found knowledge is looked upon as far more important than anything which has been said in earlier dialogues. Like a precious gem, it is set in the poetical gold of the *Symposium*—the most consummate work of art which even Plato's genius has produced.

New theory

If we ask wherein consists the new logical knowledge

[198] The unhistorical character of Diotima was made evident by Hermann, *De Socratis magistris et disciplina juvenili*, Marburg 1837, p. 12 *sqq.*

immortalised by the *Symposium*, we see it condensed in a few pages of the highest eloquence, which may be read as a record of personal experience, and as the result of the long previous development of Greek art. Lévêque[199] in France and Cohen[200] in Germany have noticed the near relation between the origin of Plato's theory of ideas and this preceding growth of Greek art. What Plato says about his discovery amounts to this: if somebody grows accustomed to generalisations and to the progress from particulars to general notions, then, at a certain moment of his life, he will become suddenly (210 E: *ἐξαίφνης*) aware of the existence of the general idea as something which does not depend upon particulars, but is the true origin of all particular qualities. This sudden vision, here pictured with the natural delight of a first discovery, is the aim of all intellectual development (211 A: *τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο οὗ δὴ ἕνεκα καὶ οἱ ἔμπροσθεν πάντες πόνοι ἦσαν*), a marvellous beauty (210 E: *θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν*) leading to every kind of virtue and to the immortality of man (212 A: *τεκόντι ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ θρεψαμένῳ ὑπάρχει θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι, καὶ εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων, ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ*).

of ideas based on the preceding growth of Greek art.

The idea as the cause of particulars.

What kind of existence the idea of the beautiful possesses is difficult to express in human language, according to Plato's own confession. But this existence was clearly meant by Plato, when he wrote the *Symposium*, to be a solution of the problem of substance proposed in the *Cratylus*. In that dialogue he limited his indications as to the substance of things to a few

Existence of ideas difficult to explain. It is independent of opinions and appearances.

[199] Carolus Lévêque, *Quid Phidiae Plato debuerit*, Parisiis 1852, p. 60: 'Quaecumque Plato de pulchritudine scripsit . . . haec in Phidiae deorum vultu expressa et ut ita dicam sculpta invenerit, ita tamen ut ad intelligendum penitus Phidiae ingenium ingenio Platonis opus fuerit. Ab illo qua via ad summae pulchritudinis ideam perveniatur didicit.'

[200] Hermann Cohen, 'Die platonische Ideenlehre, psychologisch entwickelt,' in vol. iv. pp. 403–464 of *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, Berlin 1866, p. 418: 'Platos That wie sein Geist wächst hervor aus dem gemeinsamen Samen der hellenischen Weltarbeit.'

determinations, such as permanence and objectivity. Now he has 'suddenly' perceived a beauty not only eternal (211 A: *ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθῖνον*) and objective, but also absolute, that is, independent of time and space, and of concrete appearances as well as individual opinions (*οὐ τῇ μὲν καλόν, τῇ δ' αἰσχρόν, οὐδὲ τοτὲ μέν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, οὔδ' ἔνθα μὲν καλόν, ἔνθα δὲ αἰσχρόν*). It is natural that Plato, being himself an artist and living in an age when art had reached an ideal perfection, should formulate this first assertion of a self-existent absolute idea with reference to the idea of beauty. He saw the distance between all human models and such a creation of art as the Olympian Zeus of Phidias. He imagined that even the most perfect work of art is only a particular instance of the ideal beauty, which he did not claim to perceive with the mortal eye, but with the divine insight of an enthusiastic soul. He recommends his readers to acquire this superior faculty of intellectual intuition by exercise in generalisation. He says clearly that the idea is not only immaterial (211 A: *οὐδ' αὖ φανταασθήσεται αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν οἷον πρόσωπόν τι οὐδὲ χεῖρες οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὧν σῶμα μετέχει*) but not even intellectual (211 A: *οὐδέ τις λόγος, οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη, οὐδέ που ὂν ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινί, οἷον ἐν ζῴῳ ἢ ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἢ ἔν τῳ ἄλλῳ*), nor inherent in the soul as a notion, nor in anything else. Here we have an evident indication that Cohen's[201] doubts as to the separate existence of Platonic ideas, however justified with reference to other works, are inadmissible so far as concerns the *Symposium*, and the idea of Beauty, the first discovered by Plato and the only idea spoken of in

The idea is more perfect than a work of art.

Intuition of ideas is acquired by exercise in generalisations.

[201] H. Cohen, *Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik*, Marburg 1879, p. 9: 'Diese Auffassung des *χωρισμός* ist einmal des Aristoteles eigenste verantwortliche That. Ob wir sie hätten, ob Jemand aus den Platonischen Dialogen sie herausgelesen haben würde, wenn Aristoteles sie nicht als die legitime gelehrt und—unerschrocken verhöhnt hätte, das darf wenigstens bezweifelt werden.'

the *Symposium*. This idea is certainly not immanent, but separated from concrete things. The relation of single beautiful things to the idea of beauty is expressed here by the word *μετέχειν*, not used in any earlier dialogue to express the relation of a particular thing[202] to a general notion. It means that all beautiful things owe their beauty to the idea of Beauty. This idea is not here called *εἶδος* or *ἰδέα*, but is named 'the beautiful' (211 B · *τὸ καλόν*). It is self-existent, needs nothing else to enable it to exist eternally (211 B: *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μεθ' αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν*), and Plato has invented the term *μονοειδές*, first used in the *Symposium*, to mark its simplicity. According to modern terminology Platonic Beauty is then a simple substance, the original cause of all individual beauty, suffering no alteration through its action on the particular things, to which it imparts its own quality, though in a lesser degree.

The idea of Beauty is the source of all beautiful things, exists eternally, being subject to no changes in its simplicity.

Plato admits this ideal Beauty to be an object of science and knowledge (211 C: *μάθημα*), but he leaves it uncertain whether he pretends to know it as it really is, or only as it appears to him. When, however, he

Ideas as objects of knowledge apparently

[202] This term in *Symp.* 211 B is paraphrased rather than translated by Jowett in the words: 'Beauty absolute . . . which . . . *is imparted* to the ever growing and perishing beauties of all other things.' *μετέχειν* meaning the relation of things to ideas is used for the first time in the *Symposium*, while in earlier works it had the current meaning with which it is found in other authors, translated (Jowett) by 'share in' (*Prot.* 322 D, 323 A, virtue and other arts), 'take part in' (conversation, *Euthyd.* 271 B, danger, 279 E), 'are intermediate between' (philosophy and politics, *Euthyd.* 306 A B), 'is proficient' (in an art, *Gorg.* 448 C), 'partake' (of good and evil, *Gorg.* 467 E). The technical meaning of *μετέχειν* as designating the relation of things to ideas is limited almost entirely to the *Symposium* and *Phaedo* (100 C, 101 C, cf. *Rep.* v. 476 D), while in the *Parmenides* (where the abstract noun *μέθεξις* also occurs) it is mentioned and criticised. In other dialogues *μετέχειν* is used in the ordinary meaning (as for instance *Rep.* 432 B, 455 D, 465 E, 520 B, &c.; *Phaedr.* 247 B, 249 E, 272 D; *Phil.* 11 C, 54 B, 56 C; *Tim.* 27 C, 53 C, 58 E; *Legg.* 721 D, 755 A, 963 E, &c.). The peculiar use of *μετέχειν* in the *Sophist* (as 251 E) to mark the relation between two general notions is quite different from the meaning of a participation of things in ideas. An alternative term for *μετέχειν* is *μεταλαμβάνειν*. Cf. Jowett and Campbell, *Rep.* vol. ii. p. 309.

identical with our subjective notions.

speaks of exercise, as enabling us to improve our sight of absolute Beauty (211 B: *ὅταν . . . ἐπανιὼν ἐκεῖνο τὸ καλὸν ἄρχηται καθορᾶν, σχεδὸν ἄν τι ἅπτοιτο τοῦ τέλους*), we must infer that he allowed the possibility of an immediate intuition of absolute Beauty as it is, without subjective error. He did not yet see the peculiar difficulties of such a position.

Knowledge remains right opinion based on grounds or sufficient reason, in the *Symposium* like in the *Meno*.

Though Plato in the *Symposium* thus presents a new object of knowledge, he seems not to have progressed as to the definition of knowledge itself beyond the distinction given in the *Meno*, according to which knowledge differs from right opinion by the reasons which we are bound to give when we know something. Here he recalls this distinction:

Meno 98 A: *δόξαι ἀληθεῖς . . . οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ. ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθῶσιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι· . . . . καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστίν, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ. . . . .*

Symposium 202 A: *τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι, οὔτε ἐπίστασθαί ἐστιν· ἄλογον γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη; οὔτε ἀμαθία· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος τυγχάνον πῶς ἂν εἴη ἀμαθία; ἔστιν δὲ δή που τοιοῦτον ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα, μεταξὺ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας.*

If right opinion without reasons is not knowledge, yet knowledge might still be for a modern logician something else than right opinion with reasons for it, but if Plato had changed his view of the nature of knowledge expressed in the *Meno*, he could not conceal it here, because every unprejudiced reader infers that knowledge, not being right opinion without reasons, is right opinion based on reasons, as had been stated expressly in the *Meno*, and denied only much later in the *Theaetetus*.

Distinction between Wisdom and Philosophy common to

A fresh point is gained in the distinction between wisdom and philosophy, which is repeated later in the *Phaedrus*, and here founded on the etymology of the name 'philosopher,' as one who desires wisdom and therefore does not yet possess it. It is noteworthy that even in the etymologies of the *Cratylus* Plato did not allude to this new meaning of 'philosophy,' which is

first explained in the *Symposium* (203 E: *θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι· ἔστι γάρ· οὐδ' εἴ τις ἄλλος σοφός, οὐ φιλοσοφεῖ*). This exaltation of a wisdom above philosophy, which in the *Euthydemus* and *Gorgias* was still the highest science, corresponds to the new power of intuition of Beauty, which is placed above all other knowledge. Plato became conscious of the limitations of that purely ethical knowledge of which he was so proud in the *Gorgias*. He felt an artistic longing for a perfection beyond pure logical investigation and reasoned knowledge, even beyond knowledge based on full consciousness of all reasons. He was thus led to this almost unthinkable conception of absolute Beauty.

Symposium and *Phaedrus*.

Another consequence of the new idealism is the change of position as to personal immortality. It is not clearly denied, at least for the philosopher (212 A), but the religious faith as laid down in the *Gorgias* has been converted into a pantheistic view according to which immortality consists in the eternal reproduction of the same ideal form (208 A: *τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ πᾶν τὸ θνητὸν σῴζεται, οὐ τῷ παντάπασιν τὸ αὐτὸν ἀεὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸ ἀπιὸν καὶ παλαιούμενον ἕτερον νέον ἐγκαταλείπειν οἷον αὐτὸ ἦν*, cf. *Legg.* 721 C).

Different view of immortality in *Gorgias* and *Symposium*.

This renovation of particulars is applied even to knowledge (208 A: *πολὺ δὲ ἀτοπώτερον ἔτι, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι μὴ ὅτι αἱ μὲν γίγνονται, αἱ δὲ ἀπόλλυνται ἡμῖν, καὶ οὐδέποτε οἱ αὐτοί ἐσμεν οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μία ἑκάστη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ταὐτὸν πάσχει*). Exercise keeps knowledge apparently the same, yet constantly renewed, and creates new knowledge which seems to be the same as that which we had before (208 A: *μελέτη πάλιν καινὴν ἐμποιοῦσα ἀντὶ τῆς ἀπιούσης σῴζει τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥστε τὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν εἶναι*). This surprises Plato himself more than the exchange of elements in the body, and it seems to contradict the identity of knowledge admitted in the *Gorgias*. But the contradiction is only apparent, as the identity referred to the objective know-

Peculiar view of intellectual exercise compared with renovation of matter.

ledge, and the successive substitutions are attributed to the individual. It was a consequence of the growing admiration of Plato for knowledge, that at this stage the subject disappeared as compared with the object, which became the only true reality. Thus was founded the system of idealism, known as the Platonic theory of ideas. In the *Symposium* it appears as a first attempt and is limited to the idea of Beauty.

Literary merits of the *Symposium*.

This logical importance of the *Symposium* has been little noticed up to the present time, being overshadowed by its literary perfection. Such poets as Racine [203] and Shelley [204] have attempted to render it in modern language, and many editors and commentators have spent their leisure on the text.[205]

Date of the *Symposium* 385 B.C., almost

There is an almost general agreement as to the date of the *Symposium*, the mention of the recent partition of Mantinea, which occurred 385 B.C., being admitted as a sufficient indication that the dialogue cannot have been written much later.[206] This conclusion was suffi-

[203] *Le Banquet de Platon*, trad. par J. Racine, Mme de Rochechouart et Victor Cousin, Paris 1868; also in *Œuvres de J. Racine*, ed. L. Aimé Martin, Paris 1844, vol. v. pp. 95–186. Racine's translation extends only up to the speech of Eryximachus.

[204] Percy Bysshe Shelley, *The Banquet of Plato*, London 1887 (first ed. 1840). Shelley held the *Symposium* to be 'the most beautiful and perfect' among the works of Plato.

[205] Besides modern editions of F. A. Wolf (Lipsiae 1782, also 1828), Ast (Landshut 1809), P. A. Reynders (Groningae 1825), L. J. Rückert (Lipsiae 1829), A. Hommel (Lipsiae 1834), de Sinner (Paris 1834), Jahn (Bonn 1864, re-edited by Usener, Bonn 1875), C. Badham (London 1866), G. F. Rettig (Halle 1875–76), it is worth noticing that the *Symposium* (ed. Salamanca 1553) was the first Greek publication of the famous Salamanca University Press. An extensive commentary on the *Symposium* was written already by the second French translator Loys Le Roy (*Le Sympose de Platon*, Paris 1559), who omitted the discourse of Alcibiades as too indecent for his French readers of the sixteenth century! The first translation was *Le Banquet de Platon*, trad. par M. Heret, Paris 1556, a beautiful specimen of typography.

[206] However, Plato sometimes refers with a νεωστί to events over twenty years old, as for instance in the *Gorg.* 503 c the death of Pericles is called recent (νεωστί), while from *Gorg.* 473 B it results, that the conversation between Gorgias and Socrates is assumed to have taken place 405 B.C. or twenty-four

ciently established in the last century by F. A. Wolf and has been successfully defended[207] against some attempts at another interpretation.[208] The mention of this event comes out so naturally that it cannot be regarded as a later interpolation added by the author or by his copyists. But it would still leave it open whether the *Symposium* was written in the same year or some years later, because for any contemporary reader an historical fact which occurred four or five years ago is still quite recent. Other considerations, however, make even the year 385 B.C. seem a late date for the *Symposium*, so that there is no probability in favour of a later time. The chief reason which makes it improbable that Plato could have written the *Symposium* much after 385 B.C. is the great number of works which, as our further inquiry will show, are later than the *Symposium*, and which also must be earlier than the change characterising the latest stage of Plato's authorship. On the other hand, the number of works which precede the *Symposium* is very small for the space of fifteen years since the death of Socrates. Admitting the *Euthydemus* to have been written about 390 B.C., as has been made very probable by Spengel, Teichmüller, Sudhaus, and Dümmler, we have for the five following years only the *Gorgias* and the *Cratylus*, which is not much for a gifted author about the age of forty and at the height of his literary power. This

unanimously accepted on account of a well-known anachronism.

Great number of works later than the *Symposium*.

Small number of larger works preceding it.

years after the death of Pericles. But in referring to a time so far back Plato is careless of the exact dates.

[207] Besides Wolf in his edition of the *Symposium* (1782), also J. Spiller (*De temporibus Convivii Platonici*, Glivitti 1841), Ueberweg (*Untersuch.* p. 219), Teichmüller (ii. p. 262), L. v. Sybel (*Platons Symposion*, Marburg 1888), Kassai (*Meletemata Platonica*, p. 859, Budapest 1886), have shown that the *Symposium* must have been written about 385 B.C.

[208] A. Hommel, in his edition of this dialogue, tried to get rid of the anachronism by an emendation of the text. Dümmler believes that the reference to the partition of Mantinea might have been made also about 371, when the reunion of the separated parts of Mantinea was intended. Recently U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (*Hermes*, vol. xxxi. p. 102) suggested the dissolution of the Arcadic Union in 418 B.C. as the event alluded to by Aristophanes.

difficulty is avoided by those who place before the *Symposium* such dialogues as the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*,[209] not to speak of the dialectical works. But our subsequent exposition will prove beyond all doubt that these works must have been written after the *Symposium*. Besides, the *Symposium*, according to the very plausible reasoning of Sybel and also of Teichmüller, bears the character of having been written under the fresh impression of the successful beginning of Plato's Academy, which was probably founded in 387 B.C.

The *Symposium* as an academical programme.

Position intermediate between *Cratylus* and *Phaedo*.

Various other indications confirm the intermediate position of the *Symposium* between the *Cratylus* and *Phaedo*, after the *Gorgias* and the other Socratic dialogues. In the *Cratylus*, Plato did not advance beyond a general distinction between substance and appearance, without any close determination of substance. In the *Symposium* this determination is given in regard to the substance of Beauty in a manner which makes it very probable that Plato is for the first time announcing his discovery of absolute being. In all earlier dialogues Socratic notions were 'present' in the things, or immanent (*Charm.* 159 A : πάρεστι σωφροσύνη, *Lys.* 217 D : λευκότης, 217 E : παρουσία ἀγαθοῦ, *Euthyd.* 301 A : κάλλος, *Gorg.* 497 E, 498 D : ἀγαθῶν παρουσία) ; in the *Symposium* the higher doctrine of a participation of particulars in the idea is taught. The doctrine of pre-existence, which had been formulated in the *Meno*, is

First introduction of absolute Beauty or the idea of Beauty.

[209] If C. Huit (*Etudes sur le Banquet de Platon*, Paris 1889) believes that all competent writers agree in placing the *Phaedrus* before the *Symposium*, except Ritter and Teichmüller, he betrays his ignorance of many authors, as Suckow, Munk, Thompson, Campbell, Blass, Dittenberger, Schanz, Droste, Kugler, Gomperz, Lina, Tiemann, who all agree in placing the *Phaedrus* after the *Symposium*. It is true that against these fourteen authors, who up to the time of Huit's strange assertion held the *Symposium* to be earlier than the *Phaedrus*, many others, as for instance, Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, Steinhart, Susemihl, Ueberweg, Liebhold, Teuffel, Peipers, Windelband, Christ, Zeller, were of the contrary opinion. But majorities cannot decide such questions, and since 1889 the proportion is reversed, so that the majority of new investigators take the later date of the *Phaedrus* for granted.

here only alluded to casually in the discourse of Aristophanes.[210]

References to some earlier dialogues.

The rule laid down in the *Protagoras* (347 C) to exclude flute girls and similar artists from philosophical banquets is repeated in the *Symposium* (176 E), with the recommendation to find the best entertainment in conversation (*Prot.* 347 C: *διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλοις δι' ἑαυτῶν συνεῖναι . . . διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φωνῆς καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἑαυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας, τιμίας ποιοῦσι τὰς αὐλητρίδας*: cf. *Symp.* 176 E: *εἰσηγοῦμαι τὴν μὲν ἄρτι εἰσελθοῦσαν αὐλητρίδα χαίρειν ἐᾶν . . . ἡμᾶς δὲ διὰ λόγων ἀλλήλοις συνεῖναι*). This appears, if we compare the passages, to be said in the *Symposium* as a matter of course, while it is explained at length in the *Protagoras*. Some other references to earlier dialogues are of the same kind:

The vulgarity of examples usually quoted by Socrates defended.

Gorg. 490 E: Socrates says:—*τὸν σκυτοτόμον ἴσως μέγιστα δεῖ ὑποδήματα καὶ πλεῖστα ὑποδεδεμένον περιπατεῖν*, to which Kallikles answers: *φλυαρεῖς . . .* and *ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγεις*,—491 A: *οὐ σκυτοτόμους λέγω . . .*

Crat. 388 D: *ἆρ' οὖν πᾶς χαλκεὺς ἢ ὁ τὴν τέχνην ἔχων*, also 389 E *ἅπας χαλκεύς*. *Euthyd.* 278 D: *μή μου καταγελᾶτε*. *Gorg.* 473 E: Socrates complains of Polos, who is represented as *ἄπειρος καὶ ἀνόητος*: *ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου . . . καταγελᾶν*. *Gorg.* 512 D: *καταγέλαστός σοι ὁ ψόγος γίγνεται* refers to 484 D: (*φιλόσοφοι*) *καταγέλαστοι γίγνονται*.

Symp. 221 E: *εἰ ἐθέλοι τις τῶν Σωκράτους ἀκούειν λόγων, φανεῖεν ἂν γελοῖοι τὸ πρῶτον . . . ὄνους γὰρ . . . λέγει καὶ χαλκέας τινὰς καὶ σκυτοτόμους . . . καὶ ἀεὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεται λέγειν, ὥστε ἄπειρος καὶ ἀνόητος ἄνθρωπος πᾶς ἂν τῶν λόγων καταγελάσειεν.*

198 C: *καὶ γάρ με Γοργίου ὁ λόγος ἀνεμίμνησκεν . . . ἐφοβούμην μή μοι τελευτῶν ὁ Ἀγάθων Γοργίου κεφαλὴν δεινοῦ λέγειν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πέμψας αὐτόν με λίθον τῇ ἀφωνίᾳ ποιήσειεν· καὶ ἐνενόησα τότε ἄρα καταγέλαστος ὤν.*

Gorg. 456 B: *ἔπεισα, οὐκ ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ ἢ τῇ ῥητορικῇ.*

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[210] This seems to have been overlooked by Grote (vol. iii. p. 17) when he says that in the *Symposium* no such doctrine is found. It is important to notice this, because the entire absence of the pre-existence theory in the *Symposium* might lead to wrong chronological conclusions, at least as to the date of the *Meno*.

It seems as if the examples chosen in the *Gorgias* and *Cratylus* had provoked some critics, whom Plato answers in the *Symposium*, though the description given by Alcibiades corresponds also to the historical Socrates as represented by Xenophon.

Hellenes and Barbarians.

The mention of Hellenes and Barbarians (209 E) as equal to each other also places the *Symposium* above the *Gorgias*, and on a level with the *Cratylus*.

Relation to Isocrates' *Busiris* made probable by Teichmüller; this confirms our conclusions.

Teichmüller (I. p. 120) made it very probable that the *Symposium* must be later than Isocrates' *Busiris*, in which we read (222 C) that nobody except Polycrates had ever asserted that Alcibiades had been a disciple of Socrates. This could not be said by Isocrates if he knew Plato's *Symposium*, in which the near relation and friendship between Alcibiades and Socrates is clearly represented. Teichmüller infers that Plato in introducing Alcibiades answered Isocrates' pretension to place Alcibiades above Socrates, and at the same time defended Alcibiades against the calumnious attacks of Lysias. The *Busiris* was written, according to Blass, some years after 391, and this would well agree with the admitted date of the *Symposium*, 385 B.C.

Relation to earlier dialogues generally admitted. But *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus* cannot be earlier than the *Symposium*.

We need no further evidence as to the priority of the *Cratylus*, *Gorgias*, and all Socratic dialogues, because these have generally been admitted to be earlier than the *Symposium*. The proof that some other dialogues, as the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*, which were also held by many critics to be earlier than the *Symposium*, are later, will be given when we come to deal with the date of each of them. For the present we may admit as certain, that the *Symposium* was written about 385 B.C., and after the *Cratylus*, *Gorgias*, *Euthydemus*, *Meno*, *Protagoras*, and all smaller dialogues. This result is not new; it is one of the few points of general agreement among writers on Plato. The comparison of logical contents has confirmed it, and also the style of the *Symposium* (see above, p. 169) is clearly intermediate between *Gorgias* and *Phaedo*.

III. *The Phaedo.*

(Relative affinity to the latest group, measured on the *Laws* as unity, = 0·21; see above, p. 170.)

The *Phaedo* has been interpreted in different ways, but is chiefly important as the first attempt to sustain by logical argument the theory of ideas, which had been only poetically represented in the *Symposium.*

The *Phaedo* is less artistically simple than the *Symposium*; it contains many threads of argument united with such skill that there is room for various opinions as to the chief purpose of the author and the main subject of his work. The dialogue has been regarded as an historical account of the death of Socrates,[211] as a treatise on the immortality of the soul,[212] as the poetical tragedy announced at the end of the *Symposium*,[213] as a general psychology,[214] as an ideal picture of the true philosopher,[215] and even as a treatise on the underground rivers.[216] There is some truth in all these assumptions if not taken absolutely; but for our present purpose the *Phaedo* deserves particular attention as containing the theoretical substantiation of Plato's first logical theory. We have seen in earlier works many allusions to logical problems discussed by Plato with his pupils. In the *Cratylus* the subsidiary problem of the relation between thought and language led to the hypothesis of an existent substance of things, different not only from all appearances, but also from all possible expression in human

[211] This exceedingly improbable opinion has been sustained in recent times by T. Bergk (*Griechische Literaturgeschichte*, 4ter Bd. Berlin 1887).

[212] This is the ordinary view, represented in our century especially by Steinhart.

[213] The well-known passage, *Symp.* 223 D, has been interpreted as referring to the *Symposium* as comedy, and to the *Phaedo* as tragedy.

[214] Plutarch (*Moral.* 120 E) quotes the *Phaedo* by the title περὶ ψυχῆς, which appears also in the manuscripts.

[215] Schleiermacher believed the *Phaedo* and *Symposium* to be the continuation of the *Politicus*, and to constitute between them the definition of the philosopher which had been promised in *Sophistes* 217 A B and *Politicus* 257 A. This is impossible, the *Politicus* being much later than both *Symposium* and *Phaedo.*

[216] This would result from a doubtful interpretation of Varro, *de lingua latina*, lib. VII. cap. iii. 88.

language. In the *Symposium* one aspect of such a substance was displayed as an ecstatic vision insufficiently pictured by the witness who experienced it but found himself unable to give expression in words to this unique and marvellous revelation. The first substance thus discovered by Plato was Beauty, bearing some relation to the Good, or ethical Beauty (*Symp.* 205 E: *ὁ δ' ἐμὸς λόγος οὔτε ἡμίσεός φησιν εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα οὔτε ὅλου, ἐὰν μὴ τυγχάνῃ γέ που, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀγαθὸν ὄν.* 212 A: *ὁρῶντι ᾧ ὁρατὸν τὸ καλόν, τίκτειν οὐκ εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδώλου ἐφαπτομένῳ, ἀλλ' ἀληθῆ, ἅτε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐφαπτομένῳ*). This Beauty, called already in the *Symposium* the Good, Truth, or reality, appeared in the first moment, suddenly raised above all human standards, as the only substance of the Universe. Soon, however, growing accustomed to the ideal existence of Beauty, he generalised this experience, extending it to other notions. This he does for his readers first in the *Phaedo*. He builds a system of ideas and gives an account of the way leading to his idealism; so resuming the inquiry commenced in the *Cratylus*.

Beauty was the first idea, extended in the *Phaedo* to a system of ideas.

After refuting all attempts to find truth in words, he discusses the value of knowledge gained by sense perception, and held by ordinary 'common sense' to be the most certain of all. He at once distinguishes sight and hearing as the best of all senses (65 B), but finds that even these give us no correct notions, as has been already recognised even by the poets (65 B: *οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν*), and, we might add, by such philosophical predecessors of Plato as Heraclitus and Parmenides.

Value of sense perceptions investigated. They are found to be misleading.

As in the *Symposium* the ecstatic vision of Beauty was independent of the senses and different from any material representation, so now in the *Phaedo* appear many other ideal substances, perceived by the soul alone, without help of the body (65 B C: *ἡ ψυχὴ . . . ὅταν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρῇ τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ*). This is done through reasoning (65 C: *ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι*) in moments when neither sight, nor hearing,

Ideas perceived by the soul alone without help of the body. They are more evi-

nor bodily pain or pleasure affect us, and when we feel as if we had left the body in order to approach true being (65 C: *λογίζεται . . . κάλλιστα, ὅταν . . . ἐῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ' ἁπτομένη ὀρέγηται τοῦ ὄντος*). Such substances as ideal Justice, or Beauty, Health, or Power, have an existence more evident to our reason than is the existence of particular things to our senses (65 D), though we can neither grasp them with our sight nor any other sense. We know them best by pure thinking (65 E: *ὃς ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσηται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὗ σκοπεῖ, οὗτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἴοι τοῦ γνῶναι ἕκαστον*), emancipated from the influence of sense perception (65 E: *διανοίᾳ . . . μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ . . . μήτε τὴν ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην αἴσθησιν*).

dent to reason than material things to the senses.

Human passions, illness, and physical necessities or desires put obstacles in our way to knowledge (66 B: *μυρίας . . . ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα*), and lead to wars or other conflicts (65 C). Thence Plato infers that ideal knowledge will be attainable for us chiefly after death (66 E), and that in earthly life our only way to approach truth is to limit the activity of senses to what is indispensable (67 A: *ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν . . . ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ὅ τι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι*). Only the pure soul can reach pure truth (67 B: *μὴ καθαρῷ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ᾖ*). We can learn nothing from our senses, because our soul possesses eternal innate wisdom, and all our learning consists in remembering what we knew before this life (72 E: *μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα . . . ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα*). The reminiscence depends upon similarity or dissimilarity of absolute ideas with the concrete objects of earthly experience (74 A: *συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπ' ἀνομοίων*). Still we notice in every case the difference between a perfect idea and the sensible experience which reminds us of this idea (74 A:

Body puts obstacles in our way to knowledge. Ideal knowledge expected after death. The pure soul reaches pure truth, and possessed it before entering the body.

ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὗ ἀνεμνήσθη).

Difference between idea and particulars illustrated by a mathematical example. There is no material equality in the world, though it is easy to understand ideal equality.

Here Plato introduces a classical example of this radical difference between an idea and sensible particulars: an example which has lost nothing of its logical importance up to the present time, and which also shows a far-reaching apprehension of the sensible world. This example he finds not in the distance between a concrete work of art and the artist's ideal, but in the perfection of a mathematical notion. He knows equality as the basis of all mathematical reasoning, and dares to assert that there is no such equality in the physical world. We know in our times, after many difficult measurements, that no one grain of sand is equal to another, nor a drop of water to another drop. But Plato had no microscopes and micrometers at his disposal, and it was a deep insight into the nature of physical phenomena that allowed him such an audacious generalisation against the evidence of his senses. He quotes as examples stones and pieces of wood, which only appear to be equal (74 B), but are not. He certainly knew physical objects which, according to all his means of observation, were really equal to each other, as for instance two stars of the same size and brilliancy, two wings of a small insect, or even two coins of the same mint. He could not ascertain the small existing differences between such objects by exact measurements and observations as we are enabled to do now; he had not arrived at his conviction of the impossibility of physical equality by Socratic induction. It was for him a knowledge *a priori*, quite as much as the knowledge of moral ideas. His reasoning was not built upon attempts to establish differences between apparently equal objects. He knew beforehand that the idea of equality was too perfect to be realised in the physical world. And this *a priori* knowledge of Plato has been confirmed by the experience of all the generations which have come after him.

This truth was not gained by induction or experiment, but appears to be the result of pure thought.

Plato had never alluded in his earlier writings to that difference between idea and appearance. In the *Cratylus* he mentioned things corresponding to the notion formed of them, and even derived general notions from particular experiences. In the *Symposium* he reached the sight of absolute Beauty by progressive generalisations which might be described as a continuation of Socratic induction. It is only in the *Phaedo* that he undertakes to construct a knowledge entirely independent of concrete particulars, and shows us the first model of such absolute ideas in the mathematical notion of equality, not derived from experience.

A process not observable in earlier writings than the *Phaedo*.

We have already seen in the *Meno* the theory of transcendental knowledge exemplified through a psychological experiment. But in the *Meno* there is no mention of a difference between ideal and physical equality. The figures were assumed to be equal, and their equality known. Here in the *Phaedo* we meet the assertion that there are no two equal objects in this life's experience, and that therefore all notion of equality is older than the present life. The apparent equality of two material objects approaches indefinitely the limit of absolute equality (75 A: *ὀρέγεται πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως*), and offers us the only opportunity of recalling the notion of absolute equality (75 A: *ὁμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννενοηκέναι . . . ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἅψασθαι ἢ ἔκ τινος ἄλλης τῶν αἰσθήσεων*). This reluctant concession leaves a certain importance to the activity of the despised senses. Without their perceptions we could not find an opportunity of remembering general ideas as the object of our transcendental knowledge. But once remembered, absolute equality is known to be radically different from any equality observed, and cannot therefore proceed from particular instances of approximative equality. This principle is extended to other ideas, not only of mathematical relation but also of justice, holiness, and everything that is predicated of particulars (75 D: *περὶ ἁπάντων οἷς*

Even in the *Meno* ideal equality is not thus distinguished. Still, sense perception remains a necessary condition for our training in the intuition of ideas. We are reminded by concrete appearances of eternal ideas, which were known be-

fore our birth.

ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ ὃ ἔστι). All these ideas must have been known before we began to see, to hear, and to receive other impressions of our senses (75 B: πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τἆλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει που εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ὅ τι ἔστιν) in order to enable us to refer every sense perception to such eternal ideas (75 B: τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἴσα ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίσειν, ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτα εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἔστι δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα). These ideas have an eternal existence, independent of the changes of sensible things. Beauty and similar ideas have the most real kind of existence, much more than any material appearances (77 A: οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε οὐδὲν οὕτω μοι ἐναργὲς ὂν ὡς τοῦτο, τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτ' εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἃ σὺ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες). Only through these ideas do we begin to understand the outward world (76 D: ἔστι . . . πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέρομεν).

Ideas more real than material objects, and they explain them.

Permanence of ideas a condition of unchangeable knowledge.

Everything that exists belongs to one of these two kinds (79 A: θῶμεν δύο εἴδη τῶν ὄντων): the visible material world, continuously changing, and the invisible ideal world, eternally the same, consisting of ideas and souls. No permanent and durable knowledge can refer to any but eternal objects, ideas without change. When the soul investigates ideas, certainty and knowledge are attained, and this we call activity of reason (79 D: περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη· καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται). Such an activity implies happiness, and frees us from error and all human sufferings (81 A).

Privileges of philosophers who become equal to gods.

And far more than even this, the victory over illusions of the senses leads a philosopher to become after death equal to the gods (82 C: εἰς θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῷ ἀπιόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ). A philosopher holds to be true only what he knows independently of the senses, through the pure activity of his soul, which gives an immediate, intuitive

knowledge of ideas (83 A: *ἡ φιλοσοφία . . . τὴν ψυχὴν παραμυθεῖται . . . παρακελευομένη πιστεύειν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἀλλ' ἢ αὐτὴν αὑτῇ, ὅ τι ἂν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ τῶν ὄντων*).

Necessity of logic insisted upon. Origin of scepticism in the want of logic. Scepticism compared with misanthropy.

Here we read for the first time about a science of thought or logic (90 B: *ἡ περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνη*), which is indispensable in order to preserve us from utter scepticism. He who trusts his own thoughts without an objective logic will often change his opinion, and this will lead him to a general distrust of human thought (90 C: *τελευτῶντες οἴονται . . . κατανενοηκέναι μόνοι ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων*). Such men believe themselves to have discovered that there is no truth, and that any and every opinion may be successfully defended by arguments among which none is decisive. This is an abnormal state of mind resulting from over-confidence, and similar to the misanthropy born of trusting men without knowing how to distinguish the good from the bad (89 D). If, with this unlimited confidence, a man should be deceived by those on whom he relied, he will fall straight into the contrary extreme, and cease to put any trust in his fellows. To this wrong conclusion he is brought by his ignorance of psychology (89 E: *ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τἀνθρώπεια*), and in like manner ignorance of logic may lead to a general distrust of human reason (90 C D: *οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δή τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι, ἔπειτα . . . μὴ ἑαυτόν τις αἰτιῷτο μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ . . . ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαιτο . . . τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθείη*). In this case they lose, by their own fault, the opportunity of knowing Truth and Being, and have no right to accuse human reason generally of imperfection. Plato himself is certain that human reason possesses the power of an infallible knowledge, and that we owe our errors, not to the weakness of our reason, but to the influence of the senses.

Ignorance of logic similar to ignorance of psychology. Logic unjustly accused. Power of human reason to attain truth by means of logic.

Final causes esteemed above mechanical causation.

To find absolute Truth our thought must be pure thought, and we must take care not to trust other explanations of reality than those based upon an understanding of the ideal aim of everything (97 C: *εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἑκάστου . . . τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν, ὅπῃ βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν*). This ideal cause is esteemed by Plato very much above all mechanical causation, which for him is no causation at all, but mere succession of events, or at most a necessary condition of real causation (99 B: *ἄλλο μέν τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ' εἴη αἴτιον*). Plato rises here to the summit of his new idealistic metaphysics, despising all mechanical explanation of Being as quite unsatisfactory and criticising his great predecessor Anaxagoras (98 B–E) for not having understood the importance of final causes. The only true cause appears to be that divine power which leads everything to the best, and according to the aims of the whole as well as of all parts (99 C: *τὴν τοῦ ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν . . . δαιμονίαν ἰσχύν*).

Ultimate aim of Being produces unity of knowledge and existence.

As thought reflects reality, we can investigate reality in our thoughts.

But the immediate knowledge of this ideal cause is beyond the scope of mankind, and Plato seeks an indirect way in order to find out the causes of things (99 C: *ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει, μαθητὴς ὁτουοῦν ἥδιστ' ἂν γενοίμην· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὔτ' αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν πεπραγμάτευμαι*). This second-best choice is based on the reflection that human thought is, as it were, an image of reality, and that exact knowledge of thought leads to a knowledge of truth (99 E: *ἔδοξε δή μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν*), just as we can observe the image of the sun reflected in a well, thus avoiding the injury to our eyes attendant upon looking at the sun itself.

Once on this path Plato soon recognised that thought

is more than a mere image of Being (100 A: *οὐ πάνυ συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις*), as he had explained it in the *Symposium*. He now applied the hypothetical method proposed in the *Meno*, seeking for the safest hypothesis on which he could rely, admitting as true everything in agreement with, and rejecting as false anything contradictory to this fundamental proposition (100 A: *ὑποθέμενος ἑκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἄν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν, τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, ἃ δ' ἂν μή, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ*). As such a fundamental hypothesis he proposes to accept the independent existence of Beauty as set forth in the *Symposium*, and also of other ideas (100 B: *ὑποθέμενος εἶναί τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα*). This he calls here, nothing new (100 B: *οὐδὲν καινόν*), but already frequently spoken of. It would be, however, an error to infer that another written exposition of the theory of ideas preceded, besides the first initiation in the *Symposium*. If the Platonic Socrates asserts that he constantly repeats the same truth in other as well as in the present conversation (100 B: *ἀεὶ καὶ ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ*), this is a rhetorical artifice by which, on the one hand, Plato brings his new ideas into close relation with the old Socratic notions as subsisting still in the *Euthydemus* (301 A) and *Cratylus* (439 D), while on the other hand he refers to conversations with his pupils which may have been suggested by the argument of the *Symposium*. Among the literary works of Plato none can be thought of as referred to in this passage of the *Phaedo*, because none contains a more elementary and fundamental explanation of the theory of ideas, the *Phaedrus* and *Republic* being undoubtedly later, as will be seen from their psychology, and as has been already made evident by their style. An earlier written exposition of this theory would have rendered superfluous the painstaking didactic tone of the *Phaedo*, and the difficulty of understanding expected by

Thought is even more than an image of Being. Conception of a highest principle or hypothesis, which is here the existence of ideas.

Apparent allusion to earlier expositions explained. The only earlier exposition in the *Symposium*.

the Platonic Socrates, and admitted by his hearers (100 A: *βούλομαι δέ σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ἃ λέγω· οἶμαι γάρ σε νῦν οὐ μανθάνειν—οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα*). This reminds us of the admitted obscurity of the speech of Diotima in the *Symposium*, and gives the impression of a first attempt at a written account of the new theory.

Relation between *Phaedo* and *Symposium* in the theory of ideas.

The theory as it stands in the *Phaedo* is a generalisation of the esthetic experience related in the *Symposium*. Particulars are what they seem to us to be, through their participation in the idea, and not only in the idea of Beauty but also in the ideas of all other general notions. The term *μετέχειν* used here (100 C: *φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλόν, οὐδὲ δι' ἓν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω*), as in the *Symposium*, is already felt to be not quite sufficient, and is supplemented by other terms, *παρουσία* and *κοινωνία* (100 D: *οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία . . . οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά*). The idea is present in the particulars, or is shared by them, this makes no difference for Plato: the only expression of his hypothesis which he believes to be perfectly certain is that beautiful things become beautiful through Beauty, or owe their particular beauty to the general idea. This relation between idea and particulars is formally similar to the relation between a Socratic notion and the particulars; as expressed already in the *Euthyphro* (6 E: *εἶδος, ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν . . . μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ τά τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια*). But the Socratic notion was immanent (*Euthyph.* 5 D: *ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ ὅσιον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὖ τοῦ μὲν ὁσίου παντὸς ἐναντίον, αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτῷ ὅμοιον καὶ ἔχον μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν πᾶν ὅ τί περ ἂν μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἶναι*), found in the concrete things as their point of similarity, while the Platonic idea is self-existent, independent of particulars, perceived by pure reason against all illusions of the senses. More-

Relation between idea and particulars similar to that between a general notion and particulars.

Use of terms. Variety of terms for the ideas. Priority of the idea.

over, the terms εἶδος and ἰδέα, which were freely used to designate general notions in earlier dialogues, up to the *Gorgias* and *Cratylus*, preserve generally the same meaning in the *Symposium* and *Phaedo*,[217] while the transcendental ideas are chiefly designated by the neuter of the adjective, sometimes with such determinations as ἐκεῖνο (*Symp.* 210 E, *Phaedo* 103 C) or αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό (*Symp.* 211 B, *Phaedo* 100 B) and by the verb εἶναι and its derivatives. The direct and constant use of εἶδος or ἰδέα to designate a transcendental idea belongs to a somewhat later stage of Plato's logic. In the *Symposium* and *Phaedo* he still hesitates, and this hesitation produces great variety of terms for the peculiar relation between idea and particulars.[218] He says expressly that he does not insist upon any of these terms,[219] and that the only thing he is sure of is the priority of the idea, or that the given idea

[217] εἶδος as well as ἰδέα means shape, form, or appearance in such passages as *Symp.* 189 E, 196 A, 204 C, 215 B; *Phaedo* 73 A, 104 D, 108 D, 109 B. The meaning of a Socratic species or notion appears in *Symp.* 205 B D; *Phaedo* 91 D, 100 B, &c. Campbell has shown in §§ 24–32 of his essay on Plato's use of language (*Plato's Republic*, vol. ii pp. 294–305) that both words have been used frequently by Plato in the same meaning as by earlier writers besides the new applications, chiefly illustrated from later dialogues. In the formula τὸ ἐπ' εἴδει καλὸν (*Symp.* 210 B) we also miss the specific Platonic use of εἶδος. The possible identity of εἶδος and the absolute idea seems to be admitted in the formula: εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν (102 B). But here also the εἴδη mean ethical notions of which substantial existence is predicated. Only *Phaedo* 104 B ἰδέα and 104 C εἴδη might be equivalent to the Platonic 'ideas.'

[218] Besides μετέχειν, παρουσία, κοινωνία we read: μεταλαμβάνειν 102 B, προσδέχεσθαι 102 D, προσιέναι 102 E, 103 D, δέχεσθαι 102 E, 103 D, ἐνεῖναι 103 B, μετάσχεσις 101 C.

[219] *Phaedo* 100 D: οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διισχυρίζομαι has been interpreted as a reference to an earlier different opinion by Dümmler (*Akademika*, p. 204), P. Natorp (*Philosophische Monatshefte*, vol. xxvi. p. 467), and Pfleiderer (p. 395). But this interpretation is based upon the assumption that Plato wrote about the theory of ideas before the *Phaedo*. If the *Phaedo*, as results from the present inquiry, is the first methodic exposition of Plato's theory of ideas, then 'οὐ γὰρ ἔτι' does not signify 'no longer,' but 'not further,' 'not moreover.' The whole phrase would then mean: I am only sure that beautiful things are beautiful through Beauty, but I do not go so far as to affirm anything definitively about the exact manner in which this occurs.

is the cause of the corresponding quality in each particular thing in which it is recognised.

Logical rule as to the judgment on an hypothesis, and its consequences.

On this fundamental hypothesis, according to Plato, a consistent system of science can be built up (101 D: *ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως*). He develops the hypothetical method given in the *Meno*, and recommends his disciples always to distinguish between an hypothesis and the consequences drawn from it. In a skilful discussion, the agreement of all consequences with each other must precede any inquiry as to the truth of the hypothesis on which the consequences depend (101 D: *εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔφοιτο, χαίρειν ἐῴης ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο, ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὁρμηθέντα σκέψαιο, εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ*).

Progressive generalisation up to a highest principle.

He advises rising from one hypothesis to another until irrefragable transcendental axioms are reached, which have no further need of demonstration (101 D: *ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος, ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις*). He warns us against coupling illogically (101 E: *ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοί*), in one and the same discussion, arguments for or against the hypothesis itself with arguments for or against the derived consequences (101 C: *ἅμα οὐκ ἂν φύροις περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὡρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων εὑρεῖν*).

Supposed polemical reference.

This exhortation to a methodic investigation is aimed, as Dümmler thinks, against Antisthenes, and is emphatically assented to by Cebes and Simmias simultaneously (102 A), and by Echecrates who hears Phaedo's report of the conversation. Phaedo adds that to all present, even to those who had the least understanding of philosophy, it seemed to be wonderfully clearly expressed (102 A: *εἴπερ εἰ τῶν φιλοσόφων . . . θαυμαστῶς δοκεῖ ὡς ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντι . . . πᾶσι τοῖς παροῦσιν ἔδοξεν . . . καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀποῦσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούουσιν*). This insistent asseveration of the importance of the logical

Hypothetical method extended, and defended against unknown

rule—to distinguish the consecutive steps of each argument, and to require internal consistency before criticising the foundations of a course of reasoning, shows that Plato is introducing a new method (*μέθοδος*, 79 E, 97 B), with full consciousness of its bearings. This new method is generalised from the inductive process by which, in the *Symposium*, he reached his vision of absolute Beauty. As he then proceeded from particulars to the idea, he now wishes through hypothetical argumentation to reach absolute certainty. Every successive hypothesis must be 'better' or logically more evident than the preceding, until by such approximations the goal is attained—namely, certainty.

adversaries.

Progress from hypothesis to knowledge, avoiding circular reasoning.

Even then he will not indulge in the self-conceit of those who are delighted with their own circular reasonings (101 E: *οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ . . . ἱκανοὶ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκῶντες ὅμως αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς ἀρέσκειν*). The true philosopher is obliged to examine again and again even the highest generalisations or first principles (107 B: *καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέα σαφέστερον · . . . καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστ' ἀνθρώπῳ*) in order to advance as far as human reason may.

First principles re-examined.

Plato acknowledges that his own highest hypothesis, when he wrote the *Phaedo*, was the independent existence of ideas as true substances, always the same, eternal, divine, simple, and representing the highest reality of Being. Were it not for the repeated assertion of the independence of the ideas, we might identify them with general notions. We have no clear indication either in the *Phaedo* or in the *Symposium* of any distinction between our subjective notions and the corresponding transcendental ideas. Everything confirms our supposition that Plato, at the time of writing the *Phaedo*, as well as when he wrote the *Symposium*, believed it to be possible for the human soul to know ideas as they are, and in such absolute intuition the general notion would be identical with the idea, while the idea remains equally the same

Probable identity of ideas and their subjective representation.

both when manifest in us and outside of us (103 B: *αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει*).

Intuition of ideas dispenses with experience.

The logical consequence of this doctrine was the power of reason to acquire all truth accessible to mankind by pure intuition, by contemplative meditation without or almost without external experience. In other words, our reason is able to discover the nature of things by intense reflection on the nature of her own ideas, which ideas are common both to human reason and to every other possible reason of any superior being here called God. The logical side of this doctrine culminates in the law of contradiction, expressed here as one of the chief arguments demonstrating the existence of ideas (102 E: *τὸ σμικρὸν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ἔτι ὂν ὅπερ ἦν ἅμα τοὐναντίον γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι*). Each idea is only what it is, and, therefore, perfectly simple (*μονοειδές*, 83 E).

Law of contradiction.

Solution of the problem proposed in the *Cratylus*. Stability and independence of ideas.

We see that Plato in the *Phaedo* gave his solution of the problem proposed in the *Cratylus*, and definitively decided against Heracliteanism. In the *Cratylus* he recognised the extreme difficulty of the problem and announced a further inquiry; in the *Phaedo* he communicates the results of this inquiry, postulating not only the stability of notions, already acknowledged in the *Cratylus*, but their independence of human intelligence. He goes so far now as to deny every process of becoming in the world, or at least to decline any explanation of changes (97 B: *οὐδέ γε δι' ὅ τι ἓν γίγνεται ὡς ἐπίσταμαι ἔτι πείθω ἐμαυτόν, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἑνὶ λόγῳ δι' ὅ τι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου*). Two unities added to each other cannot become two; it is not the addition which could produce a new idea. Addition is only the subjective side of the eternal relation subsisting independently of our reason between unity and the idea of two. The same explanation of all apparent changes through eternal relations between immutable ideas is the result of the absolute

Relation between ideas.

reality attributed to ideas and opposed to the phenomenal appearance of all material things.

The *Phaedo* brings Plato's Idealism to its highest point and contains a conscious representation of all consequences deriving from the fundamental hypothesis sought for in the *Cratylus*, perceived in the *Symposium*, and demonstrated here, so far as it could be, for Plato's followers. We shall meet this theory in later works, while there is no clear trace of it in works that were certainly written before the *Phaedo*.

The *Phaedo* contains the first representation of Idealism.

The importance of the *Phaedo* for the development of Plato's logic is increased by the circumstance that the authenticity of this dialogue has passed unquestioned, even by such sceptical critics as Ast and Schaarschmidt. It has been advanced [220] that the Stoic Panaetius in the second century B.C. doubted the authenticity of the *Phaedo*, but Zeller has clearly shown the untrustworthiness and even the contradictoriness of the testimonies adduced in favour of that assumption—the first mention of these pretended doubts occurring some centuries after the death of Panaetius and betraying a complete ignorance of Panaetius as well as of the reason of his imputed scepticism. The *Phaedo* has been so frequently quoted by Greek and Latin writers that we must admit that this work was generally regarded as undoubtedly authentic.

Unquestionable authenticity increases its importance.

The extreme idealism here professed has provoked severe criticisms, as for instance those of Crawford [221] in the eighteenth and of Prantl [222] in the present century. But even these criticisms show that, if Plato's idealism was mistaken, such mistakes can be made only by a

Plato's idealism provoked strong opposition, but was of

[220] R. Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Cicero's philosophischen Schriften*, 1877, vol. i. p. 232; Chiappelli, 'Panezio' in *Filosofia delle scuole italiane* for 1882; also Teichmüller, vol. i. p. 126.

[221] C. Crawford, *A Dissertation on the Phaedo of Plato*, London 1773. The author evidently had a very superficial knowledge of Plato and professed a shallow materialism.

[222] Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, p. 78, Leipzig 1855; also in his translation of the *Phaedo*, Berlin 1884.

lasting importance in the history of human thought.

philosopher of genius, and they are indispensable for the progress of philosophy, just as many failures of expeditions undertaken with the aim of discovering the sources of the Nile were indispensable for the progress of geography. Idealism is one obvious solution of the metaphysical problem, and it was necessary to follow out all the consequences of this solution in order to decide upon its value. In the *Phaedo* Plato is still struggling against some consequences of his idealism. His love of the religious traditions about the immortality of the soul, as set forth in the *Meno* and *Gorgias*, and indirectly confirmed in the *Euthydemus* and *Cratylus*, is really not quite consistent with the doctrine of idealism, and though we have no direct evidence whether he was aware of this inconsistency, we see that in the *Symposium*, together with the first glimpse of eternal ideas, there appears almost a substitution of immortal influence for the immortality of the person taught in the *Gorgias*.

New demonstration of immortality. Proofs not entirely sufficient, but meant seriously, though consistent idealism would abolish individual immortality.

Now in the *Phaedo* the avowed purpose of the Platonic Socrates is a demonstration of immortality, and he connects this demonstration with the exposition of the theory of ideas, which really might have impaired the religious belief in immortality. But if we examine the arguments in the *Phaedo*, we see that those from the beginning up to the objection of Cebes (87 A) prove only the persistence of the individual soul for some time after death, not for all time. The remaining arguments refer more to the idea of soul than to the individual soul, though they seem intended as a defence of personal immortality. Archer Hind [223] argued this question against Hegel and Teichmüller, and made it very probable that Plato in writing the *Phaedo* still really believed in a prolongation of individual existence after death, without any suspicion of inconsistency. If we look at the final conversation of Socrates with Crito (115 D: ἐπειδὰν πίω τὸ

[223] *The Phaedo of Plato*, edited by R. D. Archer Hind, London 1883, pp. 18–26.

φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενῶ, ἀλλ' οἰχήσομαι ἀπιών . . .) we must admit that Plato perfectly understood the consequences of personal immortality and believed them. The inconsistency between immortality and idealism arises only if by immortality is meant, according to our modern notions, absolute eternity of the soul, while an indeterminate continuation of the soul's existence after death is not inconsistent with idealism. It is difficult to doubt that Plato meant his arguments as sufficient to establish individual immortality, because his conclusion does not admit of another interpretation (107 A: *παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν* Ἅιδου). It is also a natural psychological consequence of the profound dissatisfaction with the present conditions of life, manifested by Plato in the *Phaedo*, that he could not easily throw off his hopes of a better state, and of a deliverance from physical limitations.

Physical theories of the *Phaedo* confirm its place after the *Symposium*.

The physical theory of the *Phaedo*, representing the insignificance of the world accessible to our knowledge as compared with a wider world even physically more perfect, confirms the place assigned to the *Phaedo* in the development of Plato's thought. Here he appears no longer as an Athenian, nor as a Greek, but rises even above the standpoint of international equality between Hellene and Barbarian attained in the *Cratylus*. In the *Phaedo* there speaks a philosopher whose interests are not limited to the earth, but extend over the universe, though maintaining still the position of the earth at the centre, in conformity with the traditional religious beliefs which Plato afterwards discarded.

Some direct confirmations of this view are found by comparing

The position of the *Phaedo* after the *Symposium* is evident from all the above comparisons, but additional evidence is not wanting as to the relation between these two dialogues, a relation generally admitted by writers on Plato since Schleiermacher. This relation allowed by Stallbaum, Hermann, Steinhart, Susemihl, and many

both dialogues, which are closely connected.

others,[224] has been in recent times very successfully defended by Teichmüller against the older view of Tennemann, Ast, and Socher, who thought that the *Phaedo* must have been written soon after the death of Socrates. Besides the logical theories in the *Phaedo*, which are found to be a continuation of those in the *Symposium*, there are some other indications of the priority of the *Symposium*. The mention at the end of the *Symposium* of a discussion about the identity of the tragic and comic poet has no visible aim at that place, but is very well explained if we take it as an apology for the prevalent comic character of the *Symposium*, and an announcement of a more serious encomium on Socrates to be delivered in the *Phaedo*. Also the words of Alcibiades, that nobody has yet praised Socrates as he deserves, if referred to Plato's own time, are better justified if the *Phaedo* had not then been written. There is a further probability that the picture of Socrates in the *Symposium*, if planned about the same time as that of the dying Socrates, should have been executed first, however improbable may be the generalisation of similar reasonings as carried out by Munk. Also the view on immortality implied in the *Symposium* presents an earlier stage than in the *Phaedo*. In the first moment of the contemplation of absolute Beauty, Plato could look upon immortal fame as an equivalent of immortal life. But so dear had been the belief in immortality to the author of the *Gorgias* that it became a natural task to base this personal immortality on the new logical theory emancipated from traditional authority. Philosophic reasoning in favour of immortality is a new departure, compared with the earlier representations of immortality as a traditional belief, a beautiful tale, true and worthy

The order of writing might in this case agree with order of events represented.

[224] A. Bischoff, *Platons Phaedo*, Erlangen 1866, pp. 282-306; L. Noack, *Philosophisch-geschichtliches Lexicon*, Leipzig 1879; also Michelis, Ribbing, and others, while Peipers, Dümmler, Christ, and Pfleiderer still believe in the priority of the *Phaedo*.

to be believed in, but not within the scope of positive knowledge.

The recognition in the *Symposium* of immortal fame as desirable shows a regard for human opinion far greater than that professed in the *Phaedo*, which in this respect approaches nearer to the disposition of mind shown in the *Phaedrus*, *Theaetetus*, and *Parmenides*. On the other hand, while his esteem for public opinion was decreasing, Plato's consciousness of his own power was undoubtedly growing, and here again we have an argument in favour of the later date of the *Phaedo*. In the *Phaedo* the philosopher is equal to the gods (82 B C), while in the *Symposium* the gods are very much above the philosopher. The proportion of apodictic affirmations, such as *ἀληθέστατα*, in the *Phaedo* is an additional proof of its later date. These form here 49 per cent. of all affirmations, while in no earlier dialogue do they exceed 35 per cent., which ratio they surpass in all later dialogues, rising above 50 per cent. in the *Laws*. This places the *Phaedo* in a line with the later works, and is a very characteristic sign of the increasing certainty which Plato professed to have attained—a certainty which remained with him through life, together with his consciousness of the high and divine vocation of the philosopher.

Disregard of human opinion. Increase of Plato's certainty visible in the proportion of apodictic affirmations.

This growing confidence is specially evident if we compare two predictions about his own philosophical career put in the mouth of Socrates once in the *Apology*,[225] and again much later in the *Phaedo*[226]:

Apology 31 A: *τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥᾳδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται . . .*

39 C D: *πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ᾐσθάνεστε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσῳ νεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε.*

Phaedo 78 A: *πολλὴ μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς, . . . πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη, οὓς πάντας χρὴ διερευνᾶσθαι ζητοῦντας τοιοῦτον ἐπῳδόν, . . . ζητεῖν δὲ χρὴ καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ῥᾳδίως εὕροιτε μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυναμένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν.*

Plato's growing confidence illustrated by the allusions to his own activity contained in *Apology* and *Phaedo*.

[225] This passage has been already understood as a prediction about Plato by Natorp (*Philosophische Monatshefte*, vol. xxvi. p. 453); Sybel (*De Platonis prooemiis Academicis*, Marburg 1889) and others.

[226] On *Phaedo*, 78 A, see Teichmüller, i. 123.

Allusions to Plato's travels and teaching.

According to the *Apology* there was no hope of finding a worthy successor to Socrates; in the *Phaedo* it is admitted as probable that such a successor, even if sought for all over the world, could not be easily found outside the circle of Socrates' disciples, and this is said with a clear reference to Plato's travels in search of truth. In the *Apology* Plato speaks of the indignation which will be produced by his writings; in the *Phaedo* he is already conscious of the charm exercised by his philosophy, and he calls himself a charmer. We shall see how Plato progressed even to a further point in the consciousness of his own power.

Difference between *Phaedo* and *Symposium* in the treatment of poets.

Another indication of the priority of the *Symposium* is the different treatment of Beauty. While in the *Symposium* Beauty is the highest ideal, it is in the *Phaedo* only one among many ideas, as in the *Phaedrus*. In the *Symposium* Plato quotes poets and lawgivers as truly eminent men, deserving immortality of fame; in the *Phaedo* (65 B) the poets are quoted with a certain irony, as if Plato meant that any truth observed by them must be clear even to a child. While in the *Symposium* Aristophanes is represented as a friend of Socrates, and Plato thus forgives the gibes of the great comic poet against his master, he refers in the *Phaedo* (70 C: *οὔκουν γ' ἂν οἶμαι, εἰπεῖν τινα νῦν ἀκούσαντα, οὐδ' εἰ κωμῳδιοποιὸς εἴη, ὡς ἀδολεσχῶ καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι*) to comic poets with a certain air of superiority and contempt; this reminds us of the *Republic*, and seems to be directed against comic poets of Plato's own time who criticised, perhaps, the wild and playful tone of the *Symposium*.

Also in style the *Phaedo* follows closely the *Symposium*.

The position of the *Phaedo* after the *Cratylus* and *Symposium* is fully confirmed by the considerable number of peculiarities of later style, which bring the *Phaedo* nearer to the *Republic* and to the latest group than any of the preceding dialogues (see above, p. 170). If we take into consideration that no other work of Plato is likely to

have been composed between the *Symposium* and *Phaedo*, we must infer that the two dialogues were not separated by a great interval, since it is unlikely that Plato would remain long unproductive as an author at the period of his life in which his chief works betray such incomparable ease and mastery of form.

Logical character of the *Cratylus*, *Symposium*, and *Phaedo* contrasted with inconclusiveness of Socratic dialogues.

The stylistically well-defined group consisting of the *Cratylus*, *Symposium*, and *Phaedo*, contains the first exposition of the theory of ideas, and shows us how Plato was led to this theory from different starting-points. In these three dialogues the ethical questions so much discussed before become secondary, and the logical problem of knowledge, blended with the metaphysical inquiry about Being, begins to occupy the philosopher's attention. He reaches a degree of certainty and a consciousness of his power forming a remarkable contrast with the inconclusiveness and modesty of the Socratic dialogues up to the *Meno*. Also his literary skill, admirable already in the *Euthydemus* and *Gorgias*, arrives in the *Symposium* and *Phaedo* at a perfection not exceeded by himself in later writings, and equalled only in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*. The polemical tone of the *Euthydemus* and *Gorgias* is disappearing, and the didactic character begins to prevail. The aim of life, which in the *Gorgias* was defined as justice founded on knowledge, becomes chiefly knowledge, with virtue as one of its consequences. The stage reached by Plato in the *Cratylus*, *Symposium*, and *Phaedo* is introductory to that of the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, which represent the doctrine taught by Plato during the mature years of his life. Stylistic and logical comparison agree in connecting the *Cratylus*, *Symposium*, and *Phaedo* into one group of works succeeding each other in the first years of Plato's activity in his Academy. The great number of works later than these reduces the limits of time for their composition to a few years. If the *Symposium* was written about 385 B.C., we

Prevalence of didactic over polemical aims. Connection of these three dialogues confirmed by their style. They were written in the first years

of the existence of the Academy.

have no reason to put the *Phaedo* later than about 384, or between 384 and 383 B.C., as will be seen from a comparison between the *Phaedo* and later works, proving that after the *Phaedo* Plato must have written more than twice as much as he had written before.

CHAPTER VI

MIDDLE PLATONISM

WHEN Plato reached the development of his logical theories as these are known to us from the *Phaedo*, he was anxious to apply them to practical aims with the purpose of promoting the moral progress of his contemporaries. He was not satisfied with knowing the truth for himself, and he wanted to impart it to others. Two practical applications of philosophy occupied his attention: politics and education. We have the results of his meditation on these subjects in two works, the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*.

Philosophical theories applied to practical aims in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*.

The *Republic* no longer deals with the moral problem in the fashion of the *Meno* or *Gorgias*. In these Socratic dialogues Plato asked and tried to answer moral questions referring to the conduct of the individual, in any given state, without expressly contemplating an altered condition of the state. He still professed Socratic ignorance as to politics, while he already had resolved the problem of individual conduct and individual relations between citizens, seeing therein the true politics (*Gorg.* 521 D). But having gained a higher metaphysical knowledge, Plato no longer dared to decline the responsibilities it implied. He was deeply interested in the reasons of the general decay of Greek states in his time, and he understood that the Socratic precept to 'mind one's own business' (τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν) would not work, if the political conditions of the state offered constant opportunities for the perversion of the individual. If the state was acknowledged to be a necessity, the citizen and especially the philosopher could

Politics succeed to individual ethics.

The state has an influence on the individual's conduct, and thus moral reform must begin by the reform

of the state, and by the reform of education.

not remain indifferent to the mode in which the state was to be ruled. Plato's interest in this problem led him to write one of his greatest works, the *Republic*, in which educational and political topics are skilfully blended. Having recognised education as one of the chief instruments of political reform, he dedicated another dialogue, the *Phaedrus*, chiefly to educational questions.

I. *The Republic.*

The exceptional size of the *Republic* must be taken into account if we wish to reckon the time spent in writing this dialogue. According to some authors this was very considerable.

Every reader of Plato is familiar with the fact that the *Republic* is very much larger than any other work of Plato except the *Laws*. This impression led even Grote to a curious exaggeration, when he said (vol. iv. p. 1) that each book of the *Republic* is as long as any one of the preceding dialogues. He was thinking chiefly of the small spurious dialogues held by him to be authentic. In reality four of the preceding dialogues, *Gorgias*, *Cratylus*, *Symposium*, and *Phaedo*, contain in all about the same amount of text as the *Republic*, and it is important to bear in mind this relation if we wish to arrive at correct conclusions on the much-debated question of the unity of the *Republic*. An incidental observation of Hermann (p. 539), that B. V–VII appear to be written later than B. VIII–IX, and that B. X must have been added later still, has been more recently developed by Krohn, and after him by E. Pfleiderer, into a theory which breaks the continuity of the *Republic*, by supposing different parts of it to have been produced at intervals during the greater part of Plato's life. For anybody who wishes to understand the growth of Plato's philosophy it becomes a very important preliminary question whether Krohn was right in believing that Plato wrote much of the *Republic* before he had written any other dialogue. This view has been recently carried by Pfleiderer to the extreme of placing the first five books of the *Republic* even before the *Apology*,

which heretofore had been almost unanimously held to be one of the earliest writings of Plato.

The *Republic* being one-sixth of all the works written in fifty years, it is probable that it took some years to write.

If we consider that the *Republic* contains one-sixth of the texts bearing Plato's name, and that it is generally admitted that he was occupied with literary labours for at least fifty years, it becomes evident that even the continuous production of the *Republic* could not have been the work of a short time. In our own century a volume of this size and on such an all-important subject is rarely written in less than several years, and there are immense differences between our methods of writing and the mode of literary composition which probably prevailed in Plato's time. Without referring to fountain pens and typewriting machines, the superiority of our ordinary writing materials over those that were available two thousand years ago has diminished many times the mechanical labour involved. The invention of printing and the custom of revising proofs affords an infinitely easier and quicker way of correcting and maturing our works than was practicable on old papyrus rolls, with an all too limited space for additions. But besides all these mechanical and material improvements, there are also deep psychological differences between an ancient Greek writer and ourselves. Any ordinary student of the present day has read ten or even a hundred times as much as Plato could have done at the same age; we are also generally far more practised in writing from our earliest years: even our elementary education includes besides gymnastics and music many literary studies. Keeping all this well in mind, we must ask the question: how many years must the composition of the *Republic* have required even if it were not interrupted by other labours? We suppose that in the first ten years after the death of Socrates Plato wrote about half-a-dozen small dialogues, and only two larger works (*Protagoras* and *Meno*), not amounting together to more than about three-quarters of the extent of the *Republic*. This was the beginning,

Difference in the mode of literary production. We have in the present time many advantages enabling us to write at a greater speed.

Illustration from the above survey of the works preceding the *Republic*.

In about six years five dialogues had been written exceeding slightly the size of the *Republic*.

and it is reasonable to expect that the author's speed in composition was increasing. In fact the next six years (390–384 B.C.) produced five dialogues (*Euthydemus*, *Gorgias*, *Cratylus*, *Symposium*, *Phaedo*), which taken together slightly exceed the size of the *Republic*. Besides, there is ample reason to suppose that some work preparatory to the *Republic* had been already done at the time of writing the *Symposium*, and the tenour and language of the first book have an obvious affinity to those of the *Gorgias*. Taking this for granted, there is on the other side the *Phaedrus*, which could not have been written before the *Phaedo*, as will be seen, and which also is probably not much later than the last books of the *Republic*. The *Phaedrus*, together with B. II–X of the *Republic*, corresponds very nearly to the total amount of the works which we place between 390 and 384 B.C. These works are so important and betray such a wonderful facility of composition, united with so complete a mastery of the language and of the subjects, that we have no reason to expect that Plato in the next period still further increased the speed of his writing, especially while his oral teaching must have occupied more and more of his time. Thus it becomes consistent with probability to suppose that the *Phaedrus* and *Republic* occupied him for another six years after 384, and this brings us to his fiftieth year, completed in 377 B.C.

B. II–X of the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* are equal in size to the works written 390–384 B.C.

It is probable that the bulk of the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* were written in the last six

If we say that according to the above reasoning Plato worked on his *Republic* nearly up to the age of fifty, this remains only a probable inference. But where we have no direct evidence as to facts, we are justified in weighing probabilities and admitting provisionally the greatest probability, in order to obtain a distinct conception of important events. For a knowledge of Plato's philosophy it is sufficient to settle the consecutive order of his works, and it is not indispensable to name a date for each work or each part of a work. But dates are useful

as an illustration of results arrived at by the detailed comparison of each work with all the others, and it is only in order to convey to our readers a clear representation of what results from the above inquiry that we say: if Plato wrote the *Republic* as one continuous work, and after the *Phaedo*, as we shall attempt to prove, this work probably filled his time for about six years before he reached the age of fifty.

years before Plato reached the age of fifty.

We know he was forty when he formally founded his Academy. His *Euthydemus* and *Gorgias* had prepared the way for this, and the first years of the existence of the Academy brought out the *Cratylus*, *Symposium*, and *Phaedo*, enouncing the new theory of ideas. The *Republic* and *Phaedrus* were then written within the first ten years of the existence of the Academy. If this be so, one important point of discussion is at once dismissed. It is natural that an author between forty and fifty, labouring at one production during about six years, while his thoughts were still maturing, should insensibly alter something in its original plan, adding new matter and even falling into some trifling contradictions. Corrections were not then so easy as they are to-day, and the standard of literary consistency was, even for Plato, not so high, as we can see from nearly all his works. He was above everything an educator, and he did not feel obliged to say all things at once. He had taught in the *Symposium* a progressive exposition of truth, and he conformed to these precepts in preparing the *Republic*. In B. I–IV we see no direct allusion to the theories explained in the *Phaedo*, and we might receive the impression that the author did not yet know the eternal ideas. At the beginning of B. V we have a clear indication that what follows is an expansion of the original plan, and at the beginning of B. VIII the thread of B. IV is resumed. B. I is called in B. II expressly an introduction (*προοίμιον* 357 A), and B. X has distinctly the form of a conclusion, somewhat

An author between forty and fifty may change some things in the plan of a work continued for several years. Educational aim explains why no mention of the theory of ideas occurs in the first books. Natural partitions of the *Republic* do not prevent its unity.

loosely tacked on to what precedes. There is no possible discussion about the existence of these partitions, which are evident to every reader, and have been acknowledged generally. But on the other side frequent hints unite these parts into one whole (see Jowett and Campbell, *Republic*, vol. ii. pp. 11–20). For our purpose, we must consider each part separately, before drawing inferences as to the whole, and we recognise in the *Republic* five chief divisions: B. I, B. II–IV, B. V–VII, B. VIII–IX, and B. X.

Book I

Different moods in Plato's works and different aims have a limited influence on the style.

Plato's mind during many of the best years of life seems to have alternated between a resolute withdrawal from the world, indulging contemplation with a few disciples, and the endeavour to go forth and influence the world and bring the results of contemplation to bear on the social life of humanity. It is natural that his style should alter with the alteration of aim. Yet such alteration of style has limits, and it is hardly conceivable that in a single work produced without intermission he should approach the characteristic form in part of earlier and in part of later writings.

First book of the *Republic* closely related to the *Gorgias* in contents and style.

The first book of the *Republic*, equal in size to the *Apology*, presents a strikingly close affinity to the *Gorgias* both in matter and form. The gentle treatment of Cephalus may be compared with the ironical respect for Gorgias, the puzzling of Polemarchus with the easy refutation of Polus, the sudden onslaught of Thrasymachus with the brusque interposition of Callicles. And the presumption raised by these comparisons is confirmed by the stylistic evidence, which yields very few examples of later peculiarities.

Probable allusion to the

We see here Thrasymachus rising to defend a position which had to be abandoned by Polus in the *Gorgias*. Polus had admitted that injustice though advantageous

is uglier than justice (*Gorg.* 475 B: *τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον . . . τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον*), and this led to his defeat in the discussion with Socrates. Now Thrasymachus, as if he had been present then, dares to assert that perfect injustice is beautiful (*Rep.* 348 D E), whereby he places himself above traditional opinion. Socrates recognises the greater consistency of this position (348 E: *τοῦτο ἤδη στερεώτερον . . . εἰ γὰρ λυσιτελεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐτίθεσο, κακίαν μέντοι ἢ αἰσχρὸν αὐτὸ ὡμολόγεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινές, εἴχομεν ἄν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα*); we might take this as an allusion to the earlier work, and as a sign that, however the first book might be earlier than the other books, we need not admit it to be earlier than the *Gorgias*. The standpoint of the author is far more advanced, since he acknowledges that his argumentation, though sufficient to overthrow a sophist's impudence, is not satisfactory to himself, so long as he has not given a definition of justice, which accordingly becomes the professed aim of the whole work. In the small dialogues no definition of any virtue is accepted as definitive, and in the larger ethical dialogues the question whether virtue is teachable overshadowed the logical inquiry as to the nature of virtue. It is only in the *Republic* that this problem is undertaken, and with a new purpose, to apply it to politics.

Gorgias in the first book of the *Republic*.

More advanced standpoint. Polemic against the sophists secondary.

There are some hints which show that the first book was not, as Hermann (p. 538) thought, originally meant as an independent whole, to which the following was added later. The mention of this life as preparing us for death (330 E: *ἐγγυτέρω ὢν τῶν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλόν τι καθορᾷ αὐτά . . .* 331 A: *ἡδεῖα ἐλπὶς ἀεὶ πάρεστι*) shows us that Plato, even when he began to write his *Republic*, had passed beyond the stage of the small dialogues, and perhaps planned already in writing the first book the final myth concluding the tenth book.

First book not an independent small dialogue. Close relation to the following books.

Also the threefold partition of the soul, which is the most important doctrine of the fourth book, is here as in

Classification of rewards here mentioned fully explained in the seventh book. Duty of philosophers to accept political power denied in *Gorgias* here accepted.

the *Phaedo* already prepared, when Socrates says that the rulers of a state are paid in money, honour, or the advantage of escaping a penalty for refusing to rule (347 A: *μισθὸν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐθελήσειν ἄρχειν, ἢ ἀργύριον ἢ τιμὴν ἢ ζημίαν, ἐὰν μὴ ἄρχῃ*). This is here a riddle for Glaucon, and is fully explained only in the seventh book, where the obligation of the philosopher to rule a state against his inclination is clearly expounded. This doctrine is in advance of the *Gorgias*, where Plato said that in order to get political influence the ruler must be like the people (*Gorg.* 513 B: *ὅστις σε τούτοις ὁμοιότατον ἀπεργάζεται, οὗτός σε ποιήσει, ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς εἶναι, πολιτικὸν καὶ ῥητορικόν*). He then saw true politics only in individual educational influence (521 D: *οἶμαι . . . ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικά*), and rejected Callicles' exhortations to him to take an active part in the rule of the state.

Now we see that already in the first book of the *Republic* Plato is conscious of the duty of obtaining political power in order to avoid the penalty of being ruled by his inferiors (347 C: *τῆς ζημίας μεγίστη τὸ ὑπὸ πονηροτέρου ἄρχεσθαι*). The three different kinds of men are also in the same passage opposed to each other (347 B: *φιλότιμόν τε καὶ φιλάργυρον—οἱ ἀγαθοί*) very much as in the *Phaedo* (82 C: *φιλοσοφοῦντες—φιλοχρήματοι—φιλότιμοι*). As in the *Phaedo* we see here the origin of the threefold partition of the soul. In the *Phaedo* Plato puts on one side the philosopher, and on the other side those who are not philosophers, almost identifying the ambitious and the money-lover (*Phaedo* 68 C: the opposite of the philosopher is named *φιλοσώματος* and subdivided: *ὁ αὐτὸς δέ που οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἤτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφότερα*). Here, likewise, we have not a direct trichotomy but a dichotomy with a subsequent division of one of the two parts, without a definite name for the third part, for which in the *Phaedo* the term *φιλόσοφος* is used. This seems to show that B. I is

Classification of men as in the *Phaedo*.

Difference of terms places the first book nearer to the *Gorgias*. Relation to the *Phaedo*

earlier than the *Phaedo*, and we find a confirmation of it in the circumstance that for the lover of money the word φιλάργυρος is used, as in the *Gorgias* (515 E: Περικλέα πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίους φιλαργύρους), while in the *Phaedo* this word is replaced by φιλοχρήματος, which also frequently recurs as a constant term in the later books of the *Republic*. The same relation between the *Phaedo* and the first book results from the comparison of the following passages:

results also from the different expression of the view that life is peculiar to soul.

Rep. I. 353 D, after a long enumeration of ἔργα (ἵππου, 352 E, ὀφθαλμῶν, etc.) follows: μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε σκέψαι· ψυχῆς ἔστι τι ἔργον, ὃ ἄλλῳ τῶν ὄντων οὐδ' ἂν ἑνὶ πράξαις, . . . τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ ἢ ψυχῇ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδοῖμεν, καὶ φαίμεν ἴδια ἐκείνης εἶναι;—οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ.—τί δ' αὖ τὸ ζῆν; ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι; μάλιστα.

Phaedo 105 C: without any preliminary explanation of what ἔργον means, or of what activities of the soul constitute life, comes the question: Ἀποκρίνου . . . ᾧ ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι, ζῶν ἔσται; Ὅι ἂν ψυχή, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἢ δ' ὅς.

It seems improbable that Plato should have explained his thought about life as a peculiar power of soul with such a series of inductions, if the result had been earlier stated to be evident, and on the other side, the short statement of the *Phaedo* is best justified by the more elementary exposition preceding it. It is not the length of an explanation which decides the question of priority, because a longer elucidation might be a supplement to a previous short statement of the question. But here we have on one side an elementary induction, and on the other side the result of this induction quoted as evident truth. Under these circumstances the longer explanation may be reasonably held to be the earlier.

This, based on long inductions in the *Republic*, stated as evident in the *Phaedo*.

The position of Book I between the *Gorgias* and *Phaedo* is further confirmed by the notion of the peculiar virtue of the soul, which appears here as a development of what in the *Gorgias* was named the peculiar order in a soul:

Order in the soul, mentioned in the

Gorgias, here developed.

Gorg. 506 E: *τάξει τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου . . . κόσμος τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὁ ἑκάστου οἰκεῖος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων . . . καὶ ψυχὴ κόσμον ἔχουσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἀμείνων τῆς ἀκοσμήτου.*

Rep. 353 E: *ἆρ' οὖν ποτὲ ψυχὴ τὰ αὐτῆς ἔργα εὖ ἀπεργάσεται στερομένη τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς, ἢ ἀδύνατον; —'Αδύνατον—'Ανάγκη ἄρα κακῇ ψυχῇ κακῶς ἄρχειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῇ δὲ ἀγαθῇ πάντα ταῦτα εὖ πράττειν.* Cf. 335 B: *τῶν κυνῶν ἀρετή*, also *τῶν ἵππων.*

Specific energies of the senses recognised, but without insistence.

The notion of a peculiar power of the soul is introduced in connection with the observation that each kind of perception also depends upon a peculiar faculty, resulting in a special activity, which cannot be fulfilled by any other instrument than the corresponding organ of sense (352 E: *ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἴδοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς; οὐ δῆτα . . . ἀκούσαις ἄλλῳ ἢ ὠσίν; οὐδαμῶς.* 353 B C: *ἆρ' ἄν ποτε ὄμματα τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον καλῶς ἀπεργάσαιντο μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὑτῶν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν . . .*). This is a clear statement of the theory known in our century as the law of specific energies of the senses. But Plato did not give any special importance to this observation, and it served him only as an analogy tending to establish his general view of human faculties. However, a variety of psychic faculties is not yet discovered in the first book, and the soul as in the *Phaedo* is spoken of as one indivisible whole.

Books II–IV

The second, third, and fourth books of the *Republic* represent the primitive state.

These three books, together equal in size to the *Gorgias*, form one whole, and represent the primitive state, including some considerations on poetry and primary education. The end of this part does not exactly coincide with the end of the fourth book, because p. 445 B begins a new argument, the explanation of a variety of states corresponding to the variety of souls, very soon interrupted at the beginning of the fifth book by the digression on the equality of the sexes. If we disregard this last page of the fourth book, connecting it with B. V and preparing for B. VIII–IX, we are justi-

fied in treating B. II–IV as representing one important division of the *Republic*, independently of the question whether the following parts were added immediately afterwards or later.

Threefold partition of the soul based on law of contradiction, which appears here not only as a law of thought, but as a metaphysical principle.

We see here chiefly one theory which belongs more to psychology than to logic, but which is indispensable for an adequate appreciation of Plato's logical progress. This is the theory of the threefold partition of the soul, introduced here for the first time and based on the logical law of contradiction. Plato discovered a truth of which he evidently was not yet aware in writing the *Phaedo*, namely that the soul has multiple opposed activities unified only through constant efforts (443 E: *ἕνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν*). He acknowledges the great difficulty of deciding whether the different activities do not belong to one and the same soul (436 A B: *χαλεπὰ διορίσασθαι ἀξίως λόγου . . . εἰ ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ καθ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν πράττομεν . . . ἢ τρισὶν οὖσιν ἄλλο ἄλλῳ*). But he invents a safe method for the solution of his new problem. He puts it down as an unquestionable truth, that the same thing cannot act or be acted upon simultaneously in contrary ways (436 B: *ταὐτὸν τἀναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν κατὰ ταὐτόν γε καὶ προς ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἐθελήσει ἅμα*, repeated 437 A, 439 B).

This sharp and general formulation of the law of contradiction not only as a law of thought, as in the *Phaedo*, but for the first time as a law of being, as a metaphysical axiom, repeated several times with great insistence, is a very important step, not easily to be accounted for by those who believe the first part of the *Republic* to belong to about the same time as the *Protagoras*. Also the terminology used to express this truth betrays a stage much more advanced. Plato speaks here as a philosopher already accustomed to exact definition, not the youthful inquirer hesitating and declining the definitive solution of every proposed problem, as he appeared in the *Protagoras* and earlier dialogues. He is now familiar with the hypothetical method (437 A: *ὑποθέμενοι ὡς τούτου οὕτως*

Plato admits that each hypothesis is taken for granted

provisionally, and may be revoked later.

ἔχοντος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προίωμεν, ὁμολογήσαντες, ἐάν ποτε ἄλλῃ φανῇ ταῦτα ἢ ταύτῃ, πάντα ἡμῖν τὰ ἀπὸ τούτου ξυμβαίνοντα λελυμένα ἔσεσθαι) and proceeds according to the logical rule given in the *Phaedo* (100 A), arguing out the consequences of the most probable hypothesis.

Three faculties of the soul, called also kinds or parts, do not exactly correspond to will, feeling, and reason.

This leads him to the conclusion that as our sensual desires are frequently in contradiction with our reason, desire and reason must be different from each other (439 C D). He thus establishes three powers or faculties of the soul for which he does not yet use the term δύναμις (B. V 477 C: φήσομεν δυνάμεις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν ὄντων), calling them εἴδη (402 C, 437 D, 439 E, 440 E), γένη (443 D), or μέρη (442 C), with some hesitation as to their relation to the whole. He seems to have looked upon the faculties as organs or instruments of the soul, according to the analogy of the senses, which are instruments of the body. The three Platonic faculties do not exactly correspond to will, feeling, and reason, which have been later generally used for the classification of psychical acts. Plato's λογιστικόν (439 D: τὸ ᾧ λογίζεται λογιστικὸν προσαγορεύοντες τῆς ψυχῆς), though it is apparently the organ of reasoning, includes also the will-power, because it could otherwise not command (441 E: τῷ λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει). Plato did not distinguish between pure objective thought and the decisions of will resulting from a certain intellectual knowledge. For him knowledge and the will to act according to this knowledge were one. Again, he did not link into one all kinds of feelings, but separated sensual feelings, under the general appellation of desire, from the moral feeling. Thus two of his faculties (ἐπιθυμία and θυμός) correspond to one of later psychology, while he finds one faculty where later the will has been distinguished from the intellect. This union of will and intellect, as taught by Plato, is preserved in the current use of the word reason, even in the philosophical theories of Spinoza, and in the 'Praktische Vernunft' of Kant.

Knowledge and the will to act according to it belong to one faculty, while sensual feeling is separated from moral feeling.

Plato assumes a gradation of faculties, placing first

reason, then the moral feeling (439 E: *ᾧ θυμούμεθα*—441 E: *τῷ θυμοειδεῖ προσήκει ὑπηκόῳ εἶναι καὶ ξυμμάχῳ τούτου* (*τοῦ λογιστικοῦ*), also 441 A), and at the lowest stage the sensuous desire (439 D: *τὸ ᾧ ἐρᾷ τε καὶ πεινῇ καὶ διψῇ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἐπτόηται ἀλογιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν*). He argues from the contradictions and conflicts of these three faculties to their independent existence. First, the sensuous desires are frequently opposed to reason and moral feeling, then the moral feeling itself is developed earlier than the reason (441 B: *θυμοῦ μὲν εὐθὺς γενόμενα μεστά ἐστι, λογισμοῦ δ' ἔνιοι μὲν ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν οὐδέποτε μεταλαμβάνειν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὀψέ ποτε*). Here we notice that *τὸ θυμοειδές* does not entirely correspond even to the notion of moral feeling, because it could not then be attributed to animals (441 B: *ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις ἄν τις ἴδοι ὃ λέγεις*).

Opposition of each faculty to the other.

Difference in their growth.

It is a very curious circumstance that the term *θυμοειδές*, very frequent in this part of the *Republic*, and also in B. VIII and IX, is entirely absent from B. V–VII and from B. X, recurring besides these parts of the *Republic* only once in Plato in the *Timaeus*, in connection with a recapitulation of the contents of the *Republic*. It seems that Plato had a passing fancy for this term and soon recognised it as insufficient, as he clearly avows later in B. VI (504 A: *τριττὰ εἴδη ψυχῆς διαστησάμενοι* . . . B: *ἐρρήθη τὰ τότε τῆς μὲν ἀκριβείας, ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐφαίνετο, ἐλλιπῆ* . . .). Here also he already confesses the imperfection of the method used (435 D: *εὖ γ' ἴσθι . . . ἀκριβῶς μὲν τοῦτο ἐκ τοιούτων μεθόδων, οἵαις νῦν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις χρώμεθα, οὐ μή ποτε λάβωμεν*) and announces a 'longer way' (435 D: *ἄλλη γὰρ μακροτέρα καὶ πλείων ὁδὸς ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄγουσα*) leading with a greater certainty to truth. This longer way, however, is not fully shown in the *Republic*, and when later, in the sixth book, Glaucon insists on having it explained (506 D: *ὥσπερ δικαιοσύνης πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διῆλθες, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διέλθῃς*), Socrates con-

Limitation in the use of the term *θυμοειδές*.

Imperfection of method confessed and a longer way announced, but not fully shown.

The idea of the good could not be taught by Socrates.

fesses himself unable to do it (506 E: *αὐτὸ μὲν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τἀγαθόν, ἐάσωμεν τὸ νῦν εἶναι· πλέον γάρ μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ὁρμὴν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοὶ τὰ νῦν*), and returns to his beautiful allegories and metaphors. It was really beyond the reach not only of the historic Socrates, but even of the Platonic Socrates. When Plato set himself to expound the 'longer way,' he selected as his spokesmen Parmenides and the Eleatic Stranger, and made Socrates a hearer of their wisdom.

The mention of a longer way is an allusion to the theory of ideas. In the *Symposium* and the *Phaedo*, also, the theory of ideas was not constantly referred to.

The allusion to the longer way in B. IV is very valuable as a chronological sign, because it dismisses at once the supposition that this part of the *Republic* could have been written before the discovery of the theory of ideas. Plato looked upon his newly discovered treasure as a *mysterium* too deep to be constantly and familiarly referred to. In the *Symposium* the greatest part of the dialogue does not contain any allusion to the *αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν*, and then by a surprise the beautiful vision is presented in the speech of Diotima, suddenly as it had appeared to Plato himself in his meditations. The same order and method were observed also in the *Phaedo*. In the beginning (up to p. 65 D) there is no mention of ideas, then the ideas are mentioned as notions (*δίκαιον αὐτὸ* 65 D), these notions are slowly worked out into independence of the senses (74 C: *οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρ' ἐστὶν ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον*), and only after the final objections of Simmias and Cebes, after the criticism of Anaxagoras and other philosophers, appears the theory of ideas introduced ironically as something well known and implied in the preceding argument (100 B: *οὐδὲν καινόν, ἀλλ' ἅπερ ἀεὶ καὶ ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων*). This rhetorical artifice of Plato, which deceived some inquirers so far as to make them doubt the fact that the *Phaedo* is the first written exposition of the theory of ideas, is repeated on a larger scale in the *Republic*. Campbell (*Rep.* II. p. 11) compares the late revelation of the ideas in B. V with the *peripeteia* of a drama.

It is an artifice peculiar to Plato to introduce successively new

Sybel[227] explained this way of proceeding by educational motives. It is quite natural that Plato should reserve the application of the theory of ideas for special occasions, and he found no such occasion in the first sketch of his political views. It was sufficient for him to allude to the longer way.

points of view of greater importance.

The threefold partition of the soul is not introduced as a psychological problem, nor as subsidiary to some logical investigation, but simply in order to show the parallelism between the three classes in a state (rulers, soldiers, and middle class) and the parts of an individual soul. This analogy between the individual and the state, which can boast of such a long history after it had been invented by Plato, is not the idea of a young Socratic pupil, but of the Master of the Academy, and is a consequence of the theory of ideas. When he began to generalise widely and to seek in everything the ruling idea, he thought that he discovered an identity of principle between the state and the individual, and this led him from the individualistic ethics of the *Gorgias* to the politics of the *Republic*. The transition is already indicated in the *Symposium* (210 c: *τίκτειν λόγους τοιούτους ζητεῖν, οἵτινες ποιήσουσι βελτίους τοὺς νέους, ἵνα ἀναγκασθῇ αὖ θεάσασθαι τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καλὸν καὶ τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ὅτι πᾶν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ξυγγενές ἐστιν*), and this indication has been taken for an allusion to the *Republic* by those who cling to the belief of a *Republic* written very early, within the first ten years after the death of Socrates.

Analogy between state and individual denotes a later stage of thought than the purely individual point of view of the Socratic dialogues.

Such a belief is founded on a gross misconception of the relations between Plato and Aristophanes, and illustrates the uselessness of interpreting Plato from

Relation between Plato and Aristophanes.

[227] L. von Sybel, *Platons Technik an Symposion und Euthydem nachgewiesen*, Marburg 1889; of the same author on the same subject: *Platons Symposion, ein Programm der Akademie*, Marburg 1888; on some smaller articles of the same author, see a review by Natorp in *Philosophische Monatshefte*, vol. xxvi. p. 449.

uncertain allusions found in the works of others, instead of explaining him from his own writings. There is much to show that, though the method in the first books of the *Republic* is avowedly elementary, the threefold partition of the soul represents a later stage than the *Phaedo*. This has been best proved by Schultess[228] (p. 55), whose arguments have never been refuted. The theory of three parts of the soul, maintained by Plato in the *Timaeus*, is a later theory than the simplicity of the soul affirmed in the *Phaedo*, and could not be left out of consideration in the *Phaedo* if Plato professed it at that time. We have in the tenth book of the *Republic* a sample of the manner in which Plato deals with this subject afterwards. Though he speaks of the immortality of the soul generally, he adds there expressly that the true nature of the soul, its multiplicity or simplicity, will best be seen in the next life (612 A: *τότ' ἄν τις ἴδοι αὐτῆς τὴν ἀληθῆ φύσιν, εἴτε πολυειδὴς εἴτε μονοειδής*). A similar allusion to the parts of the soul would certainly be found in the *Phaedo*, if the *Phaedo* had been written after the first books of the *Republic*.

Argumentation of Schultess in favour of later date of the *Republic* never refuted. Partition of the soul common to the *Republic* with the *Timaeus*, while absent from the *Phaedo*.

The later date of this work is also seen in another peculiarity of Plato's later writings, already visible in the *Phaedo* but further developed in the *Republic* and even later. Plato takes every possible opportunity to establish subtle logical distinctions in which we may discern the trace of his oral teaching in the Academy. He is delighted to bring such distinctions into a very concise form, which requires an explanation and is repeated afterwards. Any unprejudiced reader will recognise that a phrase like: '*ὅσα γ' ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναί του, τὰ μὲν ποιὰ ἄττα ποιοῦ τινός ἐστιν, τὰ δ' αὐτὰ ἕκαστα αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου μόνον*' (438 B, repeated 438 D) requires some logical training to be understood at first reading. Such phrases would be vainly sought for even in the *Cratylus* or the *Symposium*, and they are far above the sophisms of the *Euthydemus*.

Subtle logical distinctions begin with the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. Statements in a very condensed form requiring logical training

[228] Fritz Schultess, *Platonische Forschungen*, Bonn 1875.

The Platonic Socrates delivers this logical riddle as if it were something quite natural, but Plato's experience as a teacher showed him that it was too difficult for the ordinary reader, and Glaucon answers at once that he does not understand, in order to get the necessary explanation from Socrates. Socrates explains by a number of examples that correlated terms remain correlated after the addition of a qualification to each of them. If a science is the science of a knowledge, then mathematical science will be the science of mathematical knowledge. Plato pushes his caution so far as to observe that the qualification of both terms need not consist in the same word, as for instance the science of health is not healthy. After this lengthy explanation he repeats his logical theorem almost in the same words, and concludes with another example, until Glaucon is satisfied and acknowledges himself to have understood (438 E). This digression was not indispensable to the progress of the argument, and appears to have been introduced not to meet objections really made by somebody, but only as a result of Plato's increasing fondness for logic, and his experience about wrong inferences from *dictum simpliciter* (*ἁπλῶς* 438 E) *ad dictum secundum quid*, a sophism exemplified already in the *Euthydemus*, but treated methodically for the first time in the *Republic*.

to be understood, and explained by examples, then repeated. This produces digressions not indispensable to the progress of argument, and shows increased interest in logic.

A similar logical digression gives us the method of exclusion or of remainders, by which one part of a whole is investigated through elimination of the other parts (428 A: *ὥσπερ ἄλλων τινῶν τεττάρων, εἰ ἕν τι ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτῶν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν . . . εἰ τὰ τρία πρότερον ἐγνωρίσαμεν, αὐτῷ ἂν τούτῳ ἐγνώριστο τὸ ζητούμενον*). This is here introduced as leading to the definition of justice after separating from the general notion of virtue the three other virtues which together with justice constitute, according to Plato, the whole of virtue, namely temperance, courage, and wisdom. But if we look at the end of the discussion we see that the method of exclusion

Method of exclusion introduced for the purpose of a definition of justice, then not used, because at the end justice appears

to be the general source of other virtues, not co-ordinated to the three other virtues.

has not been applied to the particular case for which it was introduced, because when justice appears at last, it is not discovered as the remaining part of virtue. After the elucidation of the three virtues corresponding to the three parts of the soul and to the three classes of citizens, Plato pretends to be still in the dark about justice (432 C: *δύσβατός γέ τις ὁ τόπος φαίνεται καὶ ἐπίσκιος· ἔστι γοῦν σκοτεινὸς καὶ δυσδιερεύνητος*) and takes this opportunity to invent one word and to use another in a new meaning for describing this special darkness. It is the same laborious play as later in the *Parmenides*: justice is found not as a virtue co-ordinated to the three others, but as the source of them (433 B: *ὃ πᾶσιν ἐκείνοις τὴν δύναμιν παρέσχεν, ὥστε ἐγγενέσθαι*).

In earlier works wisdom had the first place, now given to justice, as also in the first book of the *Laws*.

Here also we find a point of view in advance of the *Phaedo*, in which wisdom was the chief virtue, and every other virtue to be exchanged for wisdom (*Phaedo* 69 B). The prevalence of wisdom is proper to the earlier thought of Plato, as we see in the *Protagoras* (352 D, cf. 357 C) and *Euthydemus* (282 A). In the *Symposium* likewise the first place is given to *φρόνησις* (209 A: *ψυχῇ προσήκει τεκεῖν φρόνησίν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν*), and it is a new departure in the *Republic* to recognise the peculiar position of justice as a link between all other virtues. This view, maintained also in the first book of the *Laws* (631 C: *ἐκ (φρονήσεως καὶ σωφροσύνης) μετ' ἀνδρείας κραθέντων τρίτον ἂν εἴη δικαιοσύνη . . . τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν*), is the later view of Plato, while in his earlier works justice was only a part of virtue, co-ordinate with holiness or temperance (*Prot.* 329 C). In the *Meno* (79 D: *μὴ τοίνυν μηδὲ σὺ ἔτι ζητουμένης ἀρετῆς ὅλης ὅ τι ἔστιν οἷον διὰ τῶν ταύτης μορίων ἀποκρινόμενος δηλώσειν αὐτὴν ὁτῳοῦν, ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τούτῳ τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ λέγων*) the identification of virtue with justice is even expressly denied, while already in the first book of the *Republic* justice appears to be the essence of virtue (353 E: *ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς δικαιοσύνην*—335 C: *δικαιοσύνη ἀνθρωπεία ἀρετή*), a position which seems to have been

again modified in favour of *νοῦς* and *φρόνησις* in the *Timaeus* and the later books of the *Laws*.

Importance of justice results from the theory of ideas.

We may admit that the increasing importance of justice in the Platonic ethics is one of the practical results of the theory of ideas, which required at the summit of Being an *ἰδέα ἀγαθοῦ*, prepared already in the *Symposium* (212 A) and in the *Phaedo* (99 C). Also in the second book of the *Republic* we meet the conception of good as a self-sufficient aim (357 B: *τοιόνδε τι ἀγαθόν, ὃ δεξαίμεθ' ἂν ἔχειν οὐ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐφιέμενοι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα ἀσπαζόμενοι*), closely related to that of Aristotle in his *Ethics*.

Relation to the *Phaedo*.

For the date of this part of the *Republic* as coming next after the *Phaedo* and the preceding dialogues, we find some other hints which it will be sufficient to mention briefly:

Speech and thought.

1. Speech as an imitation of thought (382 B C: *τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐστὶ παθήματος καὶ ὕστερον γεγονὸς εἴδωλον*) seems to refer to the *Cratylus* (430 B: *ὄνομα μίμημα τοῦ πράγματος*).

Knowledge and opinion well distinguished though the terms changed.

2. *ἐπιστήμη* is opposed to *δόξα* (444 A: *σοφίαν τὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν ταύτῃ τῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμην . . . ἀμαθίαν . . . δόξαν*) as in the *Meno* (86 A, cf. 97 C, 98 B). In the *Meno* the distinction is introduced as new, and in the *Republic* it is assumed to be generally known. That Plato again in the *Republic* also currently uses *ἐπιστήμη* in a primitive meaning, equivalent to *τέχνη*, signifies nothing, because a careful fixity of terminology was not yet acquired by Plato, as we see even later in B. V–VII.

Simplicity and unity of God, along with incidental mention of traditional gods.

3. God is free from error and lying (382 D: *ποιητὴς μὲν ἄρα ψευδὴς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι . . .* E: *πάντῃ ἄρα ἀψευδὲς τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ θεῖον*). This agrees with the *Cratylus* (438 C: *οἴει ἐναντία ἂν ἐτίθετο αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὁ θείς, ὢν δαίμων τις ἢ θεός;*), only here the unity and simplicity of God is insisted upon, which marks an advance beyond the traditional polytheism of earlier dialogues, which still survives in some expressions (381 C: *ἀδύνατον θεῷ ἐθέλειν*

αὐτὸν ἀλλοιοῦν, ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικε, κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος ὢν εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν μένει ἀεὶ ἁπλῶς ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ μορφῇ). But an occasional mention of more than one god, occurring in a criticism of traditional polytheism, is no evidence against Plato's progress towards monotheism, as we see from other passages in which *ὁ θεός* is used in a monotheistic sense (382 E: *ὁ θεὸς ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἔν τε ἔργῳ καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ*; also 379 C: *ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, . . . τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος*, and elsewhere 379 A, 380 D, etc. Cf. *Phaedo* 62 C: *θεός*). The doctrine of one God, a perfect Being, developed in the *Republic*, is adhered to in the *Timaeus* and *Laws*, while in earlier dialogues up to the *Symposium* a plurality of gods is either tacitly implied or expressly admitted.

Doctrine of one God peculiar to later Platonism.

4. A curious contradiction to a statement of the *Symposium* is contained in the principle 'one man one work' (394 E: *εἷς ἕκαστος ἓν μὲν ἂν ἐπιτήδευμα καλῶς ἐπιτηδεύοι, πολλὰ δ' οὔ*) when applied specially to the production and acting of comedy and tragedy (395 A: *οὐδὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων εἶναι δύο μιμήματα δύνανται οἱ αὐτοὶ ἅμα εὖ μιμεῖσθαι, οἷον κωμῳδίαν καὶ τραγῳδίαν ποιοῦντες*), while in the *Symposium* Socrates is made to prove the identity of the comic and tragic poet (223 D). This discrepancy is in close relation to the change of Plato's attitude towards the poets. While in the *Symposium* the tragic poet and the comic poet are represented as friends of Socrates; and Homer and Hesiod, as deserving immortal fame, are placed in one line with Lycurgus and Solon (209 D E), Plato now despises poetry as a mere *μίμησις* and banishes Homer from his state. It is strange that some erudite critics, who readily believe in an irreconcilable enmity between Plato and Isocrates, and take such a supposition for a firm basis of Platonic chronology, at the same time admit the possibility of Plato's reconciliation with the poets, which would have taken place if the *Symposium* were written after the *Republic* or *Phaedrus*. It is much

Division of labour.

Change of attitude towards the poets is definitive, and remains up to Plato's latest age.

No reconciliation possible, and thus

less probable that a philosopher like Plato should remain all his life hostile to a living man, than that he should become untrue to fundamental principles once recognised and repeatedly urged. We know from the last books of the *Laws* (941 B, 967 C, cf. 890 A, 964 C, and many other passages) that Plato up to his latest age thought poets dangerous, and we have no reason whatever to believe that he changed his opinion after he had written the *Republic*. Thence it results that the *Republic*, at least from B. II onwards, must be later than the *Symposium*.

the *Symposium* must have been earlier.

5. While in the *Symposium* the educational influence of Beauty began with the love of beautiful bodies (210 A), in the *Republic* harmony and rhythm are acknowledged to be the chief factors in education (400 D–401 C) and are said to creep into the soul unobserved (401 C). If we remember that the same view recurs in the *Laws* (665 E) and *Timaeus* (47 D), it will be easy to recognise that also in this respect the *Republic* is later than the *Symposium*.

Educational importance of harmony and rhythm.

6. The purification of the senses (411 D: *διακαθαιρομένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων*) is a very concise term scarcely used before the *Phaedo*, where the necessity of such a purification is explained at length.

Purification of senses.

7. The love of the Beauty of the soul (402 D) is here mentioned as entirely independent of corporeal Beauty, while in the *Symposium* (210 B) such a love is a higher degree to which the pupil is led, after beginning with the love of physical Beauty. In the *Symposium* sensual love as a lower degree is almost excused, and here we find it absolutely condemned (403 B).

Love of the Beauty of the soul.

8. Although the method of exposition is a popular one and not based on the theory of ideas, in some passages terms first explained in the *Symposium* and *Phaedo* are employed as if they were familiar. This occurs apparently against the author's intention, but furnishes us with a valuable evidence against Krohn's opinion that the theory of ideas was entirely ignored by the author of the first

Terms taken from the theory of ideas, occurring probably against

the author's intention, betray later date of composition.

books of the *Republic*. This would leave no room for a distinction between *αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἴδη* (402 C) and *εἰκόνας αὐτῶν*, nor for *καλὰ ἤθη ἐν τῷ εἴδει ὁμολογοῦντα ἐκείνοις καὶ ξυμφωνοῦντα, τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοντα τύπου*, as a *κάλλιστον θέαμα τῷ δυναμένῳ θεᾶσθαι* (402 D). This power of superhuman vision here invoked is certainly the same which we know from the *Symposium* and *Phaedo*. Nor are traces of the theory of ideas limited to these passages. We read also *τί τ' ἔστιν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό* (358 B)—*αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην* (363 A)—*αὐτὸ δ' ἑκάτερον τῇ αὑτοῦ δυνάμει ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἔχοντος ψυχῇ* (366 E).

Definition of courage compared with that of the *Laches*. Praise of justice in the *Gorgias* and *Republic*. Caution necessary with rhetorical figures.

9. It need scarcely be added that the definition of courage (430 B: *δύναμις καὶ σωτηρία διὰ παντὸς δόξης ὀρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου δεινῶν πέρι καὶ μή*), which has been held by an eminent critic to be earlier than the *Laches* because of the promise to treat this subject again (430 C), shows a marked advance beyond the discussion on courage in the *Laches*. And the supposition that the *Gorgias* is later because Glaucon says that nobody has as yet praised justice as it deserves (358 D) is likewise based on a misconception. The *Gorgias* cannot be looked upon by Plato at this stage as an adequate encomium on justice, because it deals with the more special question whether to suffer wrongs is better than to do them, not to dwell on the absurdity of drawing matter-of-fact inferences from a rhetorical figure. Such assertions as that about the praise of love in the *Symposium* or the praise of justice in the *Republic* cannot be taken literally; any more than Isocrates' saying in the *Euagoras* that nobody before him has written an encomium on a living man.

Relation of the *Republic* to Aristophanes' *Ecclesiasusae* not justified.

The above considerations fully confirm the conclusions about the date of the first part of the *Republic* which resulted from our study of style. There cannot be the smallest doubt that the first part of the *Republic*, except the first book which is probably earlier, was written after the *Symposium* and *Phaedo*, and that therefore it is impossible to admit that Aristophanes in 391, when he

produced his *Ecclesiazusae*, meant Plato's (IV. 424 A) short allusion to the community of wives, or his later exposition in B. V. If this comedy were a parody of Plato's *Republic*, then Plato would not have represented Aristophanes a few years afterwards with all the sympathy and friendship which are evident in the *Symposium*. It is a strange inconsequence to believe that Plato on one side would feel a lifelong resentment for the insignificant attacks of Isocrates, and then to represent him as indifferent to a ribald parody of his most cherished ideals. Between equality of women and the rule of women there is a great difference. If Plato in the *Timaeus* (18 c D) and Aristotle in his *Politics* (1266 a 34) both clearly say that Plato was the first, and according to Aristotle the only writer, who advocated community of wives, then it is evident that neither Plato nor Aristotle recognised the similarity which some modern critics have seen between the absurd caricature of mad women in the *Ecclesiazusae* and the plea for equality of sexes brought forward by Plato as the result of his meditations. The chief point for Plato was the unity of the state and the equality of the sexes. He was no advocate of abnormal sexual relations. The progress of mankind has not confirmed Plato's view, but his opinion cannot have been such an absurdity in the eyes of Aristophanes as it appeared to some modern readers. That the conception of a community of wives, on which Plato laid no special stress, was not a wholly novel conception, we see from a fragment of Euripides (quoted by Clem. Alex. *Strom.* vi. p. 751).

Otherwise we should have to change also the date of the *Symposium*.

Similarity between *Republic* and *Ecclesiazusae* not recognised by Aristotle or by Plato.

Community of wives suggested before Plato.

The coincidences quoted between the *Ecclesiazusae* and the *Republic* refer chiefly to the fifth book, and are not very striking. The subject need not be further discussed, as all consideration of it is precluded by the date of the *Republic*, which is placed after 385 B.C. according to our comparisons of style as well as of logical theories. So long as it is supposed that the

Coincidences between Aristophanes and Plato irrelevant.

Exaggerated importance has been given to them.

Ecclesiazusae were produced 391 B.C., there is no possibility whatever of admitting that they refer to Plato's *Republic*. And if some eminent writers accepted this supposed relation, they acted like Schoene and Teichmüller in the question of style: giving an exaggerated importance to a single observation of doubtful value. It is an error of method to rely upon uncertain external allusions more than on the study of contents or style. If our information seems to involve contradictions, we must carefully weigh against each other the evidence in favour of both contradictory views. We have seen above a great number of sound arguments proving that the *Republic* is later than the *Phaedo* in style and contents. This gives us a consistent view of Plato's evolution which cannot be overthrown by the very uncertain supposition that a play in which Plato is not at all mentioned, written by one of Plato's friends, could be intended as an attack on Plato's greatest work.

External allusions less certain than the result of a comparative study of style and contents.

Books V–VII

Interruption of the classification of constitutions by the question about position of women. This form of introducing a new subject might be intentional, or indicate

At the beginning of the fifth book Adeimantos interrupts Socrates' classification of constitutions by a question about the position of women in the ideal Republic. The thread of the argument here interrupted is resumed only in B. VIII, and thus B. V–VII form a natural division of the whole and deserve to be considered apart. The view has been advanced that a more important division begins towards the end of B. V, p. 471 c, where the question of the rule of philosophers is raised, which fills the whole of B. VI–VII, offering many opportunities for logical reflections. But the transition from the particulars dealt with in the first part of B. V to problems of the highest philosophy is made quite plausible and natural, while the interruption at the beginning of B. V might be intentional and made in order to attract the reader's special attention to the

new subject, by the rhetorical artifice of an apparently unexpected difficulty. The subjects dealt with in B. V–VII belong to the plan of the whole, and are not an afterthought, though this part of the *Republic*, if we trust stylistic comparisons, seems to have been completed somewhat later than the following books. If it is once recognised, as it must be on the authority of the same evidence, that there could not be any considerable distance of time between this part and the preceding fourth book, it becomes almost indifferent whether B. VI–VII were completed later or earlier than B. VIII–X. Admitting that they are probably written after B. IX and even after B. X, we do not agree for that reason with those who deny the unity of the *Republic* and the architectonic skill with which the parts of the whole structure are coordinated.

that B. V–VII have been inserted later at that point, though they belonged to the plan of the whole.

The Platonic *Republic* would not be complete without the rule of philosophers, and it is irrelevant whether the explanation of this condition of the ideal state is better dealt with before or after the investigation of imperfect governments. As it stands, it crowns the picture of the ideal state and prepares the way for a representation of less perfect states. Even the discussion about the equality of sexes and the digression about international limitations of warfare (in B. V) are not out of place as an introduction to the central part of the *Republic*. These essential peculiarities of the ideal state could be realised only under the rule of philosophers. Thus we are justified in leaving to this part of the *Republic* the place given to it by Plato, and in limiting our inquiry for the present to the relation between B. V–VII and the preceding, with reference to what has been already proved of earlier writings.

The rule of philosophers an essential condition of the Platonic *Republic*.

The theory of ideas no longer takes the form of an hypothesis, as in the *Phaedo*, but appears as a well-established truth, and the terms εἶδος and ἰδέα begin to be used currently to denote ideas, along with the familiar

Theory of ideas appears to be

familiar, and the terms *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* are freely used. Probable reference to the *Phaedo* and *Symposium* compared with a similar allusion in the *Phaedo* to earlier exposition.

terms *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό*, or *αὐτό*, or *ὃ ἔστιν*. We have here an idea of beauty (479 A: *ἰδέαν τινὰ αὐτοῦ κάλλους*), of each Being (486 D: *τοῦ ὄντος ἰδέαν ἑκάστου*), of justice (479 E: *αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον*), of injustice (476 A), of the good (505 A, 517 B, 534 C: *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν*), and of all other general notions. These ideas remain always the same (479 E: *ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ὄντα*, repeated 484 B), and each of them is the unity of many particulars (507 B: *αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων, ἃ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν, πάλιν αὖ κατ' ἰδέαν μίαν ἑκάστου ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης τιθέντες, ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον προσαγορεύομεν*). This is here stated to have been already frequently repeated (507 A: *τά τ' ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ῥηθέντα καὶ ἄλλοτε ἤδη πολλάκις εἰρημένα*). Such a reference to the theory of ideas as familiar to Socrates can only allude to the *Symposium* and *Phaedo*, and is more explicit than the famous designation of the ideas in the *Phaedo* as *τὰ πολυθρύλητα* (100 B), which has appeared to some critics a reason for placing the *Phaedo* after the *Phaedrus* and *Republic*. In the *Phaedo* the mention '*ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεὶ*' (76 D) does not even necessarily refer to the theory of ideas, but only to the notions of the beautiful, the good, &c.: 'if the beautiful, the good, and all similar attributes, about which we are always talking, have real existence,' not: 'if, as we are always repeating, the good, &c., have real existence.' In the same way '*τὰ πολυθρύλητα*' (100 B) may refer to moral ideas generally, and not to their transcendental existence as substances. But in *Rep.* V the theory of ideas is manifestly referred to.

No fixity of terminology. Frequent use of metaphors.

Moreover, no special stress is laid in the *Republic* on the separate and independent existence of ideas. The ideas are an object of thought (507 C: *τὰς ἰδέας νοεῖσθαί φαμεν, ὁρᾶσθαι δ' οὔ*). The relation of things to ideas is still described with the same terms (476 D: *αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα*) as in the *Phaedo* and *Symposium*, but how careless Plato was about the fixity of terms is evident if we consider that he speaks also of 'seeing' the idea of

the beautiful (476 B: *οἱ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν δυνατοὶ ἰέναι τε καὶ ὁρᾶν καθ' αὐτὸ . . . σπάνιοι ἂν εἶεν*). This is obviously a metaphor, which had been used also in the *Symposium* (210 E: *κατόψεταί τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν*), and means that the intellectual intuition of ideas is quite as immediate and objective as the sight of visible things. This knowledge of ideas is even much clearer than the ordinary knowledge based on perception (511 C: *σαφέστερον τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον . .*). Plato insists that the ideas are independent of the senses (532 A: *οὕτω ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρῇ, ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὁρμᾷ, καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ, πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσει λάβῃ*, cf. 537 D), and it seems as if the senses no longer enjoyed even the merit of remembering ideas through the similarity of our perception to absolute notions. This marks a development in the direction of pure idealism beyond the *Phaedo*. The similarity between concrete things and the ideas, however, continues to be maintained (476 C: *ὁ καλὰ μὲν πράγματα νομίζων, αὐτὸ δὲ κάλλος μὴ νομίζων . . . τὸ ὅμοιόν τῳ μὴ ὅμοιον ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἡγῆται εἶναι ᾧ ἔοικεν*), as the cause of errors, because every idea seems to be many, while it is really one (476 A: *πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν πέρι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ μὲν ἓν ἕκαστον εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἕκαστον*). The power or faculty of knowing the ideas as they are is here presented under different names, as *γνώμη* (476 D), *γνῶσις* (478 C, also 508 E), *ἐπιστήμη* (478 A), *νόησις* (532 B, 511 E), *νοῦς* (511 D), *τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις* (511 B).

Knowledge of ideas clearer than experience of the senses.

Similarity between things and ideas a cause of errors.

Power of knowing ideas has different names.

This variety of vocabulary need not awaken suspicion as to the perfect unity of thought in the theory. It was Plato's usual manner in that time, to use many names for his new ideas, and he blamed those who stick to names (454 A: *κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν*) as eristics, unable to classify notions accord-

Variety of vocabulary a result of Plato's position with

regard to language.

ing to natural species (454 A: διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἴδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν) and therefore using the art of contradiction (454 A: ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης) inferior to true logic.

Sub-division of intellectual faculties. Intuition of ideas the highest faculty; it depends on the idea of the Good.

Apart from the diversity of names it is evident that Plato has progressed since his first attempt at a classification of psychical acts, and that the *reason* (λογιστικόν) of B. IV is now subdivided into several distinct faculties (δυνάμεις 477 C, cf. 443 B, 518 C) among which the highest is the science or vision of ideas, or of true Being (τὸ ὂν παντελῶς 477 A, εἰλικρινῶς, ibidem, οὐσία 525 B, 534 A, &c.). This knowledge is infallible (477 E: ἀναμάρτητον), and is no longer as in the *Phaedo* based upon an ultimate hypothesis as the most probable truth, but upon a principle above every doubt (510 B: ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον, cf. 511 B: μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχήν, cf. 533 C, 534 B). The knowledge of this principle is not an inference, but an intuition, and Plato constantly uses metaphorical expressions taken from the senses of sight and touch to denote the immediate character of his highest knowledge (ἰδεῖν 511 A, 533 C, ἅπτεσθαι 511 B, ψυχῆς ὄμμα 533 D, ὁρᾶν 476 B, θεᾶσθαι 518 C, &c.).

Idea of the Good identical with final cause of the *Phaedo*. Plato shows only the way leading to it.

The principle itself, being the foundation of all this highest science, is the idea of the Good (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα μέγιστον μάθημα 505 A), identical with that δαιμονία ἰσχύς mentioned in the *Phaedo* (99 C) and there held to be beyond the reach of mankind (*Phaedo* 99 C D: ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὔτ' αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενόμην). Now Plato has found it, but he feels unable to show it to his readers (533 A: οὐκέτ' οἷός τ' ἔσει ἀκολουθεῖν) otherwise than by indicating the method of training, which leads to the evolution of the dialectical faculty. He says enough about his idea of Good to enable modern readers, who have gone through the prescribed training, and are familiar with abstraction, to distinguish what has been said metaphorically from the abstract meaning of his thoughts.

In order to under-

If we wish to understand Plato's idea of the Good, we

must bear in mind that mythical falsehoods have an educational value (382 C), and that he was carried off by the novelty and the sublime beauty of his subject into some exaggerations, which he confesses clearly towards the end of the whole logical digression (536 C: *ἐπελαθόμην ὅτι ἐπαίζομεν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐντεινάμενος εἶπον. λέγων γὰρ ἅμα ἔβλεψα πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, καὶ ἰδὼν προπηλακισμένην ἀναξίως, ἀγανακτήσας μοι δοκῶ καὶ ὥσπερ θυμωθεὶς τοῖς αἰτίοις σπουδαιότερον εἰπεῖν ἃ εἶπον*). In his indignation at the degraded condition of philosophy, Plato exalted her power and dignity. He does not add, in what particulars this exaggeration was contained, because the trifling correction introduced by this strange confession, namely the question of the most convenient age for dialectical studies, would not justify his apology.

stand it we must distinguish mythical representation from reasoning.

Exaggeration inevitable and confessed.

One property, at least, attributed to the idea of Good cannot be taken literally.[229] Plato says the idea of Good exceeds even Being itself in power and dignity (509 B: *οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος*) and is the first cause of all Being as well as of all knowledge and truth (508 E: *αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας ὡς γιγνωσκομένης . . .* cf. 509 B). Having thus brought the expectation of his hearers to the highest point, he not only refuses any explanation of the dialectic power which perceives the idea of Good (533 A) but declines even to insist that his view of it is correct (533 A: *οὐκέτ' ἄξιον τοῦτο διισχυρίζεσθαι*, cf. *Phaedo* 114 D). Here he employs much rhetorical artifice with the aim of inducing his readers to attempt the long and tedious training which according to his indications leads to this vision of overwhelming Beauty, the idea of Good. But this idea of Good in the *Republic*, with all its brilliancy and grandeur, cannot be anything else than the final cause depicted in more

The idea of the Good above Being, as the cause of Being and knowledge.

Nearer explanation declined.

Some rhetorical artifice used with an educational aim.

[229] See Paul Shorey, 'The idea of Good in Plato's Republic: a study in the Logic of Speculative Ethics,' in vol. i. pp. 188–239 of the *Studies in Classical Philology of the University of Chicago*, Chicago 1895.

sober language in the *Phaedo*. That it is raised above all hypotheses as an unconditioned principle means only that since the time when he wrote the *Phaedo* Plato had grown so much accustomed to his highest hypothesis that it has lost for him every hypothetical character. It had also become more substantial through intimate association with the practical aspirations which now absorbed him. At the same time, if he placed the idea of Good beyond Being, he made a very decisive step towards a return from the conception of the separate and independent existence of ideas. An idea as a necessary notion of every possible conscious mind is not a substance, and yet limits and shapes the existence of substances. We have no sufficient evidence for saying that Plato when he wrote the *Republic* had fully realised this truth, but if he did so, he had no need to change anything in his revelations about the idea of Good and the other ideas. His doctrine that truth is rather to be found in thought than in actual life (473 A: *φύσιν ἔχει πρᾶξιν λέξεως ἧττον ἀληθείας ἐφάπτεσθαι, κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ*) is a sign that he went still farther away from his starting point referred to in the *Phaedo*, that thought is an image of Being.

Ideas if placed above Being could not have a separate existence.

Truth sought in thought rather than in reality.

The conditions for an actual development of the faculty by which we see the idea of Good are depicted with glowing eloquence. Not everybody is able to follow the path, even if he has a leader (479 E: *τοὺς αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν μὴ ὁρῶντας, μηδ' ἄλλῳ ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἄγοντι δυναμένους ἕπεσθαι . . . δοξάζειν φήσομεν*). A philosopher is born, and when born, he must also be made and have a strong will to develope his innate power (518 C). He has a golden nature (415 A), and loves wisdom and knowledge above everything (475 B: *τὸν φιλόσοφον σοφίας φήσομεν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι, οὐ τῆς μέν, τῆς δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ πάσης*—cf. 376 B: *τό γε φιλομαθὲς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταὐτόν*, also *Phaedo* 82 C *φιλομαθής* is parallel to *φιλοσοφήσας*); he is insatiable of every kind of knowledge (475 C). Therein he is opposed to the sight-lover and others who care only for

Conditions of philosophical training.

Love of all knowledge not of sights or sounds.

concrete things (476 B). A philosopher betrays already in his childhood the greatest love of justice (486 B: *ψυχὴν σκοπῶν φιλόσοφον καὶ μὴ εὐθὺς νέου ὄντος ἐπισκέψει, εἰ ἄρα δικαία τε καὶ ἥμερος ἢ δυσκοινώνητος καὶ ἀγρία*), an excellent memory, a great facility of learning, he is generous, kind, truthful, courageous, and temperate (487 A: *φύσει μνήμων, εὐμαθής, μεγαλοπρεπής, εὔχαρις, φίλος τε καὶ ξυγγενὴς ἀληθείας, δικαιοσύνης, ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης*). From his youth upwards he loves truth beyond everything (485 D: *τὸν τῷ ὄντι φιλομαθῆ πάσης ἀληθείας δεῖ εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ὅ τι μάλιστα ὀρέγεσθαι*). He grows accustomed to consider the whole of the universe in his meditations (486 A: *ψυχῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντὸς ἀεὶ ἐπορέξεσθαι θείου καὶ ἀνθρωπίνου*), which reach far beyond the limits of his own time and include the totality of Being (486 A: *ᾗ ὑπάρχει διανοίᾳ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, οἷόν τε οἴει τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον;*) whereby human life appears insignificant, and death loses all its terrors (486 B). Through all ephemeral appearances he perceives a substance free from changes (485 B: *ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἀεὶ οὔσης καὶ μὴ πλανωμένης ὑπὸ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς . . . . καὶ πάσης αὐτῆς*) and neglects no manifestation of eternal Being, having an open eye for the smallest detail as well as for the whole. His faculty by which he sees the ideas (479 E: *αὐτὰ ἕκαστα καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ὄντα*) does not impair in any way the exercise of all virtues and the capacity for acquiring practical experience (484 D: *ἐμπειρίᾳ μηδὲν ἐκείνων ἐλλείποντας μηδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ μέρει ἀρετῆς ὑστεροῦντας*).

Early development of moral qualities. Good memory, facility of learning. Philosophers possess all virtues. Contempt for the limitations of human life, which appears to be insignificant, as compared with the total existence of the universe.

This image of the philosopher is made still more attractive by the contrast to the merely practical ordinary man (476 A) who esteems vulgar opinions (480 A), ignoring the certitude of science. He is dreaming, because he is unable to distinguish concrete things from the ideas, being deceived by their similarity (476 A, cf.

Philosopher contrasted with the practical man who has only

blind opinions.

534 C). Plato calls such would-be practical persons blind (484 C: ἢ οὖν δοκοῦσί τι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν οἱ τῷ ὄντι τοῦ ὄντος ἑκάστου ἐστερημένοι τῆς γνώσεως; cf. 506 C), their opinions are sophisms (496 A), and if they hit the truth by accident they do it like a blind man following the right road (506 C).

Idea of the Good the clearest in all existence, compared with the sun as the brightest object of sight. Reason and truth produced by the philosopher.

The power of the philosopher (511 B: ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις) is directed towards the idea of the Good which is the clearest idea in existence (518 C D: τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον . . . εἶναί φαμεν τἀγαθόν). Whatever else Plato says about the idea of Good, as cause of truth, reason, and Being (517 C: ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα . . . ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν παρασχομένη . . . 509 B: καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι), does not exclude the idea of Good from the system of ideas. Something is sacrificed to the defective comparison of the good with the sun, the light with truth (508 A–509 D). Plato had himself admitted, in agreement with the common psychological experience, that truth and reason are a product of the philosopher's own activity (490 B: ὅ γε ὄντως φιλομαθής, . . . γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῴη), and if afterwards for the purpose of drawing a parallel between the material and intellectual world he attributes truth to a power independent of the individual mind, this must be counted among the exaggerations into which he was led by the greatness of the subject.

Highest level of knowledge attainable through highest training.

In the whole Platonic doctrine of the ideal philosopher there is a permanent truth embodied: that the highest level of objective knowledge can be reached only by the highest subjective training of the best individuals. Looked at from this point of view, Plato's indications as to this special training deserve the attention of the logician, and belong really to the logic of Plato.

Mathematical training required from the

The way of initiation proceeds no longer, as in the *Symposium*, through esthetical contemplation, but is prepared, as in the *Phaedo*, by a course of mathematical propaedeutics. The power of mathematical

studies in developing abstract thought is illustrated by two fresh examples, taken one from arithmetic and the other from geometry. The identity of units, which is fundamental in arithmetical inquiries, does not exist in our sensual experience, where each unit is different from every other. This identity can only be understood by the action of thought (526 A: *ἀριθμῶν ἐν οἷς τὸ ἓν ἴσον τε ἕκαστον πᾶν παντὶ καὶ οὐδὲ σμικρὸν διαφέρον, μύριόν τε ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐδέν . . . διανοηθῆναι μόνον ἐγχωρεῖ, ἄλλως δ' οὐδαμῶς μεταχειρίζεσθαι δυνατόν*). We owe it to the clearness of numbers that we distinguish things which to our senses appear confused (524 C: *μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἑώρα . . . συγκεχυμένον τι. διὰ δὲ τὴν τούτου σαφήνειαν μέγα αὖ καὶ σμικρὸν ἡ νόησις ἠναγκάσθη ἰδεῖν, οὐ συγκεχυμένα ἀλλὰ διωρισμένα, τοὐναντίον ἢ 'κείνη*). This difference between numerical exactness and the inexactness of sense perception is the origin of rational inquiry about the nature of quantity (524 C: *ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν πρῶτον ἐπέρχεται ἐρέσθαι ἡμῖν, τί οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα αὖ καὶ τὸ σμικρόν*). A similar difference exists between the material models of geometrical figures and the ideal figures which they represent. Even Daidalos or another most skilful technical genius could never draw or form figures corresponding to our ideal notion of them (529 E), and it would be ridiculous to make geometrical inferences or to endeavour to learn the truth about geometrical properties of figures from such models, and not from the models of ideal figures that exist only in our thought, surpassing in exactness everything visible to the eye. On these examples Plato shows that mathematical studies lead from ever-changing perceptions to the true substance of Being (521 D: *μάθημα ψυχῆς ὁλκὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν*), from the twilight of vulgar experience to the daylight of philosophy (521 C: *ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινὸς ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινὴν τοῦ ὄντος οὖσαν ἐπάνοδον, ἣν ὃὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φήσομεν εἶναι*). But the philosopher will not content himself with such a knowledge of mathe-

philosopher. Mathematical units differ widely from the units of sense experience.

Difference between ideal geometrical figures and their material representation.

Study of mathematics

for philosophical training independently of practical considerations.

matics as is useful for a practical man; his immediate aim is not any practical application, but theoretical knowledge (525 B). He will push his investigations far enough to understand the nature of quantity, without caring for practical advantages (525 C: *ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ θέαν τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσεως ἀφίκωνται τῇ νοήσει αὐτῇ, οὐκ ὠνῆς οὐδὲ πράσεως χάριν, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ῥᾳστώνης τε μεταστροφῆς ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπ' ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ οὐσίαν . . .*). Such theoretical studies develope an organ of the soul more valuable than a thousand eyes, because it is the only eye which beholds truth (527 D E: *ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἑκάστου ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεται . . . κρεῖττον ὂν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὀμμάτων· μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀλήθεια ὁρᾶται*). Plato complains that solid geometry was in his times very much behind plane geometry, and believes that it is in the power of the state to further such inquiries by honouring them as they deserve (528 B). He recommends also astronomy to the future philosopher, but adds that a philosophical astronomer will not expect very much from mere observation of the stars. He will use the sight of the stars just as a mathematician uses roughly drawn figures with a view to the discovery of general laws.

Solid geometry recommended.

Astronomy not limited to observation of the stars.

Striking anticipations of the modern progress of astronomy.

Plato shows here a deep insight into the logical nature of theoretical knowledge. His very words can be applied even to-day to investigations about the possibility of which he could not have a definite idea. When he says that through all the apparent movements the astronomer should reach the true velocity and the true orbits and movements of heavenly bodies, and that this can be done only by thought, not by sight (529 D), the modern reader involuntarily remembers how Adams and Leverrier discovered Neptune without the use of a telescope, by following out purely theoretical considerations. When Plato further decides *a priori* that the movements of the stars must undergo periodical changes and cannot remain always the same (530 B: *ἄτοπον ἡγήσεται τὸν νομίζοντα*

γίγνεσθαί τε ταῦτα ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδὲν παραλλάττειν, σῶμά τε ἔχοντα καὶ ὁρώμενα), this appears a still more striking example of true physical knowledge acquired by pure thought.

Contempt for actual observation carried very far, because Plato was not aware of the possibility of a scientific investigation of probabilities. This became possible only through the infinitesimal calculus.

But our illusion is destroyed when we read that the details of the movements of the stars are not worth careful search, precisely because they undergo changes. Here the whole distance between Plato's logic and the modern logic becomes evident. For Plato science could only refer to knowledge, while we have learnt to deal scientifically with probabilities. Plato was perfectly right in holding that absolutely exact knowledge is impossible in astronomy and every other investigation of nature. But he was wrong in supposing that therefore these subjects cannot be dealt with scientifically. The whole natural science of to-day, though few persons are always aware of it, is a science of approximations and probabilities. We have learnt to estimate the possible amount of our errors, and to reduce them to units of such low degree that we can neglect them. We owe this power chiefly to the infinitesimal calculus, which marks the essential advance of science from Plato's days to the present epoch of scientific progress. Plato had no instrument for such evaluations, and he therefore could not admit an exact knowledge of astronomy. He went so far as to say that looking up at the stars not only does not exalt the soul, but does not even teach us anything, because the soul rises upwards only through inquiries about invisible Being (529 B: *οὐ δύναμαι ἄλλο τι νομίσαι ἄνω ποιοῦν ψυχὴν βλέπειν μάθημα ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἂν περὶ τὸ ὄν τε ᾖ καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον*).

Only rational inquiry belongs to science for Plato.

The eyes must in no way be esteemed above reason, nor the ears, and Plato despises equally those who believe in learning music by hearing tones and distinguishing them as sharp and flat (531 A). The true theory of music has higher problems to resolve, and studies the harmony of numbers and its reason (531 C: *ἐπισκοπεῖν τίνες ξύμφωνοι*

Even music not studied on tones.

Every particular science useful only as introductory to dialectic.

ἀριθμοὶ καὶ τίνες οὗ, καὶ διὰ τί ἑκάτεροι). Such higher music and higher astronomy, making use of the stars and of sound-harmonies only as matter for generalisations which show the unity of the whole, are recommended by Plato as useful in the preparatory training of a philosopher (531 D). But even such studies are only introductory to dialectic. Mathematicians, astronomers, musicians are only dreaming about true Being; so long as they rely on hypotheses, without being able to give reasons for them, their studies do not deserve the name of true science (533 C: ὀνειρώττουσι μὲν περὶ τὸ ὄν, ὕπαρ δὲ ἀδύνατον αὐταῖς ἰδεῖν).

First principles must be best known, and this is the pr vilege of dialectic. The dialectician is able to give the ultimate reasons of his convictions, and refers all hypotheses to their source, distrusting the testimony of the senses. General system of

A true science cannot be based on unknown or unknowable first principles (533 C: ᾧ γὰρ ἀρχὴ μὲν ὃ μὴ οἶδε, τελευτὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ ἐξ οὗ μὴ οἶδε συμπέπλεκται, τίς μηχανὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὁμολογίαν ποτὲ ἐπιστήμην γενέσθαι;). Such apparent sciences rest on mutual agreement, while only Dialectic rises above all hypothetical beginnings (533 C D: ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα, ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἵνα βεβαιώσηται) up to the absolute principle to which it gives the highest stability. The dialectician seeks the substance of each thing (534 B: διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας) and conceives himself to know something only in so far as he is able to give reasons for it (534 B: τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ λόγον αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν). Dialectic, then, or as we should now term it, metaphysic, is at the summit of all other sciences (534 E). This summit is reached through the ability of asking questions and answering them (531 E, 534 D), and through using the hypotheses with a full consciousness of their hypothetical character, until the highest principle is found, without any reliance on the testimony of the senses (511 B C). Plato had then already conceived a general system of human knowledge, including all sciences and uniting them into one whole (537 C: τά τε χύδην μαθήματα

. . . συνακτέον εἰς σύνοψιν οἰκειότητος ἀλλήλων τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος φύσεως). Only those who are able to perceive the unity of things are dialecticians (537 C: ὁ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός).

knowledge based on pure thought.

This picture of the subjective training, which is indispensable if the highest objective knowledge is to be attained, betrays a point of view far more advanced than the *Symposium*, in which the subjective training was also recognised as indispensable, but started not from reason but from esthetical and ethical experience. Though in the *Phaedo* the importance of mathematics was already accepted, and one highest principle alluded to, we see here a greater certainty manifested as to this highest principle. We find the philosopher enraptured over his discovery; it was Plato's own discovery that all the details of existence can be brought into relation to one final cause of the universe. His great predecessor Parmenides had only recognised the unity of the whole, and declared the 'many' an illusion. Plato was the first to bridge over that abyss between the one and the many, and his metaphysical discovery is one that has never since been refuted.

Subjective training of the dialectician beginning with mathematics and leading to the conception of the final cause of the universe.

Plato's conception of one final aim of the universe, of the connection between the highest idea and the most minute particulars even of sensible experience, remains unchanged after a long progress of particular sciences and of philosophy. This conception he caught sight of in the *Symposium*, declared it beyond his understanding in the *Phaedo*, and affirmed confidently its existence in the *Republic*, though he still declined to explain it fully (506 D, 533 A), alleging as one reason that Socrates is unable to give that full explanation, and as another that Glaucon is not yet sufficiently prepared to understand it. But enough is said to enable the modern reader to see that Plato was in full possession of his highest principle when he wrote his *Republic*. He called it a model contained in the soul (484 C: ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ

This conception is a discovery of Plato remaining in all later philosophy.

Greatest exactness

in the highest generalisation.

ψυχῇ παράδειγμα), and he required the greatest exactness in the highest generalisations of science (504 D E: γελοῖον . . . τῶν μεγίστων μὴ μεγίστας ἀξιοῦν εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἀκριβείας).

Comparison of the idea of the Good with the sun, and of the earth with a cave. Explanation why the philosopher is liable to err in practical life, though he has a higher knowledge of Being.

Two allegories used by Plato in the *Republic* to illustrate his thoughts are deservedly famous. The comparison between the sun and the idea of Good is deficient and contradictory, as truth, according to Plato's own acknowledgment, comes not to us from without like the light of day. But the other allegory in which this world is represented as similar to a cave (514–518) is one of the most beautiful and consistent answers of a philosopher to practical people who deride philosophy as useless. Plato here explains why the philosopher, accustomed to the most difficult problems of Being, appears at first sight liable to error in practical life, and how he, better than the merely practical man, very soon acquires a certainty in action impossible for those who know only practical life and have never measured the depth of the world of thought. Nearly every image in the allegory of the cave has a deep meaning. We spend our life in chains, being limited in the possibility of our movements, and prevented by our situation from knowing the truth. Those who succeed in liberating themselves from the chains of earthly passion and human ignorance, and explore a world much wider than the cave in which the others are living, have laid on them, according to Plato, the duty of returning among their former companions in misfortune and of instructing them so as to set free as many as possible. They will not be believed at first, and people will laugh at their tales about the beauties of the upper world, and they will sometimes commit slight errors about objects seen in the cave, which are like shadows of the realities above. Their sight, after long dwelling in full daylight, requires some time to get accustomed to the darkness of the cave, in order to distinguish the shadows, which to the prisoners appear to be the

highest realities. But once accustomed, the philosopher will judge more correctly than others, even about those shadows, because he knows the realities which produce them, and he has seen the sun of Truth, which does not shine in the cave. This beautiful allegory need not be repeated in all its details, as it may be assumed to be familiar to our readers. It has a very great logical importance, as it shows that for Plato at that time sensible experience was the shadow of the ideas. This is also the only hint which the *Republic* contains that the ideas might be independent of the human mind and indeed of any existing consciousness. In many passages, as we have seen, the ideas are spoken of as existing in the philosopher's soul and even as a product of the activity of his thought. It seems that Plato no longer attached such importance to their separate existence, and that he had to a certain extent reconciled himself to the identity of ideas with general notions.

Once accustomed to the darkness of the cave, the philosopher begins to distinguish even appearances better than those who never saw the light of truth.

The theory of ideas and of the dialectical faculty occupies the largest place in this part of the *Republic*, while the remaining intellectual faculties are briefly disposed of. The second rank is taken by the mathematical knowledge termed here *διάνοια* (534 A). The difference between this faculty and dialectical knowledge consists in the use of hypotheses (510 B), which remain untouched by the mathematician. As such hypotheses Plato quotes arithmetical properties of numbers and geometrical properties of figures, which are admitted to be the ultimate foundations of mathematical science (510 C).

Mathematical knowledge has the second rank as compared with dialectic.

Both *διάνοια* and *ἐπιστήμη* are called in one passage *νόησις* and opposed to the inferior faculty of opinion (*δόξα* 534 A), which is again subdivided into *πίστις* referring to things and *εἰκασία* to images (511 E). It seems that this division, mentioned here only and never again used by Plato, had a purely occasional character and served the purpose of an elaborate parallelism

Subdivision of intellectual faculties irrelevant. It was introduced

for the sake of analogy. Not maintained consistently.

between the sense of sight and the intuition of the soul. To correspond to the difference between things and images a division of ideas was wanted, and the mathematical figures best corresponded within the ideal world to the images of the physical world. So far the analogy was plausible, but the subdivision of the two chief faculties of opinion and science into four was not justified and is frequently contradicted by Plato in the same text, as he uses *διάνοια*, *νόησις*, *ἐπιστήμη* and *διαλεκτικὴ δύναμις* indifferently one for another. Even in the sixth and seventh books the distinction is by no means consistently followed, and in some passages (500 B: *τῷ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς πρὸς τοῖς οὖσι τὴν διανοιαν ἔχοντι*—511 A: *ζητοῦντές τε αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν ἃ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ*—529 D: *τὸ δὴ τάχος . . . . ἃ δὴ λόγῳ μὲν καὶ διανοίᾳ ληπτά, ὄψει δ' οὔ*) *διάνοια* means pure thought, and not the special faculty of mathematical knowledge which had been named *διάνοια* (511 D: *διάνοιαν καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν . . . ἕξιν*).

Also subdivision of opinion into two different faculties has no importance.

Equally irrelevant is the subdivision of opinion (*δόξα*) into an opinion about things (*πίστις* 511 E, 534 A), and an opinion about images (*εἰκασία* 511 E, 534 A). This division is of no importance and proves only Plato's fondness for symmetrical dichotomies.[230] He never again alludes to these distinctions, and the old bipartition of intellectual activity into opinion and knowledge remains here as in all other works of Plato fundamental. Opinion is intermediate between ignorance and knowledge (477 B, cf. 478 D), and it refers to what in one respect is being and in another not-being, and appears as intermediate between substance and nothing (478 D: *οἷον ἅμα ὄν τε καὶ μὴ ὄν*).

[230] It has been attempted to find a relation between the four intellectual faculties of the *Republic* and the degrees of perfection in the *Symposium* (Carl Boetticher, 'Eros und Erkenntniss bei Plato in ihrer gegenseitigen Förderung und Ergänzung,' *Jahresbericht des Luisenstädtischen Gymnasiums zu Berlin*, Ostern 1894), but the exposition is by no means convincing.

For the first time Plato here investigates the object of opinion as differing both from the object of knowledge and from that of ignorance. While the ideas are the proper object of science, they are not accessible to opinion, and Plato defines with great logical acuteness what is susceptible of opinion. It is anything that could be otherwise than it is (479 A). We see here clearly established the difference between accident and substance, opinion and science. This very important logical theory was prepared by the law of contradiction, stated in the *Phaedo*, where Plato observed that apparent contradictions are found in things but not in ideas (*Phaedo* 103 B). But neither in the *Phaedo* nor in any earlier work had the difference between the object of science and that of opinion been recognised.

Object of opinion: everything that could be otherwise than it is.

It is interesting to observe that Plato employs this distinction between accident and substance to justify his conviction of the mental equality between the sexes, wherein he was so much in advance of his own times, and even of the reigning prejudice of our own century. It is one of the deepest thoughts in Plato's *Republic*, that the sexual difference is accidental and exterior as compared with individual intellectual differences among men as well as women (454 B–455 A). And this thought is one of the most interesting practical applications of Plato's logic. Plato thus proclaimed the truth that thought is independent even of such fundamental bodily conditions as the difference of sex. Many times later philosophers have been drawn by the strength of appearance to credit organs of our body with pure thought, and thus to destroy the soul's independence and permanence. Plato had within his limited experience many inducements to admit the popular belief that some part of the body is active in thought. He resisted this temptation and was the first to understand clearly and to affirm confidently that thought is an activity of the invisible, incorporeal soul, which does not need material organs for its exercise. That the body's only aim is to supply us with sensations

Recognition of the mental equality between the sexes.

Thought independent of the body, even of the most essential bodily conditions.

Plato the first to understand that thought is an activity of the soul.

and to act on the outward world according to our own will, is a truth which remains even to-day incredible to some physiologists unjustly called psychologists. This truth was discovered by Plato and constantly reaffirmed by him, from the *Phaedo* onwards to his latest works.

Not-Being object of ignorance, which is identical with wrong opinion.

A consequence of the doctrine that the objects of opinion and science are not the same led Plato to his theory about Not-Being or Nothing as the object of ignorance. Ignorance is a state of the soul, and consists in believing what is not (478 B: *ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τὸ μὴ ὄν . . .* C: *Μὴ ὄντι μὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπέδομεν, ὄντι δὲ γνῶσιν*). Therein ignorance is distinguished from mere opinion and coincides with 'wrong opinion' (*δόξα ψευδής*) called also *ἀμαθία* by Plato (*Prot.* 358 C: *ἀμαθίαν τὸ τοιόνδε λέγετε, τὸ ψευδῆ ἔχειν δόξαν καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν πολλοῦ ἀξίων*, cf. *Euthyd.* 286 D, and also *Theaet.* 170 B, *Polit.* 309 A, *Crat.* 429 D: *τοῦτό·ἐστιν τὸ ψευδῆ λέγειν, τὸ μὴ τὰ ὄντα λέγειν*). Opinion as intermediate between ignorance and knowledge had been already mentioned in the *Meno* and *Symposium* (202 A: *τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν . . . ἔστιν τι μεταξὺ σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας*) but then with the predicate of 'right' which is dropped here, with an intention of exact terminology not afterwards maintained.

Relation to the *Phaedo* in the conception of the ultimate aim of life, above pleasure and even knowledge.

In the above exposition of the logical theories contained in B. V–VII we had already occasion to see that Plato has here advanced beyond the stage of the *Phaedo*. But perhaps a more evident proof of this position is found in an ethical hint about the highest aims of life. It was a current theory of earlier dialogues that true happiness is the aim of each individual, and the tale of rewards and punishments after death was in agreement with this conception of the aims of life. Even in the first books of the *Republic* this was tacitly admitted, and in the ninth book Plato attempts to prove that the philosopher is happier than anybody else. Intellectual pleasure or knowledge (*φρόνησις Phaedo* 76 C, 79 D) was the highest

ideal of Plato before the *Republic*. Now he declares that the aim cannot be pleasure, nor even knowledge (505 B C), because there are bad pleasures, and because the knowledge, if defined, will turn out to be the knowledge of the good. The aim of life is higher than this, and must be clearly known by the leader of men (505 E: *ὃ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει*). The conception of an aim of life above every kind of pleasure and happiness, even above knowledge and wisdom (509 A), is new, and arises here as a consequence of the new knowledge of ideas and their hierarchy leading to the one highest principle of Being.

Traces of teaching activity.

Some hints show us Plato's educational experience at the time when he wrote this part of the *Republic*. He says that the young must be taught through play (537 A: *παίζοντας τρέφε*), and warns us that no teacher should treat his pupils as slaves (536 E: *οὐδὲν μάθημα μετὰ δουλείας τὸν ἐλεύθερον χρὴ μανθάνειν . . . ψυχῇ βίαιον οὐδὲν ἔμμονον μάθημα*) because knowledge is never durable if imposed by violence. Plato is so confident as to the power of youth that he credits the young with the greatest labours and undertakings (536 D: *νέων πάντες οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι*), but he has already experienced the logical abuses of youth, which he complains of later in the dialectical dialogues. Young men are not serious in reasoning, and delight in contradictions, playing with the argument like young dogs with our clothes (539 B). Here again, as in the *Phaedo*, Plato sees the origin of scepticism in the abuse of reasoning:

Judgment about youth. Logical abuse leading to scepticism.

Phaedo 90 B: *ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι . . . κἄπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδὴς εἶναι . . . καὶ αὖθις ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος . . . τελευτῶντες οἴονται . . . οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιον.*

Rep. 539 B C: *ὅταν πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτοὶ ἐλέγξωσιν, ὑπὸ πολλῶν δὲ ἐλεγχθῶσι, σφόδρα καὶ ταχὺ ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς τὸ μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι ὧνπερ πρότερον.*

Plato's view of youth.

It is characteristic that this abuse was explained in a general and somewhat lengthy way in the *Phaedo*, while

here it is briefly mentioned as well known (539 B: *οἶμαι σε οὐ λεληθέναι*) and attributed specially to the young, which confirms the impression that Plato was grown older, as in his latest works he frequently speaks of the inconsequence of youth (cf. *Phil.* 15 D E). Some minor coincidences between this part of the *Republic* and the earlier dialogues may be briefly mentioned. The affinity of the soul to the ideas, affirmed in the *Phaedo*, is here shortly referred to (490 B: *αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἑκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἅψασθαι ᾧ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιούτου· προσήκει δὲ ξυγγενεῖ*), with the difference that according to the new division of faculties only a part of the soul is distinguished by this affinity. The metaphor *λήγειν ὠδῖνος*, used in this passage to describe the suffering of a soul in search of the Truth, would be scarcely natural in this abridged and familiar form if the theory of intellectual fecundity in the *Symposium* were not assumed as known (*Symposium* 209 A). A similar allusion to the *Symposium* appears in the assertion of the fewness of those who are able to seek the idea of Beauty, and to follow when they are led to it:

Similarity of the soul to the ideas.

Relation to the *Symposium* illustrated by comparisons.

Symp. 210 A: *δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς ἰόντα ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα . . . ἐὰν ὀρθῶς ἡγῆται ὁ ἡγούμενος . . . κατανοῆσαι ὅτι τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ ὁτῳοῦν σώματι τῷ ἐπὶ ἑτέρῳ σώματι ἀδελφόν ἐστιν . . .*	*Rep.* 476 C: *ὁ καλὰ μὲν πράγματα νομίζων, αὐτὸ δὲ κάλλος μήτε νομίζων μήτε, ἄν τις ἡγῆται ἐπὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ, δυνάμενος ἕπεσθαι, ὄναρ ἢ ὕπαρ δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν;*

It would be useless to enumerate all such hints, which become convincing to anybody who reads the dialogues in the order now proposed. Only a boundless indifference to the philosophical contents of Plato's works could allow the supposition that Plato wrote the *Republic* about the same time as the *Euthydemus*, while in every respect we find here a thought more mature, and a positive philosophy which was only a desideratum when he disputed with the Sophists. He now no longer appears so anxious about the bad influence of bad teachers generally, because

Progress beyond earlier dialogues.

Milder view

he has found in the fundamental differences of human nature a deeper reason for the natural evolution of states as well as individuals. A weak mind is not capable either of great virtues or of great crimes (491 E: *ἀσθενῆ δὲ φύσιν μεγάλων οὔτε ἀγαθῶν οὔτε κακῶν αἰτίαν ποτὲ ἔσεσθαι*). He denies that the Sophists could have the power of perverting their pupils (492 A). The eloquent picture of the influence of impersonal public opinion on a young man (492 B C) reveals an author who is himself very much above these dangers, and no longer in the first stage of his activity. All this agrees perfectly with our supposition that Plato was approaching the age of fifty when he wrote about the future reign of philosophers over the world.

of the Sophists.

Influence of public opinion on youth.

Books VIII–IX

A strange contrast to the preceding digression is formed by the two next books, which resume the continuation of the fourth book broken off at the beginning of B. V, and except the recapitulation at the outset contain no direct allusion to B. V–VII. The contents of B. VIII–IX are chiefly political, and give a peculiar application of the classification of human faculties to the classification of states and the demonstration of the happiness of the philosopher. The philosopher has a better experience of the pleasures of other men than they can have of the pleasures of knowledge, and he alone is competent to compare different feelings and to judge which of them gives the most satisfaction. Thence it results that he must be believed when he affirms that the pleasure of knowledge is the highest of all human pleasures (580 D–583 A). This demonstration, repeated afterwards by Aristotle (*Ethica Nic.* X. vii.), is here stated with a certain insistence, and might appear superfluous after what has been said in the seventh book on pleasure as utterly indifferent to the true aims of life.

Classification of states. Happiness of philosopher demonstrated by his experience and his competency.

While in the preceding books only contempt is ex-

True opinions more appreciated but always opposed to knowledge.

pressed for mere opinion as opposed to science, here true opinion and science are placed together almost as if they were synonyms (585 C). This shows not a difference of views, but a difference of exposition. The opposition of opinion and science was already so familiar to Plato when he wrote the *Republic* that he did not always insist upon it in his most popular writings, and the eighth and ninth books are from the nature of the subject-matter very much more popular than the sixth and seventh. The author's own aim was always pure and certain science which he valued above mere opinion; but he recognised the value of right opinion above ignorance, as he had done already in the *Meno*. In the same passage in which he puts right opinion along with science as opposed to sensuous gratification, he makes a direct and unmistakable allusion to the theory of ideas, and even to the special account of it given in the *Phaedo*:

Ideas more truly existent than bodies

Phaedo 80 B: τῷ θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ . . . καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχή . . . 77 A: πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτ' εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα . . .

Rep. 585 C: τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου ἐχόμενον καὶ ἀθανάτου καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὂν καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον, μᾶλλον εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ;

and can be better known.

Another allusion to earlier expositions is the assertion that what continually changes is less susceptible of knowledge and truth than the eternal (585 D: τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν γένη τῶν γενῶν αὖ τῶν περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπείαν ἧττον ἀληθείας τε καὶ οὐσίας μετέχει).

B. VIII–IX a continuation of B. II–IV.

Generally this part of the *Republic* is not only formally but also in its philosophical contents a continuation of the fourth book, and seems not to refer in any way, unless perhaps at the end of B. IX, to the high metaphysical speculations of the immediately preceding sixth and seventh books.

Book X

In the tenth

This last part of the *Republic* is introduced at first as a supplement to the judgment on the poets proffered in

the second and third books. Plato seems to defend himself against some polemical attacks on his severe criticism of poetry, and he gives a deeper justification of his contempt by a general definition of art as an imitation. This part of the tenth book has its peculiar place in the history of esthetics; we are here concerned only with the logical theories alluded to in connection with other pursuits. We see here the theory of ideas treated as familiar to all readers (596 A: *εἶδος πού τι ἓν ἕκαστον εἰωθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλὰ οἷς ταὐτὸν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν*). But in the formulation of this method we perceive a stage of the theory unknown from earlier works. Heretofore, only general mathematical, esthetical, and ethical notions were ideas. There is no trace whatever in preceding parts of the *Republic* (except in the allegory of the cave, which may have been written later), nor in the *Phaedo* and *Symposium*, of ideas of manufactured things, or of any and every group of things bearing one name. Then the ideas were contemplated, known or found as existent. Now they are posited (*τίθεσθαι*); this term has been applied earlier to names (as, for instance, *Crat.* 384 D), but never to ideas, though a distinction of species was posited in the *Phaedo* (79 A: *θῶμεν δύο εἴδη τῶν ὄντων*). Here also we might at first suppose that *εἶδος* means only species, as in the similar passage of the *Phaedo*, but in what immediately follows the word *ἰδέα* is used in its unmistakable technical meaning (596 B: *μία ἰδέα*), and applied to a table or a chair. Thus it appears that ideas of manufactured articles are admitted.

Book esthetical considerations based on the familiar use of ideas.

Ideas of manufactured things appear for the first time, thus initiating a change in the primitive form of the theory.

Also the popular objection to the unity of ideas is dealt with, namely, the supposition that the same process which leads to the positing of one idea could be repeated indefinitely, producing an infinity of ideas of the same thing. Plato says that God being the creator of ideas, either his will or some other necessity—of course a logical necessity—prevented the possibility of a plurality of identical ideas (597 C). This logical necessity is further

Infinity of identical ideas denied on the same grounds as Aristotle justified the

simplicity of perception.

explained exactly in the same way in which Aristotle afterwards justified the simplicity of perception (Aristot. *De anima* iii. 2, 425 b 15 *sqq.*). If there were two ideas of the same thing, then the true idea would be the common type of the two primitive ideas (597 C). This would impair the perfection of ideas, and to avoid it, God, who is not a chairmaker, but the maker of the idea of a chair, made one idea of the chair (597 D: ὁ θεός, . . . μίαν φύσει ἔφυσεν).

One idea of each thing.

God as maker of ideas is a metaphor, meaning the logical necessity.

Now if we consider the deeper meaning of this explanation, we recognise a certain advance beyond the *Phaedo* and perhaps even B. VI–VII. The God who makes the ideas is not the same God who is mentioned in earlier dialogues. God makes the ideas—this is a metaphorical expression which translated into abstract speech means: the ideas are a product of pure thought—not necessarily of men, but of a thinking subject. This is a consequent development of the theory about the idea of Good which was the final cause of all other ideas. Now this idea of good is supplanted by God, not by some god nor by a god, but by 'the God' (ὁ θεός). The monotheism appears well established and a matter of course.

New proof of immortality, beginning by a general statement of the conditions of indestructibility.

A class of indestructible things is shown to

Also the immortality of the soul is reaffirmed, and a proof added to those of the *Phaedo*, which could hardly have been omitted in the *Phaedo* if Plato had then been in possession of it. In the *Phaedo* the problem was represented as very difficult and further research invited. Now it is an easy thing (608 D: οὐδὲν γὰρ χαλεπόν) to prove that the soul is immortal. The proof is no longer based on the ideas, but on the substantiality of the soul. Each existing thing has its own virtue and its own evil, and can be destroyed only by its own weakness and evil (609 A). If there is anything in existence which suffers from its own evil, without danger of being destroyed, as metals are by rust, then this substance, if any, is indestructible (609 B). To this description the soul is found to correspond. This kind of proof is the converse

of all the proofs given in the *Phaedo*. There immortality was found as a property of the soul, through a definition of the idea of the soul. Here Plato begins by constituting a class of indestructible substances, and then shows that the soul belongs to it. We shall see that this new logical expedient is used by Plato also later, and it is certainly superior to the method of the *Phaedo*.

include the soul.

We have here an application of the principle that truth is to be found in thought, that our speculation is always concerned with our own ideas, and not with the things outside. Still, from our ideas we draw inferences about the things, and Plato, after representing immortality as a necessity of thought, goes a step further and concludes that the number of souls in the universe remains invariable (611 A: *ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ἀεὶ ἂν εἶεν αἱ αὐταί· οὔτε γὰρ ἄν που ἐλάττους γένοιντο . . . οὔτε αὖ πλείους*). This simple conclusion, which we shall find again in a later writing, was missed in the *Phaedo*, and leads to very important consequences.

Immortality as a necessity of thought. Conclusion about number of souls.

In the *Phaedo* the unity of the soul was one of its properties because the threefold partition was not yet proposed. Now, after the repeated exposition of a division of faculties, the parts of the soul can no longer be ignored (603 A), but Plato defends himself against a misinterpretation of his view. The soul is in its true substance not full of contradictory powers (611 B). The eternal is simple in its own nature, and cannot be composed out of many elements (611 B: *οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀΐδιον εἶναι σύνθετόν τε ἐκ πολλῶν*). The partition referred to the imperfect transitory earthly state, not to the soul's eternal existence. We contemplated it under the modifications produced by union with the body, and failed to perceive its eternal nature.

Unity of soul despite its different parts. Simplicity of eternal elements when set free from the bonds of the body.

This is a manifest correction of the theory of threefold partition as taught in B. IV and IX, and exemplifies Plato's manner of revising his earlier writings. He did not alter anything in what had been written, but he

Example of revision of earlier writings

without any alteration in the earlier text.

adds his correction in the continuation of the same dialogue, just as he added his confession of a certain exaggeration in the picture of the philosopher at the end of the seventh book. This way of correcting and criticising his own views confirms our supposition as to the technical difficulties which stood in the way of many changes in the original drafts of Plato's writings. Some other examples of such self-criticism will appear in later works, and it is exceedingly characteristic that this proceeding begins already with the *Republic*.

Subject of immortality alternatively mentioned as new and as already dealt with.

Plato's habit of considering each work in turn as one independent whole is apparent from the fact that the subject of immortality is introduced in B. X as new and never heard of before (608 D: *οὐκ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι ἀθάνατος ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυται; καὶ ὃς ἐμβλέψας μοι καὶ θαυμάσας εἶπε· Μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔγωγε· σὺ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχεις λέγειν;*). Some readers of Plato saw in this passage a proof that the tenth book of the *Republic* had been written before the *Phaedo*, without noticing that a few pages later there occurs a perfectly clear allusion to the *Phaedo*, which cannot refer to any other work of Plato but the *Phaedo* only. He says (611 B): *ὅτι τοίνυν ἀθάνατον ψυχή, καὶ ὁ ἄρτι λόγος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναγκάσειαν ἄν.*

Clear allusion to the *Phaedo* in the tenth book of the *Republic*.

This means that in an earlier writing there had been given a number of arguments (λόγοι) of a logically necessary or apodictic character (*ἀναγκάζοντες*) proving the soul's immortality. Now a plurality of such arguments is not given in any other work of Plato besides the *Phaedo*. The *Phaedrus*, which might be thought of here, contains only one argument, and other dialogues, such as the *Meno*, *Gorgias*, &c., do not contain arguments (λόγοι) but tales (*μῦθοι*, cf. *Phaedo* 61 B: the poet invents *μύθους, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους*, cf. also *Gorg.* 523 A). That λόγος is used in the tenth book in the meaning of a logical argument can easily be seen from many passages (611 B: *ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἐάσει*—609 D: *ἄλογον*—610 A: *κατὰ λόγον*, &c.). Thus we see that Plato, even alluding in a general way to

Each dialogue of Plato stands apart,

his earlier writings, sometimes ignored their particular contents in a new exposition. Each dialogue was meant to stand apart, as if it were written expressly for the new generation of students entering the Academy, or, in the case of the *Republic*, possibly for a wider circle.

though he sometimes refers to earlier exposition.

The illusory character of sense perception, as represented in the *Phaedo* and in the earlier books of the *Republic*, is here maintained (602 C: *ταὐτόν που ἡμῖν μέγεθος ἐγγύθεν τε καὶ πόρρωθεν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως οὐκ ἴσον φαίνεται*), and is illustrated by a skilful enumeration of optical illusions produced by distance, colouring, and reflection of light. But the distrust of the senses is no longer so unlimited as in the *Phaedo*, and is subject to a distinct modification. We have a means of correcting their illusions, says Plato, and this consists in measuring, counting, and weighing (602 D: *τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἱστάναι βοήθειαι χαριέσταται . . . ὥστε μὴ ἄρχειν τὸ φαινόμενον . . . ἀλλὰ τὸ λογισάμενον*). This intuition of the mathematical power of correcting the illusions of sense seems to be a Pythagorean notion, and betrays also the fact that since the first understanding of the distance between appearance and ideas Plato had been working to bridge it over partially by physical research. His programme is constantly realised in our own days, and we witness many subtle corrections of primitive sense illusions by the power of number, measure, and weighing. This power of correcting the illusions of the senses is ascribed to the cognitive faculty, which is the best part of the soul (603 A: *τὸ μέτρῳ γε καὶ λογισμῷ πιστεῦον βέλτιστον ἂν εἴη τῆς ψυχῆς*).

Illusory character of the sense perception, corrected by measuring, counting, and weighing.

Physical research bridges over the distance between ideas and appearances.

Reason corrects errors of the senses.

The opposition between opinion and knowledge thus alone remains out of the whole fabric of the four subdivisions of the cognitive faculty in B. VI–VII. And opinion is here more sharply distinguished from knowledge than ever; it becomes quite another part of the soul, like feeling or desire (603 A: *τὸ παρὰ τὰ μέτρα δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ κατὰ τὰ μέτρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταὐτόν*).

Four subdivisions of cognitive faculty not maintained.

Hence opinion probably will not partake in immortality.

Instability of terminology.

The instability of Platonic terminology at the time when he wrote the *Republic* is seen from the circumstance that even here, where opinion is condemned so strongly, the same word, *δόξα*, is used for both opinion and knowledge, in the meaning of a judgment which might be wrong or right (602 E, cf. *Theaet.* 190 A).

Law of contradiction as a law of thought.

Here for the first time occurs a formulation of the law of contradiction as a law of thought, while in the *Phaedo* and earlier books of the *Republic* it was a metaphysical law:

Phaedo 102 E: *οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ἔτι ὂν ὅπερ ἦν ἅμα τοὐναντίον γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι.*	*Rep.* 436 B: *ταὐτὸν τἀναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν κατὰ ταὐτόν γε καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἐθελήσει ἅμα.*	*Rep.* 602 E: *ἔφαμεν τῷ αὐτῷ ἅμα περὶ ταὐτὰ ἐναντία δοξάζειν ἀδύνατον εἶναι.* Cf. *Theaet.* 190 A.

The user more competent than the maker, as he has the knowledge.

This is also an indication of Plato's advancing logical preoccupation. There are besides other hints of the relation of the tenth book of the *Republic* to earlier dialogues. Here, as in the *Cratylus* and *Euthydemus*, the competent judge about anything is he who makes a proper use of it (601 C: *ὅσπερ ἐπίσταται χρῆσθαι*) not the maker (601 D: *πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τὸν χρώμενον ἑκάστῳ ἐμπειρότατόν τε εἶναι, καὶ ἄγγελον γίγνεσθαι τῷ ποιητῇ, οἷα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ ᾧ χρῆται*). Here this principle is generalised, while in the *Cratylus* it was applied specifically to word-making. The opposition between user and maker is parallel to the contrast between knowledge and faith (601 E: *ὁ μὲν εἰδὼς ἐξαγγέλλει περὶ χρηστῶν καὶ πονηρῶν . . . ὁ δὲ πιστεύων ποιήσει*).

Poets deprived of right opinion: Homer below Protagoras.

The poets are now shown to have neither knowledge nor even right opinion (602 A: *οὔτε ἄρα εἴσεται οὔτε ὀρθὰ δοξάσει ὁ μιμητὴς περὶ ὧν ἂν μιμῆται πρὸς κάλλος ἢ πονηρίαν*). Homer, who was named in the *Symposium* as holding the first place among those who deserved immortal fame, is now not only esteemed below Solon and Pythagoras, but even humiliated by comparison with

Protagoras and Prodikos (600 c) who succeeded better in life, says Plato, because they had more knowledge than the king of poets. We see here a pitiless condemnation of what had been the chief element in Plato's own education. He knows well the temptations of the poet, and remains still poet enough to degrade poetry with poetical exaggeration. The future writer of the *Laws* appears here already with his boundless contempt even for the most refined pleasures, asking for deeds not words, choosing rather to deserve praise than to praise others (599 B), and proudly conscious of his own productive activity.

The style and date of the Republic.

Unity of the *Republic* resulting from the study of its contents.

We have found a natural progress of doctrine from the beginning to the end of the *Republic*, but no such fundamental differences between the first books and their continuation as to make it necessary to recur to such adventurous suppositions as Krohn and Pfleiderer made about the composition of this work, which is remarkable for its unity in spite of its unusual volume. A comparison of contents alone, however, is insufficient for a decisive solution of the question, and we must turn to our *εἰωθυῖα μέθοδος* of stylistic differentiation in order to find a trustworthy confirmation of the view resulting from the study of theoretical development.

Style of the first book very early. Many important peculiarities common to all later books are missed

As to the single books of the *Republic* the point of main significance is the very early style of the first book. This has none of the important peculiarities common to all the following books, neither the scarcity of *ναί, πάνυ γε, πάνυ μὲν οὖν* which characterises B. II–X (these answers form in B. I over one-third of all answers, just as in *Charm. Lach. Prot.*)—nor *τί μήν;* nor *ἀληθέστατα*, nor *ὀρθῶς*, nor *ὀρθότατα*, nor *ὀρθότατα λέγεις*, nor *δῆλον*—all these being important peculiarities characterising all the following books, and missed in the first book certainly not by chance, as all the usual opportuni-

in the first book.

ties for their use were given. Also some important peculiarities which were introduced into the style of Plato in earlier dialogues, and remained up to the latest works, are absent from B. I. Such is for instance the general prevalence of superlatives over positives in all affirmative answers, common to the *Phaedo* with nearly all later dialogues and all books of the *Republic* (325), the great frequency of questions by means of ἄρα (378) common to the *Cratylus* with all later dialogues and all other books of the *Republic*, new-invented adjectives in ειδής (254), beginning with the *Gorgias* and frequent in all parts of the *Republic* except B. I, τε singly (231) frequent in all other books and occurring already even in some Socratic dialogues, interrogations asking for better explanation (453), great frequency of prepositions (390, found already in the *Laches* and common to all other books of the *Republic* with the latest group), questions by means of ποῖος (353); many other less important peculiarities are absent from the first book, being common to all other parts of the *Republic* with the latest group and, in the case of the last enumerated, even with some Socratic dialogues. In the above enumeration no accidental peculiarity has been included, and of these a certain number can easily be found in the table of affinity (pp. 162–171), quoted as occurring in various parts of the *Republic* except in the first book.

Peculiarities of later style occurring in the first book are generally found also in earlier dialogues.

If now after this long enumeration of peculiarities vainly sought for in the first book we ask what kind of peculiarities of later style are found in it, we find chiefly accidental occurrences of peculiarities known already from the earliest dialogues, and only one unique peculiarity of some importance later than the *Phaedo*, namely a double occurrence of καλῶς or a similar adverb without verb in an affirmative answer. This is the only important peculiarity common to all other parts of the *Republic*, found in the first book and not in dialogues earlier than the *Republic*. Other important peculiarities of the first

book belong to an earlier time, as for instance τοίνυν in conclusions (284) beginning with the *Crito*, frequency of apodictic answers equal to that in the *Euthydemus* (376), and ἀληθῆ without λέγεις as in the *Charmides* (385). This proves the very early date of the first book, which however may still be as late as the *Gorgias*.

We cannot compare it with the *Gorgias*, because the latter dialogue is thrice as large, and we have no evidence as to the occurrence of the investigated peculiarities in a part of the *Gorgias* equal to the first book. That it is earlier than the *Cratylus* appears very probable if we consider the great difference of the equivalent of affinity, which is sufficiently considerable to include a reasonable allowance for the difference of size:

Comparison of the first book with the *Cratylus* and with the *Gorgias* shows the probable position of the first book between these two dialogues.

Rep. a (20½ pp.): 28 (I) 6 (II) 3 (III) = 49 (I).
→ *Crat.* (42 pp.): 33 (I) 16 (II) 15 (III) 1 (IV) = 114 (I).

As here the equivalent of affinity of the later work is over twice as large, and more than proportional to the size, while generally the equivalent of affinity increases less than proportionally to the size, we may fairly infer that the *Cratylus* is later. This inference is confirmed by the fact that certain peculiarities absent from the first book are sufficiently frequent in the *Cratylus* to be presumed to exist in all its parts, and therefore also in any part equal in size to *Rep.* I. Such are οὐσία in the meaning of substance (245), adjectives in ώδης denoting causal relation (275), κατά with accusative prevailing over all prepositions except ἐν (389), interrogations asking for better explanation (453), new-invented adjectives in ώδης (255), and great frequency of τοίνυν (308). Of these peculiarities, all frequent and important in the *Cratylus*, none is found in the *Gorgias* except one question asking for better explanation, and therefore they show the later date of the *Cratylus*, while they cannot be used for a determination of the relation between *Gorgias* and *Rep.* I. The *Gorgias* has only three important peculiarities (253,

307, 377) absent from the first book of the *Republic*, which happen to be absent also from the *Cratylus*, and these have generally less importance than those found in the *Cratylus* and absent from the *Gorgias* and the first book of the *Republic*.

Thus it may be regarded as probable that the first book is earlier than the *Cratylus*, while nothing can be said from purely stylistic comparisons about its relation to the *Gorgias*, to which its contents show it to be subsequent.

Close relation between second, third, fourth, eighth, and ninth books.

As to the following books of the *Republic*, stylistic comparison proves that there is no such great distance between the first four books and the following as has been sometimes supposed by those who believed in a very early publication of the first four, five, or even six books.[231] The style of B. II–IV is not very different from the style of B. VIII–IX, if equal samples are compared. Take for instance B. II–B. III 412 A, slightly exceeding in size the total of B. VIII–IX. Both appear evidently later than the *Phaedo*, to which they are inferior in size:

Phaedo (49 pp.): 43 (I) 26 (II) 17 (III) 2 (IV) = 154 (I).
→Rep. b 1.2 (37½ pp.): 47 (I) 20 (II) 22 (III) 2 (IV) = 161.
→Rep. d (34 pp.): 47 (I) 22 (II) 27 (III) 3 (IV) = 184.

B. II–IV and B. VIII–IX differ in the com-

The advance beyond the *Phaedo* is considerable if we take into account the difference of size, and also the nature of those peculiarities which are common to B. II–IX being absent from the *Phaedo*. These include nearly all the

[231] The separate publication of the first four books has been advocated by Hermann and later by Krohn, Chiappelli ('Sopra alcuni capitoli della vita di Dione di Plutarco,' Torino 1883, *Rivista di filologia*, anno 12), Siebeck (*Jahrbücher für Philologie*, Band 131, 1885, p. 229), and many others. Pfleiderer laid great stress on the division at 471 c. Teichmüller, under the influence of the prejudice about the relation of B. V to Aristophanes' *Ecclesiasusae*, supposed the first five books to be one whole published about 392 B.C. Finally Rudolf Kunert ('Die doppelte Recension des Platonischen Staates,' *Wissenschaftliche Beilage zum Jahresbericht des Königlichen Gymnasiums zu Spandau*, 1893) believes that B. II–VI form one indivisible whole, published before 390 B.C.

peculiarities enumerated above as characteristically absent from the first book. Among these the following have a special prominence: τί μήν; (202), θυμοειδής as a philosophical term (261), οὐκοῦν χρή (338), ἀληθέστατα, ὀρθῶς (342), δῆλον (343), ὀρθότατα with or without λέγεις (342, 388), ἄπειρος (473), μεθίσταμαι (488), all found in both parts of the *Republic*, but not in the *Phaedo*. On the other side B. VIII–IX contain not a single new important peculiarity absent from B. II–IV. The advance in style from the earlier to the later part is only due to a greater number of accidental peculiarities, and to an increase of the frequency of all kinds of peculiarities. Thus generally speaking B. VIII–IX belong to the same time as B. II–IV, showing a later style only to such an extent as might be expected in a continuous work of these dimensions. We have therefore no stylistic reason whatever to admit a great distance of time between the earlier and the later part, as has been also shown by the comparison of the contents. Naturally this does not imply that both parts must have been written in the same year, or in the same couple of years.

parative frequency of identical peculiarities.

Both parts of the *Republic* belong to the same time.

Style is changing slowly, and even the small advance in style observed may correspond to two or three years, if we allow for the whole of the *Republic* an average term corresponding to its size, anything between 5–7 years. As to B. V–VII, there is some stylistic evidence to place it after B. IX, at least its chief part designated in the table of affinity as c_2 (471 c–541). We find:

The intermediate part of the *Republic* appears to be later.

Rep. d (B. VIII–IX = 34 pp.): 47 (I) 22 (II) 27 (III) 3 (IV) = 184.
→Rep. c_2 (471 c–541 = 44 pp.): 50 (I) 21 (II) 38 (III) 7 (IV) = 234 (I).

The comparison seems at first sight, in view of the difference of size, to be insufficient for chronological purposes. But if we add to B. VIII–IX a part of B. V to increase its size, then we obtain:

Rep. c_1 d (50 pp.): 62 (I) 23 (II) 36 (III) 3 = 228 (I).
→Rep. c_2 (44 pp.): 50 (I) 21 (II) 38 (III) 7 (IV) = 234 (I):

Slight advance of style of B. VI–VII, over B. VIII–IX confirms the supposition of their later date.

a small difference of few units in favour of the smaller sample of text, very significant through the prevalence of important and very important peculiarities. Some peculiarities appear in B. V–VII, which are missed alike in B. II–IV and in B. VIII–IX as in all earlier dialogues. These include γὰρ οὖν in short answers (326), πῇ (332), πᾶς used with ὅλος (375), κατά separated from the corresponding accusative by τε (395), ὄντως ὄν (236), δύω (195), ἀκίνητος (469), and other words of a more accidental character. This confirms our conclusions from the contents, and makes it probable that the bulk of B. V–VII has been added later, at least after B. IX.

Relation between beginning and end of B. V uncertain.

From the observations it is, however, not easy to ascertain whether the beginning of the fifth book forms one indivisible whole with the picture of the philosopher from 471 c to the end of the seventh book. The first part of the fifth book, dealing with the equality of sexes, and with international relations between Hellenes and Barbarians, might still be earlier than the eighth book, while the larger portion filling the sixth and seventh books might have been added later. This point can only be decided by a more minute comparison of a greater number of peculiarities in samples of text absolutely equal. For our purpose it has no importance whatever, as this part of the fifth book contains no contribution to the knowledge of Plato's logic.

Position of the tenth book remains uncertain, though it is probably the latest.

It is equally difficult to decide whether the tenth book is later than all parts of the *Republic*, or only later than B. VIII–IX. It contains a considerable number of peculiarities of later style for its small size, but only three accidental peculiarities are new (438, 475, 478), while B. V–IX contain a greater number of peculiarities which are absent from B. X. But a definitive solution of these difficulties can only be expected from further stylistic research. Meanwhile it remains certain that B. X is later than B. IV, probable that it is later than B. IX, and possible that it is later than all other books of the

Republic. This possibility, a mere possibility so far as our stylistic comparison reaches, becomes a probability when the contents are carefully considered.

The *Republic* written after the *Phaedo* in the course of about six years.

All the parts of the *Republic*, except the first book, being later than the *Phaedo*, and differing not very much in style among each other, we may conclude that they were written continuously in the time next following the *Phaedo*, and as we have no reason to suppose that in that time Plato increased the speed of his writing, or the average amount of text produced yearly, it remains probable that the *Republic* occupied him for about six years, up to nearly his fiftieth year, as we supposed.

Voyage to Syracuse might have led Plato to reflect on political matters.

This refutes all the suppositions about a possibly early date [232] of the *Republic*, and shows that Plato wrote his great work after his return from the first Sicilian voyage, and after the foundation of the Academy. Chiappelli [231] (p. 16) believes that Plato had already formed his political convictions when he came to Syracuse. If we accept the traditional account of his adventures, the reverse is far more probable: that the personal experience and observation of the consequences resulting from the abuse of tyrannical power gave an opportunity to Plato for political reflections. This may have brought him from a position of individualistic ethics to a socialistic political theory such as is set forth in the *Republic*.

[232] Among all the artificial arguments in favour of an early date of the first books of the *Republic*, none has been invented with such remarkable imagination as Pfleiderer's contention, which deserves, for the sake of curiosity, to be here quoted in his own words: 'nach meiner Ansetzung in den neunziger Jahren des 4en Jahrhunderts feiert *Rep.* A (= '5⅔' according to Pfleiderer's strange designation, or B. I–V 471 c) zugleich das zweihundertjährige Jubiläum der Gesetzgebung des Solon von 594, welche ja als Leistung seines von ihm so hoch geehrten Verwandten dem Plato Zeitlebens als spornender Vorgang vorgeschwebt' (*Sokrates und Plato*, p. 248). Equally bold is Gymnasialdirector Carl Schmelzer (see above, p. 25, note 66) who declares that Plato did not mean seriously his political theories, and that for instance κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων means: 'es muss jeder Mann eine jede Frau achten und schätzen als sei sie die seinige.'

II. *The Phaedrus.*

(Relative affinity to the latest group, measured on the *Laws* as unity, = 0·31; see above, p. 176.)

The *Phaedrus* shows the conditions of a philosophical rhetoric.

The *Phaedrus*, beyond any other work of Plato, has been misunderstood by interpreters who devoted more attention to indifferent details than to the philosophical contents of the dialogue. It has been ascribed to a young man of twenty-five, while it contains notions and theories which Plato could scarcely have advanced before he was fifty. Some critics, and among them Grote, saw in the *Phaedrus* an erotic dialogue, either supplementary or even preparatory to the *Symposium*—though the evident aim of the *Phaedrus* is to establish the conditions of a philosophical rhetoric, chiefly applicable to educational purposes. In the preceding dialogues we have seen Plato rising to the highest principles of knowledge without any attempt to reason about the best way of imparting them, except the few precepts given in the *Republic*. He tacitly assumed that any one possessing knowledge can impart it to others, if they are able to receive it. We may suppose that Plato attracted chiefly very gifted pupils, and to begin with he had such a great power of teaching that he felt no need of rhetorical artifice. His eloquence, which we admire even in such early dialogues as the *Apology*, was the natural outburst of his genius progressing spontaneously from the *Apology* to the *Gorgias*, from the *Gorgias* to *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, and the dialectical books of the *Republic*, apparently without effort or study (*Phaedr.* 248 B). This explains why he contemptuously defined rhetoric in the *Gorgias* as a kind of flattery, and why he condemned tragic poetry in the *Republic* as an imitation.

Plato's natural eloquence made rhetoric superfluous for him.

He saw the usefulness of some

His first opportunity for noticing the usefulness of some rhetorical artifice must have arisen at a time when his pupils began to teach, and he first observed that some of them, with all the knowledge inherited from the Master,

were less capable of imparting it than others. Though we admit some educational activity of Plato before the foundation of the Academy in 387 B.C., the teaching by others under his direction could scarcely have begun earlier, and even probably began later, than the first years of the existence of his own school. When the number of his pupils increased, and some of them had remained with him a longer time, it is natural that the elder pupils should begin to teach; and their deficiencies in teaching may have led Plato to some reflections on rhetoric, which he embodied in the *Phaedrus*. This view is here not given as a reason for the late date of the *Phaedrus*, but only as an explanation of the origin of this dialogue, which becomes probable when once we know its late date, as resulting from the study of its style (see above, p. 176).

rhetorical rules when his pupils began to teach and manifested some deficiencies in their teaching.

For the purpose of a discussion on rhetoric, Plato had to select a speech as an example to illustrate his views. His choice of a speech of Lysias[233] was natural, inasmuch as Lysias was thought one of the greatest rhetors of

Selection of a speech of Lysias as an

[233] Much erudition has been spent on the question whether the speech attributed by Plato to Lysias is authentic or only invented by Plato in imitation of other writings of this orator. We have no reason to disbelieve Plato if he clearly credits Lysias with this speech. To criticise his own invention and to accuse Lysias of the greatest moral degradation on the ground of a forged document, would certainly be below Plato's dignity. That the speech is read by Phaedrus, and not repeated from memory, adds to the probability of its authenticity, which has been maintained also by Haenisch (*De oratione quae sub nomine Lysiae in Platonis Phaedro legitur*, Ratibor 1825), Spengel, Franz, Westermann, Hölscher (quoted by Hermann, p. 675, note 554), L. Schmidt (*Verhandlungen der* 18en *Philologenversammlung*, Wien 1858), Ueberweg (*Untersuchungen*, p. 262), and by many others, while it has been opposed by Hermann and Jowett. A certainty in this question can only be arrived at by very minute stylistic comparison. So long as an evident proof of the spuriousness is not forthcoming, we must admit the authenticity. Plato has never quoted by name an author attributing to him words or opinions which were invented by himself. So far as the works alluded to by Plato are preserved, all his quotations from Homer, Parmenides, Protagoras, have been confirmed, and the natural assumption is, therefore, that he included in the *Phaedrus* an authentic speech of Lysias. The *onus probandi* is entirely on the side of those who deny it.

example of wrong rhetoric.

those times (228 A: *Λυσίας ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ κατὰ σχολὴν συνέθηκεν, δεινότατος ὢν τῶν νῦν γράφειν*). The subject of the speech to be selected was accidental and secondary. It could obviously not be a forensic speech, because Plato's aim was an investigation of educational rhetoric, not of forensic oratory. He had to choose from speeches which were designed for the young, and it was not his fault that such speeches did not attain a very high moral standard. He could not select a model speech, even if one could be found outside the Socratic circle, because the artistic purpose required a sharp contrast between his rhetoric and the wrong rhetoric of contemporary orators. His choice of a discourse of Lysias, written in apology of illicit sexual relations, must be, therefore, recognised as perfectly fit and proper for the purpose. Before any theoretical discussion followed, a better example had to be opposed to the example taken from Lysias. This better example was at first to be better in the form, and then afterwards to be made better and more elevated in the contents. Plato chose to oppose to the first speech two speeches of his own: the first on the same subject, but better composed—the second directed against the contents of both the preceding speeches. Thus it resulted as a necessity of composition that the three speeches, intended to exemplify the theory, occupied a great part of the whole writing, being nearly equal in size to the remaining dialogue.

Choice limited because it had to be a speech to the young.

The second speech improves the form, the third speech the contents.

Subject-matter secondary, and not limited to love.

The three speeches are avowedly examples of good and bad eloquence (262 D, cf. 264 E). The subject-matter is of secondary importance, and is by no means limited to love, since the myth in the second speech of Socrates deals even more with immortality, reminiscence, and human perfectibility than with the particular subject of love which formed the accidental starting point. We see here in every respect a very much widened horizon; in the *Phaedo* the scene of the mythical digression was limited to the earth's depths and heights, and even in

Widened horizon.

Rep. X the Earth is still the centre of interest. Here we see Plato, in accordance with his recommendation in the *Republic* as to the study of astronomy, taking the universe up to the fixed stars as the scene for the periodical migrations of each soul. The allegory of the cave is repeated on a much larger scale. The whole earth now takes the place of that subterraneous dwelling, and instead of the world outside the cave, where Truth can be seen as we see here earth and water, we have now the supramundane region beyond the most distant stars, a metaphorical expression which means beyond space and matter. Those who remember their vision of Truth, and act accordingly, are deemed to be mad (249 D: *ἐξιστάμενος τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων . . . νουθετεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακινῶν*, cf. *Rep.* 517 D: *εἰ ἀπὸ θείων θεωριῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπειά τις ἐλθών . . . φαίνεται σφόδρα γελοῖος*), because vulgar people are unable to understand philosophy.

Place of the mythical tale extended far beyond the limits of earth.

While in the *Phaedo* even the murderer of his father could be pardoned after one year's punishment (114 A), here, as in the *Republic*, the period of probation lasts a thousand years after each life on earth, and a free choice of a new fate is left to each soul:

Increase of the duration of punishments or rewards.

Rep. X 615 A: *διηγεῖσθαι δὲ ἀλλήλαις . . . ἀναμιμνησκομένας ὅσα τε καὶ οἷα πάθοιεν καὶ ἴδοιεν ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ γῆς πορείᾳ—εἶναι δὲ τὴν πορείαν χιλιέτη—τὰς δ' αὖ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ εὐπαθείας διηγεῖσθαι καὶ θέας ἀμηχάνους τὸ κάλλος. . . .*

617 D: *προφήτην . . . λαβόντα κλήρους τε καὶ βίων παραδείγματα . . . εἰπεῖν· ψυχαὶ ἐφήμεροι . . . ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἱρήσεσθε.*

Phaedr. 249 A B: *ὅταν τὸν πρῶτον βίον τελευτήσωσιν, κρίσεως ἔτυχον, κριθεῖσαι δὲ αἱ μὲν εἰς τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς δικαιωτήρια ἐλθοῦσαι δίκην ἐκτίνουσιν, αἱ δ' εἰς τοῦρανοῦ τινα τόπον ὑπὸ τῆς δίκης κουφισθεῖσαι διάγουσιν ἀξίως οὗ ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει ἐβίωσαν βίου. τῷ δὲ χιλιοστῷ ἀμφότεραι ἀφικνούμεναι ἐπὶ κλήρωσίν τε καὶ αἵρεσιν τοῦ δευτέρου βίου αἱροῦνται ὃν ἂν θέλῃ ἑκάστη.*

This denotes a deeper understanding of the responsibilities of life, and agrees with the doctrines of the latest works, such as the *Timaeus* and *Laws*.

Even the philosopher, who, according to the *Phaedo*, reached the happiest state immediately after death, being

Cycle of ten

thousand years for all souls except philosophers.

freed from the body (*Phaedo* 114 C: *οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον*), is now obliged to return twice to life on earth in three thousand years before he can again reach perfection (*Phaedr.* 249 A). For other souls a cycle of ten incarnations during ten thousand years, unknown in the *Republic*, is now imagined at each fall into matter (249 A). This shows that Plato progressed in emancipating his thought from the narrow limits of time as known on earth. We see also other signs of the greater height from which earthly affairs are looked upon. Those against whom Plato wrote some of his earlier dialogues are here judged with the indulgence of one who is too sure of his superiority to deny small merits in others (247 A: *φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χωροῦ ἵσταται*). Thus Polos, who had been treated so severely in the *Gorgias*, also Protagoras, and many others (267 A B), are recognised here as inventors of certain rhetorical artifices, not quite as important as they pretended, but useful and even necessary to those who know how to use them (269 B: *τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα*). This concession, though supplemented by the announcement that this preliminary knowledge should not be taken for the true art of rhetoric, is certainly a sign that the earlier hate is now changed into indulgent compassion. Pericles, too, who was treated with such severity in the *Gorgias* (516 A), is now represented as a model orator. Anaxagoras, who in the *Phaedo* was accused of having deceived Socrates by his unfulfilled promise of explaining everything through the power of reason, is now credited with the merit of teaching true eloquence to Pericles (270 A). In the same line comes also the very moderate recognition of Isocrates, only in so far as his character is said to be superior to that of Lysias and other orators (279 A), with the addition that even the greatest merit in this direction is infinitely inferior to true philosophy.

Indulgence towards persons treated severely before: Polos, Protagoras, Pericles, Anaxagoras, Isocrates. All of them being esteemed less than philosophers.

Contempt of poets

In one respect Plato's severity remained unchanged: the poets are here placed very low in the scale of human

fates, below the gymnasts, money-makers, and soothsayers (248 D). That poets are imitators, is here assumed without any further explanation (*ποιητικὸς ἢ τῶν περὶ μίμησίν τις ἄλλος*), as if the reader were supposed to be familiar with the tenth book of the *Republic*, no earlier general definition of poetry as imitation being known.[234] Plato's progress from admiration of poetry to contempt of it began only after the *Symposium*, and was first justified in the *Republic*; it is manifest in the *Phaedrus* and all later works. Also the low place assigned to the tyrant in the ninth book of the *Republic* remains here unchanged (248 E).

as imitators presupposes the *Republic*.

In some other respects we notice a development of earlier views. Love was in the *Symposium* the universal creative power in nature, and is here only one of four kinds of madness; Beauty was the highest idea, and is here only one among many ideas, of which justice occupies the first place (247 D: *ἐν δὲ τῇ περιόδῳ καθορᾷ μὲν αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθορᾷ δὲ σωφροσύνην, καθορᾷ δε ἐπιστήμην . . .*), as is natural after the long dialogue on justice (276 E: *παγκάλην, παιδιάν, . . . δικαιοσύνης . . . πέρι μυθολογοῦντα*). Some important terms used in the *Republic* are here applied as quite familiar: thus *δύναμις* in the meaning of a faculty (246 D: *πτεροῦ δύναμις*), *διαλεκτική* meaning metaphysical science (never used before Plato, and by

Love and Beauty have lost a part of their importance.

Use of terms introduced in the *Republic*.

[234] In *Rep.* II 373 B *ποιηταί* are named as co-ordinate to *μιμηταί*, and the latter term applies to interpreters of poetry. In the third book of the *Republic* only a part of poetical works is done 'by imitation' (394 C: *τῆς ποιήσεως . . . ἡ μὲν διὰ μιμήσεως ὅλη ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ δι' ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ἡ δ' αὖ δι' ἀμφοτέρων*), the term *μίμησις* being never used as a general class to which poetry belongs. This is for the first time explained in the tenth book of the *Republic* and then applied, in the same manner as in the *Phaedrus*, in the *Laws* (668 A: *μουσικήν γε πᾶσάν φαμεν εἰκαστικήν τε εἶναι καὶ μιμητικήν*). To an evidently earlier stage corresponds the definition of poetry as creation in the *Symposium* (205 B: *ἡ τοι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὂν ἰόντι ὁτῳοῦν αἰτία πᾶσά ἐστι ποίησις . . . ἀπὸ δὲ πάσης τῆς ποιήσεως ἓν μόριον ἀφορισθὲν τὸ περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῷ τοῦ ὅλου ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεται*), while in the much later subdivision of *ποιητική* in the *Soph.* 265 B, the primitive meaning of the word seems to be already forgotten, and poetry is not even named as one of the subdivisions.

Plato first in *Rep.* VII, cf. *Phaedr.* 276 E); *διαλεκτικός* meaning, not as in the *Cratylus*, *Euthydemus*, and in Xenophon, one who knows how to ask and answer questions, but the philosopher able to discover unity in the variety of particulars (266 B: *δυνατὸν εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκόθ' ὁρᾶν . . . προσαγορεύω . . . διαλεκτικόν*, cf. *Rep.* 537 C: *ὁ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός*, cf. *Crat.* 390 C: *ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον . . . διαλεκτικόν*); *ἀρχή* as first principle of Being (*Phaedr.* 245 D).

Proof of the soul's immortality compared with the proofs given in the *Republic* and in the *Phaedo*.

There are two special psychological theories of the *Republic* which recur in the *Phaedrus*, and offer some opportunity for an instructive comparison. The most important is the proof given of the soul's immortality. Formally the proof differs here as in the *Republic* from the arguments of the *Phaedo*: a substance which must be necessarily immortal is first defined, and then the soul is shown to correspond to the notion thus determined. The proof given in the *Phaedrus* is supplementary to that of the tenth book of the *Republic*: there the question was asked, what can be the cause of destruction of something existing, and it had been answered by the supposition that only a thing's own weakness and evil can destroy it. Here the corresponding positive question is asked, what is the cause of life and its external manifestation—movement, and it is answered, that the true cause must be a self-moving principle, all other things moved from without having no certainty of continued movement. There the only thing which is not destroyed by its own evil was the soul; here also each self-moving principle is found to be a soul. That the proof of immortality given in the *Phaedrus* is the later of the two, is evident from the fact that it is the only proof recurring in the *Laws*, and that no other new proof is given in any later dialogue. For the purpose of a further discussion of this definitive Platonic theorem, the two similar demonstrations in *Phaedrus* and *Laws* ought to be carefully compared with the last proof given in the *Republic*:

***Phaedrus* supplements the tenth book of the *Republic*.**

Rep. X (abbreviated).

608 D: ἀθάνατος ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυται (1).

609 A B: τὸ ξύμφυτον κακὸν ἑκάστου καὶ ἡ πονηρία ἕκαστον ἀπόλλυσιν (2), ἢ εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ἀπολεῖ, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο γε αὐτὸ ἔτι διαφθείρειεν (3). οὐ γὰρ τό γε ἀγαθὸν μή ποτέ τι ἀπολέσῃ, οὐδὲ αὖ τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτε ἀγαθόν (4).

609 B: ἐὰν ἄρα τι εὑρίσκωμεν τῶν ὄντων, ᾧ ἔστι μὲν κακόν, ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὸ μοχθηρόν, τοῦτο μέντοι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτὸ λύειν ἀπολλύον . . . ἤδη εἰσόμεθα ὅτι τοῦ πεφυκότος οὕτως ὄλεθρος οὐκ ἦν . . . . (5)

609 D: ψυχὴν . . . ἐνοῦσα ἐν αὐτῇ ἀδικία . . . τῷ ἐνεῖναι . . . οὐδαμῶς . . φθείρει (6). ἄλογον τὴν μὲν ἄλλου πονηρίαν ἀπολλύναι τι, τὴν δὲ αὑτοῦ μή.

610 C: οὐδείς ποτε δείξει ὡς τῶν ἀποθνησκόντων ἀδικώτεραι αἱ ψυχαὶ διὰ τὸν θάνατον γίγνονται (7).

610 E: ὁπότε δὴ μὴ ἱκανὴ ἥ γε οἰκεία πονηρία καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον κακὸν ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ ἀπολέσαι ψυχήν, σχολῇ τό γε ἐπ' ἄλλου ὀλέθρῳ τεταγμένον κακὸν ψυχὴν ἤ τι ἄλλο ἀπολεῖ . . . . ὁπότε μηδ' ὑφ' ἑνὸς ἀπόλλυται κακοῦ, μήτε οἰκείου μήτε ἀλλοτρίου, δῆλον ὅτι

Phaedr. 245 C–246 A: ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος (1), τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον· τὸ δ' ἄλλο κινοῦν καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλου κινούμενον, παῦλαν ἔχον κινήσεως παῦλαν ἔχει ζωῆς (2)· μόνον δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν, ἅτε οὐκ ἀπολεῖπον ἑαυτό, οὔ ποτε λήγει κινούμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα κινεῖται τοῦτο πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως (3). ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀγένητον. ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ μηδ' ἐξ ἑνός . . . . ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀγένητόν ἐστιν, καὶ ἀδιάφθορον αὐτὸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ἀρχῆς γὰρ δὴ ἀπολομένης οὔτε αὐτή ποτε ἔκ του οὔτε ἄλλο ἐξ ἐκείνης γενήσεται, εἴπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δεῖ τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι (4). οὕτω δὴ κινήσεως μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν. τοῦτο δὲ οὔτ' ἀπόλλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν. . . . . ἀθανάτου δὲ πεφασμένου τοῦ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινουμένου (5), ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον τοῦτον αὐτόν τις λέγων οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖται (6). πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα, ᾧ μὲν ἔξωθεν τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἄψυχον, ᾧ δὲ ἔνδοθεν αὐτῷ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἔμψυχον, ὡς ταύτης οὔσης φύσεως ψυχῆς (7)· εἰ δ' ἔστιν τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, μὴ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν ἢ ψυχήν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγένητόν

Laws:

894 E: ὅταν ἕτερον ἄλλο ἡμῖν μεταβάλῃ, καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλο ἕτερον ἀεί, τῶν τοιούτων . . οὐκ . . ἔσται ποτέ τι πρῶτον μεταβάλλον. ἀλλ' ὅταν αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινῆσαν ἕτερον ἀλλοιώσῃ, τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἄλλο . . . ἀρχή τις αὐτῶν ἔσται τῆς κινήσεως ἁπάσης . . . ἡ τῆς αὐτῆς αὐτὴν κινησάσης μεταβολή.

895 B: ἀρχὴν ἄρα κινήσεων πασῶν καὶ πρώτην . . . φήσομεν ἀναγκαίως εἶναι πρεσβυτάτην . . .

C: ζῇν αὐτὸ προσεροῦμεν, ὅταν αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινῇ.

896 A: ᾧ δὴ ψυχὴ τοὔνομα, τίς τούτου λόγος; ἔχομεν ἄλλον πλὴν τὸν νῦν δὴ ῥηθέντα, τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν αὑτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν; . . . ἱκανῶς δεδεῖχθαι ψυχὴν ταὐτὸν ὂν καὶ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν καὶ κίνησιν τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ γεγονότων καὶ ἐσομένων . . . κινήσεως ἁπάσης αἰτία ἅπασιν.

904 C: μεταβάλλει μὲν τοίνυν πάνθ' ὅσα μέτοχά ἐστι ψυχῆς, ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κεκτημένα τὴν τῆς μεταβολῆς αἰτίαν.

959 A: πείθεσθαι δ' ἐστὶ τῷ νομοθέτῃ χρεὼν . . . λέγοντι . . . . ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ βίῳ τὸ παρεχόμενον ἡμῶν ἕκαστον τοῦτ' εἶναι μηδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν ψυχήν . . . B: τὸν

ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ὂν εἶναι, εἰ δ' ἀεὶ ὄν, ἀθάνατον (8). 611 A: Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, οὕτως ἐχέτω (9).	τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη (8). περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς ἱκανῶς (9).	ὄντα ἡμῶν ἕκαστον ὄντως ἀθάνατον, ψυχὴν ἐπονομαζόμενον, ἀπιέναι δώσοντα λόγον . . .

Parallelism between the proof in the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*.

The most striking parallelism is evident between the two first proofs. Both begin by a short statement of the theorem which has to be proved in what follows (1). Both then name a kind of things subject to destruction (2), contrasted with another indestructible kind (3). The indestructibility of this second kind is then proved by elimination of other possible suppositions (4). The next step in both arguments is the conclusion that a thing corresponding to the above definition is indestructible (5), and the identification of such a thing with the soul (6). This identification is brought about in the *Republic* by a longer digression on the possible analogies between soul and body (609 B–D) which has been here omitted. In the *Phaedrus* the identification of the soul with the self-moving principle is briefly introduced as a conviction of which nobody needs to be ashamed. After this identification in both passages follows the special indication of the opposition between body and soul (7), the conclusion that the soul is immortal (8), in the *Phaedrus* supplemented by the additional determination that it has no beginning, and the whole argument concludes by an express statement that the proof is deemed sufficient (9).

Both proofs posterior to the *Phaedo*. They show a greater certainty, an advance in the form

If Plato knew any one of these arguments when he wrote the *Phaedo*, he could not have omitted such proofs, which are far superior to anything which the dying Socrates had to offer to Simmias and Cebes. That those proofs were not yet deemed sufficient by Plato himself is seen from the exhortation at the end of the *Phaedo* to investigate the subject further (*Phaedo* 107 B: *ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστίαν ἔτι ἔχειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων*, says Simmias, and Socrates answers: *καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστε-*

ρον) which is the opposite of the confident assertion in the *Republic* as well as in the *Phaedrus*, that the above proof is sufficient (*Phaedr.* 246 A: ἱκανῶς, cf. *Phaedo* 101 E: ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις). The logical method of beginning with the enunciation of the theorem which has to be proved, and then stating the axioms on which the proof rests, is also an advance beyond the method used in the *Phaedo*. Thus the arguments both of the *Republic* and *Phaedrus* are clearly later than those of the *Phaedo*. And almost equally probable is the priority of the *Republic* as compared with the *Phaedrus*, the latter being distinguished by a greater conciseness, by the avoidance of induction based on analogy which is used in the *Republic*, by its deductive character based on necessities of thought, by the exact co-ordination of immortality or infinite future with an infinite past, and above all by its agreement with the only proof given in the *Laws*. This is a point of the greatest weight: Plato laid great stress on the immortality of the soul in the *Laws*, and out of all his arguments in favour of this doctrine he selected the proof given in the *Phaedrus* as adequate (ἱκανόν) and worthy to be repeated in his latest work. This confirms our view that the *Phaedrus* is nearer to the *Laws* than the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, which are the only other works of Plato containing logical argumentation about immortality. After the *Phaedrus* Plato thought it superfluous to look for new arguments, and whenever he spoke about immortality he took it as well established and certain, or he added only, as in the *Timaeus*, mythical representations fit for popularising one of his favourite theories.

of expression, carried further in the *Phaedrus* than in the *Republic*.

Coincidence of *Phaedrus* with the *Laws*.

The comparison with the *Laws* disposes also of every doubt about the author's intention to apply his proof to the individual soul of every man.[235] Whatever Plato

In both cases the individual

[235] Some ancient interpreters thought that ψυχὴ πᾶσα means 'the whole soul in the universe,' and this artificial interpretation has been accepted also by Teichmüller (I. 63), who contends that Plato did not admit individual immortality, against the evidence of the texts. But Walbe's very special

soul is meant, as results from a comparison between *Phaedo* and the *Laws*.

thought later about the relation of individual souls to the whole or to God, there is no possible doubt that he taught individual immortality as a rational theory from the *Phaedo* up to the *Laws*. There is no need to infer with Teichmüller that those who read this teaching in Plato's works make him an adherent of atomism or monadologism. Individual souls can have a common origin and an universal direction, remaining all the same immortal, and always equal in number, as we read in the *Republic* as well as in the *Timaeus*. The Platonic doctrine was that the inward personality by no means needs the body for its existence:

Phaedo 115 CD: οὐ πείθω Κρίτωνα, ὡς ἐγώ εἰμι οὗτος ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ νυνὶ διαλεγόμενος . . . ἀλλ' οἴεταί με ἐκεῖνον εἶναι, ὃν ὄψεται ὀλίγον ὕστερον νεκρόν, καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δή, πῶς με θάπτῃ . . . ἐπειδὰν πίω τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενῶ, ἀλλ' οἰχήσομαι ἀπιών . . .

Legg. 959 C: οὐδέποτε οἰκοφθορεῖν χρὴ διαφερόντως, νομίζοντα τὸν αὑτοῦ τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν τῶν σαρκῶν ὄγκον θαπτόμενον, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνον . . . ὅντινά τις μάλισθ' ἡγεῖται ποθῶν θάπτειν, οἴχεσθαι περαίνοντα καὶ ἐμπιμπλάντα τὴν αὑτοῦ μοῖραν.

This doctrine, common to the *Phaedo* with the twelfth book of the *Laws*, unchanged in the course of thirty years and more between these writings, results with equal stringency from the *Phaedrus* as from the *Republic*, since in both the soul is opposed to the body, and immortality predicated of the pure soul.

Doctrine of the parts of the soul in *Phaedrus* and *Republic*.

We had to dwell at some length on these comparisons, because of their importance for the order of the dialogues, and also because they illustrate a logical progress of method. Plato's increased power of exact argumentation did not prevent him from indulging in his favourite manner of mythical allegories, as we see in the shape which he gives in the *Phaedrus* to the other chief psychological doctrine of the *Republic*, namely the three-

investigation on the use of πᾶς in Plato (see note 135) proves that here ψυχὴ πᾶσα means 'each soul' or 'all individual souls,' and not, as Thompson translates, 'the vital principle in general' (Jowett: 'the soul through all her being').

fold partition of the soul. But even in this mythical shape a certain development of doctrine is noticeable.

The *θυμός* was defined in the *Republic* as *τὸ ᾧ θυμοῦται* (580 D), and we have there interpreted it as the moral feeling. This interpretation finds its confirmation in the *Phaedrus*. Plato must have felt the terms *θυμός* and *θυμοειδές* to be too narrow, and this explains why *θυμοειδές* as a faculty of the soul has never been used by Plato after the *Republic* except in the recapitulation of the *Timaeus* (18 A). In the *Phaedrus* the moral feeling is represented under the image of a beautiful and good horse of noble breeding (246 B), full of ambition, but also the lover of temperance and honour, following right opinion and amenable to reason (253 D).

Wider determination of the moral feeling.

This is a wider determination than that given in the *Republic*, and also the classification of men according to their capacities is much enlarged. There we had only three kinds of men, divided according to the prevalence of one or another faculty. Here we find twelve kinds of souls, each of which has its own different ideal (247 A) allegorically represented by one of the Olympian gods. We need not attach any special importance to the number twelve, which is here accommodated to the mythological form. But it is certainly characteristic that Plato admits a great variety of souls not only in the myth of the dialogue, but also in the following conversation (271 B: *ψυχῆς γένη*), and this reveals an enlarged view of human nature. Here, as in former writings, the philosopher is placed above all other kinds of men, as following the band or chorus of Zeus (248 D: *τὴν πλεῖστα ἰδοῦσαν εἰς γονὴν . . . φιλοσόφου*, cf. 252 E). He is here named a leader of men by his very nature (252 E: *φιλόσοφός τε καὶ ἡγεμονικὸς τὴν φύσιν*) whereby the result of the long explanation of the *Republic* about the leadership of philosophers is briefly assumed as certain. A still stronger sign of the increasing educational influence of Plato is that he once uses 'we' (250 B: *ἡμεῖς*) without any nearer

Classification of men exceeds the narrow limits drawn in the *Republic*.

Philosopher assumed to be a leader of men.

determination, in the meaning 'the philosophers.' The writer has already a sufficient public of readers among his pupils to feel certain that he will not be misunderstood. But he insists repeatedly on the scarcity of philosophical natures (250 A: *ὀλίγαι λείπονται, αἷς τὸ τῆς μνήμης ἱκανῶς πάρεστιν, . . .* 250 B: *μόγις αὐτῶν καὶ ὀλίγοι ἐπὶ τὰς εἰκόνας ἰόντες θεῶνται τὸ τοῦ εἰκασθέντος γένος*).

Authority of the philosopher above all other men.

No authority is binding for the thinker but his own reason (270 C: *χρὴ πρὸς τῷ Ἱπποκράτει τὸν λόγον ἐξετάζοντα σκοπεῖν, εἰ συμφωνεῖ*), and the philosopher proclaims his superiority not only above the poets, as in the *Republic*, but above the law-givers and orators; only when they are philosophers do any of these deserve our esteem (278 C D). This contempt for the eminence of fame and vulgar opinion (274 C: *ἀνθρωπίνων δοξασμάτων*) shows a great distance from the *Symposium*. That the term *φιλόσοφος* is here introduced in opposition to *σοφός* (278 D) is a rhetorical artifice, like the novelty of immortality in the *Republic*, while in another passage the dialectician is compared to a god, whom even Socrates would follow with delight (266 B). Moreover, the ideal of the philosopher appears here, as later in the *Laws*, more and more supplanted by the ideal of a God, to whom the philosopher is similar. But in so far as any comparison of a philosopher with other men is made, the superiority of the philosopher accentuates itself more and more. Philosophy is divine (239 B: *θεία φιλοσοφία*) as in the *Timaeus* (47 A: *φιλοσοφίας μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' ἦλθεν οὔθ' ἥξει ποτὲ τῷ θνητῷ γένει δωρηθὲν ἐκ θεῶν*, cf. *Phil.* 16 C: *θεῶν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις*), and leads her votaries to please gods not men (274 A).

Ideal philosopher similar to God.

Divine philosophy.

Ideas contemplated by reason not the senses.

In the mythical part of the *Phaedrus* the ideas are still spoken of as contemplated by reason (247 C: *ἡ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα, . . . μόνῳ θεατὴ νῷ*), and appear to be objective (247 D E: *καθορᾷ . . . δικαιοσύνην . . . ἐπιστήμην, οὐχ ᾗ γένεσις πρόσεστιν . . . ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ ὅ ἐστιν ὂν ὄντως ἐπιστημην οὖσαν*), with

the express caution that they cannot be seen through our bodily eyes (250 D: *ὄψει φρόνησις οὐχ ὁρᾶται*). At all events the theory of an immanence of the ideas, as taught in the *Symposium*, and to a certain extent in the *Phaedo*, is supplanted by the view of a similarity or imitation of the ideas by the things which has been already indicated in the *Phaedo* and accepted in the *Republic*. The particular thing is an image of the idea (*ὁμοίωμα*, 250 A, B) which it imitates (251 A: *θεοειδὲς πρόσωπον κάλλος εὖ μεμιμημένον ἤ τινα σώματος ἰδέαν*).

Ideas as models of Being might well be identical with general notions. Faculty of perceiving unity of species in the variety of appearances a privilege of man.

We must translate this metaphorical speech into abstract thought in order to learn whether the writer of the *Phaedrus* continued in his belief of separate ideas. And the metaphors here used might well be applied to general notions. There are some hints pointing in this direction. Amidst all the imagery of the space above heaven appears a very dry explanation of the difference between man and animals. Man must understand general notions which are the result of the union by means of reasoning into one concept of what appears to the senses as a manifold variety (249 B: *δεῖ ἄνθρωπον ξυνιέναι τὸ κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρουμένων*). This is given as an explanation of the preceding metaphorical assertion that no soul is incarnated into the form of man without having enjoyed the supercelestial vision of true substance and science. If we follow this example set by Plato himself in the interpretation of his allegories, we soon get quit of the riddle of self-existing ideas. Plato does not require us to take his mythical allegories literally: he says clearly that he does not insist on everything said in the myth (265 B: *ἴσως μὲν ἀληθοῦς τινος ἐφαπτόμενοι, τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλοσε παραφερόμενοι, κεράσαντες οὐ παντάπασιν ἀπίθανον λόγον, μυθικόν τινα ὕμνον προσεπαίσαμεν μετρίως τε καὶ εὐφήμως*), and confesses to have mixed truth with fiction. Thus we are at liberty to interpret the allegories and to distinguish truth from fiction. That 'beyond the limits of the stars

Metaphors about ideas

could refer to general notions.

exist pure ideas without shape or colour, intangible and invisible, not fixed in sensible particulars, but free and independent,' means only: that pure concepts of reason are never fully realised in the things to which they apply, as for instance, absolute equality is never found identical with physical equality.

Our interpretation is appliable even to the ideas of the *Phaedo*, though there we had not such an express authorisation of free interpretation as in the *Phaedrus*, where the whole mythical account is called a pleasant play (265 C: *φαίνεται τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῷ ὄντι παιδιᾷ πεπαῖσθαι*) in which the only serious thing is the double way from particular things to the general idea, and from the idea to all its particular kinds. Here *ἰδέα* and *εἶδος* are used in a meaning which is identical with the idea as conceived by Kant, a necessary concept of reason. The synthetic union of scattered particulars is clearly a condition of consistent definition for the purposes of teaching (265 D: *εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, ἵνα ἕκαστον ὁριζόμενος δῆλον ποιῇ, περὶ οὗ ἂν ἀεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλῃ . . .*). The test of self-consistency is already stated in the first Socratic speech as the indispensable condition of knowledge (237 C: *τοὺς πολλοὺς λέληθεν ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν οὐσίαν ἑκάστου· ὡς οὖν εἰδότες οὐ διομολογοῦνται ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς σκέψεως, προελθόντες δὲ . . . οὔτε ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογοῦσιν*). Substance is even used as a synonym of definition (245 E: *οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον*, cf. 270 E: *τὴν οὐσίαν δείξει ἀκριβῶς τῆς φύσεως τούτου, πρὸς ὃ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει*).

Ideas of Plato and of Kant.

Ideas formed by the study of particulars.

The ideas appear as a result of the study of particulars, not found in the particulars, nor taken from the particulars, but discovered by reason in the act of defining each particular (273 E: *κατ' εἴδη διαιρεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα καὶ μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον περιλαμβάνειν*). When once a general idea is formed, it becomes the dialectician's aim to subdivide it into kinds, not artificially, but into natural kinds (265 E: *τὸ πάλιν καὶ τὰ εἴδη δύνασθαι τέμνειν κατ' ἄρθρα, ᾗ πέφυκεν*)

Subdivision of ideas into natural

which are distinguished from accidental parts. This division and classification must proceed to the point of indivisibility (277 B: *πᾶν ὁρίζεσθαι, ὁρισάμενός τε πάλιν κατ' εἴδη μέχρι τοῦ ἀτμήτου τέμνειν*). This method (*μέθοδος*, 269 D, 270 C, D) shows the relation between each particular and the whole, neither soul nor body nor anything being perfectly known if studied apart from everything else (270 C: *ψυχῆς φύσιν ἀξίως λόγου κατανοῆσαι (ἀδύνατον) . . . οὐδὲ σώματος . . . ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως*). The first step of investigation is to ask whether a proposed object is simple or manifold, indivisible or divisible (270 D: *πρῶτον μέν, ἁπλοῦν ἢ πολυειδές ἐστιν . . . δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι*).

kinds brings them into mutual relations to each other.

The method of definition and division of notions differs from the divine intuition of ideas. And along with this transition from metaphysic to logic, the efficient cause, despised in the *Phaedo*, regains its rights. We are asked in the case of a simple element to investigate its active or passive capability in relation to other things (270 D: *ἂν μὲν ἁπλοῦν ᾖ, σκοπεῖν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, τίνα πρὸς τί πέφυκεν εἰς τὸ δρᾶν ἔχον ἢ τίνα εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ*), while in dealing with a compound whole, we have to divide it into its kinds or elements, and then to look for the activity and passivity of each of them (270 D: *ἐὰν δὲ πλείω εἴδη ἔχῃ, ταῦτα ἀριθμησάμενον, ὅπερ ἐφ' ἑνός, τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ἐφ' ἑκάστου, τῷ τί ποιεῖν αὐτὸ πέφυκεν ἢ τῷ τί παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ;*). The recognition of efficient causes corresponds to the higher esteem of Anaxagoras, and to the definition of the soul as a self-moving principle. This removes at once all possibility of believing the *Phaedo* to have been written later than the *Phaedrus*, as the importance of efficient causes is constantly recognised in all later works, for example in the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*.

Transition from metaphysics to logic.

Division of things into their elements.

Efficient causes recognised.

The *Phaedrus* is a work of the greatest inspiration; it contains in the most natural exposition the germs of much that was later worked out by Plato, and it betrays also a greater range of study than the *Phaedo*. Dialectic as a science of Being based on definition and division is the

Dialectic based on

definition and division applied to teaching, leads to the greatest human happiness.

fulfilment of what had been postulated in the earlier work. Its chief application is clearly shown according to the ethical rules explained in the *Republic*: he who knows is bound in duty to teach. The teacher writes imperishable lines in his pupil's immortal soul, imparting a living knowledge, together with the ability to defend it against errors (276 A: *τοῦ εἰδότος λόγος ζῶν καὶ ἔμψυχος . . . γράφεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ μανθάνοντος ψυχῇ, δυνατὸς μὲν ἀμῦναι ἑαυτῷ, ἐπιστήμων δὲ λέγειν τε καὶ σιγᾶν πρὸς οὓς δεῖ*). For this he requires dialectical art (276 E: *τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ χρώμενος*) and must make a proper selection of receptive souls (*λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν*). Then his activity will yield eternal fruits and procure the highest happiness attainable by man (277 A: *λόγους, οἳ οὐχὶ ἄκαρποι ἀλλὰ ἔχοντες σπέρμα, ὅθεν ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἤθεσι φυόμενοι τοῦτ' ἀεὶ ἀθάνατον παρέχειν ἱκανοί, τὸν ἔχοντα εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦντες εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατὸν μάλιστα*).

Natural conditions of eloquence contrasted with the art of rhetoric.

An art of rhetoric is recognised as useful, but the essential conditions of a good speaker are: innate ability, exercise, and knowledge of the subject on which he intends to speak.[236] If to these conditions we wish to add the guidance of art, then we are asked to look for much more than has been offered by rhetors and grammarians, who were able only to invent such elementary rules as are preparatory to the art, much as the rules for tuning a musical instrument are preparatory to a theory of harmony (268 E). True eloquence requires, besides a perfect knowledge of the subject dealt with (262 C), also an excellent formal arrangement of the contents (236 A). Each speech must consist of well-proportioned parts, and have a proper beginning as well as a suitable conclusion, with such a disposition of the contents that each part shall have

Suitable disposition of the parts of a discourse.

[236] Strangely enough this knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη* 269 D) has been misunderstood by many interpreters as if it meant knowledge of the rules of rhetoric. Even E. Holzner ('Platos Phaedrus und die Sophistenrede des Isokrates,' *Prager Studien*, Heft IV. Prag 1894), who corrects the error of those who identified this *ἐπιστήμη* with the following *τέχνη*, falls into an almost worse error in asserting the identity of *ἐπιστήμη* in this passage with *τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα* 269 B. This misconception is due to

its proper place, being the continuation of what precedes and preparing what follows (264 C: *μέσα καὶ ἄκρα, πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ γεγραμμένα*). A speech must not be like those verses which can be read in any order (264 D). There are rhetorical necessities which determine the placing of each part of a discourse (264 B: *τὸ δεύτερον εἰρημένον ἔκ τινος ἀνάγκης δεύτερον τεθῆναι*).

Each part from the beginning to the end has its proper place.

In order to arrive at this perfection, an art is required far above anything known heretofore by the name of rhetoric (266 D). This art will teach us to lead souls by means of speech (261 A: *ψυχαγωγία διὰ λόγων*) not only in tribunals and on the market place, but in every circumstance of life, small or great (261 B: *ἡ αὐτὴ σμικρῶν τε καὶ μεγάλων πέρι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐντιμότερον τό γε ὀρθὸν περὶ σπουδαῖα ἢ περὶ φαῦλα γιγνόμενον*). The true speaker must begin

New conception of rhetoric.

an abuse of comparison with Isocrates' oration against the Sophists, without taking into account his later works, and earlier opinions of others:

Isocrates, *in sophist.* (Or. xiii.) § 17 (294 D): *δεῖν τὸν μὲν μαθητὴν πρὸς τῷ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν οἵαν χρή, τὰ μὲν εἴδη τὰ τῶν λόγων μαθεῖν, περὶ δὲ τὰς χρήσεις αὐτῶν γυμνασθῆναι.* (About 390 B.C.)

Cf. Plato *Prot* 323 C: *οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ διδακτόν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας παραγίγνεσθαι.*

Xenoph. *Memor.* II. vi. 39: *ἀρετὰς πάσας μαθήσει τε καὶ μελέτῃ αὐξανομένας.* IV. i. 3: *αἱ ἄρισται δοκοῦσαι εἶναι φύσεις μάλιστα παιδείας δέονται.*

Plato, *Phaedr.* 269 D: *εἰ μέν σοι ὑπάρχει φύσει ῥητορικῷ εἶναι, ἔσει ῥήτωρ ἐλλόγιμος, προσλαβὼν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ μελέτην.*

Cf. 237 C: *εἰδέναι δεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἡ βουλή . . .*

259 E: *ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τοῖς εὖ γε καὶ καλῶς ῥηθησομένοις τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος διάνοιαν εἰδυῖαν τἀληθὲς ὧν ἂν ἐρεῖν πέρι μέλλῃ.*

Isocr. *Antidosis* (Or. xv.) § 187: (Steph. p. 93). *δεῖ τοὺς μέλλοντας διοίσειν ἢ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἢ περὶ τὰς πράξεις . . . πρῶτον πρὸς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι καλῶς . ἔπειτα παιδευθῆναι καὶ λαβεῖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἥτις ἂν ᾖ περὶ ἑκάστου, τρίτον δὲ ἐντριβεῖς γενέσθαι καὶ γυμνασθῆναι . .* About 353 B.C.

See also Alkidamas' *περὶ σοφιστῶν* as quoted by Gercke (*Hermes*, vol. xxxii. pp. 362–364, Berlin 1897) who is, however, inclined to invert the chronological relations.

Here it is by no means certain that Plato had in view the much earlier work of Isocrates, as the three conditions of success were a commonplace and needed not to be invented by Plato or by Isocrates. Now it is very important to observe that Isocrates thought, in 390, that only the knowledge of rhetoric is required, while thirty-seven years later he agrees with Plato in asking for a knowledge of the subject. That in the *Phaedrus* *ἐπιστήμη* means knowledge of the subject is evident from the other passages and from the opposition of this knowledge to *τέχνη*.

by studying all kinds of souls and their classification (271 D: *ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ψυχὴ ὅσα εἴδη ἔχει*). Plato does not enumerate here these kinds, but those enumerated by Aristotle are probably due to a great extent to Plato's teaching. The next step is to determine what can act on a soul, and what are the limits of the soul's action (271 A: *ὅτῳ τί ποιεῖν ἢ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέφυκεν*). After a careful classification of souls and of kinds of oratory, a special inquiry is needed to show what kind of speech acts on each kind of soul, and why it has this power (271 B: *διαταξάμενος τὰ λόγων τε καὶ ψυχῆς γένη καὶ τὰ τούτων παθήματα δίεισι τὰς αἰτίας, προσαρμόττων ἕκαστον ἑκάστῳ καὶ διδάσκων, οἷα οὖσα ὑφ' οἵων λόγων δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ μὲν πείθεται, ἡ δὲ ἀπειθεῖ*).

Classification of souls and of kinds of oratory.

This clear programme of a future rhetoric has been so exactly followed up by Aristotle in his work on the same subject that probably Plato's special teaching on that matter is preserved in his pupil's exposition. Plato himself left no written system of rhetoric, because he did not write for the purpose of teaching, but for the artistic reminiscence of some new thoughts, or in order to refute the enemies of philosophy. All his works, even the *Laws*, preserve that character of art which is absent from the works of Aristotle. Systematic teaching was probably given by Plato to his pupils, and transmitted by them to the following generations in the Academy. But he appears not to have thought it a convenient subject for written exposition. There is some dramatic character in his works even when they contain such dry enumerations as we find in the *Sophist* and *Timaeus*. Also in the present day, though writing is so much easier, some eloquent men write little.

Plato did not write a handbook of rhetoric, being therein very different from Aristotle. Plato's works retain always their dramatic character. They record his own oral teaching. He was able to speak better than he wrote,

We may well believe Plato when he says that his eloquence was still greater than his literary skill (278 C: *λέγων αὐτὸς δυνατὸς τὰ γεγραμμένα φαῦλα ἀποδεῖξαι*), as he expressly asks every great writer to be able to speak better than he wrote. This is certainly not a common faculty,

and many great writers would disagree with Plato. He judged evidently according to his own experience, and his power of oral eloquence has been unanimously praised by the tradition of his times. This explains why Plato in a much longer life wrote much less than Aristotle. Aristotle, owing his initiation to Plato, may have been older when he began to write than Plato was, since Plato at the age of twenty-eight was emancipated from the influence of his teacher, while Aristotle remained under some influence of Plato up to the age of thirty-seven. If we assume that both began their literary activity about the same early age of twenty-eight, then Plato wrote during fifty-two years, and Aristotle only during thirty-four. But the extant works of Aristotle are considerably more than twice as long as all the works of Plato, though many works of Aristotle are lost, while we have all the works of Plato. This leads us to the conclusion that Aristotle wrote four or five times more copiously than Plato, and this implies a great difference of views about the use of writing. It is clear that many things written out by Aristotle were not held by Plato as fit for literary representation.

and he wrote much less than Aristotle, though he lived longer.

Difference of Plato's and Aristotle's views on literary composition.

We must not judge about this from our present point of view, accustomed as we are to learn chiefly from books. In Plato's times, and in his own opinion, oral teaching stood much higher than written handbooks, and this was a natural consequence of the difficulty of writing and reproducing written matter. It has been frequently argued from the celebrated passage on literary composition at the end of the *Phaedrus* that Plato despised writing altogether. This is certainly a very exaggerated inference. He calls writing a play, but at the same time insists on the superiority of this philosophical play over the vulgar diversions of other people (276 D: *παγκάλην παιδιάν, τοῦ ἐν λόγοις δυναμένου παίζειν, δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἄλλων ὧν λέγεις πέρι μυθολογοῦντα*). To fable about justice, as had been done in the *Republic*, is one of the most beautiful

Plato did not despise writing.

This was for him the noblest play.

Reference to the

Republic in a passage of the *Phaedrus*.

amusements for a divine man. There is no reason to think that Plato would not have spoken so lightly of writing after his great work. On the contrary, it is psychologically probable that he would not have spoken thus without the full consciousness of being a great writer (cf. *Laws* 968 E, where the same thought recurs at the end of Plato's largest work). It would not suit his artistic intention to despise writing if he had not already proved that he is a master in it, and that his contempt is not a consequence of impotence. And he has a very definite rhetorical and artistic purpose in this passage.

After an encomium on his own written myth put in the mouth of Phaedrus (257 C: *τὸν λόγον δέ σου πάλαι θαυμάσας ἔχω*), admitted even by Socrates with the poetical pretext of inspiration due to the Nymphs (263 D: *ὅσῳ λέγεις τεχνικωτέρας Νύμφας . . . Λυσίου πρὸς λόγους εἶναι*), it is his purpose to raise the reader's expectation to the highest pitch by announcing that this beautiful sample of written eloquence is nothing as compared with his oral teaching. The *Phaedrus*, like the *Symposium*, *Euthydemus*, and some other works, is written not only for the pupils, but also for those who followed wrong paths outside of the Academy, inviting them to join the School. Invitations are extended even to those about whom no hope could be left. Lysias is told to learn dialectic, and what has been held for a eulogy on Isocrates is rather an ironic invitation to learn true philosophy. Anybody who reads Isocrates' *Panegyricus*, written in 380 B.C., or about the same time when Plato was occupied with the *Republic*, will understand that Isocrates could not be flattered by such a form of recognition as that which we see in the *Phaedrus*.

The *Phaedrus* invites the reader to join the school. Invitation to learn philosophy extended to Isocrates.

The recognition was meant sincerely, as also the merits attributed to Pericles (269 A), Prodikos, Polos, Hippias (267 B), Protagoras (267 C: *Πρωταγόρεια . . . πολλὰ καὶ καλά*), even to Sophocles and Euripides (268 C)

who are named as the greatest poets, without any reference to the general low appreciation of poetry. In no other work of Plato is that same spirit of benevolence and conciliation shown, and this disposition of mind is best explained after a great success, like the production of the *Republic*. But certainly Isocrates pretended to more than to be preferred to Lysias (279 A), to hear that 'some philosophy' is manifest in his character (279 B: *ἔνεστί τις φιλοσοφία τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διανοίᾳ*) and to be advised to take a more divine start (279 A: *ὁρμὴ θειοτέρα*) than his present pursuits, if he cares to do better than to excel 'in later age' all orators (279 A: *οὐδὲν ἂν γένοιτο θαυμαστὸν προϊούσης τῆς ἡλικίας, εἰ . . . πλέον ἢ παίδων διενέγκοι τῶν πώποτε ἁψαμένων λόγων*). This prophecy is at once shown in its relative value, when we read in continuation that there is something far greater (*μείζω*) than to excel all orators, something requiring a divine power, and this is nothing else than Plato's educational activity.

Spirit of benevolence and conciliation.

Moderate recognition of Isocrates could not be accepted as satisfactory by him.

Isocrates repeatedly pretends to be a representative of true philosophy (for instance *Panegyric*. § 10) and he must have felt humiliated by Plato's judgment of his relative merits. Thompson[170] has shown at least one passage of the *Phaedrus* which clearly criticises a pretension of Isocrates as proffered in the *Panegyricus*:

Isocr. (Or. iv. p. 42 CD) *Panegyr.* § 8: *ἐπειδὴ δ' οἱ λόγοι τοιαύτην ἔχουσι τὴν φύσιν ὥσθ' οἷόν τ' εἶναι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πολλαχῶς ἐξηγήσασθαι, καὶ τὰ μεγάλα ταπεινὰ ποιῆσαι καὶ τοῖς μικροῖς μέγεθος περιθεῖναι, καὶ τά τε παλαιὰ καινῶς διελθεῖν καὶ περὶ τῶν νεωστὶ γεγενημένων ἀρχαίως εἰπεῖν, οὐκέτι φευκτέον ταῦτ' ἐστί, περὶ ὧν ἕτεροι πρότερον εἰρήκασιν, ἀλλ' ἄμεινον ἐκείνων εἰπεῖν πειρατέον.*

Plato *Phaedr.* 267 A: *Τισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε ἐάσομεν εὕδειν, οἳ πρὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα εἶδον ὡς τιμητέα μᾶλλον, τά τε αὖ σμικρὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα σμικρὰ φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσιν διὰ ῥώμην λόγου καινά τε ἀρχαίως τά τ' ἐναντία καινῶς, συντομίαν τε λόγων καὶ ἄπειρα μήκη περὶ πάντων ἀνηῦρον; ταῦτα δὲ ἀκούων ποτέ μου Πρόδικος ἐγέλασεν.*

Relation between the *Phaedrus* and Isocrates' *Panegyricus* discovered by Thompson, though already

Here we see that an artifice which Isocrates recommended as useful is attributed by Plato to Isocrates'

alluded to by Cicero.

teacher Gorgias, and condemned by the remark that he who would follow this advice would be obliged to esteem probability more highly than truth, and deserved the laughter of Prodikos.

Mention of Isocrates as attempting a new kind of speeches refers to the *Panegyricus* as Teichmüller demonstrated.

This relation of the *Phaedrus* to the *Panegyricus*, already implied by Cicero (*Orator*, xiii. 37), and again discovered by Thompson, gives a precious chronologic indication, as the *Panegyricus* is known to have been published in 380 B.C. The date of the *Phaedrus* is thus indicated by an anachronism of Plato almost similar to that of the *Symposium*, because he puts in the mouth of Socrates the prediction that Isocrates would easily excel all orators if he continues to write such speeches as those on which he works *now* (279 A: λόγους, οἷς νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖ). This 'now' cannot refer to the lifetime of Socrates, as then Isocrates wrote forensic speeches not deserving even that restricted recognition which Plato expresses in the *Phaedrus*. And, as Teichmüller (ignoring Thompson) demonstrated in a most convincing way, no earlier work of Isocrates than the *Panegyricus* could educe from Plato any approbation. This is unexpectedly confirmed by Dümmler, though he continues to believe in an early date of the *Phaedrus* (*Chronologische Beiträge*, p. 11). Dümmler sees in a later work of Isocrates (*Antidosis*, § 62) a clear allusion to a conditional approbation of the *Panegyricus*, though he does not refer this mention to the *Phaedrus*, but to the *Republic* (426 C D E). It is more probable that Isocrates when he wrote the *Panegyricus* already knew Plato's views on the relation between Hellenes and Barbarians (*Rep.* 470), though this cannot easily be made evident.

This inference confirmed by an observation of Dümmler, though he professes another opinion as to the *Phaedrus*.

Pretended early date of the *Phaedrus*.

The date of the *Phaedrus* is one of those problems in Platonic chronology on which a great wealth of ingenious supposition has been spent in vain. The strangest of all possible errors was the thought that the *Phaedrus* could have been written in the lifetime of Socrates. This is a result of purely philological combinations, without any

consideration of the philosophical contents, which betray a date at least as late as the *Republic*, and undoubtedly later than the *Phaedo*. What reasons Diogenes Laertius had for his observation that the subject of the *Phaedrus* has something juvenile in it, is unknown. Probably he held with many superficial readers the subject to be illicit love, not philosophical rhetoric. In our century Schleiermacher was the first to proclaim that the *Phaedrus* must be one of the earliest works of Plato on the ground of its philosophical poverty. He says that the philosophical contents in the *Phaedrus* are not yet mature for a dialectical exposition (vol. i. p. 67), for which were substituted strength of passion and questions of method. He seems to believe that investigations of method are particularly proper to the youth of a philosopher. According to such a standard Kant's *Kritik* might have been written thirty years earlier than it was.

Schleiermacher complains of the philosophical poverty of the *Phaedrus*

Another argument is the poetical language of the *Phaedrus*, which reminds Schleiermacher of the tradition about Plato's verses which he was said to have burnt when he knew Socrates. This argument is fully refuted by the great number of stylistic coincidences with the *Laws* which are found in the *Phaedrus*. Schleiermacher sees also a sign of early date in the triumphant confidence of the dialogue. If Plato had such confidence at the age of twenty-five, how could he have lost it in the *Protagoras* and *Meno*? This question is left unanswered by Schleiermacher. The contempt of writing, argues Schleiermacher, is unthinkable in a man who has written already very much. But Plato does not despise writing at all, and he states it expressly (258 D: *παντὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν αὐτό γε τὸ γράφειν λόγους*)—he despises only bad writing (*ἐκεῖνο αἰσχρὸν ἤδη, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν*) and the cult of mere literary erudition (275 D: *πλέον τι οἰόμενος εἶναι λόγους γεγραμμένους τοῦ τὸν εἰδότα ὑπομνῆσαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ᾖ τὰ γεγραμμένα*) which substitutes opinions for knowledge (275 B: *πολυήκοοι γάρ σοι γενόμενοι*

Poetical language.

Triumphant confidence.

Contempt of mere erudition, not of literature.

ἄνευ διδαχῆς πολυγνώμονες εἶναι δόξουσιν . . . δοξόσοφοι γεγονότες ἀντὶ σοφῶν), and leads men to spend all their attention on the form, making it impossible for such mechanical writers to have a clear view of general ideas (248 B: πολὺν ἔχουσαι πόνον ἀτελεῖς τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας ἀπέρχονται).

Mention of Isocrates is not a sign of unreserved approbation, only a recognition of his superiority to other orators.

What Plato wanted, is that anybody who pretended, like Isocrates, to be named a philosopher, should be able to impart to his pupils something better than speeches corrected over and over during many years like the *Panegyricus* of which that rhetor was so proud. The Platonic Socrates recommends Phaedrus to say that to Lysias (278 D E), but Phaedrus asks whether the same does not apply to Isocrates, and the answer is not in the negative: more talent (279 A: τὰ τῆς φύσεως) and a nobler character (ἤθει γεννικωτέρῳ) are not denied to the author of the *Panegyricus*, but he is left only the first place among orators, not allowed to rank among philosophers until he shall yield to a more divine inspiration.

Solemnity of style.

What Schleiermacher quotes besides as a sign of youthfulness, an exaggerated solemnity in some passages, has been demonstrated by Campbell to be a peculiarity of later style. The mention of Polemarchos, Lysias' brother, as a pupil of Socrates appears to Schleiermacher most probable in the lifetime of Polemarchos, who was poisoned four years before Socrates (Lysias *contra Eratosth.* §§ 17, 18). But Polemarchos is also introduced in a work written long after his death (*Rep.*).

Mention of Sophocles and Euripides used by Ast as chronological indication.

Ast saw in the *Phaedrus* Pythagorean influence, and a great similarity to the *Timaeus* (pp. 106–107), but this did not prevent him from following Schleiermacher in identifying the supposed date of the conversation with the date of the composition. He added to Schleiermacher's arguments only one very curious reason: Sophocles and Euripides are spoken of as living, and therefore the *Phaedrus* must be written before 406 B.C. Ast did not notice that the same reasoning would lead

him to place also the *Timaeus* and *Critias* before the death of Socrates.

More recent defenders of the early date of the *Phaedrus*.

What has been said in favour of an early date of the *Phaedrus* by Krische[237] and Volquardsen,[238] who has dedicated a whole volume to the subject, is only a paraphrase of Schleiermacher with such insignificant additions as the acute observation of Krische that the death of Socrates is not alluded to in this work (this would rather speak for a late date) or the unfounded fancy of Volquardsen that the philosophical contents of the dialogue are purely Socratic. These authors have not thought it of any importance to explain why Plato in the *Phaedrus* despises poetry or how he could so early have arrived at the conviction of a periodic migration of souls, contradictory to the very cautious statements on future life in the *Apology*, *Crito*, and all purely Socratic dialogues.

A more recent attempt to represent the *Phaedrus* as written some years before the death of Socrates has been made by Usener[239] and accepted for a time by Wilamowitz-Moellendorff,[240] but the latter has expressly revoked this opinion (*Hermes*, vol. xxxi. p. 102).

Thompson's edition of the *Phaedrus* still unknown in Germany.

The case of the *Phaedrus* in one respect resembles that of the *Sophist*. As Campbell's investigations on the *Sophist* have waited thirty years to be at last acknowledged by a competent authority as an 'immortal feat in Platonic chronology,'[241] so Thompson's equally immortal investigations on the *Phaedrus*—published in 1868,

[237] A. B. Krische, 'Ueber Platons Phaedrus,' in *Göttinger Studien* for 1847, pp. 930–1065, Göttingen 1848.

[238] C. R. Volquardsen, *Platons Phaedrus, Erste Schrift Platons*, Kiel 1862, 321 pp.

[239] H. Usener, 'Abfassungszeit des Platonischen Phaidros,' in *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, 35er Band, p. 131, Frankfurt a. M. 1880.

[240] Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Philologische Untersuchungen*, Band i. p. 213.

[241] Th. Gomperz, 'Die Jowett-Campbellsche Ausgabe von Platos Republic,' in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, Band cix. p. 163, says: 'Lewis Campbell's Name wird in der Platon-Forschung unvergänglich dauern.'

but written and read in the university of Cambridge as early as 1859—remain up to the present time a dead letter to continental philologers. Two reasons have acted in this case as well as in Campbell's: first that on the Continent nobody expects important original investigations to be buried in the Introduction and Appendices of the text edition of a single dialogue; and second that Thompson, like Campbell, did not use the confident language which is necessary to make an impression on a reader accustomed to the confidence of Schleiermacher, Hermann, Zeller, Teichmüller—and maintained even by such paradoxical authors as Schaarschmidt or Pfleiderer. What Teichmüller developed into an important chapter of his work, without knowing Thompson, was given by the Master of Trinity College in footnotes, with a modesty which even on a reader accustomed to the incomparable modesty of English scholars leaves an impression of incertitude.

Both Thompson and Campbell stated their convictions with great modesty, which produces the impression of incertitude.

Thompson has made it evident to the attentive reader of the four dissertations accompanying his edition of the *Phaedrus* (Introduction and three Appendices) that this dialogue must be written after the *Panegyricus* of Isocrates, that is after 380; and before the death of Lysias, that is before 378. This is such an exact determination of date as is possible only for a very few Platonic dialogues. The same argument has been independently and with far greater assurance produced by Teichmüller in 1881 (*Literarische Fehden*, vol. i. pp. 57–82) and has never been refuted. This agrees perfectly with the place assigned by us to the *Phaedrus* in the development of Plato's logic, and with the limits of the probable time necessary since the *Symposium* for the composition of the *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Phaedrus*. That the *Phaedrus* must be later than *Phaedo* and *Symposium* has been also recently recognised by Th. Gomperz and must be acknowledged by all who know the investigations on the style of Plato which have so completely confirmed Thompson's view.

Thompson confined the date of the *Phaedrus* within the narrow limits of 380–378.

This agrees with the above considerations.

Yet up to the present time, many eminent German scholars, as Zeller, Susemihl, W. Christ, P. Natorp and others, persist in the opinion that the *Phaedrus* is earlier than the *Phaedo* and *Symposium*, so that some supplementary observations on the evidence for the priority of these and other dialogues are perhaps not out of place.

Relation of the *Phaedrus* to other dialogues.

As to the *Phaedo*, the arguments of Schulthess are decisive, and Schedle,[242] Liebhold,[243] Kassai,[244] who advocated the priority of the *Phaedrus*, were unable to refute them, while Bury [245] supplemented them in the best manner. The comparison of the arguments for immortality has shown equally that the *Phaedrus* must have been written after the *Phaedo*. The priority of the soul to the body appears in the *Phaedo* (80 A) as a new thought and is already familiar in the *Phaedrus* (246 B: *πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου*); the theory of reminiscence, which is in the *Phaedo* mentioned with the caution '*εἰ ἀληθής ἐστιν*' (72 E), is in the *Phaedrus* assumed as certain (250 A); that ideas or notions are the substance of things is in the *Phaedo* a probability (76 D: *εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεί, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοσαύτη οὐσία* . . . 100 B: *ὑποθέμενος εἶναί τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ* . . .), in the *Phaedrus* the common inheritance of all philosophers (247 C: *ἡ* . . . *οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα κυβερνητῇ μόνῳ θεατὴ νῷ*). More important points of comparison are afforded by some characteristic differences between *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*, which show the *Phaedrus* in agreement with other later works. It has been observed by Ueberweg (*Untersuchungen*, p. 285) that an important doctrine is common to *Phaedrus* and *Timaeus*,

Relation to the *Phaedo*.

Ueberweg's observation which led him to suppose it later

[242] F. Schedle, *Die Reihenfolge der platonischen Dialoge Phaedros, Phaedon, Staat, Timaeus*, Innspruck 1876.

[243] Liebhold, *Ueber die Bedeutung des Dialogs Phädon für die Platonische Erkenntnisstheorie und Ethik*, Rudolfstadt 1876.

[244] G. Kassai, 'Meletemata Platonica,' in *Egyetemes Philologiai Közlöny*, pp. 857–870, Budapest 1886.

[245] J. B. Bury, 'Questions connected with Plato's Phaidros,' in *Journal of Philology*, Nr xxix. for 1886.

date of the *Phaedo* can be interpreted otherwise.

while not yet recognised in the *Phaedo*, namely the axiom that what is unconditioned is indestructible, while everything that has a beginning must have an end. Ueberweg was led by this observation to place the *Phaedo* after the *Phaedrus* and *Timaeus*, wherein he departed from his ordinary sagacity and caution, as the natural inference would have been that the *Phaedo* is earlier, the more so as *Phaedrus* and *Timaeus* agree in this respect with the *Laws* (see above, p. 333), a fact which seems not to have been noticed by Ueberweg.

Coincidences between *Phaedrus* and *Timaeus* as compared with *Phaedo*.

The view of the sense perceptions offers another coincidence between *Phaedrus* and *Timaeus* against the *Phaedo*. In the *Phaedo* as well as in the *Symposium* true Beauty was inaccessible to the senses (*Phaedo* 65 D), while in the *Phaedrus* not only Beauty is accessible to the physical sight (250 D: *κάλλος . . . δεῦρο ἐλθόντες κατειλήφαμεν διὰ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως . . . φρόνησις οὐχ ὁρᾶται . . . κάλλος μόνον ταύτην ἔσχε μοῖραν, ὥστ' ἐκφανέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον*), but the sense perceptions lead to the formation of general notions (249 B: *τὸ κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρουμένων*). This agrees with the view expressed in the *Timaeus* metaphorically (44 B: *πρὸς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἰόντων σχῆμα ἑκάστων τῶν κύκλων αἱ περιφοραὶ κατευθυνόμεναι, τό τε θάτερον καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν προσαγορεύουσαι κατ' ὀρθόν, ἔμφρονα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὰς γιγνόμενον ἀποτελοῦσιν*).

Allusion in the *Phaedrus* to the *Phaedo* and *Symposium* with preference shown for the *Phaedo*.

The relation of the *Phaedrus* to the *Symposium* can be easily shown by many comparisons, and it is now evident that the *Phaedrus* is later, though the majority of authors think otherwise. The mention that Phaedrus has been the cause of many speeches (242 A) in peculiar connection with a similar mention of Simmias (242 B) may with some probability refer to the *Symposium*, in which Phaedrus is represented (177 A) as the initiator of the series of speeches on love proposed by Eryximachos. This allusion is in so far probable as Simmias named in the same passage has in the *Phaedo* a principal share in

initiating the dialogue on immortality (*Phaedo* 61 C). And if Plato in the *Phaedrus* credits Simmias with a greater merit, this means that he preferred his *Phaedo* to the *Symposium*, and that he looked on both dialogues as his masterpieces, very superior to speeches of other orators (242 A B: *θεῖος εἶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς θαυμάσιος· οἶμαι γὰρ ἐγὼ . . . μηδένα πλείους ἢ σὲ πεποιηκέναι γεγενῆσθαι ἤτοι αὐτὸν λέγοντα ἢ ἄλλους ἑνί γέ τῳ τρόπῳ προσαναγκάζοντα. Σιμμίαν Θηβαῖον ἐξαιρῶ λόγου· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πάμπολυ κρατεῖς*).

Mention of Polemarchos' conversion might refer to the *Republic*

The mention of Lysias' brother Polemarchos as converted to philosophy (*Phaedr.* 257 B) might be a direct allusion to the *Republic*, in which Polemarchos is represented as convinced by Socrates that nobody ought to do wrong to his enemies (*Rep.* 335 E). This would be an allusion similar to that which is contained in the mention of Simmias and Phaedrus, and would tend to show that Plato looked upon the persons of his dialogues as more real than their living models, who were dead when he wrote. He says at least that there is more truth in thought than in action (*Rep.* 473 A), and he takes many times such a liberty with Socrates that he puts in his master's mouth allusions to his own written dialogues, or even to his experiences, without any consideration whether such allusions were suitable to the historical Socrates.

Teichmüller's supposition about the speech of Lysias uncertain unless new evidence is forthcoming.

Teichmüller sees (ii. pp. 22, 272) in the erotic speech of Lysias allusions to the speech of Pausanias in the *Symposium*, and believes the speech to have been written as a criticism of the *Symposium* by Lysias, thus provoking Plato's pitiless criticism in the *Phaedrus*. This ingenious supposition, if it could be proved, would sufficiently explain why Plato selected just this speech of Lysias as a sample of bad rhetoric, and why he criticised it with more than usual insistence and irony (243 C: *ἀναιδῶς εἴρησθον τὼ λόγω . . . ἐν ναύταις που τεθραμμένων καὶ οὐδένα ἐλεύθερον ἔρωτα ἑωρακότων*). The parallel passages quoted by Teichmüller deserve our attention, but they seem not to be fully

sufficient to prove his supposition (*Symp.* 183 E compared with *Phaedr.* 231 A, 184 C with 233 A, 182 D with 234 A, 218 B with 231 D). These allusions are not quite evident, but they might be confirmed if some independent testimony about Lysias' Eroticos should ever be found: therefore they deserve to be remembered. The relation between *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* appears also in the mention occurring in the *Phaedrus* that physical beauty provokes an admiration which can become a germ of perfection (251 A): this seems to refer to the corresponding explanation in the *Symposium* (210 A).

View on poetry in both.

But the most decisive argument for the priority of the *Symposium* turns on the difference of views about poetry. In the *Symposium* poets are still esteemed, in the *Phaedrus* the poet takes one of the lowest places, and Homer is parodied (252 B) by two verses in which the inconstancy of his gods is ridiculed.

Comparisons with earlier dialogues superfluous.

It would be easy to show in the *Phaedrus* also many points of comparison with the *Cratylus*, with which it has in common a certain etymological tendency, with the *Gorgias*, which Thompson showed to be earlier when the majority of German scholars were still of the contrary opinion, and with other dialogues. But the priority of the *Gorgias* has been lately recognised by some of its former opponents, especially by Zeller, and has been made evident also by Natorp, Siebeck, Dümmler, after Socher, Stallbaum, Hermann, Steinhart, Susemihl, and Ueberweg, so that it may be admitted as sufficiently proved.[246]

Thompson's determination

Thus Thompson's determination of the date of the *Phaedrus* as written between 380 and 378, or about 379 B.C., is confirmed in every respect, and not the least important of all these confirmations is given by the stylistic investi-

[246] The recent attempt of Gercke (*Platons Gorgias, erklärt von Sauppe, herausgegeben von Gercke*, Berlin 1897) to prove that the *Phaedrus* preceded the *Gorgias* is based on the assumption of uncertain allusions to writings of other authors, and without regard either for the philosophical contents or for the style of these two dialogues. See above, note 236.

gations. Already Campbell found in the *Phaedrus* a surprisingly large number of words common to the latest three dialogues, exceeding in relation to the size not only the number of such words to be found in the *Phaedo* and *Symposium*, but even those of the *Republic*, *Sophist*, *Parmenides*, and *Philebus*. This peculiarity of the vocabulary of the *Phaedrus* has been since outweighed by other peculiarities observed, so that in our list the *Phaedrus* exceeds in stylistic affinity with the latest group only those works which are really earlier, as the *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, and equal samples from the *Republic*. The only part of the *Republic* which has a slightly greater number of important peculiarities of later style than the *Phaedrus* is the picture of the philosophers in B. VI–VII. But the difference is too insignificant for chronological conclusions (116 peculiarities equivalent to 234 units of affinity on 44 pp. in Rep. VI–VII against 118 peculiarities equivalent to 220 units on 39 pp. in *Phaedr.*). The more so since only the greater frequency of peculiarities occurring is superior, and not their number. This might be a consequence of the much more varied contents of the *Phaedrus*.

of the date of the *Phaedrus* confirmed by stylistic evidence.

Only B. VI–VII of the *Republic* might be later, though this remains uncertain.

If we compare the peculiarities of later style found in this part of the *Republic* only and absent from the *Phaedrus* and all earlier dialogues with those found in the *Phaedrus* and absent from the *Republic*, we see that the *Phaedrus* notwithstanding its smaller size has more exclusive affinities with the latest group than the latest part of the *Republic*:

Peculiarities of later style found in

Rep. 471 C–541 B (44½ pp. Did.), and in no earlier dialogue nor in any other part of the *Republic*.	*Phaedrus* (39 pp. Did.), and in no earlier dialogue nor in the *Republic*.
πάντως καὶ πάντῃ (327) once	πάντῃ πάντως (323) once
ἐρρήθη (336) once	εἴρηται (324) once
τὰ πάντα εἴδη (361) once	τὸ ξύμπαν (363) once
μυρίῳ (329) once	γένος as a logical term (24)
ἀνάπαυλα (470) once	ἀπίθανος (476) once

Rep. (continued)—

οὐσία = complexus omnium rerum (238) once

ἀκίνητος (469) repeated

δύω (195) repeated

Phaedr. (continued)—

adjectives in τος formed of substantives (6) repeated

τε, adding a third phrase (233) repeated

ὁμοίωμα (468) repeated

great scarcity of answers denoting subjective assent (318), important

Interrogations by τί prevailing over those by πῶς (452), important

Date of the *Phaedrus* about 379 B.C.

Thus it is probable, though not yet certain, that the *Phaedrus* is later than the *Republic*, taken as a whole, and it is quite certain that the last three books of the *Republic* preceded the *Phaedrus*. This results both from stylistic comparisons and from the comparison of contents. At all events the date of the *Phaedrus* as written about 379 B.C. (380–378) is now quite as well confirmed as the date of the *Symposium* about 385 B.C.

Middle Platonism

The period of Middle Platonism produced as much as one half of the amount of text written afterwards.

We have seen that in the time between 384 and 378 B.C. Plato dedicated his leisure only to the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, all other works being either earlier, as has been already shown with respect to those preceding the *Republic*, or later, as will be seen in the continuation of our inquiry. This short epoch of middle Platonism lasting up to Plato's fiftieth year produced, therefore, an amount of text equal to one half (233 pp. ed. Did.) of all the works written in the remaining thirty years of the philosopher's life (476 pp. ed. Did.). Thence it results that Plato's literary activity was on the decrease after the *Phaedrus*, and that he followed the maxims expressed at the end of this dialogue, according to which writing is by no means the most important of the aims of a philosopher, in contradiction to his rival Isocrates, to whom

nothing appeared more important than his written speeches, in which he pretended to teach also a philosophy, condemned by Plato.

Doctrine of ideas during Middle Platonism developes into the view of a mere similarity between things and ideas.

The doctrine of the ideas, invented in the first period after the foundation of the Academy, is maintained during the time of middle Platonism, but the same stress is no longer laid on the independent existence of the ideas, and the relation between particular things and the ideas, first designated by the term *μετέχειν*, becomes a mere similarity (*μίμημα, μιμεῖσθαι, ὁμοίωμα, ὁμοιοῦν*), which allows us also to form ideas by the observation of similarities in sensible objects. In several passages the ideas and knowledge appear as created by the philosopher, though the earlier conception of a vision of self-existing ideas is not yet wholly abandoned, and reappears in the myth of the *Phaedrus* accompanied by its logical interpretation, according to which the ideas become identified with general notions.

Ideas not limited to ethical or mathematical notions.

It is fully in accordance with this later stage of the doctrine, that ideas are no longer limited as in the *Symposium* and *Phaedo* to ethical and mathematical objects, but are equally supposed to exist for manufactured things. Thus a transformation of the primitive theory of ideas is already prepared though not yet carried out. While the ideal of the first Platonic stage was a state of subjective perfection and separation from the vulgar surroundings of common life, a passive contemplation of ideas, we see in middle Platonism an increasing confidence in the necessity of applying philosophy to life, and also of investigating particulars. The search for definitions was a Socratic inheritance, but the fondness for classifications appears not earlier than in the *Republic*, though it is prepared by the *Phaedo*.

Application of philosophy to life.

Logical classifications lead to a

This direction taken by Plato had a great influence on the development of his logic. So long as only definitions are sought for, the supramundane independence of ideas can easily be maintained. But once on the way of

recognition of the subjective element in ideas.

systematic classification it is impossible not to observe the subjective character of subdivisions, and this leads to the conclusion that the existence of ideas is only possible in a soul: not necessarily the soul of the thinker, but a soul of an individual being. The objectivity of ideas resulting from an agreement between souls is different from the objectivity based on the feeling produced by passive contemplation. The first impression of a philosopher who notices the distance between an idea and the particulars is to exaggerate the objectivity and independence of the idea, and to assert emphatically its independence and incommensurability with the particulars, which seems to imply its existence outside individual consciousness. The belief in its independence of particulars is lasting, because it is true, and has been proved by Plato in the *Phaedo* and in all following works, remaining the cardinal truth of all later philosophy, ignored only by thinkers who were not sufficiently versed in the history of logic, like Comte and Mill.

Ideas independent of particulars but not outside individual consciousness.

Logical independence of ideas the foundation of science.

But the existence of ideas otherwise than in some individual consciousness is an illusion, similar to that more familiar illusion which makes colours and sounds appear objective, though they have no existence outside of us. The illusion of objective idealism is, however, one of those illusions which are necessary steps in philosophical progress. It is only a metaphoric expression of the truth that ideas are logically independent of the individual, and this logical independence (ἀνάγκη) must be recognised as a foundation of objective knowledge and science.

Plato's objective idealism lasted a short time.

Thus Plato at the beginning of his logic and during the middle period of his literary activity was idealist: he believed in the objective existence of the ideas outside particulars and outside the individual soul. This belief found its clearest expression, at the beginning, in the *Symposium* and in the *Phaedo*, combined with a vague uncertainty as to the relation between things and ideas.

During middle Platonism, so far as we can guess from the hints given in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, the same conviction was maintained with a clearer definition of the relation between things and ideas as consisting in their similarity. But less emphatic stress was laid on the independence, and if due allowance is made for metaphorical language, the whole mythical part of the *Phaedrus* may well agree with a conception of ideas in the meaning they had for Kant.

Already less certain in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*.

We need not fear to deprive Kant of his originality if we come to the conclusion that Plato towards his later age understood the ideas in very much the same way as Kant. The truth is one, and once found cannot be changed. There is no impossibility or even improbability in supposing that a thinker like Plato, having no other aim in his life than thought, arrived at a correct notion of ideas after a long educational career. It would be astonishing to find the contrary. And Kant cannot lose any substantial merit in consequence of this discovery, as the notion of ideas forms only one of the points of Kant's philosophy, while in many other points he progressed, as might naturally be expected, beyond Plato and other philosophers.

Coincidence between the later stage of Plato's thought and Kant not accidental.

There is one very striking analogy between Kant and Plato. Kant undertook a critical reform of his earlier convictions after having reached the age of fifty, and the same was the case with Plato. It is not surprising that philosophers arrive late at the full maturity of their thoughts. Every more perfect being requires a longer development, and men's childhood lasts longer than the childhood of inferior animals. A philosopher in Plato's opinion must excel other men almost to the same extent as any man is superior to other animals. This is not an extraordinary pretension, if we bear in mind that for Plato the activity of a philosopher is by no means limited to abstract thought, but extends to all departments of human life; so that he would certainly have included in

Analogy between Kant and Plato.

this class some of our contemporaries, not asking them to write philosophical dissertations in order to legitimate their pride in belonging to the ruling class of mankind, formed of more perfect beings than the average citizens even in an ideal state.

CHAPTER VII

REFORM OF PLATO'S LOGIC

WE have seen in the above exposition of middle Platonism a theory of knowledge according to which the ideas were perceived by intuition, and constituted eternal models of everything in the phenomenal world. The chief point was the independence of ideas, not involving, however, their separate existence. That no phenomenal appearance can fully correspond to a pure idea is a great discovery of Plato, made by the consideration of mathematical as well as moral notions. Whether such ideas have any existence out of the human mind, or generally outside an individual consciousness, was a question not discussed, and perhaps not clearly formulated by Plato: when he speaks of the beauty of ideas outside the physical universe, he does it in such metaphorical language, that we cannot draw certain inferences from his images. The true meaning of all these visions is the conviction that ideas are independent of material things, and that the existence and changes of physical objects must be ruled by immaterial and invisible ideas, often spoken of as objects of thought.

Ideas perceived by intuition and independent of appearances.

Substantial existence of ideas not certain.

The relation between things and ideas—whether defined as a presence or immanence of ideas in the things, or as a similarity between things and ideas, or as an imitation of ideas by particulars—was the first question that occurred when once the existence of the ideas had been established. While a personal training was deemed necessary in order to attain the vision of ideas, their

Existence of ideas

evident for the initiated.

existence needed no other proof than the personal experience of the initiated. This initiation by means of mathematical, astronomical, or musical studies, and subsequent discussion of political or educational problems, proved a sufficient aim for many years of teaching. But at last a new problem became inevitable. Suppose we have arrived at the intuitive knowledge of many ideas, and are aware of the difference between an idea and a particular object of sensible experience, the next question to ask is about the order of ideas and their mutual relations. These can be well explained only through a distinction of similarities, leading to an universal classification of notions. Already in the *Republic* it was asked how many kinds of reasoning are possible (532 D: *τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμεως, καὶ κατὰ ποῖα δὴ εἴδη διέστηκε*), but the question was left unanswered. In the *Phaedrus* (266 B) the complete classification of ideas from the most general kinds down to the indivisible logical units was proclaimed as the chief aim of the dialectician.

Once their existence recognised their order and hierarchy deserve the attention of the philosopher.

Classificatory tendency appears at a later stage.

This classificatory tendency is absent from earlier works, where specific problems were discussed, without any allusion to a contemplation of all time and all existence, which we find first in the *Republic* (486 A). But even in the *Republic* the classifications and divisions are limited to a few subjects, and no attempt is made to bring all the possible objects of knowledge under a certain number of heads. Nor is this fully carried out even in the *Phaedrus*, where the importance of such a logical method is so warmly insisted upon, and the power of building up general notions and dividing them is proclaimed divine.

The dialectical dialogues carry out the programme

An attempt to realise this programme is made in the series of dialectical dialogues, among which the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides* are the earliest, as we have seen from stylistic comparisons, which are confirmed by the examination of their logical contents. They share with the

later works of this group another important peculiarity, the historical method of comparing impartially and judging according to their merits the theories of other philosophers. The primitive theory of ideas is no longer the object of such ecstatic admiration as in the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*. It is subjected to a critical examination in the *Parmenides* and almost ignored in the *Theaetetus*, so much so that many readers have believed this to be an early dialogue. This impression vanishes at once upon a close consideration of some philosophical terms familiarly used both in *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides* which had been elaborated during the period of middle Platonism. To these belong the notions of dialectic (*Theaet.* 161 E, *Parm.* 135 C), of substance (*οὐσία*, *Theaet.* 186 D, *Parm.* 135 A), power or faculty (*δύναμις*, *Theaet.* 158 E, 159 A, 185 C, *Parm.* 133 E, 135 C), the one (*Theaet.* 152 D, *Parm.* 137 C, &c.), Not-Being (*Theaet.* 185 C, *Parm.* 142 A), and the opposition of activity and passivity (*Theaet.* 157 A, 174 B, *Parm.* 138 B).

of the *Phaedrus*.

Theory of ideas ignored in *Theaetetus* criticised in *Parmenides*. In both occur terms elaborated during the preceding period.

Both *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides* have further in common two important distinctions, which could not have been ignored in the *Republic*, nor in the *Phaedrus*, if the author had already become familiar with them. One of these is the well-defined notion of movement, including qualitative alteration as well as change of position in space. This meaning of *κίνησις*, accepted by Aristotle, and many later philosophers, is a result of the increasing importance of this notion for Plato, and would necessarily have been alluded to in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus* in those passages in which *κίνησις* is used in its primitive signification of movement through space. It is a far-reaching generalisation to identify movement with qualitative alteration, because both are a manifestation of change. The comparison of corresponding passages shows that this unity was not yet noticed in the period of middle Platonism:

Both *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides* contain a new notion of movement, including change of position as well as of quality.

Rep. 454 C D: ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος τῆς ἀλλοιώσεώς τε καὶ ὁμοιώσεως μόνον ἐφυλάττομεν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὰ τεῖνον τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα.

530 C: πλείω εἴδη παρέχεται ἡ φορά . . .

583 E: τό γε ἡδὺ ἐν ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κίνησίς τις ἀμφοτέρω ἐστόν.

Phaedr. 245 D: κινήσεως ἀρχὴ . . . οὔτ' ἀπόλλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στῆναι καὶ μήποτε αὖθις ἔχειν ὅθεν κινηθέντα γενήσεται.

Theaet. 156 A: κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν (quoted as a view to be criticised).

181 C: πότερον ἕν τι εἶδος αὐτῆς λέγουσιν ἢ ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται δύο; μὴ μέντοι μόνον ἐμοὶ δοκείτω, ἀλλὰ συμμέτεχε καὶ σύ, . . . ἆρα κινεῖσθαι καλεῖς ὅταν τι χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφηται; — ἔγωγε — . . . ὅταν δὲ ᾖ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, γηράσκῃ δὲ, ἢ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ ἢ σκληρὸν ἐκ μαλακοῦ γίγνηται, ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἀλλοίωσιν ἀλλοιῶται, ἆρα οὐκ ἄξιον ἕτερον εἶδος φάναι κινήσεως; . . . δύο δὴ λέγω τούτω εἴδη κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ φοράν.

153 A: τὸ μὲν εἶναι καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἡσυχία.

Parm. 138 B: κινούμενόν γε ἢ φέροιτο ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἄν· αὗται γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις—ναί.

162 D: οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἓν μὴ ὂν στρέφεσθαι ἂν δύναιτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν . . . οὐδὲ μὴν ἀλλοιοῦταί που τὸ ἓν ἑαυτοῦ, οὔτε τὸ ὂν οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν. εἰ δὲ μήτ' ἀλλοιοῦται μήτε ἐν ταὐτῷ στρέφεται μήτε μεταβαίνει, ἆρ' ἄν πῃ ἔτι κινοῖτο; πῶς γάρ;

Legg. 894 E: ὅταν αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινῆσαν ἕτερον ἀλλοιώσῃ, τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἄλλο . . . μῶν ἀρχή τις αὐτῶν ἔσται τῆς κινήσεως ἁπάσης ἄλλη πλὴν ἡ τῆς αὐτῆς αὑτὴν κινησάσης μεταβολή;

The distinction of two kinds of movement, first introduced in the *Theaetetus*, stated to be a personal discovery of the Platonic Socrates.

We see that in the *Republic* the distinctions introduced in the *Theaetetus* are not yet known. The use in the *Republic* of *κίνησις* in its metaphorical meaning as movement of the soul is transitional to the later generalisation, but does not yet imply it. In the *Phaedrus* *κίνησις* means movement through space, and this is very characteristic if we remember that in the later dialogues the distinction of two kinds of movement is represented as quite essential. This distinction is first made in the *Theaetetus*, and recurs as familiar in the *Parmenides* and *Laws* (where it is assumed as a matter of course that the first movement produced is a qualitative change) as well as later in the works of Aristotle. The distinction of two kinds of movement is introduced in the *Theaetetus* as a new theory, after another division had been incidentally

referred to. It is stated expressly to be a personal discovery of the Platonic Socrates, which he is anxious to see accepted and to share with others the risk of an error (*συμμέτεχε καὶ σύ*). After its acceptance, it is repeated as logically necessary (181 D: *ἀναγκαῖον*). The starting point of this theory was the recognition of movement as a principle of Being, justified in the *Phaedrus*, mentioned as known in the *Theaetetus*, and finally reconciled with the stability of Being in the *Sophist*. This discovery is related to the increasing interest for physical science, which is manifest through Plato's later works, while it is absent from his earlier writings. It need hardly be observed that here we have not to do with such an ephemeral distinction as between *πίστις* and *εἰκασία* in the *Republic*, but with one of the greatest generalisations of philosophy, continually discussed by later thinkers up to Trendelenburg and Lotze. It is one of Plato's wonderful anticipations of ideas which have been better explained only in modern times. The identification of physical movement with qualitative change is a truth which could scarcely be fully realised before Kant, and yet it is taken for granted in the *Theaetetus*, *Parmenides*, and *Laws* of Plato.

It is one of the great generalisations of philosophy.

Implies subjectivity of space.

Had the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*, being the two most critical works of Plato, no other new theory than the inclusion of qualitative change and physical movement under one primary kind, with the subtle subdivision of physical movement into a movement through space, and revolution on the same spot—this would alone be a strong reason for placing them after *Republic* and *Phaedrus*. But we find in these two dialogues another theory of cardinal importance, yet introduced quite as incidentally as the theory of movement. In the time of middle Platonism the favourite examples of ideal existence were moral or mathematical notions, the former being specially fit for allegorical representation as objects of enthusiastic vision. When the first enthusiasm was

List of categories first attempted by Plato in the *Theaetetus*.

Enumeration of highest kinds independent of esthetical considerations.

over, it became very natural to attempt a general enumeration of highest kinds, independently of the esthetical feelings of awe and admiration which first led to the perception of such ideas. This problem of categories has remained ever since a permanent department of philosophy and has been cultivated from Aristotle onwards by all logicians. But the first table of categories in the history of logic is found in Plato's *Theaetetus*, repeated and enlarged in his *Parmenides* and *Sophist*. It is not wrapped in such emphatic language as the sovereignty of philosophers or the precept that to suffer wrongs is better than to inflict them. It is the historian's duty to show the incomparable importance of this first step in a new direction. There is reason to believe that Plato was conscious of this importance, though he did not insist on it, because he felt the incompleteness of his table of categories (*τὰ κοινά*). The enumeration in the *Theaetetus* is introduced at a culminating point of the dialogue, and followed by 'an unwonted outburst of admiration' (Campbell, *Theaet.* p. 160) of the pupil who discovered it; also by the significant observation that a long discussion has been avoided by this happy intuition, a result of good natural capacity (144 B) and a training in mathematics, music, and astronomy (145 A) according to the precepts laid down in the *Republic*. A careful comparison of similar passages in later dialogues and of Aristotle's account of the same problem shows very clearly that the first attempt at such an enumeration is that occurring in the *Theaetetus*, not, as has been sometimes supposed, that in the *Parmenides*. The list is increased by some notions in the *Parmenides* and *Sophist*:

A very important step in philosophy. Its importance understood by Plato.

Theat. 185 C: *ἡ δὲ δὴ διὰ τίνος δύναμις τό τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις δηλοῖ σοι, ᾧ τὸ ἔστιν ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστιν καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἠρωτῶμεν*	*Parm.* 136 A: *χρὴ σκοπεῖν . . . εἰ πολλά ἐστι . . . καὶ αὖ εἰ μή ἐστι πολλά . . . καὶ . . . εἰ ἔστιν ὁμοιότης . . . καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίου . . . κινήσεως καὶ στά-*	*Soph.* 254 D: *μέγιστα τῶν γενῶν . . . τό τε ὂν αὐτό καὶ στάσις καὶ κίνησις.* E: *τό τε ταὐτὸν καὶ θάτερον.*

περὶ αὐτῶν ;—οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταὐτόν τε καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἓν καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ αὐτῶν. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν ἐρωτᾷς καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἕπεται, διὰ τίνος ποτὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθανόμεθα ;—ὑπέρευ ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἔστιν ἃ ἐρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.

σεως, καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὅτου ἂν ἀεὶ ὑποθῇ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος, δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων.

129 E: τὰ εἴδη, οἷον ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότητα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν.

Aristoteles *Categor.* 1 b 25: οὐσία, ποσόν, ποιόν, πρός τι, ποῦ, ποτέ, κεῖσθαι, ἔχειν, ποιεῖν, πάσχειν.

Metaphys. 1029 b 24: ποιόν, ποσόν, ποτέ, ποῦ, κίνησις. See also below, p. 480, on the categories in the *Timaeus*, produced by the movements of the soul.

The first place is given in all enumerations to substance and Not-Being. The same and the other, and similarity and dissimilarity, are also common to the three enumerations. One and the many form a third pair in the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*, but are dropped in the *Sophist*. A fourth pair is movement and immobility, omitted in the *Theaetetus*, but appearing both in *Parmenides* and *Sophist*. The differences are not necessarily due to a change of views, but to the incompleteness of enumeration, also frequent in Aristotle, who often mentions only six Categories even in passages where it would seem that the enumeration might be complete.

Differences in the three lists.

These highest kinds, which denote what is common to many particulars, are different from the ideas admired in the *Republic*. There is no place among these common notions for Truth or Beauty, nor for the idea of Good, though these are mentioned as also perceivable by the soul alone (186 A). These are not entirely supplanted by the new ideas, but they no longer attract the philosopher's chief attention. The intuitive vision of transcendental ideas is exchanged for a discursive investigation of a given universe. This may be explained by the natural evolution of Plato's activity in his Academy.

Among categories Truth, Beauty, the Good omitted.

Variety of actual experience had to be submitted to classification.

The training recognised to be necessary in order to develope intuition had to be directed, and the variety of material appearances, at first despised as irrelevant, had to be considered and classified. The astronomical and mathematical studies recommended in the *Republic* tended to promote not only dialectical ability, but also some recognition of sensible experience, and of the reality underlying physical phenomena. If in earlier times the power of the soul over the body was chiefly seen in moral determinations, it now appeared that the body, though subordinate to the soul, is a useful instrument for the purpose of increasing even ideal knowledge by forming new ideas. The moral ideas, being few in number, afforded no sufficient scope for the dialectical tendency to distinguish and classify. The field of logical exercise was first extended to a classification of states and men; but even this did not satisfy that philosophical curiosity which is accustomed to consider all substance and all time, neglecting nothing, however small or insignificant it may appear to the vulgar mind.

Extension of the field of thought beyond the limits of moral ideas.

Reform of Plato's logic carried out in the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*.

Among such pursuits, which seem to have occupied the greatest part of Plato's time after the *Phaedrus*, the general problem of knowledge was reinvestigated, and this led to an important reform of earlier logical conceptions. Of this reform we have a record in two works which more than any preceding them may be termed critical, though at first sight they appear almost as inconclusive as the Socratic dialogues. These works, the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*, are of decisive importance for an appreciation of Plato's philosophy, and deserve our attention not only for their main subjects, but also for seemingly casual allusions to doctrines of the greatest gravity.

I. *The Theaetetus.*

(Relative affinity to the latest group, measured on the *Laws* as unity, = 0·32; see above, p. 177.)

The aim of this dialogue is a definition of knowledge, which, however, is not given, in spite of several unsuccessful attempts made by Theaetetus. Among the definitions which are recognised to be insufficient is one which had been provisionally received in some previous dialogues: namely, that knowledge is true opinion founded on sufficient reasons. This had been proposed in the *Meno* (98 A) and tacitly admitted in *Symposium* (see above, p. 238) and *Phaedo*, whereas it is refuted in the *Theaetetus* (210 A):

Definition of knowledge sought in the *Theaetetus* not given.

Phaedo 96 B: πολλάκις ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν . . . ἐκ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην.

Theaet. 210 A: οὔτε ἄρα αἴσθησις, οὔτε δόξα ἀληθὴς οὔτε μετ' ἀληθοῦς δόξης λόγος προσγιγνόμενος ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη.

In the *Cratylus* (426 A), *Symposium* (202 A), and *Phaedo* (76 B) λόγος had the meaning of a sufficient reason, while here it is more exactly analysed, and each of its three meanings is shown to be incapable of changing opinion into knowledge. What Plato's real conviction about knowledge was, is known from the *Republic*, and also from later works: for him the difference between opinion and knowledge ultimately consisted in the difference of their objects. In this respect there is no change from the *Phaedo* to the *Theaetetus*: the activity of reason is an activity of the soul, not wanting the help of the senses and of the body:

Difference between opinion and knowledge consists in the objects to which they refer.

Phaedo 65 B C: ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἅπτεται . . . ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι . . . λογίζεται δέ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν γίγνηται ἐῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα.

Theaet. 186 D: ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ· οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μέν, ὡς ἔοικε, δυνατὸν ἅψασθαι.

Knowledge is acquired by the

soul's own activity.

The same term is repeatedly used in both dialogues (*αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτήν Phaedo* 65 C, 79 D, 83 A, *Theaet.* 186 A, 187 A) to denote the soul's independence of the body. Also the distinction between attaining knowledge and possessing it is already prepared in the *Phaedo*.

Phaedo 75 D : *τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι τοῦτ' ἐστίν, λαβόντα του ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλεκέναι.*

Theaet. 197 C : *ὅρα δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατὸν οὕτω κεκτημένον μὴ ἔχειν.*

Unity of consciousness indicated in the *Republic* is here more clearly expressed.

But it is only here that the unity of consciousness is insisted upon, as resulting from the variety of perceptions. It had been already observed in the *Republic* that each sense is used only to convey one kind of impression. This observation is here generalised and affirmed as certain :

Rep. 352 E : *ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἴδοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς ;—οὐ δῆτα·—τί δέ ; ἀκούσαις ἄλλῳ ἢ ὠσίν ;—οὐδαμῶς· —οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν ταῦτα τούτων φαῖμεν ἔργα εἶναι ; πάνυ γε.*

Theaet. 185 A : *ἃ δι' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι' ἄλλης ταῦτ' αἰσθέσθαι, οἷον ἃ δι' ἀκοῆς, δι' ὄψεως, ἢ ἃ δι' ὄψεως, δι' ἀκοῆς ;*

477 C : *λέγω ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοὴν τῶν δυνάμεων εἶναι, εἰ ἄρα μανθάνεις ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν τὸ εἶδος.*

There is a certain progress in the formulation of this principle from the *Republic* to the *Theaetetus*. In the earlier work the term *δύναμις* as appliable to the senses was first introduced ; here it is used without hesitation, and the observation that it is possible to see only by means of the eyes is supplemented by the general rule : it is impossible to perceive through one faculty the proper object of another sense faculty, as can be verified through the familiar example of sight and hearing.

Senses instruments of the soul.

The application of this law of specific energy of the senses, given in the *Theaetetus*, goes far beyond what we found in the *Republic* and *Phaedo*. Already in those earlier works the senses were defined as instruments used by the soul, and this is here maintained :

Phaedo 79 C: ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι' ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως —τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δι' αἰσθήσεων σκοπεῖν τι—τότε . . . πλανᾶται.

Rep. 508 B: ὄμμα . . . ἡλιοειδέστατον τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὀργάνων.

Theaet. 184 C: σκόπει γάρ, ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθοτέρα, ᾧ ὁρῶμεν, τοῦτο εἶναι ὀφθαλμούς, ἢ δι' οὗ ὁρῶμεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀκούομεν, ὦτα, ἢ δι' οὗ ἀκούομεν;—δι' ὧν ἕκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, μᾶλλον ἢ οἷς·—Δεινὸν γάρ που, εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις, αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅ τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ξυντείνει, ᾗ διὰ τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά.

But we find here a new conclusion, not thought of before. If all senses are but instruments, they must be the instruments used by one and the same thing, be it named soul or otherwise. In earlier works Plato used the term soul as free from every ambiguity. Here we see already a trace of doubts about the existence of the soul, against which he guards himself by the caution that it does not matter whether we call by the name soul or otherwise that substance which is the necessary recipient of all particular impressions. A further proof of the existence of this substance and its peculiar activity is given by the argument that impressions of different senses are comparable among themselves, and no single sense could bring about these comparisons. If we think about two different perceptions of two different senses, this could not be done by means of one of the senses concerned (185 A: εἴ τι περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, οὐκ ἂν διά γε τοῦ ἑτέρου ὀργάνου, οὐδ' αὖ διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι' ἄν). Plato proceeds to give well-chosen examples of thoughts, which are possible with reference to different perceptions. He observes in the first place that all perceptions have in common existence (185 A), then that they differ from each other, and are identical each with itself (185 A), then that each of them is one, and both are two (185 B), and finally that there may be similarity or dissimilarity between them (186 B: εἴτε ἀνομοίω εἴτε ὁμοίω ἀλλήλοιν).

Conception of the soul developed.

Its power of comparing impressions of different senses.

Attributes of different perceptions form the list of categories.

No special faculty for perceiving categories.

This enumeration of general notions which can be applied to a variety of concrete objects is not accidental, because it is repeated by Theaetetus nearly in the same order, and forms really the most ancient table of categories. Plato asks by what faculty the soul can perceive those general notions.

They are recognised by the soul alone; though this is a truth not easy to prove.

The answer that such general notions can be known only immediately by the soul's own activity (185 D E: *αὐτὴ δι' αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ κοινά μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν*) is received as a truth which can be at once understood only by the better class of intellects, and would require a long proof, had not this been made superfluous by the natural capacity of Theaetetus (185 E). These general notions, here distinguished as the proper object of knowledge, are placed in close relation to the particulars observed by means of the senses, and this denotes a change in Plato's attitude towards physical phenomena.

Illusions of the senses difficult to discover.

He no longer despises them as in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*: he recognises the difficulty of discovering the illusions of the senses (179 C: *περὶ δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἑκάστῳ πάθος, ἐξ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι γίγνονται, χαλεπώτερον ἑλεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς*). He has made a very special study of these appearances and has arrived at surprising intuitions of physical truth.

Colour and heat explained as resulting from motion.

Thus for instance he states clearly that colour does not belong to objects outside us nor even to our eyes (153 D). That light is a result of movement and affects different persons in a different way, and that it is a pure quality out of space, appears to be a truth attainable only by the methods of modern physics, and yet any reader can find it in the *Theaetetus* (153 E: *μηδέ τιν' αὐτῷ χώραν ἀποτάξῃς*). Another of the great discoveries of our own time is here anticipated, the explanation of heat as a mode of motion (153 A: *τὸ θερμόν τε καὶ πῦρ, ὃ δὴ καὶ τἆλλα γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιτροπεύει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρίψεως· τοῦτο δὲ κίνησις*).

Traces of physical

This is certainly said with another meaning than it might have for the modern reader. But it betrays the fact that

Plato had already begun those physical reflections which led him later to the theories expounded in the *Timaeus*.

investigations.

It seems that a thorough-going materialism had made its appearance within the Academy or outside it and decided him to a full refutation. For the *Theaetetus*, no doubt, is meant above everything as a refutation of materialism and sensualism. The materialists are mentioned as very uneducated men, not initiated into the mysteries of a refined philosophy (155 E). With these are contrasted the subtler sensualists (156 A: *κομψότεροι, ὧν μέλλω σοι τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν*) who explain everything by movement and make everything relative, destroying thus all fixed notions, which are indispensable in laying the groundwork for a system of science. Plato seems to admit so much of their theory of the relativity of sensations as agrees with his own views. He argues that the reality of dreams for the dreamer is equal to the reality of waking for men awake (158 C D), and he leaves the difficulty for the time unsolved. The same might be said of illness (158 D) and madness (157 E), but only in so far as sensations are concerned, which have always a subjective character (154 A: *ἢ σὺ διϊσχυρίσαιο ἂν ὡς, οἷον σοὶ φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ζῴῳ—μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε*). This proves that true knowledge cannot be sought in sensations.

Refutation of materialism.

Contrasted with a subtler sensualism which had produced some physical theories accepted by Plato. Relativity of sensations under different conditions.

Though the true nature of knowledge is not stated in clear words as the result of the inquiry, we can easily gather from certain allusions that knowledge was no longer conceived to be a mere intuition of pre-existing ideas, but a product of the mind's activity. Knowledge is to be found in that state of the soul, in which it considers being, or in its judgments (187 A: *ἐπιστήμη . . . ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι, ὅ τί ποτ' ἔχει ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα*). Here knowledge is brought under the head of *δόξα*, not in the meaning of opinion, but of judgment (187 A: *τοῦτο καλεῖται . . . δοξάζειν*). This position is not contradicted in the

Plato's view of knowledge as a kind of judgment.

following discussion and may be accepted as Plato's true conviction. He explains thought as a conversation of the soul with itself (189 E: *τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἆρ' ὅπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖς :—τί καλῶν ;—λόγον ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ . . . αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρινοπένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα*), leading to a choice between affirmation and negation, wherein judgment consists (190 A: *ὅταν δὲ ὁρίσασα, . . . τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη φῇ καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς*). This duality of affirmation and negation begins to attract Plato's attention more than ever before. The beautiful and the good are not merely associated as in *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, but paired with their opposites (186 A) : so also the four pairs of categories in the same passage, and other notions (186 B: *σκληρότητα καὶ μαλακότητα*, 180 D: *ἑστάναι . . . κινεῖσθαι*, &c.). Thus he quotes as one of the objects of judgment the essence of the opposition of beings among each other (186 B : *τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ἐναντιότητος αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ κρίνειν πειρᾶται*), and he insists on the impossibility of identity between opposite notions (190 B: *ἀναμιμνήσκου εἰ πώποτ' εἶπες πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον . . . τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστι*).

Thought as moving between affirmation and negation, according to the law of contradiction.

Opposition of contradictory ideas.

The nature of judgment is further analysed and found to be essentially different from the notions of which it consists. While according to the earlier theory the sight or intuition of ideas was knowledge, it appears now from the example of letters and syllables that the judgment is not the sum of its components, but a new unity (203 E: *χρῆν γὰρ ἴσως τὴν συλλαβὴν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐκείνων ἕν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἔχον, ἕτερον τῶν στοιχείων*, cf. 204 A). This conception is repeated with insistence several times (203 E, 204 A, 205 C, 205 D) in order to refute the supposition that the elements can be less knowable than the whole. He who pretends to know a whole without being able to account for its parts is declared not to speak seriously (206 B: *ἐάν τις φῇ συλ-*

Judgment is a new unity differing from its elements.

Knowledge of a whole

λαβὴν μὲν γνωστόν, ἄγνωστον δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχεῖον, ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα παίζειν ἡγησόμεθ' αὐτόν, cf. *Crat.* 426 A). This postulate, to base the knowledge of everything upon the knowledge of its ultimate elements, agrees with what has been said in the *Phaedrus* on the same subject (270 D), and corresponds to a stage in which the chief interest attaches to those notions which are built upon the observation of actual appearances. The question of analysing everything into its elements or kinds was superfluous in dealing with absolute ideas which were supposed to be simple in their perfection.

presupposes the knowledge of its elements, while absolute ideas are simple in their perfection.

It corresponds also to the new classificatory tendency that λόγος is distinguished into its three kinds: speech (206 D), enumeration of parts (207 A), and definition (208 E). The three degrees are declared insufficient to guarantee knowledge, but it may be taken for granted that each of them is held indispensable for knowledge. Nobody knows who cannot explain in words the object of his knowledge, enumerate its parts, and give a definition of each of its elements. This last point is stated here with greater fulness than anywhere before. Definition should consist in the indication of the specific difference which distinguishes a given object from all others (208 C: *τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον εἰπεῖν ᾧ τῶν ἁπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν, . . .* cf. 175 C). We are warned to avoid circular definitions, which pretend to explain a notion by its synonym (147 B, 210 A), and the enumeration of examples is also declared to be an insufficient substitute for a definition. When Theaetetus began by an enumeration of different kinds of science instead of giving a definition of science, Socrates detained him and appeared to imply at this stage of the dialogue that knowledge is based on definitions (146 E: *τὸ δ' ἐπερωτηθὲν οὐ τοῦτο ἦν, τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὁπόσαι τινές· οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμῆσαι αὐτὰς βουλόμενοι ἠρόμεθα, ἀλλὰ γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστίν*, cf. *Euthyph.* 5 D, 6 E; *Meno* 72 A). Some models of definitions are given, as for instance 'clay is moistened earth' (147 C), or 'the

Three kinds of λόγος indispensable for knowledge.

Definition by indication of a specific difference, equivalent to knowledge at the beginning of the dialogue.

Definitions common to knowledge and opinion.

sun is the brightest of the heavenly bodies which revolve about the earth' (208 D). Though at the end of the dialogue the definition is supposed not to be a peculiarity of knowledge alone, there is no doubt that it has been admitted as an essential condition of knowledge, common to knowledge and true opinion (209 D: *περὶ τὴν διαφορότητα ἄρα καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη ἑκάστου πέρι*). It is very surprising that among the possible meanings of λόγος enumerated, precisely that meaning which this word appears to have in connection with knowledge for Plato (=*αἰτία*) is omitted, except in one passage in the familiar phrase *δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον* (202 C) in which λόγος is identical with sufficient reason, as in similar passages of the *Cratylus* (426 A), *Phaedo* (76 B, 95 A), and *Republic* (531 E). Consistency is here, as already in earlier works, expressly stated to be a necessary condition of knowledge (154 E: *βουλησόμεθα θεάσασθαι αὐτὰ πρὸς αὑτά, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἃ διανοούμεθα, πότερον ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις ξυμφωνεῖ ἢ οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.*—200 D: *τί ἂν αὐτὸ μάλιστα εἰπόντες ἥκιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιωθεῖμεν;*), and the fixity of notions is represented as a condition of consistency (183 A) against the Heraclitean theory of eternal change of everything.

Consistency condition of knowledge.

Heraclitus refuted while the investigation of Parmenides is adjourned.

This theory had been declared in the *Cratylus* to be too difficult for refutation, and only here it is refuted, while the criticism of the opposite view of Parmenides is left for a future occasion under a similar pretext to that which in the *Cratylus* accounted for the postponement of the criticism of the Heraclitean doctrine, namely that the philosophy of Parmenides is too deep for a superficial digression, while it would lead away from the chief purpose of the present conversation, the definition of knowledge (184 A). We see here the same dramatic opposition of two conflicting views as to the whole of universal existence, which was represented later with such pathetic solemnity in the *Sophist*. Only here the conflicting views are not materialism and idealism as in the *Sophist*, but Heracliteanism and Eleaticism (180 D E).

Dramatic opposition of two views on Being.

This comprehensive survey of the great conflicts in human thought could have been reached by Plato only after a full elaboration of his own philosophy. Thus speaks the head of a school, who has pupils from all parts of the Hellenic world, and observes in them the natural tendencies towards different aims.

Historical standpoint reached.

What has been said in the *Republic* about the necessary training of a philosopher is here repeatedly mentioned with reference to Theaetetus, who has been prepared for the present inquiry by mathematical, musical, and astronomical studies (145 A, C), and also, according to the recommendation given in the *Republic*, by investigation into stereometry (148 B). His mind corresponds in every point to what has been required from a philosopher in the *Republic*: he learns everything as easily as oil spreads silently over a smooth surface (144 B), and besides this intellectual development he is courageous and gentle (144 A). This picture of the natural gifts of a future philosopher agrees perfectly with that given in the *Republic*, as also Plato's confidence in youth expressed through the person of Theodorus (146 B: *τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ἡ νεότης εἰς πᾶν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει*). Thus in one important point the psychological rule of earlier logic is maintained: the highest level of knowledge can be reached only by exceptional natures, which have the privilege of being born rulers and teachers of men. For the ideal of the philosopher rises above the rest of mankind, and finds its own model in the ideal of divinity, to which the philosopher approaches as near as possible (176 A: *διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅ τι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι*). The philosopher is represented as indifferent to the political affairs of his country (173 D), and no stress is laid on his duty to go down into the struggles of vulgar life, and to apply his higher knowledge to the necessities of his countrymen.

Training of the Philosopher illustrated by the *Theaetetus*, so as to confirm the precepts laid down in the *Republic*.

Philosopher near the divinity, far from the actual political life, dedicated to abstract speculation.

The philosopher is here conceived in that stage of

abstract speculation which was limited in the *Republic* to a few years of his life. His mind expatiates over the whole heaven, and all manifold objects forming different wholes, without caring any longer for what is near at hand (173 E: *ἡ διάνοια ταῦτα πάντα ἡγησαμένη σμικρὰ καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἀτιμάσασα πανταχῇ φέρεται κατὰ Πίνδαρον, τά τε γᾶς ὑπένερθε καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, οὐρανοῦ τε ὕπερ ἀστρονομοῦσα, καὶ πᾶσαν πάντῃ φύσιν διερευνωμένη τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου ὅλου, εἰς τῶν ἐγγὺς οὐδὲν αὐτὴν συγκαθιεῖσα*). Accustomed to look upon the whole earth, he despises the greatest landowner as insignificant (174 E), and he equally thinks little of human measures of time, because he knows that even this poor earth (176 A: *τόνδε τὸν τόπον*) has already a past of innumerable millions of years (175 A: *πάππων καὶ προγόνων μυριάδες ἑκάστῳ γεγόνασιν ἀναρίθμητοι, ἐν αἷς πλούσιοι καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ βασιλῆς καὶ δοῦλοι βάρβαροί τε καὶ Ἕλληνες πολλάκις μυρίοι γεγόνασιν ὁτῳοῦν*). We see here an horizon of thought extending beyond even that of the *Phaedrus*. With his wonderful intuition, Plato credits the earth with an age which modern geology for the first time made probable, and leaves far behind him those primitive chronologies which counted only thousands of years since the appearance of the first man. It is strange that acute critics, who took quite seriously the number of twenty-five ancestors quoted here as an example of *σμικρολογία*, and counted with the greatest care the ancestors of various contemporaries of Plato in order to ascertain whom he might have meant, did not perceive that 'innumerable myriads of generations' evidently was not a rhetorical exaggeration, but a quite serious view of Plato about the antiquity of mankind, in agreement with the cycle of ten thousand years alluded to in the *Republic* and the myth of the *Phaedrus*, but entirely absent from the *Phaedo* and all earlier dialogues.

Enlargement of Plato's mental horizon. Human measures of time and space insignificant.

Anticipation of modern views.

Antiquity of Man.

Myriads of generations meant more seriously than twenty-five ancestors.

Reason slowly

The theoretical tendency is increasing here, and the differences between men still more clearly recognised than in

the *Republic*. Few reach a full development of reason: true knowledge can be acquired only by long endeavours under the best guidance, while man and beast alike have sense perceptions from their birth upwards (186 C). The impartial pursuit of truth is here contrasted with eristic discussion, and this exhortation is curiously enough put into the mouth of Protagoras, against whom Plato fought earlier not quite impartially in the dialogue bearing his name. Here Protagoras recommends justice in every discussion, and explains for us some of Plato's own contradictions, avowing frankly that in polemical writings every one seeks the appearance of being right, while convicting his opponent of as many errors as possible (167 E: *ἀδικεῖν δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅταν τις μὴ χωρὶς μὲν ὡς ἀγωνιζόμενος τὰς διατριβὰς ποιῆται, χωρὶς δὲ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παίζῃ τε καὶ σφάλλῃ καθ' ὅσον ἂν δύνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σπουδάζῃ*). If we lead a discussion with the object of arriving at the truth and deal fairly with our opponent, then he accuses only himself and hates his errors, whereby he is led to philosophy, with a complete change of his former nature (168 A).

developed and in few persons.

Increasing seriousness of philosophical purpose.

Protagoras introduced as exhorting to impartial dialectical discussion.

That such a purely Platonic precept should be given as an exhortation of Protagoras to the Platonic Socrates, appears to be an expiation of earlier polemics and an announcement of that purely objective historical standpoint which we see in the dialectical dialogues. Also Rhetoric as an art of persuasion is here mentioned with irony but without the bitterness of the *Gorgias*, and more in the indulgent mood of the *Phaedrus*. Plato recognises the power of Rhetoric to persuade without knowledge, and sees herein an argument for the great distance separating right opinion from knowledge (201 A: *οὐ διδάσκοντες, ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιοῦντες ἃ ἂν βούλωνται*).

An implied confession of earlier partiality.

Recognition of rhetoric, as giving beliefs without knowledge.

This importance attached to a distinction between right opinion and knowledge might be better appreciated if we could guess with some certainty against whom the polemic is directed. Knowledge is emphatically affirmed

Rhetoric still distinguished from philosophy.

to be one of the highest aims in life (148 C: *ἐπιστήμη . . . τῶν ἀκροτάτων*), worthy to be explained (148 D: *προθυμήθητι παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν τε ἄλλων πέρι καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν*), and giving authority to those who possess it (170 A: *ἔν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις . . . ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν . . . σωτῆρας σφῷν προσδοκῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τῳ διαφέροντας ἢ τῷ εἰδέναι.* Cf. 171 C, 183 B C).

Changes in the logical point of view not made explicitly. Earlier statements not revoked. But categories take the place of ideas.

Although the ultimate distinction between knowledge and right opinion is not given, it results at least that there is an essential difference between them, and this consists in the systematic unity of knowledge founded on one highest principle, as has been postulated in *Phaedo* and *Republic*. It is exceedingly significant that no use of the theory of ideas as known from those dialogues has been made in the whole inquiry, and that the transition from self-existing ideas to categories of reason is made without a formal revocation of earlier views. But it must be recognised that these views are not entirely contradictory, and that ideas of moral notions might continue to exist along with the categories of perceptions. Only in some special cases the conflict becomes evident, as for instance if we compare some passages of the *Phaedo* and *Theaetetus* referring to a problem which was one of the starting points of the theory of ideas and which again returns here as requiring a new explanation:

Phaedo 100 E: *οὐδὲ σὺ ἄρ' ἂν ἀποδέχοιο, εἴ τίς τινα φαίη ἕτερον ἑτέρου τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττω τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἐλάττω,* 101 A: *ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροιο ἂν ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μεῖζον πᾶν ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ μεῖζόν ἐστιν ἢ μεγέθει . . . μή τίς σοι ἐναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐὰν τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζονά τινα φῇς εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μεῖζον μεῖζον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἔλαττον, ἔπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ σμικρᾷ οὔσῃ τὸν μείζω μείζω εἶναι.*

Theaet. 154 C: *σμικρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα εἴσει ἃ βούλομαι. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που ἕξ, ἂν μὲν τέτταρας αὐτοῖς προσενέγκῃς, πλείους φαμὲν εἶναι τῶν τεττάρων καὶ ἡμιολίους, ἐὰν δὲ δώδεκα, ἐλάττους καὶ ἡμίσεις.*

155 A: *ἅττα ποτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα ἐν ἡμῖν; ὧν πρῶτον . . . μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἂν μεῖζον μηδὲ ἔλαττον γενέσθαι μήτε ὄγκῳ μήτε ἀριθμῷ, ἕως ἴσον εἴη αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ . . . δεύτερον δέ γε, ᾧ μήτε προστίθοιτο μήτε ἀφαιροῖτο, τοῦτο μήτε αὐξά-*

B: . . . τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτὼ δυοῖν πλείω εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλήθει . . . ἑνὶ ἑνὸς προστεθέντος τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἂν λέγειν;

C: καὶ μέγα ἂν βοᾷς ὅτι . . . οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν . . . τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐᾷς ἂν χαίρειν, παρεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις.

νεσθαί ποτε μήτε φθίνειν, ἀεὶ δὲ ἴσον εἶναι.

B: καὶ τρίτον, ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον τοῦτο εἶναι ἄνευ τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον . . . ταῦτα ὁμολογήματα τρία μάχεται αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ, ὅταν τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀστραγάλων λέγωμεν.

C: καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὕτως ἔχει . . . δοκεῖς γοῦν οὐκ ἄπειρος τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι;— ὑπερφυῶς ὡς θαυμάζω τί ποτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνίοτε ὡς ἀληθῶς βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδινιῶ.

The problem now considered with more appreciation of its logical nature and its relation to other instances.

We see here[247] that in the earlier dialogue the difficulty is stated and left ironically to wiser men for solution. In the *Theaetetus* the statement of the difficulty is no longer particular as in the *Phaedo*, but is expressly generalised, and shown to be applicable to innumerable instances, out of which one had been selected as example.

Form of the statement sharper.

Then also the form of the statement is much sharper in the later work, where the problem is reduced to three axioms (*φάσματα*), two of which are in contradiction with the third. The axioms are here said to be *in the soul*, whereby it becomes clear that we are no longer dealing with transcendental ideas, as in the *Phaedo*, but with subjective notions. While in the *Phaedo* only the fixity of notions is insisted upon, here we see activity as a condition of change, which corresponds to the increasing interest in physical science, and to the constant applica-

Importance of the soul increased.

[247] H. Jackson ('Plato's later theory of ideas: iv.' *Journ. of Philol.* vol. xiii. pp. 267-268) infers from this passage of the *Theaetetus* that 'the intervention of the idea is wholly unnecessary for a change of relations,' while in the *Phaedo* this intervention was held to be necessary. But really in the *Phaedo* there was no question of change, and only fixity of relations was sought. The notion of change and movement belongs to a later stage, prepared in the *Republic*, beginning with the *Phaedrus*, and growing in the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*.

tion of the opposition between ποιεῖν and πάσχειν, common to the *Theaetetus* with the *Phaedrus*.

Speculations as to the possibility of error do not lead to definitive conclusions.

In connection with this we find in the *Theaetetus* a general investigation into the possible conditions of error, which does not lead to a definitive conclusion, but contains very subtle distinctions and deserves our closest attention. It appears first that errors are only possible when one perception is taken for another (193 B C D) under the influence of an imperfection of sense activity (194 B: περὶ ὧν ἴσμεν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις στρέφεται καὶ ἐλίττεται ἡ δόξα ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθὴς γιγνομένη) combined with thought (195 C D: ηὕρηκας δὴ ψευδῆ δόξαν, ὅτι οὔτε ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσίν ἐστι πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὔτ' ἐν ταῖς διανοίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ συνάψει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν). But then an instance is adduced of errors possible without the participation of the senses (196 A B), and the difficulty is left unsettled. It results that without a definition of knowledge no definition of error can be given (200 D) and knowledge remains undefined, though Socrates remembers that in the whole discussion it had been dealt with as already known (196 E: μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ γιγνώσκομεν καὶ οὐ γιγνώσκομεν, καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, ὥς τι συνιέντες ἀλλήλων ἐν ᾧ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν) because dialectical discussion would be impossible without a notion of knowledge (196 E: τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει τούτων ἀπεχόμενος;—οὐδένα ὤν γε ὃς εἰμί).

No solution possible until knowledge is defined.

Theaetetus not a Socratic dialogue. The inconclusive ending marks a new departure.

These fundamental problems were not yet appreciated in their whole importance in the earlier works, and their appearance in the *Theaetetus* brings us back in one respect to the Socratic stage, namely in so far as no definitive conclusion is apparently reached. But the above significant logical contents involve subtle distinctions which would be looked for in vain in the Socratic dialogues. The similarity consists only in the circumstance that here as well as there a new development of thought was beginning. This new development beginning here—with the substitution of categories for ideas, of

the individual soul for the supercelestial space, of analysis and synthesis for poetical vision, of activity and passivity for immutable identity, of critical cautiousness for poetical eloquence—is a momentous step in the history of human thought and would have required another thinker than the author of the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, were he not of such an immense intellectual power and had he not lived so long as to initiate a new philosophical movement after the age of fifty.

Consequent importance of the date of composition, which by Zeller and others is assumed to be very early.

Thus considered, the question of the date of the *Theaetetus* acquires an exceptional importance, and no consideration of evidence will be wasted, if it helps to decide the question, whether we are right in placing this dialogue after the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*. Up to the present time some of the most competent scholars agree with Zeller in believing that the *Theaetetus* must have been written within the first ten years after the death of Socrates, or about the same time as the *Euthydemus*. We have seen that this position is contradicted by the style as well as by the logical theories of our dialogue. But in view of the paramount importance of the question and of the great authority of those who are supporting an early date for the *Theaetetus* we are obliged to consider in detail the arguments in support of this opinion, which has been unanimously sustained by the chief writers on Plato from Tennemann, Schleiermacher, Ast, Socher, Stallbaum, Hermann, Steinhart, Susemihl up to the last editions of Zeller's *Philosophie der Griechen* (1889) and of Ueberweg's *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* (1894) besides many special dissertations.[248] The most eminent supporter of an early date of the *Theaetetus* is

Zeller, in common with many

[248] Among these are conspicuous Natorp's *Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnissproblems im Alterthum* (Berlin 1884) and his paper on the *Phaedrus* (*Philologus*, 48er Band, pp. 428-449, 583-628, Göttingen 1889), wherein he looks upon the *Theaetetus* as preparatory to the theory of ideas. In favour of the opposite view we have, besides all those who have written on the style of Plato, also some authors who admitted a late date for the *Theaetetus* for other reasons, as for instance Munk (see note 89), Berkuski (*Platons*

previous critics, still upholds an early date.

Zeller, and he has not yet been thoroughly refuted. Though polemic enters to no extent into the plan of the present investigation, it seems to be in this special case our duty to consider Zeller's arguments, and to prove that they are insufficient to establish his claim.

Allusion to an encampment near Corinth.

1. The first chronological indication is seen by Zeller in the allusion to an encampment near Corinth (*Theaet.* 142 A). He refers it to the war which is known in history as the Corinthian war and lasted about seven years 394–387. Even if we admit this reference as possible—instead of accepting the very convincing arguments of Ueberweg, Teichmüller, Bergk, and Rohde, according to which the allusion refers to a battle of 368 B.C. mentioned by Xenophon (*Hellen.* vii, 1, 15) and other historians—Zeller's inference as to the identity of the date of composition and the presumed date of the conversation is not cogent. The more striking the campaign the more probable becomes a later allusion to it. All that is really proved is that the date of composition is subsequent to 392; there is no reason to identify both dates, as has frequently been done in the case of the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*. The association of ideas between Corinthian war and 'encampment near Corinth' is more immediate for us than for the first readers of Plato. But we see in the dialogue the mention of an encampment not of a battle. A soldier might have been wounded in some insignificant attack on his encampment, without having taken part in an historical battle. If we take the mere fact of an en-

Assumption of the identity of the date of composition with the supposed date of the introductory dialogue

Theätetos und dessen Stellung in der Reihe seiner Dialoge, Inaugural-dissertation, Jena 1873), H. Schmidt (*Exegetischer Commentar zu Platos Theätet*, Leipzig 1880), H. Jackson, E. Rohde, W. Christ ('Platonische Studien,' in vol. xvii. of *Abhandlungen der philosophisch-philologischen Classe der königlich bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*), Teichmüller, Siebeck, Archer Hind (Introduction to the *Timaeus*, p. 21), M. Jezienicki (*Ueber die Abfassungszeit der platonischen Dialoge Theaitet und Sophistes*, Lemberg 1887). Zeller did not consider all the above authors and their arguments when he declared repeatedly the discussion as definitively settled (*Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. iv. p. 189, vol. v. p. 289, vol. viii. p. 124, and on many other occasions).

campment in which dysentery is reigning, we have no reason whatever to refer it to 392 rather than to 368 unless some independent testimony is forthcoming about an epidemic of dysentery occurring at one of these dates alone. In both cases a fight near Corinth took place. It has been argued that Theaetetus, who was a boy according to the dialogue at the time of Socrates' death, could not already be famous seven years later. Here, as in the *Phaedrus*, we have a prophecy put in the mouth of Socrates realised at the time of writing. If in the *Phaedrus* the prophecy refers to the *Panegyricus* written 26 years later, the prophecy about Theaetetus might well have been realised in a length of time almost equal. Zeller believes that the mention must refer to a recent fact. The notion of recent facts is often abused. Anybody might speak to-day of the Russo-Turkish war as recent if compared with the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks. There is no reason to believe that for Plato current events ceased to be recent sooner than for us, at a time when he spoke of twenty-five generations as a ridiculously small period.

Comparison with the *Phaedrus* prophecy.

Notion of a recent fact.

2. If historians are right in saying that Iphicrates in this very Corinthian war introduced the peculiar force of light-armed infantry known as πελτασταί, the allusion to them on the part of Socrates (165 D) certainly involves an anachronism. But if the use of peltasts began at that time, there is no reason to think that it ceased twenty years later. It would be more reasonable to argue from a similar mention of peltasts in the *Protagoras* (350 A) that the *Protagoras* cannot have been written earlier than 393; and any one who compares the *Protagoras* with the *Theaetetus* will find such differences of style, of method, of literary perfection, and of philosophical theory, that it is impossible to ascribe both to the same period. But the truth is that, whatever may have been the device of Iphicrates, the word πελταστής occurs in several earlier writers, Euripides, Thucydides, Lysias, Xenophon, and

Mention of the Peltasts common to the *Theaetetus* wit *Protagoras* and *Laws*.

is common to the *Laws* with *Theaetetus* and *Protagoras*, so that it has no chronological value whatever in Plato. To infer anything from it means almost as much as to refer any work in which a mention of potatoes occurs to the next time after the first introduction of this vegetable in Europe in 1584 A.D. It seems astonishing that Zeller should have followed Teichmüller in such inferences from an accidental mention of an object familiar to Greek readers before Plato began to write.

Twenty-five ancestors. Genealogy less interesting for Plato than for some modern historians of philosophy.

3. A third indication of the date of the *Theaetetus* is seen by Zeller in the allusion (175 A) to those who are proud of twenty-five ancestors, and of their descent from Heracles son of Amphitryon. This allusion has also been treated as a mark of date by Bergk and Rohde, but each assumes a different descendant of Heracles. And even if we take Plato to be referring to a contemporary, who is to decide whether among the twenty-five ancestors Amphitryon's father Alcaeus or his grandfather Perseus are to be counted or not? In any case Heracles need not be the twenty-fifth. The discussion whether Agesipolis (Zeller), Euagoras (Rohde), Dionysius of Syracuse (Teichmüller), Agesilaos (Bergk) or anybody else is meant by Plato is a curious example of the abuse of erudition leading to misunderstanding of the text on which the erudition is spent. Plato speaks of twenty-five generations as he does of ten thousand plethra of land, probably without any intentional allusion to any one in particular. The pride of counting Heracles among one's ancestors, and even a catalogue of twenty-five or more of them, cannot have been uncommon in Plato's time, if after so many centuries four historians are able to quote four different descendants of Heracles with twenty-five or more ancestors a-piece (175 A: *σεμνυνομένων καὶ ἀναφερόντων* is a plural that might be taken literally). But it is by no means certain that Plato was as skilled in genealogy as his modern interpreters. He regards the whole question as contemptible, a monstrously small way of reckoning

(*σμικρολογία*). Those acute critics who perceive in each round number quoted a statistical datum incur the danger of being accused of a *σμικρολογία* more blameworthy than that complained of by Plato.

The inconclusive form indicates new departure, or second beginning.

4. A fourth argument of Zeller is more serious than the preceding. He says that the critical character of the *Theaetetus* does not agree with the positive constructive exposition of the *Republic*. Zeller means that such elementary inquiry into the foundations of knowledge was most probable in a time when Plato began the building of his philosophy. We quite agree with Zeller, but if we add that Plato in his exceptionally long and active life had time to build more than one philosophy, we are at liberty to place the *Theaetetus* at the opening of Plato's second voyage for the discovery of truth, after the *Republic*.

Allusions to *Republic* and *Phaedrus*.

In two passages we notice allusions which may with some probability be referred to *Republic* (177 E: *παραδειγμάτων ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἑστώτων, τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιωτάτου, οὐχ ὁρῶντες ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὑπὸ ἠλιθιότητός τε καὶ ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι* . . . 175 C: *σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας* . . . *βασιλείας πέρι καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ὅλως εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος* . . . *ποίω τέ τινε ἐστὸν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἀνθρώπου φύσει προσήκει τὸ μὲν κτήσασθαι αὐτοῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀποφυγεῖν*), and to the *Phaedrus* (175 E: *ἁρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντος ὀρθῶς ὑμνῆσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμόνων βίον*)—while Zeller could not find in the whole *Republic* an equally probable allusion to the *Theaetetus*. If we compare the critical tendency of the *Theaetetus* with the critical and elementary character of the works belonging to the Socratic stage, we shall easily notice the difference between those youthful personal criticisms and the fundamental criticisms of the *Theaetetus* similar to those of the *Parmenides* and *Sophist*.

Zeller's view of early date of

5. Zeller finds an argument for the early date of the *Theaetetus* in his belief that the *Politicus* is earlier than *Symposium* and *Phaedo*. But he has not furnished any proof of this assumption, which contradicts everything we

Politicus clearly wrong. Relation to Euclides and Antisthenes uncertain.

know about the development of Plato's style and his logical doctrines.

6. The relations between Plato, Antisthenes, and Euclides, which Zeller also invokes in favour of an early date of the *Theaetetus*, are too little known for any chronological inferences, and they could never prove anything about the date of composition, because Antisthenes is not named in the dialogue, and Euclides appears at the beginning without any mention which would allow inferences about his relations to Plato.

Zeller's view that a late date for the *Theaetetus* leaves no room for the dialogues which follow it.

7. Zeller enumerates the dialogues which in his opinion followed the *Theaetetus*, and finds it improbable that they could have been written in the last twenty years of Plato's life. But he includes the *Republic* in this enumeration, on the ground that he holds the *Republic* to be later than the *Philebus*, and the *Philebus* than *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus*. We quite agree that the *Parmenides* and *Philebus* follow the *Theaetetus*, but we see no sufficient reason for placing the *Republic* after the *Philebus*. Zeller relies on some parallel passages which are too general to prove anything, and even rather confirm the priority of the *Republic*.[249] Such parallels are rarely decisive, and have only then a certain value, if many concomitant variations point in the same direction. The seven dialogues which, according to our exposition, precede the *Theaetetus* (*Euthydemus*, *Gorgias*, *Cratylus*, *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*, *Phaedrus*) are in their total size (453 pp. ed. Did.) almost equal to the seven dialogues which we suppose to be later than the *Theaetetus* (*Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Laws*, 457 pp. ed. Did.). If we are right in supposing that the seven earlier dialogues were written in the years 390–379, there is no difficulty whatever in admitting that the seven later works fall within the last twenty years of

Which are these?

Relation of size between dialogues earlier and later than the *Theaetetus*.

[249] This question has been recently dealt with by Jackson ('Plato's later theory of ideas VII. The supposed priority of the *Philebus* to the *Republic*,' in the *Journal of Philology* for 1897, N. 49, pp. 65–82).

Plato's life (367–347), or even within the time after his third voyage to Sicily (361 B.C.). If this were proved, then the mention of the superiority of oral teaching at the end of the *Phaedrus* would mean nothing less than an interruption of about twelve years in Plato's literary labours. But of course such a conclusion requires more serious arguments than those on which Zeller founded his conviction about a very early date of the dialectical works. Here it is only put forth as a possibility which may be made probable by further investigations.

Probable interruption in Plato's literary activity.

At all events, the above reasoning shows that Zeller's arguments prove only that the *Theaetetus* is later than 392 B.C., without any determination of the distance between this *terminus a quo* and the date of composition. All the allusions found out by Zeller with such acuteness and erudition, even if we admit the interpretation he gives them, would remain quite as natural twenty-five years after the Corinthian war as immediately afterwards. In such things we have not the right to look at Plato from the point of view of a newspaper editor, who wishes to give to his readers the most recent information. Plato was free to choose from his large stores of experience at any time any example proper for an illustration of his views, without considering whether it occurred long ago or yesterday. No such immediate allusion as the *διοικισμός* of the *Symposium* has been found as yet in the *Theaetetus*. On the contrary we have several reasons to believe that the *Theaetetus* is a late dialogue, written by Plato after fifty and possibly after sixty. These reasons have been collected since Munk and Ueberweg by many investigators and can easily be supplemented by considerations of style and logical comparisons.

Zeller's argumentation not convincing.

Prevailing reasons for a late date of the *Theaetetus*.

We find in the *Theaetetus* clear allusions to Plato's school. The person of the younger Socrates, introduced here, is also known from the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle (1036 b 25), where he is quoted in the manner in which Aristotle quotes oral reminiscences. This led Ueberweg to

Allusions to Plato's school.

The younger Socrates and Aristotle.

the conclusion that this younger Socrates belonged to the Academy at the same time with Aristotle, or after 367 B.C. If we consider that he does not take an active part in the conversation, it becomes probable that Plato introduced him as a witness out of some personal sympathy at the time when he already had known him for some time past. This argument is not decisive, because the younger Socrates may have belonged to the Academy a long time before Aristotle and still have continued in it afterwards. The Academy was not similar to our universities as to the limits of time fixed for the studies, and Plato's pupils probably remained in touch with him for life.

Allusions to travels.

But a more important observation has been made by Ueberweg as to the picture drawn of the philosopher, that it can best be explained if we refer it to Plato's experience in Syracuse, where he may have found many parasites ready for all kinds of slavish services to please the tyrant. It may also be argued that the insistence with which Theodorus of Cyrene is asked to take an active part in the discussion is most natural after Plato's visit to Cyrene.

Theodorus of Cyrene.

Teichmüller's argument from the dramatic form.

Such allusions to external events are always open to doubts, and are here quoted without attaching to them any special importance. There is another chronological indication of a more serious character, noticed already by Schleiermacher and brought forward afresh with strong conviction by Teichmüller. This is the statement at the beginning of the dialogue that it has been written down in the dramatic form to avoid frequent repetitions of such formulas as *καὶ ἐγὼ ἔφην, καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, συνέφη, οὐχ ὡμολόγει* (143 C). Teichmüller infers from this passage that Plato began only with the *Theaetetus* to write his dialogues in a dramatic form. But the dramatic form is the primitive form for a dialogue, and needs no apology. The narrated form of a philosophical dialogue is a much more complicated mode, and was perhaps introduced into Greek literature by Plato. After trying its different variations,

How far defensible.

he returns to the dramatic form and apologises for the change. In point of fact the narrated form has been tried by Plato only in a few of his works, and almost in every case with some difference, as the following classification of the form of Plato's dialogues shows:

Twelve different modes of dialogue in Plato.

1. A continuous speech, including questions and answers. This is the character of the *Apology*, in which some passages refer to conversations held by the speaker (20 A), and others introduce an imagined conversation with the accuser (24 D E, 27 B C, &c.).

2. Dramatic dialogues in which Socrates acts as leader of a conversation. This is the most numerous class, including *Euthyphro*, *Crito*, *Laches*, *Io*, *Meno*, *Gorgias*, *Cratylus*, *Philebus*—and among the doubtful dialogues *Alcibiades I. II.*, *Hipparchus*, *Theages*, *Hippias maior* and *minor*. A slight variation appears when the dramatic conversation includes long speeches of Socrates or others: *Menexenus*, *Phaedrus*.

3. In a narration in which Socrates gives an account of some earlier conversation, the chief part is a narrated dialogue. This is the form of the *Republic*, and besides only of *Lysis* and *Charmides* (among the spurious dialogues: *Erastae*). In this form the repetition of the formulas complained of at the beginning of the *Theaetetus* is most conspicuous.

4. After a dramatic introduction, in which Socrates appears as one of the persons of the dialogue, he begins to narrate an earlier conversation, and this narration follows up to the end. This form is found only in the *Protagoras*.

5. Different from the above is a narration interrupted by dramatic portions in which other persons speak with Socrates about his narration, and such a conversation forms the conclusion of the whole. This occurs only in the *Euthydemus*.

6. After a dramatic introduction another person than Socrates narrates a dialogue in which Socrates played the chief part. This is limited to the *Symposium*.

7. The above form is improved by dramatic interruptions in which some opinions are expressed by the hearer about the narrated dialogue. This occurs only in the *Phaedo*.

8. After a dramatic introduction follows a reading of a dramatic dialogue, excused by a censure of the narrated dialogues generally. This is the case of the *Theaetetus* alone.

9. After a short narration designed to explain the circumstances of a conversation, follows the dialectical conversation without the interruptions complained of in the *Theaetetus*. This distinguishes the *Parmenides* from all other narrated dialogues, and makes it possible that this work was written after the *Theaetetus*, though in

its general form it is a narrated dialogue, and even a narration of a narration, the dialogue being represented as first narrated by Pythodoros, then from him learned by Antiphon, and from Antiphon's narration repeated by the actual narrator. But formulas peculiar to the narrated form occur only on pp. 126 A–137 C, here being also often omitted, while they are altogether missed on pp. 137–166. Those occurring in the introduction are different from those condemned in the *Theaetetus* and from the use of other works: ἔφη φάναι, εἰπεῖν being chiefly used.

10. Dramatic conversations in which Socrates proposes a subject, which is then dealt with by another philosopher: *Sophist*, *Politicus*.

11. After a short dramatic conversation in which Socrates proposes a subject, follows a much longer speech by another person. This long speech may be interrupted by some words of recognition from Socrates (*Timaeus*) or not at all interrupted (*Critias*).

12. Dramatic dialogue in which Socrates no longer appears even as hearer: *Laws*.

Pure narration least common of all, and occurs in three works.

It results from the above distinctions[250] that what Teichmüller calls the narrated dialogue includes seven kinds (No. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9), which represent different attempts towards a more perfect form. Only the *Lysis*, *Charmides*, and *Republic* take the form of a continuous narration. The nearest mode to this is a narration with dramatic introduction, as in the *Protagoras*. From the *Protagoras* the *Euthydemus* differs by dramatic interruptions and conclusion, the *Symposium* by the absence of Socrates in the Introduction, the *Phaedo* in addition to this by its dramatic interruptions. At last, in the second part of the *Parmenides* narration is abandoned altogether without any explanation, and the whole dialectical discussion follows dramatically.

Teichmüller's inference, if limited to the supposition that Plato did not return after the *Theaetetus* to the form criticised in this dialogue, appears very probable, and

[250] An attempt at such a classification has already been made by Stein (*Sieben Bücher zur Geschichte des Platonismus*, Göttingen 1864), who divided all the works of Plato into five classes, in a somewhat different manner from the above. It is noteworthy that all the spurious dialogues have the form 2 or 3, while the ten other kinds of dialogues used by Plato have not been imitated.

furnishes us with valuable chronological information, giving additional strength to other reasons, according to which the *Theaetetus* is later than the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. It is not contradicted by any well-established fact, that Plato in his later age used the dramatic form exclusively. All the dialogues known to be the latest are dramatic, and the narrated form of the *Republic* compared with the dramatic form of the *Timaeus*, its professed continuation, confirms again the supposition that Plato relinquished the narrated form in order to adopt the dramatic. But it does not follow that he should never have used the dramatic form before he started with narrations, nor even in intervals between narrated dialogues. The small dialogues, as to which there is great probability that they were written early, are dramatic, and it is most natural for anybody who writes philosophical dialogues to begin with this form. Esthetical reasons, and the desire to give a greater poetical plasticity or historical probability to an imagined conversation, led later to the more difficult form of narration, which, after different variations, had to be finally abandoned in the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*. The inconvenience of narration could nowhere be felt more clearly than in the composition of the *Republic*, and thus one of the most probable inferences from the explanation given in the *Theaetetus* is the priority of the *Republic*. This is further confirmed by a parallel passage in the *Republic*, where the dramatic form is condemned, after a long explanation of the difference between narration and dramatic representation (*Rep.* 392 D-396 C) on the ground that the dramatic form is less immediate and sincere than the narrative (396 C: *ὁ μέν μοι δοκεῖ μέτριος ἀνήρ, ἐπειδὰν ἀφίκηται ἐν τῇ διηγήσει ἐπὶ λέξιν τινὰ ἢ πρᾶξιν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, ἐθελήσειν ὡς αὐτὸς ὢν ἐκεῖνος ἀπαγγέλλειν καὶ οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ μιμήσει . . .* E: *διηγήσει χρήσεται οἵᾳ ἡμεῖς ὀλίγον πρότερον διήλθομεν . . . καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῦ ἡ λέξις μετέχουσα μὲν ἀμφοτέρων, μιμήσεώς τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης διηγήσεως, σμικρὸν δέ τι μέρος ἐν πολλῷ λόγῳ τῆς μιμήσεως*).

It is true, however, that all the latest dialogues are dramatic in form.

Theaetetus after *Republic*.

This recommendation of narrations is given in a narrated dialogue, and we know that Plato wrote afterwards dramatic dialogues, as, for instance, his *Laws*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*. If now we meet in the *Theaetetus* an apology for avoiding the form of a narrative when it might be expected, it appears very natural that this apology is later than the condemnation of the dramatic form enunciated in the *Republic*. This conclusion is the more justifiable, as Plato warns us that his condemnation of the dramatic form is not limited to tragedy and comedy (394 D). The above is only an indication, but seems to be more significant than the inferences drawn from the genealogy of various descendants from Heracles. The formulas objected to in the *Theaetetus* can occur only in a dialogue narrated by Socrates, and therefore the whole objection, if taken literally, refers solely to *Lysis*, *Charmides*, *Protagoras*, *Euthydemus*, and *Republic*. Besides the formulas expressly named other answers are used, and it would be an interesting investigation to find out in which of these five dialogues the expressions rejected in the *Theaetetus* are most frequent. There can be scarcely any doubt that the greatest number of them is to be found in the *Republic*.

Possible motive for the preface to *Theaetetus*.

The priority of the *Republic* to the *Theaetetus* is confirmed also by other allusions and comparisons already mentioned which may be here briefly recapitulated:

Notions familiar in *Theaetetus*, but carefully explained in the *Republic*.

1. δύναμις is first explained in *Rep.* 477 C as a new notion. It is used currently as familiar in the *Theaetetus*: 158 E, 185 C, &c.

2. The eternal models of the happiest and unhappiest life (176 E) as well as the mention that the philosopher investigates the nature of justice (175 C) are best explained if the reader is supposed to be familiar with the *Republic*.

3. The short and matter-of-fact enumeration of mathematics, music, astronomy, geometry, and stereometry (145 A C, 148 B), as preparatory to philosophical problems, seems also to be a reminiscence of the *Republic*.

Relation of both dialogues.

4. The poets are placed on the same footing with Protagoras in their error of denying permanent substance (152 E). This is best explainable after the *Republic*, as in the *Symposium* and even in the *Phaedo* (95 A) Homer was praised without irony.

5. The notion of movement as distinguished into change of quality and change of place, common to the *Theaetetus* with *Parmenides* and *Laws*, could not easily be ignored in *Republic* and *Phaedrus* if already familiar to Plato.

6. The idea of innumerable periods of ten thousand generations (*Theaet.* 175 A, cf. *Legg.* 676 B C, 677 D: μυριάκις μύρια ἔτη) implies an advance beyond the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, where large periods of generations first appeared, and were specially justified. The long duration of life on the earth is here assumed as known to every educated man, and this was first explained in the *Republic*.

7. The logical standpoint goes very much beyond the theory of ideas as known from the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*. This results from our whole exposition.

Some of the above points apply equally to the priority of the *Phaedrus*, and there is besides one special point of comparison which places the *Phaedrus* before the *Theaetetus*, namely the calm recognition of rhetoric (201 A), which seems to imply what has been said on this subject in the *Phaedrus*. But the strongest reason why the *Theaetetus* must be looked upon as later than the *Phaedrus* lies in the affinities of both dialogues to different groups of other dialogues. The *Theaetetus* is in style and contents nearest to the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, which are proved to be very late. The *Phaedrus* shows in style and contents the greatest affinity with the *Republic*, which is proved to be earlier than the *Sophist*. The poetical imagination displayed in the *Phaedrus* and *Republic* is radically different from the dialectical imagination of the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. The retirement of the philosopher from the world, which we see in the *Theaetetus*, remains throughout all later dialogues, and also the complaint that life on earth is too imperfect for the realisation of a philosopher's dreams. This complaint, quite opposed to the optimism of the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, betrays an interval not only of time but also of bitter experience between the poetical and the dialectical group.

Priority of *Phaedrus* to *Theaetetus*.

Affinity of *Phaedrus* to the *Republic*, and of *Theaetetus* to the *Sophist*.

We know in Plato's life, after the foundation of the Academy, only one great disenchantment which could

The *Theaetetus*

probably subsequent to the second voyage to Sicily.

justify that change of attitude on the part of the great thinker. This was his second voyage to Sicily in 367 B.C. which he undertook in the hope of realising his ideal schemes, and which ended unsuccessfully. It appears most probable that the new departure, beginning with the *Theaetetus*, coincides with his return from this voyage. This cannot be proved, but may be suggested as a plausible hypothesis, well adapted to explain many things otherwise unexplained. Those who believe that the battle near Corinth, mentioned at the beginning of the dialogue, must have been quite recent when Plato wrote the *Theaetetus* are then at liberty to accept Ueberweg's supposition that a battle in 368 B.C. is meant here, and they can seek additional evidence in inscriptions and literary monuments in order to prove that dysentery was reigning then in the encampment. The lovers of genealogies will have a greater choice to select from, and may find in some contemporary encomium, as Dümmler expects, a clear statement about twenty-five ancestors descending from Heracles, thus removing the improbable supposition that Plato himself counted somebody's ancestors.

This agrees with other arguments.

Probable interval between *Phaedrus* and *Theaetetus*.

These are trifling advantages, compared with other considerations. If, as we suppose, the *Phaedrus* was written about 379 B.C., and the *Theaetetus* after 367, then the passage at the end of the *Phaedrus*, in which oral teaching is extolled over writing, would obtain a new and original interpretation: it was a farewell to literary activity for about twelve years. And also one strange peculiarity of the style of the *Theaetetus* is psychologically explained. The *Theaetetus*, having according to our calculations a slightly later style than the *Phaedrus*, is distinguished by the entire absence of very important or very frequent stylistic peculiarities. This is natural if that dialogue is written after a long interruption of literary activity. Plato was then to a certain extent free from acquired habits, and he did not at once fall into new idioms which might become very familiar in later works.

This would explain peculiar style of the *Theaetetus*.

He used freely the richness of his old vocabulary and style, recurring less than usual to new formations and new idioms. Out of 500 peculiarities observed only four accidental words or locutions (11: *μεμπτός*, 208: *ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη*, 399: *περὶ δή* with genitive, 467: *γυμνασία*) are new, being missed in earlier works. All other peculiarities of later style occurring in the *Theaetetus* (58 accidental, 41 repeated, 31 important) have been also found in dialogues which we have placed earlier. While the number of accidental, repeated, and important peculiarities is much greater than in the *Phaedrus* (130 against 112) there is not one very important peculiarity in the *Theaetetus* though seven are found in the *Phaedrus*. But none of these seven is missed in the *Theaetetus*, only their frequency is smaller, so that they are counted only as important or repeated in the *Theaetetus*, while they are more important in the *Phaedrus* (23, 231, 376, 377, 390, 412, 451).

Absence of very important peculiarities.

The difference between both dialogues is just what might be expected if we place the *Phaedrus* at the end of a period of extraordinarily intense literary activity, and the *Theaetetus* at the beginning of another period, after a long interruption. Nor is the time of twenty years from 367–347 B.C. too short for the composition of the *Theaetetus* and the seven dialogues which are left, as their total size is inferior to the total size of the nine dialogues preceding the *Theaetetus* (*Protagoras—Phaedrus*) written according to our view between 393–379 B.C. or in about fourteen years. Whether a writer like Plato writes more at forty than after sixty is a question that cannot be decided on general grounds, and we make a due allowance for the diminution of activity in old age, down to an average of only four lines (ed. Didot) every day if the last eight dialogues (*Theaetetus—Laws*) were written in about nineteen years.

Amount of text written after the *Theaetetus* inferior to the preceding nine dialogues.

What is here proposed as a plausible hypothesis is susceptible of proof by further investigation of style. At

The interval

between *Phaedrus* and *Theaetetus* might be confirmed by further research.

present the stylistic difference between *Phaedrus* and *Theaetetus* is only just sufficient to confirm the later date of the second. But if we remember that thirty years ago the style of the *Theaetetus* so far as it could then be ascertained appeared as early as that of the *Protagoras*, and that Campbell resisted the temptation to trust that appearance and judged the *Theaetetus* to be later than the *Phaedrus*, which has been fully confirmed by later research—then we are entitled to hope that also our present supposition, that the *Theaetetus* is about twelve years later than the *Phaedrus*, may be confirmed by further research. It may also be contradicted, but one thing results as certain from the whole above investigation: the *Theaetetus* is certainly later than the *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo*, and *Symposium*.[251] This relation will be still better confirmed if we study the next dialogue, the *Parmenides*, which in many respects shows a greater affinity with the *Theaetetus* than its acknowledged continuation, the *Sophist*.

The *Theaetetus* is certainly later than the *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, and *Symposium*.

II. *The Parmenides*.

(Relative affinity with the latest group, measured on the *Laws* as unity, = 0·34; see above, p. 177.)

Authenticity doubted but without cause.

Among the greater works of Plato none has raised so many suspicions as to its authenticity as the *Parmenides*, since Socher (1820) had the courage to confess that he felt unable to share the traditional admiration for the antinomies forming its second part. Many doubts expressed by Ueberweg and Schaarschmidt have been removed by the subsequent studies on Plato's style. This dialogue presents such numerous Platonic peculiarities, despite its abstract contents, as never occur in spurious

[251] The relation between *Theaet.* and *Symp.* can also be judged from a comparison of what in both dialogues is said about intellectual pregnancy, which is first introduced in the *Symposium* (206 B), and here supplemented by the notion of intellectual midwifery (*Theaet.* 148 E–149 B).

works. Whatever may be thought of the philosophical value of antinomies, we find them here presented with great skill, and the conclusions are not more puzzling than those found in a similar treatment of philosophical problems by modern thinkers. The great originality of form and contents can raise suspicion only in critics who are unaware of Plato's originality in other works. The *Parmenides* is not like other dialogues, but the *Phaedrus* and the *Timaeus* also differ widely from the *Phaedo* and *Symposium*.

Grounds urged by Ueberweg and Schaarschmidt removed by subsequent research.

It has been thought that Plato could not have invented such objections to his own theory as those with which he credits Parmenides in this dialogue. Thus Teichmüller and Siebeck [252] have been led to the supposition that Plato wrote the *Parmenides* against Aristotle, and that the second part is intended to refute the objections raised in the first part against the theory of ideas. Even if we admit that the Aristoteles of the dialogue is introduced here with reference to the philosopher Aristotle, there are serious difficulties in the way of crediting him with the objections expressed by Parmenides. Aristotle came to the Academy in 367 B.C. at the age of seventeen, and in view of the extent of the six dialogues which are later the *Parmenides* cannot have been written long after this. We have seen in the *Theaetetus* how Plato proceeds when he seriously wishes to refute an objection, and according to this standard we cannot accept the second part of the *Parmenides* as a refutation of objections raised in the first part. It leads, like the *Theaetetus*, beyond the primitive theory of ideas to a system of categories, among which unity and variety are discussed by a peculiar method, and shown to supplement each other.

The *Parmenides* not written against Aristotle.

Every exclusive hypothesis leading to contradictions, it follows that neither the one alone nor the many

One and many.

[252] 'Plato als Kritiker aristotelischer Ansichten,' in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, vol. 107, pp. 1–28, Leipzig 1895.

explain existence altogether, and that therefore we have to seek everywhere the one and the many, as is done in the subsequent dialectical dialogues. It has been asked whether the one means the Platonic idea, or God, or anything else. This question is out of place here. The whole discussion is kept in the most general terms, and may apply to many particular cases. We notice the same tendency as in the *Theaetetus* to substitute abstract notions for the primitive conception of the ideas, and we need not deprive Plato of the merit of having discovered his objections for himself, the more so as these objections do not necessarily refer to his own earlier views, but to certain special determinations of these views, which may be ascribed to his pupils.

The terms are used with absolute generality.

In no earlier dialogue had the different conceptions of the relation between ideas and the particulars been stated with such clearness. It remains uncertain whether these different conceptions are Plato's own, because his theory of ideas so far as it was expressed in earlier dialogues admitted different interpretations. It might be supposed that these interpretations had been attempted by some of his pupils and that he wrote the *Parmenides* with the purpose of showing the difficulty of such very concrete and special interpretations. The chief point which had been always insisted upon with sufficient clearness, the essential difference between idea and particulars, remains untouched by all objections, and for the first time we find it clearly stated that an idea may vary according to the conception of the conceiving mind.

Plato himself discovered the objections: whether to his own theory, or that of some follower.

The chief objection, known as the 'third man,' consists in the representation of an infinite number of identical ideas (132 A: *αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα τὰ μεγάλα, ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδῃς . . . ἕν τι αὖ που μέγα φανεῖται, ᾧ ταῦτα πάντα ἀνάγκη μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι. ἄλλο ἄρα εἶδος μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται, παρ' αὐτό τε τὸ μέγεθος γεγονὸς καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὖ πᾶσιν ἕτερον, ᾧ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα ἔσται· καὶ οὐκέτι δὴ ἓν*

The *Τρίτος ἄνθρωπος* argument.

ἕκαστόν σοι τῶν εἰδῶν ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος). This objection is by no means peculiar to the *Parmenides*. It had occurred in the *Theaetetus* (200 B: ἢ πάλιν αὖ μοι ἐρεῖτε ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν εἰσὶν αὖ ἐπιστῆμαι . . . καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκασθήσεσθε εἰς ταὐτὸν περιτρέχειν μυριάκις οὐδὲν πλέον ποιοῦντες) applied to knowledge, and in the *Republic* (597 B C) to the idea of a chair. There Plato indicated the logical necessity of stopping in this infinite progress. A certain analogy to this is found also in the *Timaeus* (31 A) where the question is raised, whether besides our world there is not an infinity of worlds containing it, and this is denied.

Not peculiar to the *Parmenides*.

This argument has been attributed to Polyxenos whom Plato met in Syracuse, and is here for the first time answered by the supposition that each idea might be a thought and exist only in our soul (132 B: μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ᾖ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκῃ ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς). This explanation is not contradicted by what follows. Parmenides says that if each idea is thought of as unity (132 C: εἶδος ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ νοούμενον ἓν εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὂν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν) the primitive theory of μέθεξις could not be maintained (132 C: εἰ τἆλλα φῇς τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχειν . . . οὐκ ἔχει λόγον). Then Socrates proposes, not as a different solution, but only as an additional explanation, a view of the ideas as models of natural kinds, to which the particulars are similar (132 D: τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐοικέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα· καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς). This view is consistent with the psychological character of ideas as notions, and the further objections refer to εἴδη αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά (133 A), not to general notions.

Ideas as notions.

Ideas as models.

The one and the many, to which the antinomies of the second part refer, are also notions, not ideas existing outside the human mind. This is perfectly consistent with what has been said in the *Theaetetus* about the activity of the soul. It is one of the aspects of later Platonism: the soul as the

All centres in the soul.

source of movement acquires an increasing importance and considers its own notions as objects of knowledge. In the *Parmenides* the link is given which makes it possible to use the terminology of ideas for general kinds or notions. One of the objections of Parmenides against the universal application of transcendental ideas is at once admitted by Socrates and gives the explanation of the subsequent discussion. The idea in its former shape had to be perfect, and at that earlier stage Plato cared only for the knowledge of what could attain perfection. Now his desire of knowledge extends to everything existing, and there are things imperfect by their very nature (130 C: *θρὶξ καὶ πηλὸς καὶ ῥύπος ἢ ἄλλο ὅ τι ἀτιμότατόν τε καὶ φαυλότατον*) of which we conceive notions, but not transcendental ideas, under the penalty of falling into an abyss of absurdity (130 D: *δείσας μή ποτε εἰς τιν' ἄβυθον φλυαρίαν ἐμπεσὼν διαφθαρῶ*).

Extension of knowledge to imperfect things.

Rising from particulars to more general kinds, human notions are susceptible of improvement up to the ideal standard of the divinity. Thus perfect ideas appear to be out of the reach of human reason (135 A: *πολλὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ εἶναι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἄγνωστα*). If anybody denies their existence, it is difficult to prove his error: it requires an exceptional intelligence to show that each thing has its own substance (135 A B: *ἀνδρὸς πάνυ μὲν εὐφυοῦς τοῦ δυνησομένου μαθεῖν ὡς ἔστι γένος τι ἑκάστου καὶ οὐσία αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτήν, ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστοτέρου τοῦ εὑρήσοντος καὶ ἄλλον δυνησομένου διδάξαι ταῦτα πάντα ἱκανῶς διευκρινησάμενον*). What Parmenides says, that without fixed ideas neither dialectic nor philosophy is possible, refers to the general kinds of Being as they have been presented in the *Theaetetus*, and does not necessarily imply their separate existence. He then recommends dialectical exercise as the best way of advancing knowledge, and proceeds to give a sample of such an exercise, which is here called a laborious pastime (137 B: *πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν παίζειν*), convenient only in a limited

Relativity and fixity.

Dialectical exercise after a

circle of friends and pupils (137 A: *αὐτοί ἐσμεν*), not before a larger public (136 D: *ἀπρεπῆ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν . . . . ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν ἔχειν*). **new model.**

The method is supplementary to the method which had been proposed in the *Phaedo*. There it was the philosopher's aim to explain each hypothesis by another up to the highest hypothesis which might be confidently accepted. Here Parmenides wants us to follow out the consequences of each hypothesis affirmed or denied, and its relation to the whole of our knowledge (136 B: *ἑνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὅτου ἂν ἀεὶ ὑποθῇ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος, δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα πρὸς αὑτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅ τι ἂν προέλῃ, καὶ πρὸς πλείω καὶ πρὸς ξύμπαντα ὡσαύτως · καὶ τἆλλα αὖ πρὸς αὑτά τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὅ τι ἂν προαιρῇ ἀεί, ἐάν τε ὡς ὂν ὑποθῇ ὃ ὑπετίθεσο, ἐάν τε ὡς μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές*). This method implies the recognition of a mutual relation and interdependence of all things that exist, and we need not expect in the following large sample of antinomies about the one and the many a full realisation of the proposed problem. **Disjunctive inference.** **Mutual relation of all existing things.**

The idea of relation occupied Plato's mind with increasing fascination, as is shown not only in the antinomies of the *Parmenides*, but also in the surprising conception according to which our notions are in the first instance related only among themselves, and could be out of relation with more perfect notions or ideas of the Divinity. The example chosen to illustrate this relativity is the relation between a slave and his master. This relation is a relation of two men, says Parmenides, and not of the ideas of slavery and mastership (133 E). Although this view is here introduced as an objection to transcendental ideas generally, it agrees very well with the tendency of the dialectical dialogues which follow, in which we shall find frequently a complaint about the relativity of human **Remoteness of the perfect idea.**

knowledge. The distinction between a subjective notion and its objective counterpart is nowhere so clearly stated as here; this is not the only feature in which the *Parmenides* approaches Kant's *Kritik*. Also the discovery that abstract notions, if applied without restriction, lead to antinomies of reason, is common to Plato and Kant, although they have treated the subject differently. These antinomies are the further consequence of the dualistic tendency already visible in the *Theaetetus* and increasing in the *Laws*, where even the unity of soul throughout the universe is denied, since evil cannot be ascribed to God.

Platonic and Kantian antinomies.

On the other side we find here a partial answer to the question 'what is knowledge?' which was raised in the *Theaetetus* and left unanswered. Knowledge is a system of notions from the highest down to the lowest, brought into manifold mutual relations. Only uneducated people look upon logical exercise as idle talk (135 D). Such exercise leads us from the visible world to the ideas which are an object of reason (135 E: *ἡγάσθην, ὅτι οὐκ εἴας ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ μάλιστά τις ἂν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἴδη ἂν ἡγήσαιτο εἶναι*). The true philosopher neglects nothing, however insignificant it may appear, if it has a bearing upon his general theories, and is not influenced by the unscientific opinions of the many (130 E: *νέος γὰρ εἶ ἔτι, καὶ οὔπω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία, ὡς ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις· νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν*). This attitude is preserved also in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, in which the dialectical pastime is continued.

Knowledge more clearly conceived.

Universality of the philosopher and his high training.

We have seen in the preceding works the theory that the highest standard of knowledge is attainable only through the highest intellectual training. The training proposed in the *Republic* was in mathematical, astronomical, and musical studies as preparatory to Dialectic. Dialectic was there only the knowledge of

the highest idea of Good. In the *Phaedrus* it was defined as the art of analysis and synthesis of concepts, and this programme was probably followed out in many particulars in the oral teaching of Plato. The result was an essential change of the former views about ideas. The occupation with particulars of nature brought the concept of movement into prominence, and movement was in some way brought into the fixed and unalterable world of the ideas as we know them from the *Phaedo* and *Symposium*. This movement consisted first in the universal mutual relations among ideas, and then in the progress of each idea, according to the individual perfection of the thinker. Plato's love of ideal perfection is not on the decrease, and the ideas of the perfect Being or God remain as perfect as they were seen in the space above heaven of the *Phaedrus*. But they are not out of all relation to a living consciousness, and each of those unities has infinite approximations in the minds of the whole hierarchy of beings, and in the variety of appearances. No doubt the philosopher is able to bring his ideas to divine perfection, but only through dialectical exercise. In agreement with the importance acquired by general concepts, we find in the *Parmenides* some new notions. Besides δύναμις (133 E, 135 C), κίνησις (138 B), ἀλλοίωσις, φορά (138 C, 162 D E), μὴ ὄν (142 A) and other categories used already before, we meet here for the first time τὸ συμβεβηκός as a logical term (128 C), στέρεσθαι (157 C, 159 E), τὸ ἐξαίφνης (156 D), which are clear as general notions but scarcely fit for representation as transcendental ideas.

Beginning of movement among ideas: increased interest in becoming. Evolution of ideas according to the perfection of the thinker.

New terms and notions.

If our interpretation of the logical meaning of the *Parmenides* is right, it becomes exceptionally important to determine the place of this work among Plato's dialogues, as it begins together with the *Theaetetus* a new philosophy of Plato.

That the *Parmenides* is not an early dialogue, results from many hints. What is here repeatedly said of

***Parmenides* not**

early: as appears from the way in which youth is regarded.

youth (130 E, 135 D, 137 B), that young men are inconsequent, that one must learn while young, and that youth is pleasing and compliant, is only explainable if the author was comparatively speaking an old man when writing. If we consider that the limits of youth were wider with the Greeks than with us, that youth must be already at some distance to be thus treated, and that we find in the *Laws* and in the other works of Plato's old age similar remarks on youth, we are justified in admitting that Plato must have passed middle life when he wrote the *Parmenides*.

Socrates represented as very young and subordinated to another master.

Plato's consciousness of his own superiority.

Another general argument in favour of a late date is the characterisation of Socrates as a young man, receiving instruction from Parmenides. There is nothing disparaging for Socrates in this position, as Schaarschmidt thought. He is here clearly admired by Parmenides and Zeno, and his philosophical aptitude is extolled. In all preceding dialogues we have seen Socrates as the ideal teacher, only in the *Symposium* subordinated to the ideal Diotima, but even there supposed to be the true author of all that he attributes to her. If now we meet for the first time a Socrates who is truly subordinated to another Master, and if we know that in all remaining works of Plato, except the *Philebus*, Socrates is only a hearer, it becomes very natural to suppose that the *Parmenides* was written at a time when the living picture of Plato's Master was fading away in a distant past, under the influence of a consciousness of his own superiority. That Socrates appears here as a young man, is a consequence of the plan of the dialogue, in which a theory formerly attributed to Socrates had to be corrected and abandoned.

The conception of ideas as patterns has been anticipated;

It has been thought that the view of paradeigmatic ideas or eternal models (132 D: *παραδείγματα ἐν τῇ φύσει*, cf. *Theaet.* 176 E) appears here for the first time, but this cannot be maintained in view of the fact that we had already in the tenth book of the *Republic* paradeigmatic ideas, and that such are also implied in the allegory of the

Cave. The only view which is really expressed for the first time is the identification of the ideas with notions in the soul. This view, which we shall see recurring in later works, cannot belong to an early time in Plato's life, at least in connection with a criticism of self-existing ideas.

ideas as notions appear for the first time.

The meeting of Parmenides with Socrates, whether historic or not, is mentioned besides this dialogue also in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. If we compare[253] both mentions, it is obvious that the *Sophist* refers to our dialogue, while in the *Theaetetus* the mention is more general:

Other allusions to the meeting of Socrates with Parmenides.

Theaet. 183 E: *τοὺς ἄλλους, οἳ ἓν ἑστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν . . . ἧττον αἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἕνα ὄντα Παρμενίδην . . . συμπροσέμιξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτῃ, καί μοι ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον.* 184 A: *φοβοῦμαι οὖν μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα ξυνιῶμεν, τί τε διανοούμενος εἶπε πολὺ πλέον λειπώμεθα . . .*

Soph. 217 C: *πότερον εἴωθας ἥδιον αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξιέναι . . . ἢ δι' ἐρωτήσεων, οἷόν ποτε καὶ Παρμενίδῃ χρωμένῳ καὶ διεξιόντι λόγους παγκάλους παρεγενόμην ἐγὼ νέος ὤν, ἐκείνου μάλα δὴ τότε ὄντος πρεσβύτου;—τῷ μὲν ἀλύπως τε καὶ εὐηνίως προσδιαλεγομένῳ ῥᾷον οὕτω, τὸ πρὸς ἄλλον.*

We see that Plato in the *Theaetetus* mentions in general terms his admiration for Parmenides, and an interview which might be historical without necessarily implying a special reference to the dialogue, while in the *Sophist* an allusion is made to the short generally affirmative answers which characterise both the *Parmenides* and *Sophist*, not the *Theaetetus*. These three dialogues contain very frequent mentions of Parmenides, who is besides quoted only in the *Symposium* (178 B, 195 C) on an insignificant matter and without great esteem. In the *Theaetetus* the examination of the philosophy of Parmenides is declined and adjourned; in the *Parmenides* the

[253] This comparison has been specially insisted upon by P. Natorp in his review of O. Apelt's *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie*, Leipzig 1891, in the *Philosophische Monatshefte*, vol. xxx. pp. 63–70, but in connection with a very early date of the *Theaetetus*. Natorp's own argumentation gains in strength if the *Theaetetus* immediately preceded the *Parmenides*.

Eleaticism for the first time seriously confronted.

philosopher is introduced as criticising earlier Platonism and explaining the consequences of his own hypothesis in a manner which might lead the hearer to some doubts; in the *Sophist* he is criticised by the anonymous guest from Elea, introduced as a friend of Parmenides and Zeno. If these three dialogues, in which the influence of the Eleatic philosophy is first noticed, are written after a sojourn of Plato in Sicily, then it might appear probable that on this voyage he came into closer relations with the Eleatics, just as in the period of middle Platonism the influence of Pythagoras' school is noticeable. So long as we have no more detailed testimonies about these voyages, we must limit our inferences to the observation that Plato at a later stage of his life conceived a special interest in the Eleatic philosophy, either in consequence of personal acquaintance with the representatives of this school abroad, or perhaps under the influence of his own pupils in the Academy, some of whom might have arrived from Italy.

Possible occasions for this.

Categories more differentiated.

An important argument for the priority of the *Theaetetus* to the *Parmenides* is the different manner in which the categories and the subdivision of κίνησις into ἀλλοίωσις and φορά appear, being in the earlier dialogue distinctly meant as something new, while in the later both theories are supposed to be known.

Remoteness of the imaginary dialogue.

Both the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides* are distinguished from other dialogues by the introductory information calculated to make on the reader the impression of things of a remote time: in the *Theaetetus* this is done by the fiction of a written account repeatedly corrected; in the *Parmenides* the source appears more distant, as the dialogue has been first narrated by Pythodorus to Antiphon, and by Antiphon to Kephalos, who narrates it to the reader.

Stylistic relation to the

Some reason for placing the *Theaetetus* before the *Parmenides* is given by stylistic comparisons. The total stylistic affinity of the *Parmenides* with the latest

Theaetetus shows that the longer dialogue is earlier.

group (equivalent to 243 accidental peculiarities) exceeds only slightly that of the *Theaetetus* (equivalent to 233 accidental peculiarities), and this alone would not yet justify a conclusion, were there not a great difference of size between the two dialogues, the *Theaetetus* being one of the largest (53 pp. ed. Did.), and the *Parmenides* one of the shorter (31 pp. ed. Did.) dialogues. Under these circumstances the priority of the *Theaetetus* appears to be very probable, so much more as the *Parmenides* has a much greater number of peculiarities of later style which are absent from the *Theaetetus*, than *vice versa*, as can be seen from the following comparison:

Peculiarities of later style not occurring in works earlier than the Republic and found:

in Theaet., not in Parm., accidental: 218, 337, 348, 395, 404, 336, 190, 335, 341, 324, 11, 208, 399; repeated: 192, 227; important: 247, 12, 452.	in Parm., not in Theaet., accidental: 486, 487, 488, 189, 216, 224, 331, 485, 470, 492, 483, 490, 478, 323, 476, 25, 28, 225, 322, 458, 459, 461, 462, 464, 466; repeated: 481, 477, 489, 332, 480, 475, 24, 468, 26, 460, 463, 465; important: 479, 318, 27; very important: 14, 15.

This relation of style between *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus* was less evident as long as smaller numbers of peculiarities were compared. Thus, according to Campbell's table, the *Parmenides* appeared to have less affinity with the latest group than nearly all Socratic dialogues, and C. Ritter was led even to doubt the authenticity, because he found fewer peculiarities of later style than he expected in a work which betrayed by some very characteristic marks its late origin. Now we have just enough stylistic evidence to confirm the place assigned to the *Parmenides* between *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*, and further stylistic investigations may very possibly increase such evidence in this case, as they have done in the case of the *Theaetetus*. Both *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus* are stylistically more difficult to class than most

Probability of an interval after *Republic* and *Phaedrus*.

other works of Plato. The supposition that both followed after a longer or shorter interval of literary inactivity accounts best for this circumstance. An author who returns to literary labours after an interval does not reach at once a certain fixity of expression and is less likely to introduce many new peculiarities of a permanent character. Thus, however original may be his style in such works, they will contain fewer peculiarities recurring later than the following dialogues, and this produces a diminution of the stylistic affinity with the latest group. The close relation between *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides* as critical dialogues has been illustrated by Campbell through a number of analogies ('On the place of the *Parmenides*,' pp. 6–7, see note 145) which are the more striking as the subject of both dialogues is not identical.

Supposed allusion to Aristotle difficult to verify. The younger Socrates.

There is no definitive indication which could help to fix the date of the *Parmenides* with exactness, except the supposed allusion to the philosopher Aristotle contained in the mention as a person of the dialogue of another Aristotle, one of the thirty tyrants. This allusion is plausible, and has been brought into relation with Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic ideas. It acquires some additional plausibility if compared with the introduction of the younger Socrates in the *Theaetetus*. But these conjectures require some independent testimonies before they can be accepted as certain. If we accepted them, then the *Parmenides* would have been written after 367 B.C., and shortly after the *Theaetetus*. Without rejecting this hypothesis, it remains still possible that both dialogues were composed earlier, but not before the *Phaedrus*, and not in the next time after the *Republic*, as the elaboration of the new point of view required a certain length of time. The nearest approach to this new point of view was the recommendation of analysis and synthesis given in the *Phaedrus*.

The *Phaedrus* affords a point of transition towards the new dialectic.

Plato's critical philosophy.

To resume the results of the above inquiry on the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*, we see in these two works the trace of a new logical departure, which does not quite amount to a brusque negation of earlier views, but changes the aims of science. While Plato in the works of his middle lifetime had a conception of truth eternally fixed, which can be perceived by a well-trained mind exactly as it is, he became later aware of the subjectivity of knowledge, of its existence in an ascending scale of souls up to divine perfection. The ideal was thus further removed from the present life, while losing nothing in its perfection. The aim of science is now not the immediate contemplation of truth eternally pre-existent, but the perfecting of our own ideas so as to form a system built on the mutual correlation of all particulars. The particulars of sensible experience are no longer rejected as useless or perturbing, but they have to be brought into relation with the general stock of knowledge. In the physical world movement is acknowledged as the chief factor, and the origin of movement attributed to the soul. The causes of error are investigated with greater accuracy and found chiefly in the imperfection of our perceptions. The notions are paired with their opposites, and the preference for dichotomy is manifest, but is not suffered to stiffen into a conventional rule.

Beginning of a reform in dialectic.

Remoteness of the ideal.

Synthetic endeavour.

Ideas correlated with one another and with particular things.

The soul as source of movement acknowledged as chief factor.

Preference for dichotomy.

Plato remains in this period faithful to his custom of fixing in a literary form only certain aspects of his thoughts, obliging us to supplement by inferences what he omits to mention. Neither the *Theaetetus* nor the *Parmenides* are systematic accounts of any part of the doctrine which probably was imparted to Plato's pupils according to the precepts of the *Phaedrus*. The centre of gravity of the Platonic system has been changed without recapitulating all the details it carried with it, and the dialogues written

The change is not

explicit. Plato's dialogues are still works of art.

after the change continue to be works of art rather than expositions of doctrine. They are only ideal samples of conversations held in the Academy, and the artistic purpose of harmonious proportion is quite as evident in these conversations on abstract subjects as in the more poetical *Symposium*. In these works, as in the preceding, from the *Symposium* onwards, we have didactic conversations between pupil and master, not as in earlier works like the *Gorgias*, discussions between men of opposed convictions.

Their protreptic and educational character.

The pupil is led by an ascending way so that at each turning point he believes himself to reach the summit, when a new horizon is opened, leading higher, and at the end the infinite ideal of knowledge remains still high above the highest summits hitherto described. This protreptic character is maintained in the critical dialogues no less than in the constructive works. In the *Republic* the idea of the Good remained beyond the reach of Adeimantos and Glaucon; in the *Phaedrus* the ideal rhetoric appeared as a powerful ideal beyond the understanding and ability of the greatest orators of the time; in the *Theaetetus* knowledge appeared at a height much above all human opinions, even those which guess the truth correctly. In the *Parmenides* the objects of knowledge are shown not to correspond to poetic metaphors, and to be attainable only by a difficult exercise of reason. In all these cases the rising soul of a lover of philosophy is the chief object of literary exposition. The contents of philosophy are mentioned occasionally and never exhaustively. The distance between the philosopher and vulgar humanity is increasing while the philosopher's constant aim is to approach his ideal of the divinity.

The ideal recedes, and becomes more divine, but is approached continually.

The occasional glimpses of theory show us a great wealth of intellectual life, and a consciousness of some cardinal conditions of truth. The chief results arrived at by Plato at this stage appear to be: the subjectivity of sensations, the unity of consciousness in the act of judg-

ment, the plurality and mutual relation of the highest kinds of Being, the universal analogy between great and small things which must be considered all with equal care in order to increase our knowledge. The method proposed leads to a general system of science, some aspects of which are developed in the three following dialectical dialogues.

CHAPTER VIII

NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE

As the Socratic stage was followed by positive ethical exposition, so the second critical stage was followed by positive logical and metaphysical teaching.

WE have seen Plato begin his literary career with small critical dialogues, culminating in *Protagoras*, *Meno*, and *Euthydemus*, and progressing from this first critical stage to the positive exposition of some of his moral, political, and educational theories in the *Gorgias* and later works up to the *Phaedrus*. In like manner the second critical stage, manifest in the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*, was followed by some dialogues full of positive metaphysical and logical theories, skilfully treated with regard to questions of purely formal importance. This indirect manner of exposition is prominent in the three dialectical dialogues which follow the *Parmenides*, namely the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus*. Here, as in the preceding works, we do not find a systematic exposition of doctrine, but occasional glimpses which betray studies very remote from those of middle Platonism, and show us a part of that 'longer way' alluded to in the *Republic* as leading to the knowledge of truth.

I. *The Sophist.*

The aim is formally, to define the Sophist; really to expound Plato's views on

In this dialogue the definition of the Sophist is only a pretext for the exposition of Plato's views on scientific method, on the origin of error, and on the nature of true Being. These views are presented in a form which leaves no doubt as to the author's own convictions and his judgments about other philosophers. The historical method of comparing existing theories and contradictions is here maintained, as in the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*,

but with greater maturity of treatment. In this respect, as well as in the manner of the didactic proceeding accompanied with frequent quotations of results obtained before, and with recapitulations after each progress of the argument, the *Sophist* approaches more nearly to the writings of Aristotle than any earlier dialogue of Plato. The dialogical form is still preserved, but the answers for the most part only confirm opinions expressed in the question, so that they could easily be omitted.

scientific method. Use of historical comparisons. Approach to the manner of Aristotle.

While in the *Parmenides* it was still assumed as natural and necessary that a dialectical exposition must be given in the form of a conversation (137 B: *τίς οὖν μοὶ ἀποκρινεῖται; ἢ ὁ νεώτατος;*), we see in the *Sophist* for the first time a clear admission that philosophical teaching may be given in the form of a continuous lecture (217 C: *πότερον εἴωθας ἥδιον αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξιέναι λέγων τοῦτο, ὃ ἂν ἐνδείξασθαί τῳ βουληθῇς, ἢ δι' ἐρωτήσεων, οἷόν ποτε καὶ Παρμενίδῃ χρωμένῳ . . . παρεγενόμην*). If we take into account that this form of continuous lecture prevails in the *Timaeus* and *Critias* and some parts of the *Laws*, which are acknowledged to be late works, it becomes evident that the *Sophist* is in this respect intermediate between *Parmenides* and *Timaeus*. This inference is strengthened by the observation that in an admittedly early work, the *Protagoras*, lecturing is condemned and dialogical discussion required (*Prot.* 334 D: *ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ἐπιλήσμων τις ὢν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐάν τίς μοι μακρὰ λέγῃ, ἐπιλανθάνομαι περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾖ ὁ λόγος . . . σύντεμνέ μοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ βραχυτέρας ποίει, εἰ μέλλω σοι ἕπεσθαι*).

Continuous exposition admitted as possible.

Not as in *Protagoras*.

Thus we see how Plato advanced from the form of philosophical conversations to that form of a philosophical lecture or dissertation which has been adopted by his pupil Aristotle and by the majority of later philosophers. This fact is not without logical importance. In conversation at least two persons are wanted to elaborate the truth. This implies a stage of personal

Logical significance of the change.

uncertainty or at least the absence of a recognised authority. The thinker who has arrived at the highest degree of certainty needs only receptive hearers to whom he may communicate his knowledge, and looks upon discussion as useless and tiresome. The earliest works of Plato were discussions; even later, despite the increasing authority of Socrates, the persons represented as partners in his conversation still enjoyed the freedom of expressing other views. In the *Theaetetus* Socrates is represented as desiring to discuss freely philosophical difficulties with Theodoros rather than with a young man who dares not go against his authority. It is only in the *Parmenides* that discussion (*πολυπραγμονεῖν*) is declared useless. This is a logical mode of regarding the matter and amounts to this: whoever is in possession of truth can impart it to others without expecting an advance of knowledge from the conflict of opinions. Or, truth is the result of the activity of one soul, not of the co-operation of many. In all the six latest dialogues Plato remained faithful to this principle, which he adopted definitively in the *Parmenides*. There is no discussion in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, nor in the *Philebus* and the *Laws*. In the *Timaeus* and *Critias* even the dialogical form is extinct. Plato appears to have abandoned conversational equality between investigating friends, he prefers now a didactic authority of one Master of wisdom.

Form of dialogue gradually relinquished.

Consciousness of method.

The consciousness of method is also increasing. The art of reasoning, postulated already in the *Phaedo* (90 B: *ἡ περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνη*), is now a reality and bears the name of a logical method (*Soph.* 227 A: *τῶν λόγων μέθοδος*), which remained in the highest esteem among all later philosophers. Many translators of Plato refrained from the identification of *μέθοδος* with the modern term *method*, as if they were afraid to credit an ancient Greek philosopher with a consciousness of regulated proceeding which seems to be a privilege of recent science. Thus, for instance, Schleiermacher renders *μέθοδος* by

'das erklärende Verfahren,' Deuschle by 'der Gang der Untersuchung,' Müller by 'der Fortgang unserer Erörterung.' This is really a wrong cautiousness, and Jowett and Campbell were perfectly right in translating *μέθοδος* here by 'method.' In earlier dialogues, as *Phaedo* (79 E, 97 B) and *Republic* (435 D, 510 B C, 531 C, 533 B C, 596 A), this word had not yet a fixed meaning and was equivalent to 'argument,' 'study,' or 'way of reasoning.' In the *Phaedrus* *μέθοδος* (269 D, 270 D) is used in the same primitive meaning of 'way of reasoning.' In the *Theaetetus* (183 C) it means 'hypothesis' or 'theory.' But in the *Sophist* there appears for the first time a 'logical method,' essentially different in form and contents from the *διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος* of the *Republic* (533 C), which meant no more than the study of dialectic, or vision of the idea of Good. Here the 'logical method' means what up to the present time is known as the method of classification, or scientific method generally.

Meaning of *μέθοδος* more definite.

This method neglects nothing however insignificant it may appear to be, and seeks truth quite independently of all practical applications or advantages (227 A: *τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἢ φαρμακοποσίας οὐδὲν ἧττον οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλον, εἰ τὸ μὲν σμικρά, τὸ δὲ μεγάλα ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ καθαῖρον*). Its aim is pure knowledge, which depends upon the distinction of natural affinities and similitudes between different things, without any prejudice in favour of one subject or another (227 B). Of this disinterested impartiality of pure science Plato gives curious examples which show his tendency to free himself from every authority or reigning opinion. The art of human war, he says, belongs to the general kind of hunting, no less surely than the art of vermin-destroying, despite the greater vanity of man-killers (227 B, cf. *Theaet.* 174 D).

Disinterestedness of science.

The philosopher finds out the true similarities and differences which allow an exact definition of each kind of beings as belonging to a more general class (235 C: *πάντως οὔτε οὗτος οὔτε ἄλλο γένος οὐδὲν μή ποτε ἐκφυγὸν*

Similarity and difference impartially

surveyed, without trusting appearances or following arbitrary lines.

ἐπεύξηται τὴν τῶν οὕτω δυναμένων μετιέναι καθ' ἕκαστά τε καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα μέθοδον). The greatest care must be taken about apparent similarities (231 A: τὸν δὲ ἀσφαλῆ δεῖ πάντων μάλιστα περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας ἀεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακήν· ὀλισθηρότατον γὰρ τὸ γένος). The temptation to mix all things and to make the great appear as small and the like as unlike is the sign of a man who is only beginning to approach the problem of being, and delights in contradictions (259 D: τὸ δὲ ταὐτὸν ἕτερον ἀποφαίνειν ἁμῇ γέ πῃ καὶ τὸ θάτερον ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀνόμοιον, καὶ χαίρειν οὕτω τἀναντία ἀεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὔτε τις ἔλεγχος οὗτος ἀληθινὸς ἄρτι τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος νεογενὴς ὤν).

Definition of primary notions too much neglected.

Many notions as to which apparently there is no disagreement among disputants are insufficiently defined, and ought to be investigated again, however clear and simple they appear at first sight (242 C: τὰ δοκοῦντα νῦν ἐναργῶς ἔχειν ἐπισκέψασθαι πρῶτον, μή πῃ τεταραγμένοι μὲν ὦμεν περὶ ταῦτα, ῥᾳδίως δ' ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογῶμεν ὡς εὐκρινῶς ἔχοντες). The true logician follows his opponents on their own ground and refutes them according to their own principles (259 C D: χαλεπὸν ἅμα καὶ καλὸν . . . τοῖς λεγομένοις οἷόν τ' εἶναι καθ' ἕκαστον ἐλέγχοντ' ἐπακολουθεῖν, ὅταν τέ τις ἕτερον ὄν πῃ ταὐτὸν εἶναι φῇ καὶ ὅταν ταὐτὸν ὂν ἕτερον, ἐκείνῃ καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνο ὅ φησι τούτων πεπονθέναι πότερον).

Scientific truth the philosopher's single aim.

He seeks the truth first for himself and then for those who are able to partake of such investigations (264 E: ἐπιδείξομεν μάλιστα μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐγγυτάτω γένει τῆς τοιαύτης μεθόδου πεφυκόσιν).

Generalisation and division proceeding from the simple to the complex.

This aim is reached by the subdivision of notions into indivisible ultimate kinds (229 D: καὶ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, εἰ ἄτομον ἤδη ἐστὶ πᾶν, ἤ τινα ἔχον διαίρεσιν ἀξίαν ἐπωνυμίας), and by a training which consists in a consecutive selection of examples, beginning with those which present less difficulty and rising progressively to the most difficult problems (218 C: ὅσα δ' αὖ τῶν μεγάλων δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι καλῶς, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δέδοκται πᾶσι καὶ πάλαι τὸ πρό-

τερον ἐν σμικροῖς καὶ ῥᾴοσιν αὐτὰ δεῖν μελετᾷν, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς μεγίστοις). This notion of logical exercise is here new, and did not occur in any earlier work of Plato. When Parmenides recommended dialectical exercise, he took as subject of this 'play' at once the highest notions of the one and the many; also the illustration of the nature of justice in the *Republic* through the idea of the state was not a vulgar example. Now we see that any insignificant object is admitted to be a convenient model for logical exercise (218 D: *βούλει δῆτα περί τινος τῶν φαύλων μετιόντες πειραθῶμεν παράδειγμα αὐτὸ θέσθαι τοῦ μείζονος*). Here we are at a considerable distance from the time when observation of stars appeared to be a useless and even pernicious occupation if not immediately connected with a knowledge of the general laws of astronomy. Now not only stars, but all animals and plants come within the range of observation and investigation. When Plato in the *Republic* described the philosopher as desiring intensely every kind of knowledge, he had not yet drawn all the consequences from this universal desire, and he despised many kinds of knowledge which in the *Sophist* are gravely included in the system of science. Newly discovered kinds are named by means of new words, with the observation that we ought not to pay too much attention to the existing names, which are often understood in different ways by different men (218 C: *δεῖ ἀεὶ παντὸς πέρι τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μᾶλλον διὰ λόγων ἢ τοὔνομα μόνον συνομολογήσασθαι χωρὶς λόγου*).

Dialectical exercise to be first used on obvious examples. No object of knowledge to be despised.

The logician is not to be misled by common language.

Dialectic is no longer, as in the *Republic*, the knowledge of the Good, but the science of division of notions, as in the *Phaedrus*. This important coincidence between the *Phaedrus* and the *Sophist* (253 C D: *ἐπιστήμης . . . ἴσως τῆς μεγίστης . . . τῶν ἐλευθέρων . . . τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μήτε ταὐτὸν ὂν εἶδος ἕτερον ἡγήσασθαι μήτε ἕτερον ὂν ταὐτὸν . . . τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φήσομεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι*) is difficult to account for by those who place the *Phaedrus* before the *Republic*. In earlier dialogues dialectic was

Division of concepts a link between the *Phaedrus* and the *Sophist*.

But the process is here more elaborately described.

merely the art of asking and answering questions (*Crat.* 390 C), as it was for Xenophon. Now the dialectician follows each idea through its manifold appearances, and distinguishes within each notion many differences, uniting again one notion with many others into one higher kind (253 D: *μίαν ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἑνὸς ἑκάστου κειμένου χωρίς, πάντῃ διατεταμένην ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεται, καὶ πολλὰς ἑτέρας ἀλλήλων ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένας, καὶ μίαν αὖ δι' ὅλων πολλῶν ἐν ἑνὶ ξυνημμένην, καὶ πολλὰς χωρὶς πάντῃ διωρισμένας . . .*). The ideas here mentioned can evidently only be notions of the human mind, never the self-existent ideas of a space above heaven.

Communion of ideas not transcendental.

The aim of dialectical operations is precisely to learn the relation between ideas (253 E: *τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν, ᾗ τε κοινωνεῖν ἕκαστα δύναται καὶ ὅπῃ μή, διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος ἐπίστασθαι*). Many definitions of notions are given, and we are asked to determine the specific difference which distinguishes each notion from others of the same kind (232 A). Here again, as in the *Theaetetus*, Plato insists upon the difference between an enumeration of examples and the definition of the class to which these objects belong (240 A: *τὸ διὰ πάντων τούτων, ἃ πολλὰ εἰπὼν ἠξίωσας ἑνὶ προσειπεῖν ὀνόματι, φθεγξάμενος εἴδωλον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὡς ἓν ὄν*). We have here the teacher who warns his pupils repeatedly against familiar logical errors. His own definitions are not always serious, as, for instance, when he calls the sophist a paid hunter after wealth and youth (223 B), a merchant in the goods of the soul (224 C, cf. *Prot.* 313 C), a retailer of the same sort of wares (224 D), a manufacturer of the learned wares he sells (224 E), a money-maker of the eristic kind (226 A), a purger of souls who clears away notions obstructive to knowledge (231 E), a magician and imitator of true being (235 A), and a dissembler who in private and in short speeches compels the person who is conversing with him to contradict himself (268 C). This is intended to show the various relations of notions apparently very distant from each

Propaedeutic through playful definitions.

other, and can only be taken as a sample of dialectical exercise.

There are definitions of other notions to which a serious importance seems to have been attached, and one of these generalises a view already enunciated in the *Symposium*:

Others more serious. 'Making' includes more than poetry.

Symp. 205 B: ποίησίς ἐστίν τι πολύ· ἡ γάρ τοι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὂν ἰόντι ὁτῳοῦν αἰτία πᾶσά ἐστι ποίησις, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ὑπὸ πάσαις ταῖς τέχναις ἐργασίαι ποιήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ τούτων δημιουργοὶ πάντες ποιηταί.

Soph. 265 B: ποιητικὴν πᾶσαν ἔφαμεν εἶναι δύναμιν, ἥ τις ἂν αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι.

219 B: . . . πᾶν ὅπερ ἂν μὴ πρότερόν τις ὂν ὕστερον εἰς οὐσίαν ἄγῃ, τὸν μὲν ἄγοντα ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀγόμενον ποιεῖσθαί πού φαμεν.

This definition of creation as the power of bringing into Being anything not existing before presents in both dialogues a characteristic difference resulting from the increasing importance attributed to the personal agent. In the *Symposium* Plato spoke of an impersonal cause of new existence and named it for the purpose of his argument 'poetry,' thus extending the notion of poetry to all kinds of making. In the *Sophist* the formulation is sharper, and the opposition between the agent and the object of activity is introduced, with the use of the favourite term δύναμις, familiar since the *Republic*.

Definition of Being in reply to the Materialists: as capability of acting or being acted on. Dynamic notion of existence.

More important is the definition of true Being as anything that has the power of activity or passivity, to act or to undergo an influence from anything else, be it even only once (247 D: λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν κεκτημένον δύναμιν εἴτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκὸς εἴτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰσάπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι· τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὁρίζειν τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις). This is here proposed after the complaint that none among the earlier philosophers has given a definition of Being, and that many would be unable to do it (247 D). Thus we must accept it as Plato's own view at the time of writing the *Sophist*. This definition does not correspond to the

Not, like the old ideas, unalterably fixed

primitive ideas, which according to the *Symposium* remain unaffected by the changes occurring in the world. If we compare it with the definition of the soul as the first cause of movement, it becomes very probable that Plato attributed true Being to souls more than to anything else, and this is confirmed by the following argumentation in which the author states clearly that the soul acts in acquiring knowledge, while the substance of things undergoes the influence of the soul's activity (248 D: *τὴν ψυχὴν γιγνώσκειν, τὴν δ' οὐσίαν γιγνώσκεσθαι . . . .* E: *τὴν οὐσίαν δὴ . . γιγνωσκομένην ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως, καθ' ὅσον γιγνώσκεται, κατὰ τοσοῦτον κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ πάσχειν, ὃ δή φαμεν οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι περὶ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν*).

Knowledge an activity.

Ideas are no longer true Being.

If this view is maintained, the objects of knowledge are here not unchanging and unaffected ideas, but our own notions, which undergo some changes under the influence of our intellectual activity. This agrees well with the view put forth in the *Parmenides*, and we may accept it as Plato's conviction with the restrictions which are made by himself in connection with this passage. He says that true Being must have movement, life, soul, and reason (248 E: *ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν ἢ ῥᾳδίως πεισθησόμεθα τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι μὴ παρεῖναι, μηδὲ ζῆν αὐτὸ μηδὲ φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ ἅγιον, νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, ἀκίνητον ἑστὸς εἶναι;*). Students of the *Sophist* who read this dialogue with the prejudice that true Being can never mean anything for Plato besides the ideas, have drawn the curious inference from this passage that Plato credits here the ideas with life and a soul—why not with a body also? Such ideas, if still named ideas, could evidently be nothing else than individual beings, very similar to human persons.

The Soul is now seen to be the truest Being.

Any unprejudiced reader who remembers what is said in the *Phaedrus* about the soul as origin of movement, and in the *Laws* about the stars as bodies of individual gods (967 A–E), must infer from this passage that here true Being means no longer ideas but souls, including

human souls. This view is well prepared by the theory of unity of consciousness in the *Theaetetus* and by the contradictions shown in the *Parmenides* as resulting from self-existing ideas. Only the circumstance that the dialectical dialogues, being more difficult, were less read, could lead to the reigning conception of Platonism as a mere theory of ideas. We have seen that the ideas appeared first in the *Symposium* and were maintained only in three other dialogues (*Phaedo*, *Republic*, *Phaedrus*), undergoing a change from immanence to transcendence, and becoming at last ideal models of things, which apart from their copies retain their own existence. After the *Parmenides* we have no reason to identify true Being with ideas in this sense. We shall see in later works of Plato that he more and more dedicated himself to the investigation of notions of his own soul and of the particulars of experience. He says unmistakably that reason and life are possible only in a soul (249 A : *νοῦν μὲν ἔχειν, ζωὴν δὲ μή, φῶμεν;—καὶ πῶς;—ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀμφότερα ἐνόντ' αὐτῷ λέγομεν, οὐ μὴν ἐν ψυχῇ γε φήσομεν αὐτὸ ἔχειν αὐτά;—καὶ τίν' ἂν ἕτερον ἔχοι τρόπον;—ἀλλὰ δῆτα νοῦν μὲν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχήν, ἀκίνητον μέντοι τὸ παράπαν, ἔμψυχον ὄν, ἑστάναι;—πάντα ἔμοιγε ἄλογα ταῦτ' εἶναι φαίνεται.—καὶ τὸ κινούμενον δὴ καὶ κίνησιν συγχωρητέον ὡς ὄντα*).

Thus the theory of ideas has been modified: first passing from immanence to transcendence, then becoming models of things. Now they are notions inherent in a soul.

We see here movement recognised as true Being. In the *Phaedrus* and *Laws* the cause of movement is the soul. Here equally in the whole passage the soul is identified with true Being. The only difficulty of interpretation might be seen in the ambiguity of the term 'soul,' as it is not always the individual soul. But we have seen that in the *Phaedrus* the individual soul was meant, as results from the avowed purpose of the exposition there given. Equally in the *Laws* the priority of soul has a practical application to the individual life of each citizen, and unity of soul in the universe is even denied. Thus we must admit as Plato's view a plurality of souls, and this agrees with the myth of the *Timaeus*. In the *Timaeus* these

Plurality of souls acting and being acted upon.

souls are said to be created by one universal creator. But this is a mythical allegory which means only the substantial similarity of all souls. Whatever Plato's opinion about the relation of the individual human soul to the Divinity could have been, so much is clear from the above comparisons, that he credited the individual soul with true existence, the power of acting and being acted upon.

A certain fixity or stability still required in the objects of knowledge.

The movement of the objects of knowledge is limited by Plato in so far as without the fixity of notions knowledge appeared impossible (249 C: *τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ δοκεῖ σοι χωρὶς στάσεως γενέσθαι ποτ' ἄν;—οὐδαμῶς·—τί δ'; ἄνευ τούτων νοῦν καθορᾷς ὄντα ἢ γενόμενον ἂν καὶ ὁπουοῦν;—ἥκιστα*). The object of philosophy is the divine substance of Being, which is not attainable to vulgar minds (254 A: *ὁ φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ἰδέᾳ, διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν αὖ τῆς χώρας οὐδαμῶς εὐπετὴς ὀφθῆναι· τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ψυχῆς ὄμματα καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀφορῶντα ἀδύνατα*).

Existence implies unity and totality.

But this does not mean that we have to imagine this substance as the idea of Good in the *Republic*. The notion of Being extends to all individual things (237 D: *καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν που φανερόν, ὡς καὶ τὸ τί τοῦτο ῥῆμα ἐπ' ὄντι λέγομεν ἑκάστοτε· μόνον γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγειν, ὥσπερ γυμνὸν καὶ ἀπηρημωμένον ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων, ἀδύνατον*) which constitute unities of thought (237 D: *ἀνάγκη τόν τι λέγοντα ἕν γέ τι λέγειν*), each of them an existing whole (245 D: *οὔτε οὐσίαν οὔτε γένεσιν ὡς οὖσαν δεῖ προσαγορεύειν τὸ ἓν ἢ τὸ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς οὖσι μὴ τιθέντα*).

The communion of kinds.

The theory of the mutual relation (*κοινωνία*) of notions among each other is proposed after the refutation of two contradictory suppositions. That all notions cannot be predicated of each other (252 D: *πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἐῶμεν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἐπικοινωνίας; . . . τοῦτό γέ που ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνάγκαις ἀδύνατον*) is seen from the impossibility of joining in one judgment contradictory ideas, as, for instance, immobility and movement. On the other hand, if each idea stands apart from all others (251 E: *μηδενὶ μηδὲν*

μηδεμίαν δύναμιν ἔχειν κοινωνίας εἰς μηδέν), all reasoning becomes impossible. It remains only to admit that some notions agree and others not; a special investigation is needed to find which is the case in each instance (253 A). This is illustrated by the example of letters, which form syllables and words only in certain combinations, determined by the science of grammar. Similarly the combinations of ideas are the object of dialectic. But Plato warns us against the illusions of thought which can be produced by the charm of skilful eloquence (234 C).

Only certain combinations possible.

The recognition of the power of a perverse rhetoric goes so far that it implies a certain opposition between pure thought and acquired experience, conceding to the latter the power of correcting the illusions of thought. Such a view is far removed from the triumphant idealism of the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, and cannot be interpreted otherwise than by an increasing esteem of outward experience, which is common to the *Sophist* and the *Laws*:

Increasing recognition of the value of experience.

Soph. 234 D: *τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν τότε ἀκουόντων ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη, χρόνου τε ἐπελθόντος αὐτοῖς ἱκανοῦ καὶ προϊούσης ἡλικίας, τοῖς τε οὖσι προσπίπτοντας ἐγγύθεν καὶ διὰ παθημάτων ἀναγκαζομένους ἐναργῶς ἐφάπτεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μεταβάλλειν τὰς τότε γενομένας δόξας, ὥστε σμικρὰ μὲν φαίνεσθαι τὰ μεγάλα, χαλεπὰ δὲ τὰ ῥᾴδια, καὶ πάντα πάντῃ ἀνατετράφθαι τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις φαντάσματα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἔργων παραγενομένων.*

Legg. 769 D: *τοιοῦτον τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλημα · πρῶτον μὲν γράψαι τοὺς νόμους πρὸς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν κατὰ δύναμιν ἱκανῶς · ἔπειτα προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τῶν δοξάντων ἔργῳ πειρώμενον . . . πάμπολλα ἀνάγκη παραλείπεσθαι τοιαῦτα, ἃ δεῖ τινὰ ξυνεπόμενον ἐπανορθοῦν . . .*

888 A: *νέος εἶ · προϊὼν δέ σε ὁ χρόνος ποιήσει πολλὰ ὧν νῦν δοξάζεις μεταβαλόντα ἐπὶ τἀναντία τίθεσθαι · περίμεινον οὖν εἰς τότε κριτὴς περὶ τῶν μεγίστων γίγνεσθαι.*

It was a natural consequence of the extension of detailed investigations that Plato began to think more highly of experience than he did at the time when he was still inebriated with his discovery of absolute ideas. For the same reason it is impossible to explain the above passage without the admission that the writer is an aged man. He knows that truth is reached through bitter

experience, and that experience can prevent the pain to which youth without a guide is often exposed (234 E: *ἡμεῖς σε οἵδε πάντες πειρασόμεθα καὶ νῦν πειρώμεθα ὡς ἐγγύτατα ἄνευ τῶν παθημάτων προσάγειν*).

This concession to practical experience, which led to the substitution of a second best state for the ideal Republic, did not change the fundamental postulate of earlier Platonic logic, namely the fixity of ideas, without which knowledge and reason would become impossible (249 C: *πρός γε τοῦτον παντὶ λόγῳ μαχετέον, ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ νοῦν ἀφανίζων ἰσχυρίζηται περί τινος ὁπῃοῦν*). The ideas exist in the soul and are quite as invisible and intangible as the soul in which they abide (247 A B). There are certain highest kinds (254 D: *μέγιστα τῶν γενῶν*), which Plato enumerates as Being, rest, motion, identity, and difference (*ὄν, στάσις, κίνησις, ταὐτόν, θάτερον*, 254 D E).

The highest kinds, or categories.

The idea of difference explains the notion of Not-Being which presented such difficulties to Plato's predecessors (237 C–238 D). Being is absolute or relative (255 C: *οἶμαί σε συγχωρεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀεὶ λέγεσθαι*), while Not-Being is always relative. It is impossible to affirm that something contradictory to Being exists (257 B, 258 E). But Not-Being means only different Being, and denotes the relation of notions which do not agree with each other (256 D). Of each thing an infinity of negations can be predicated, because we can compare with each Being all different Beings which are not what the chosen Being is (256 E: *περὶ ἕκαστον ἄρα τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μέν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, ἄπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὄν* . . . 257 A: *καὶ τὸ ὄν . . . ὅσα πέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ ὂν ἓν μὲν αὐτό ἐστιν, ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τἆλλα οὐκ ἔστιν αὖ*). This logical solution of the riddle which caused so much difficulty to Parmenides has been prepared already by the mention of a perception of opposites in the *Theaetetus* (186 B), and by the antinomies of the *Parmenides*. Such antinomies would have no meaning after a definition of Not-Being as

Being and Not-Being.

Not-Being always relative.

Not-Being is difference.

Preparation in previous dialogues for this concep-

different Being, and after the transition from a metaphysical idea of Not-Being to the logical conception of Other-Being.

tion of Other-Being.

The term Not-Being had been used already in the *Republic* (478 C), where, as in the *Parmenides*, it was declared impossible to be a subject of thought or opinion. Such a declaration coming after the inquiry of the *Sophist* would be unaccountable, and has never been accounted for by those who believe the *Republic* to be later than the *Sophist*. For the explanation of Not-Being in the *Sophist* is not a passing fancy like the creation of an object of ignorance in the *Republic*. It is an important step in the history of Philosophy, and brings Not-Being from the region of metaphysical speculation into the dry light of formal logic. It is a consequence of the recognition of Relation as a chief factor of knowledge, without which error in pure thought is inconceivable (237 A: *τετόλμηκεν ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὑποθέσθαι τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι· ψεῦδος γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἐγίγνετο ὄν*).

These imperfect views could not be later than the *Sophist*.

First clear conception of Relation as a condition of thought.

If the ideas were always perceived as they are, the participation of concrete things in them would allow of a determination free from error. But as the relations of ideas between each other are not evident to our intuition, we commit errors by supposing relations which are not. The question of error was left unsettled in the *Cratylus* (429 D), and in the *Theaetetus* (187 D, cf. 200 D). It is only here that Plato explains error as a judgment about Not-Being, while in all earlier works the possibility of thinking or judging Not-Being was denied in agreement with Plato's philosophical predecessors. Not-Being is recognised as a notion in one line with Being (260 B: *τὸ μὲν δὴ μὴ ὂν ἡμῖν ἕν τι τῶν ἄλλων γένος ὂν ἀνεφάνη, κατὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα διεσπαρμένον*), from which it differs by its relativity.

Consequent possibility of errors.

While the elements of earlier Platonic logic were single ideas, the importance of judgment is here asserted as a first element of knowledge. Judgment is analysed into

Judgment a first element

of knowledge.

Subject and predicate.

The terms here first accurately defined.

its essential parts, and for the first time Plato establishes the distinction between the subject and predicate of a proposition (261 E). He divides the signs used in language into *ὀνόματα* and *ῥήματα* and states expressly that *ῥῆμα* means the sign of an action (262 A: *τὸ ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ὂν δήλωμα ῥῆμά που λέγομεν*). This is a new term, because in earlier dialogues *ῥῆμα*, even if used along with *ὄνομα*, meant a phrase or expression. Thus, for instance, in the *Protagoras* (341 E, 343 B) the term *ῥῆμα* is used for sayings of Simonides and Pittacos. In the same meaning of a saying or phrase *ῥῆμα* is often used (*Prot.* 342 E, *Crat.* 399 B, 421 B, E, *Rep.* 336 A, 463 E, 498 E, 562 C, *Phaedr.* 269 B, *Theaet.* 190 C, *Legg.* 660 A, 669 C, 839 B, 840 C), also in such expressions as *ῥῆμα καὶ λόγον* (*Rep.* 473 E), *ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα* (*Apol.* 17 B, *Crat.* 425 A, *Symp.* 198 B, 221 E, *Rep.* 601 A, *Theaet.* 168 B, 184 C, 206 D), *ῥῆμα καὶ δόγμα* (*Rep.* 464 A, *Soph.* 265 C, *Legg.* 797 C). In other cases *ῥῆμα* means a single word (*Rep.* 462 C, *Theaet.* 165 A, 183 B, *Soph.* 237 D, *Tim.* 49 E, *Legg.* 627 D, 656 C, 669 E, 783 C, 800 D, 906 C) or textual expression (*Euthyd.* 305 A, *Gorg.* 450 E, 489 B, *Phaed.* 102 B, *Rep.* 340 D, *Phaedr.* 228 D, 271 C, *Theaet.* 166 D, 190 C, *Soph.* 257 B). It is quite another thing in the above passage of the *Sophist* in which *ὄνομα* and *ῥῆμα* have each an unmistakable technical meaning, as subject and predicate, clearly introduced for the first time. The term *ῥῆμα* is used in this meaning of predicate also in some later instances (*Polit.* 303 C, *Legg.* 838 B). If we compare *Cratylus* and *Sophist* on the connection between *ὄνομα*, *ῥῆμα*, and *λόγος*, it might at first sight appear that the later dialogue repeats only a definition given in the earlier:

The *Cratylus* compared.

Crat. 425 A: *ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων μέγα ἤδη τι καὶ καλὸν καὶ ὅλον συστήσομεν . . . τὸν λόγον τῇ ὀνομαστικῇ ἢ ῥητορικῇ ἢ ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη.*

431 B: *εἰ ἔστι μὴ ὀρθῶς διανέμειν τὰ ὀνόματα . . . εἴη ἂν καὶ ῥήματα*

Soph. 262 A: *ἐξ ὀνομάτων μόνων συνεχῶς λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὐδ' αὖ ῥημάτων χωρὶς ὀνομάτων λεχθέντων.*

C: *οὐδεμίαν γὰρ οὔτε οὕτως οὔτ' ἐκείνως πρᾶξιν οὐδ' ἀπραξίαν οὐδὲ οὐσίαν ὄντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὄντος δηλοῖ τὰ*

ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖν. εἰ δὲ ῥήματα καὶ ὀνόματα ἔστιν οὕτω τιθέναι, ἀνάγκη καὶ λόγους· λόγοι γάρ που . . . ἡ τούτων ξύνθεσίς ἐστιν.

φωνηθέντα, πρὶν ἄν τις τοῖς ὀνόμασι τὰ ῥήματα κεράσῃ · τότε δ' ἥρμοσέ τε καὶ λόγος ἐγένετο εὐθὺς ἡ πρώτη συμπλοκή, σχεδὸν τῶν λόγων ὁ πρῶτος καὶ σμικρότατος.

Many translators understood *ῥῆμα* in the above passage of the *Cratylus* as 'verb' or 'predicate,' but if we compare other passages of the same dialogue it becomes evident that here also *ῥῆμα* means 'phrase.' Plato deals with a succession of increasing units, beginning with a single letter, progressing to a syllable, a word, a phrase, and a speech. The parallelism of *ὀνομαστική* and *ὄνομα*, *ῥητορική* and *ῥῆμα* confirms this, and *λόγος* means here not a sentence but a speech, or language generally; also in the second passage the progress from a wrong distribution of words to a wrong distribution of phrases is a plausible induction, while it would be unjustifiable to apply to the *Cratylus* a definition given only in the *Sophist*, and received first by the pupil as requiring nearer explanation (262 A: *ταῦτ' οὐκ ἔμαθον*, C: *πῶς ἄρ' ὧδε λέγεις;*). Even if we had not many other reasons to admit the priority of the *Cratylus* to the *Sophist*, this comparison would show that the distinction of subject and predicate, made in the *Sophist*, must be later than the opposition of words and phrases, which in the *Cratylus* is already familiar at a time when the need of a theory of predication was not yet felt.

A judgment, says Plato here, refers to things present, past, or future, and connects a predicate with a subject (262 D: *δηλοῖ γὰρ ἤδη που τότε περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ γιγνομένων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, καὶ οὐκ ὀνομάζει μόνον, ἀλλά τι καὶ περαίνει, συμπλέκων τὰ ῥήματα τοῖς ὀνόμασι*). This connection is not, as some logicians even now suppose, limited to an identity of subject and predicate, but presents a great variety of aspects (251 A: *λέγομεν ἄνθρωπον δή που πόλλ' ἄττα ἐπονομάζοντες, τά τε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετάς, ἐν οἷς πᾶσι καὶ ἑτέροις μυρίοις οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν εἶναι φαμέν, ἀλλὰ*

Predication does not imply identity: variety of predicates.

καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕτερα ἄπειρα). This is misunderstood by those who are unable to grasp the relation between the one and the many, and believe that each judgment implies an identity (251 B: *ὅθεν . . . τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον ὡς ἀδύνατον τά τε πολλὰ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἶναι, καὶ δή που χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἐῶντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον*). What is here explained about the nature of the sentence applies also to the unspoken judgment (263 E: *διάνοια καὶ λόγος ταὐτόν· πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη, διάνοια . . . τὸ δέ γ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης ῥεῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰὸν μετὰ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος*).

Negation not contradiction.

The negative judgment is not contradictory to its positive counterpart, and the negation means only a difference, leaving open an infinity of possibilities (257 B: *οὐκ ἄρ', ἐναντίον ὅταν ἀπόφασις λέγηται σημαίνειν, συγχωρησόμεθα, τοσοῦτον δὲ μόνον, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων τι μηνύει τὸ μή καὶ τὸ οὔ προτιθέμενα τῶν ἐπιόντων ὀνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων περὶ ἅττ' ἂν κέηται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα ὕστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὀνόματα*).

Refutation an instrument of moral training.

Wrong judgments are refuted by showing the contradictions they imply (230 B). Such refutations are extolled as being not only of logical but also of moral importance (230 D: *τὸν ἔλεγχον λεκτέον ὡς ἄρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεών ἐστι, καὶ τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον αὖ νομιστέον, . . . τὰ μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα, ἀπαίδευτόν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν γεγονέναι*).

Importance of the new theory.

Plato presents his theory of negation and of predication as a truth which alone can account for the existence of error, and could only be denied under the penalty of being involved in constant contradictions (241 E). Ignorance, named here an ugliness of the soul (228 A), is always involuntary (228 C: *ψυχήν γε ἴσμεν ἄκουσαν πᾶσαν πᾶν ἀγνοοῦσαν*), being worst if he who is ignorant is under the illusion that he knows (229 C: *ἀγνοίας . . . μέγα καὶ*

χαλεπὸν ἀφωρισμένον εἶδος . . . τὸ μὴ κατειδότα τι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι . . . τούτῳ μόνῳ τῆς ἀγνοίας ἀμαθία τοὔνομα).

The most impressive passage of the *Sophist* (242 C–251 A) represents the metaphysical and logical conflict between materialism and idealism, wherein Plato chooses a middle solution, thus confirming his criticism in the *Parmenides* of the primitive theory of ideas. The improved materialism here represented has, with some plausibility, been attributed by Siebeck [254] to Aristotle; the idealism here represented bears some relation to Plato's own views as expressed in *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Phaedrus*. The third or middle view proposed is the true existence of souls, not of animated ideas as some critics thought. Here, exactly as in the tenth book of the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*, Plato, at the end of an argument on another notion, suddenly introduces the soul as corresponding best to the general notion first explained. There it was the notion of a self-moving principle—here it is the notion of true Being (248 E: *τὸ παντελῶς ὄν*) which, besides movement, as postulated in the *Phaedrus*, must have reason, and if reason, necessarily life (249 A: *νοῦν μὲν ἔχειν, ζωὴν δὲ μή, φῶμεν; καὶ πῶς;*). But reason and life are found only in a soul (249 A: *ταῦτα μὲν ἀμφότερα ἐνόντ' αὐτῷ (τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι) λέγομεν, οὐ μὴν ἐν ψυχῇ γε φήσομεν αὐτὸ ἔχειν αὐτά;—καὶ τίν' ἂν ἕτερον ἔχοι τρόπον*).

Conflict between materialism and idealism.

Plato's mediating view.

Dynamic aspect of Being identifies Being with Soul.

It results that the soul or souls correspond best to the idea of true existence, though Plato at the end does not insist on this conclusion, because his aim was only to show that both materialists and idealists have a too narrow conception of Being (246 A): earlier philosophers have taken it lightly, and spoke of quality and quantity of Being without a definition of their starting point (242 C: *εὐκόλως μοι δοκεῖ Παρμενίδης ἡμῖν διειλέχθαι καὶ πᾶς ὅστις πώποτε ἐπὶ κρίσιν ὥρμησε τοῦ τὰ ὄντα διορίσασθαι πόσα*

Narrowness of earlier conceptions.

[254] H. Siebeck, 'Platon als Kritiker aristotelischer Ansichten: III. Der Sophista,' in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, Band 108, pp. 1–18, Leipzig 1896.

τε καὶ ποῖά ἐστιν). They invent fables as if they were speaking to children (242 c: μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεταί μοι διηγεῖσθαι παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν) instead of analysing the chief concept of philosophy, the idea of Being. This substitution of Being as the ultimate aim of Dialectic instead of the earlier hegemony of the Good is one of the signs of the change which occurred in Plato's thoughts, from absolute ideas to the ideas of the human mind. At the same time the bold review of philosophical doctrines betrays a Master in metaphysics who could be nobody else than Plato alone, so that all doubts as to the authenticity of the *Sophist* must be dismissed.

Being becomes the chief object of research, not the Idea of Good.

Those who up to quite recent times ascribed the *Sophist* to another writer[255] had not considered the close

[255] Ernst Appel ('Zur Echtheitsfrage des Dialogs Sophistes,' in vol. v. pp. 55–60 of the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*) and Huit (in vol. xviii. pp. 48–69, 169–188 of the *Annales de philosophie chrétienne*, Paris 1888) have added nothing to Schaarschmidt's arguments, which have been abundantly refuted by R. Pilger (*Ueber die Athetese des platonischen Sophistes*, Berlin 1871) and many others. Huit adds only a very strange objection (p. 175): he believes that the historical character of the *Sophist* is unplatonic, and that Plato never reviews his predecessors. This needs no refutation for anybody who knows the *Theaetetus*, the *Phaedrus*, or the *Phaedo*. Fouillée (*La Philosophie de Platon*, Paris 1888) was right in saying (p. xii. Préface) that to deny the authenticity of the *Sophist* and *Politicus* 'il faut être myope intellectuellement.' The logical importance of the *Sophist* has been recognised among other authors by: Bertini (*Nuova interpretazione delle idee Platoniche*, Torino 1876, p. 23 sqq.), Achelis ('Kritische Darstellung der platonischen Ideenlehre,' pp. 90–103 in vol. 79 of the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, Halle 1881), Benn (*The Greek philosophers*, London 1882), Peipers (*Ontologia Platonica*, Lipsiae 1883, pp. 319–346), Lukas (*Die Methode der Eintheilung bei Platon*, Halle 1888), Apelt (*Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, Leipzig 1891, pp. 67–99, also pp. 529–540 of vol. 145 of *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik*). Very peculiar are the views of Wolff (*Die Platonische Dialektik*, Halle 1875), who thinks that Plato ignored 'den Unterschied zwischen Gattung und Art,' and Uphues (*Das Wesen des Denkens bei Plato*, Landsberg 1881), who credits Plato with such opinions as: 'das Denken ist eine Verbindung der die Vorstellungen verbindenden Wörter zu Sätzen,' and resumes his opinion on Plato's logic thus: 'das Verständniss des Satzes wird uns nicht durch ihn selbst sondern durch ein Anderes gegeben; als Quelle unserer Erkenntniss der Wahrheit kann nicht der Satz sondern muss eben dies Andere gelten. Dieses Andere ist die

stylistic relations between the *Sophist* and the *Laws*. The strangest of all objections to the authenticity of the *Sophist* rests on a very low estimate of Plato's sincerity. It has been said that Plato would not have criticised his own theories as the author of the *Sophist* criticises the Platonic ideas. Such critics seem to measure Plato's ambition according to the standard of a vulgar schoolmaster. The dialogical form of Plato's works left him a great liberty for introducing new theories, attributing them to new speakers. In the *Laws* many political theories of the *Republic* are abandoned, and thus also the *Parmenides* and *Sophist* take leave of the theory of ideas as expounded in the *Phaedo* or *Phaedrus*.

Stylistic relations.

Criticism of the cruder theory of ideas.

The *Sophist* appears to be in every respect a continuation of the *Parmenides* and a fulfilment of a part of the programme there proposed. There are at least two passages in which the *Parmenides* is alluded to in the later dialogue: at the beginning (217 C), where the form of the dialectical discussion of the *Parmenides* is mentioned in an unmistakable manner, and at a further stage, where an equally clear allusion is made to the contents of the antinomies (244 C: *τῷ ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθεμένῳ (τὸ ἓν εἶναι), πρὸς τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθέν, καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ὁτιοῦν, οὐ πάντων ῥᾷστον ἀποκρίνασθαι*: cf. 245 E: *καὶ ἄλλα μυρία ἀπεράντους ἀπορίας ἕκαστον εἰληφὸς φανεῖται τῷ τὸ ὂν εἴτε δύο τινὲ εἴτε ἓν μόνον εἶναι λέγοντι*[256]). What Zeller says in order to invert the relation and to place the *Parmenides* after the *Sophist* is by no means convincing. After the determination of negation in the *Sophist* a great part of the antinomies of the *Parmenides* would be superfluous, as can be seen from what is said in the *Parmenides* about Not-Being (*Parm.* 142 A: *τῷ μὴ ὄντι οὐδ' ὄνομα οὐδὲ λόγος*

The *Sophist* subsequent to the *Parmenides*.

Zeller's parallels unconvincing.

christliche Trinitätslehre.' This touching simplicity is equalled only by Pfleiderer, who sees in the *Sophist* 'die Ehrenrettung des richtigverstandenen Nichtseins' (p. 347).

[256] This passage, in which True Being appears neither as only one, nor as Two opposite, seems also to imply a plurality of Beings, or souls, as the ultimate solution of the metaphysical problem.

οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἴσθησις οὐδὲ δόξα: cf. 164 B). Zeller quotes several parallel passages of both dialogues which either prove nothing about the chronological order or even confirm the priority of the *Parmenides*:

Parm. 128 E–129 C: the particulars are said to participate in ideas and even in opposite ideas, and Socrates adds: *εἰ ὁ ἔστιν ἓν αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ ἀποδείξει, καὶ αὖ τὰ πολλὰ δὴ ἕν, τοῦτο ἤδη θαυμάσομαι. . . . εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἴδη ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τἀναντία.*

Soph. 251 A–C: the multiplicity of predicates referring to one subject is denied only by persons *ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα τεθαυμακόσι . . .*

253 D: the dialectician distinguishes ideas and their relations.

In the above two passages the Eleatic stranger takes for granted what Socrates in the *Parmenides* represents as a great and unsettled difficulty. If any chronological inference is allowed from such general coincidences, the later date of the *Sophist* is the most probable conclusion. Other passages compared by Zeller are quite as inconclusive:

Parm. 133 C: *οἶμαι ἂν καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις αὐτήν τινα καθ' αὑτὴν ἑκάστου οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι, ὁμολογῆσαι ἂν πρῶτον μὲν μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν. πῶς γὰρ ἂν αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν ἔτι εἴη; . . . ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἳ εἰσιν, αὐταὶ πρὸς αὐτὰς τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ὁμοιώματα.*

Parm. 143 A: *οὐσίας φαμὲν μετέχειν τὸ ἕν, διὸ ἔστιν . . . καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τὸ ἓν ὂν πολλὰ ἐφάνη. . . αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, ὃ δή φαμεν οὐσίας μετέχειν, ἐὰν αὐτὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνον καθ' αὑτὸ λάβωμεν ἄνευ τούτου οὗ φαμὲν μετέχειν, ἆρά γε ἓν μόνον φανήσεται ἢ καὶ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο;—ἕν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε . . . B: ἄλλο τι ἕτερον μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἕτερον δὲ αὐτό; εἴπερ μὴ οὐσία τὸ ἕν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἓν οὐσίας μετέσχεν . . . εἰ ἕτερον μὲν ἡ οὐσία, ἕτερον δὲ*

Soph. 255 D: *οἶμαί σε συγχωρεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀεὶ λέγεσθαι . . . τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον . . . εἴπερ θάτερον ἀμφοῖν μετεῖχε τοῖν εἰδοῖν ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν, ἦν ἄν ποτέ τι καὶ τῶν ἑτέρων ἕτερον οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον· νῦν δὲ ἀτεχνῶς ἡμῖν ὅ τί περ ἂν ἕτερον ᾖ, συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέρου τοῦτο ὅ πέρ ἐστιν εἶναι.*

Soph. 244 B: *ἕν πού φατε μόνον εἶναι;—φαμὲν γάρ—ὂν καλεῖτέ τι;—ναί—πότερον ὅπερ ἕν, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρώμενοι δυοῖν ὀνόμασιν, ἢ πῶς;*—the answer to this question is stated to be difficult, with a very probable reference to the *Parmenides*, in which precisely the same question led to contradictory conclusions. The theory of communion of kinds as set forth in the *Sophist* may be regarded as an attempt to solve

τὸ ἕν, οὔτε τῷ ἓν τὸ ἓν τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερον οὔτε τῷ οὐσία εἶναι ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων.

the riddles of the *Parmenides*, and to progress beyond the rigid Eleatic unity of Being.

The above comparisons speak rather against Zeller's conclusions, though the chronological value of these passages is much less evident than the above quoted references to the *Parmenides* in the *Sophist* (217 c, 244 c). The general contents of both dialogues are best explained by the priority of the *Parmenides*. The *Parmenides* prepares the ground for the theories of the *Sophist*, and is as we have seen intermediate between *Theaetetus* and *Sophist* in its list of categories as well as in its antinomies. This is confirmed also by numerous stylistic observations. The vocabulary of the *Sophist*, despite the difference of contents, shows such a surprising number of coincidences with *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and *Laws*, as no earlier dialogue except the *Phaedrus*. We have already seen what reasons account for the exceptional style of the *Phaedrus*, and there are many stylistic peculiarities in which the *Sophist* is much nearer to the *Laws* than the *Phaedrus* and *Parmenides*. To these belongs first of all the avoidance of hiatus, which cannot be accidental, and is common to the *Sophist* with the five latest works. Other important peculiarities absent from the *Parmenides*, *Theaetetus*, *Phaedrus* and all earlier dialogues appear for the first time in the *Sophist* and remain in the style of all the latest works of Plato: the prevalence of *καθάπερ* over *ὥσπερ*, the very great frequency of *τοίνυν*, *πᾶς*, *ξύμπας*, and the scarcity of *μέντοι*. Besides these important peculiarities, others of less importance appear for the first time in the *Sophist* and are common to this dialogue with the latest works of Plato: *τὼ δύο*, *τάχα ἴσως*, *τοιγαροῦν*, *μῶν οὖν*, *μῶν οὐ*, inversion of *λέγεις*, *ξυνάπας* are found repeatedly in our dialogue, and the number of accidental peculiarities of later style is much greater than in the *Parmenides*; thus the stylistic affinity of the

The list of categories in the *Sophist* more mature. Vocabulary.

Hiatus avoided.

Other peculiarities of later style.

Sophist with the group of the *Laws* amounts to 468 units of affinity against only 243 of the *Parmenides*.

This is quite sufficient to render the later date of the *Sophist* as probable as anything can be in Platonic chronology, and it has been recognised since Campbell by all investigators of Plato's style, as well as by many other critics, as for instance Jowett, Tocco, Teichmüller, on independent internal grounds. Against all this evidence Zeller continues to place the *Sophist* before the *Republic* and the *Symposium*. This is chiefly due to the circumstance that he is evidently unaware of the existence of so many investigations on the style of Plato, and that he has not given a special attention to Plato's logical theories. On the other side the late date of the *Sophist* has been recently confirmed in a most decisive manner by two different lines of inquiry, which enabled two authors, who knew nothing of Campbell, to find out that in two different ways the *Sophist* and *Politicus* belong to the same group as the *Timaeus* and *Critias*. These confirmations acquire an increased importance through the fact that they touch upon our problem from a standpoint not yet applied specially to Plato. R. Hirzel[257] dedicated two volumes to a general investigation of the form of literary dialogue from Plato to the present time. This he did with remarkable acuteness, at least so far as Plato is concerned, and he made it still more evident than Ueberweg and Campbell had done that the form of the dialogue in the *Sophist* and the dialectical dialogues corresponds necessarily to a later stage of literary activity than that evinced in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*. In view of the special attention paid by Hirzel to the dialogical form in the literature of all ages and nations, we are bound to accept his testimony as a valuable confirmation of the results obtained by comparison of style and logical theories. Hirzel observes that the change in the

Zeller is singular in placing the *Sophist* before the *Republic*. Important confirmation of the later date by Hirzel and Bruns. R. Hirzel on Dialogue in Literature.

[257] R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog, ein literarhistorischer Versuch*, 2 vols. Leipzig 1895.

form of the dialogue consists in many peculiarities, by which the dialectical dialogues are distinguished from earlier more poetical works. The characterisation of persons and of the place of conversation is less elaborate, and the leader of the conversation becomes the impersonal representative of abstract reason, not only without personal character but even without name in the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Laws*. There is nothing in these dialogues to remind us that they are represented as held in Attica or even Greece: they could be imagined anywhere in the universe. Throughout these works we move in a spiritual atmosphere apart from the material world (vol. i. p. 252: Farb und gestaltlos liegt die Welt um uns, Platons Dichtergeist entzündet kein sinnliches Leben mehr in ihr, wir befinden uns in einer Geisteratmosphäre, die erhaben ist über Zeit und Raum). The connection of several dialogues into one larger whole is also indicated by Hirzel as a peculiarity of Plato's latest manner, and he agrees with Christ in the supposition that the term trilogy and tetralogy had been used for Platonic dialogues before it came into use for dramatic poetry. The progress from single dialogues to trilogies or tetralogies appears to Hirzel a psychological evolution similar to that which is noticeable in epic and dramatic poetry. Plato saw after the *Republic* the difficulty of representing very complex systematic expositions in a single dialogue, and he was also led to simplify introductory matters by the connection of dialogues in series.

Less marked characterisation.

Scene indefinite.

Dialogues connected in series. 'Trilogy' and 'tetralogy.'

These observations of Hirzel, made in a work of more general aims and not limited to Plato, deserve the most serious attention of all who still have any doubts as to the authenticity and late date of the *Sophist* and *Politicus*. They were unexpectedly confirmed in a most satisfactory manner by another author, who also referred to Plato only in connection with an investigation into another general aspect of literary composition. Ivo Bruns wrote

Ivo Bruns, on Literary Portraiture, also observes the decline of characterisation.

a very interesting volume [258] on the literary portraits in Greek literature, from Thucydides down to Demosthenes. This work deals also at some length with Plato as a great artist in skilful personal characterisation. Bruns found this art no longer present in the Platonic trilogies, namely in the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Timaeus*, and *Critias*. While in the *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, *Theaetetus*, and in earlier dialogues a careful characterisation of each speaker is given, and the philosophical conversation comes as if by accident, Bruns observes that in the *Sophist* and later dialogues the speakers are not characterised individually, except that they are spoken of as competent and well prepared for philosophical conversation. This, says Bruns, is a sign that Plato, when he wrote the dialectical works, had retired from life to the School (p. 272: der Unterschied scheint gering, ist aber in Wirklichkeit ein tiefgreifender: er bedeutet den Schrift des platonischen Dialogs von dem Leben in die Schule; er bedeutet das Aufgeben des künstlerischen Princips, mit dem der frühere platonische Dialog untrennbar verbunden ist). This is called by Bruns a new style, essentially different from the 'realistic' style of the *Republic* and earlier works, in which each conversation was accidental and ended naturally after a single problem had been exhausted. In the trilogies the subject of the conversation is not accidental, but well planned, and this produces the systematic connection of several works into larger wholes. The *Sophist* and *Timaeus* are only apparent continuations of earlier dialogues: really each of them begins a new trilogy, and their connection with a dialogue of the old style is only employed to avoid an introductory exposition of the circumstances in which the dialogue was started. Neither in writing the *Theaetetus* had the *Sophist* been planned, nor in writing the *Republic* had Plato already formed the plan of the *Timaeus*; but with the *Sophist*

Plato had retired from life to the School.

Less of realism, more of system: hence connected series.

This connection begins with the *Sophist*.

Neither *Republic* nor

[258] Ivo Bruns, *Das literarische Porträt der Griechen im fünften und vierten Jahrhundert vor Christi Geburt*, Berlin 1896.

and *Timaeus* begins the plan of two trilogies. The difference between the trilogies and the dialogues of the old style which are supposed to be introductory to the trilogies consists, as Bruns very judiciously observes, in the great authority given to the new leaders of philosophical conversation. The stranger of Elea, who leads the dialogue in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, is expressly recommended at the beginning of the dialogue as a remarkable philosopher (*Soph.* 216 A: *ξένον ἄγομεν . . ἐξ Ἐλέας, ἑταῖρον δὲ τῶν ἀμφὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα, μάλα δὲ ἄνδρα φιλόσοφον . . .* C: *δοκεῖ θεὸς μὲν . . . οὐδαμῶς εἶναι, θεῖος μήν . . .* 217 B: *διακηκοέναι γέ φησιν ἱκανῶς καὶ οὐκ ἀμνημονεῖν*). Similar is also what is said in the *Timaeus* and *Critias* about the special authority and preparation of the speakers. We see in all these dialogues perfect teachers, accustomed to repeat their lessons, and well prepared for what they are to say, and hearers equally prepared to receive the instruction. What Bruns says about the psychological motives of this change in Plato's later style coincides with the similar observations of Ueberweg, Campbell, and also of Hirzel, though Bruns seems not to be aware of this coincidence, or, at least, does not quote his predecessors.

Theaetetus contemplated other dialogues to follow. The leader of the conversation is invested with far more authority.

His testimony, coming thus quite independently, increases our confidence as to the absolute certainty of our conclusions about the date of the *Sophist*. This dialogue belongs evidently to Plato's old age, and is much later than the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*; it may even have been written after the third voyage to Sicily. In style and contents there is a progress beyond the *Theaetetus* which prevents us from seeing in the *Sophist* an immediate continuation of the former. The external relation between *Theaetetus* and *Sophist* is no sign of a continuity of composition, just as, in despite of a similar connection, the *Timaeus* is much later than the *Republic*.

Bruns' testimony evidently independent. The *Sophist* belongs already to Plato's old age.

II. *The Politicus.*

Continuation of the *Sophist.*

The *Politicus* is a genuine continuation of the *Sophist* much more than the *Sophist* can be esteemed as a continuation of the *Theaetetus.* Here we have a close and mutual connection: in the *Sophist* (217 A) the *Politicus* is announced, and in the *Politicus* the *Sophist* is expressly quoted (257 A, 266 D, 284 B, 286 B).

The scientific method still in use.

This close literary connection of the two companion dialogues corresponds to the near relation of their contents and method. The scientific method is here equally praised as leading to truth against every prejudice, and neglecting nothing, however insignificant it may appear (266 D: *τῇ τοιᾷδε μεθόδῳ τῶν λόγων οὔτε σεμνοτέρου μᾶλλον ἐμέλησεν ἢ μή, τόν τε σμικρότερον οὐδὲν ἠτίμακε πρὸ τοῦ μείζονος, ἀεὶ δὲ καθ' αὑτὴν περαίνει τἀληθέστατον*). This method consists here, as in the *Sophist*, in the classification of particulars according to their natural kinds (286 D: *ὁ λόγος παραγγέλλει πολὺ μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτον τὴν μέθοδον αὐτὴν τιμᾶν τοῦ κατ' εἴδη δυνατὸν εἶναι διαιρεῖν*). The aim of logical exercise is to become better prepared for more difficult problems, and the impatient pupils are warned that the way may be long or short according to the subject (286 E: *λόγον, ἄν τε παμμήκης λεχθεὶς τὸν ἀκούσαντα εὑρετικώτερον ἀπεργάζηται, τοῦτον σπουδάζειν καὶ τῷ μήκει μηδὲν ἀγανακτεῖν, ἄν τ' αὖ βραχύτερος, ὡσαύτως*). It seems that the form of the *Sophist* had been criticised as too lengthy, and as winding around the subject with which it deals. Plato answers here that such critics ought to have shown how the same results could have been reached by a shorter way, and whether the shorter way would have been equally useful for the purpose of developing dialectical power (287 A). This is clearly a polemic reference, and if in a contemporary writing we could discover some censure of the *Sophist* of Plato, the relation between this writing and the *Politicus* would be established beyond every doubt. Unluckily, no

Logical method, especially classification regarded as a preparatory exercise.

Defence of lengthy arguments against objectors, who remain unknown.

such writing seems to be known—at least, Teichmüller and Dümmler, who believe themselves to have found so many other 'literary feuds,' have made no use of this interesting passage.

Illustration from learning to read.

The ideal of logical training occupies Plato's mind with increasing fascination, and he insists on its importance at every step. He quotes manifold instances of the way in which higher aims are furthered by elementary exercise. One who learns reading, and is asked of what letters a word consists, does not aim only at answering that particular question, but at becoming more proficient in grammar (285 C). Thus also the investigation of the nature of the statesman is only a lesson in dialectic (285 D, cf. *Soph.* 227 B). For the aim of life is to become better and wiser by means of science and justice (293 D). True and well-founded opinions on these things are divine, and to be seen only in divine souls (309 C: *τὴν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων πέρι καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἐναντίων ὄντως οὖσαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν μετὰ βεβαιώσεως, ὁπόταν ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνηται, θείαν φημὶ ἐν δαιμονίῳ γίγνεσθαι γένει*). Their greatest happiness is knowledge (272 B), and Plato invents here a new word never used before him to signify the treasury of human knowledge (272 C: *συναγυρμὸς φρονήσεως*) as an ideal totality of individual endeavours, eternally increasing and transmitted from generation to generation. Such a conception he could not have had when he wrote the Socratic dialogues, and it is really difficult to understand how so many distinguished Platonists could believe in an early date of the *Politicus*. The use of *δύναμις* alone in this passage is a sufficient sign that the *Politicus* is written after the *Republic*, and many other signs are here available for the determination of this relation between the two dialogues. Here even the notion of desire is subtilised to such a height that it is applied to logical training (272 D: *τὰς ἐπιθυμίας περί τε ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῆς τῶν λόγων χρείας*). The chief instrument of this training is the same here as at an earlier stage, the power

Knowledge of truth and justice is the ultimate aim. Comprehensiveness of knowledge as now conceived. Maturity of this conception a mark of lateness.

to ask and answer questions (286 A: *δεῖ μελετᾶν λόγον ἑκάστου δυνατὸν εἶναι δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι*, cf. *Phaedo* 76 B, *Crat.* 426 A, &c.).

Similarity and difference again.

The notion of similarity and difference retains the importance which it acquired in the *Parmenides*. The true dialectician is asked first to find out all the differences in a group of things, and then to discern all common peculiarities which unite them into various logical units (285 B).

Scientific construction.

Each science is built up by a skilful selection of appropriate elements, and the right union of similar particulars into one, while useless observations and notions are rejected (308 C: *πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη πανταχοῦ τὰ μὲν μοχθηρὰ εἰς δύναμιν ἀποβάλλει, τὰ δ' ἐπιτήδεια καὶ χρηστὰ ἔλαβεν, ἐκ τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁμοίων καὶ ἀνομοίων ὄντων, πάντα εἰς ἓν αὐτὰ ξυνάγουσα, μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν καὶ ἰδέαν δημιουργεῖ*, cf. *Crat.* 438 E).

Reality only attained by reason.

For this an exact definition of each notion is required, based on reasoning not on sense perception (277 C: *γραφῆς δὲ καὶ συμπάσης χειρουργίας λέξει καὶ λόγῳ δηλοῦν πᾶν ζῷον μᾶλλον πρέπει τοῖς δυναμένοις ἕπεσθαι*). No figure or drawing can correspond to the true substance of things, which is conceived only by pure reason (286 A: *τοῖς δ' αὖ μεγίστοις οὖσι καὶ τιμιωτάτοις οὐκ ἔστιν εἴδωλον οὐδὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰργασμένον ἐναργῶς, οὗ δειχθέντος τὴν τοῦ πυνθανομένου ψυχὴν ὁ βουλόμενος ἀποπληρῶσαι, πρὸς τῶν αἰσθήσεών τινα προσαρμόττων, ἱκανῶς πληρώσει*). This relation of truth to reason is here insisted upon (286 A: *τὰ γὰρ ἀσώματα, κάλλιστα ὄντα καὶ μέγιστα, λόγῳ μόνον, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ σαφῶς δείκνυται*, cf. *Phaedo* 65 D).

True conceptions independent of sense and of language.

The ideas must be understood independently of the use of language and without attaching any exceptional importance to words (261 E: *κἂν διαφυλάξῃς τὸ μὴ σπουδάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, πλουσιώτερος εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀναφανήσει φρονήσεως*, cf. *Crat.* 439 A).

Platonic absolutism,

The greatest differences of opinion, which divide men into opposite camps, refer to moral convictions, and the philosopher appears here possessed with that Platonic absolutism which in a later age produced the Christian

Inquisition. Such an intolerance is a distinct peculiarity of Plato's later years, and distinguishes the *Laws* from the *Republic*, forming at the same time a link between the *Politicus* and the *Laws*. That ethical questions divide men more than purely theoretical discussion was assumed already in the Socratic dialogues, but here it is asserted with much greater strength:

the source of later Christian Inquisition.

Euthyphro 7 C: *περὶ τίνος δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἐχθροί γε ἂν ἀλλήλοις εἴμεν καὶ ὀργιζοίμεθα; . . . σκόπει εἰ τάδε ἐστὶ τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν.*

Crito 49 D: *οἶδα . . . ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει · οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μή, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὁρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλεύματα.*

Polit. 308 E: *ἡ βασιλική . . . τοὺς μὴ δυναμένους κοινωνεῖν ἤθους ἀνδρείου καὶ σώφρονος ὅσα τε ἄλλα ἐστὶ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀθεότητα καὶ ὕβριν καὶ ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ κακῆς βίᾳ φύσεως ἀπωθουμένους, θανάτοις τε ἐκβάλλει καὶ φυγαῖς καὶ ταῖς μεγίσταις κολάζουσα ἀτιμίαις.* Cf. *Legg.* 909 A: where those who disagree with the lawgiver on religious matters are condemned to death.

Thus we see that Plato admitted the impossibility of proof in moral questions, otherwise he had no reason to propose the penalty of death for moral dissenters, and specially for atheism. He recognised here a power of individual nature, resisting the charm even of the highest philosophical rhetoric, which produces conviction only in purely theoretical matters of science, not in practical tendencies of life.

Division of universal science into pure and applied, critical and epitactic.

The unity of universal science, already affirmed in the *Sophist* (257 C), is here taken for granted, and a division of the whole is attempted into theoretical and practical, or pure and applied science (258 E: *ταύτῃ τοίνυν συμπάσας ἐπιστήμας διαίρει, τὴν μὲν πρακτικὴν προσειπών, τὴν δὲ μόνον γνωστικήν—ἔστω σοι ταῦθ' ὡς μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ὅλης εἴδη δύο*). Pure science is again divided into critical and epitactic, of which the former teaches what is, and the latter what ought to be (260 B: *κρίσει δὲ καὶ ἐπιτάξει διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν τούτω τὼ γένεε; συμπάσης τῆς γνωστικῆς τὸ μὲν ἐπιτακτικὸν μέρος, τὸ δὲ κριτικὸν . . .*). To the

epitactic sciences belong not only ethics and politics but also all practical pursuits which require helpers to execute the leader's instructions, as, for instance, the art of architecture. The further subdivisions are only playful, and cannot be taken seriously as a permanent contribution to the classification of sciences.[259] Also other samples of classification given at some length in the *Politicus*, as, for instance, the classification of living beings (262–267), have no permanent value, and offer only an opportunity for the application of logical rules. For instance, Plato criticises the division of men into Hellenes and Barbarians (262 D), and compares it with a division of all numbers into ten thousand and other numbers than ten thousand. For the purpose of showing his independence of every prejudice he finds a similarity between swine and men, so much that both kinds of animals are distinguished only by the number of their feet, man being a gregarious tame hornless animal walking on earth by the power of two divided feet, while the swine use twice that number, thus appearing to have even an advantage over men (266 C). Such a fanciful definition is meant as a protest against the undeserved exaltation of vulgar mankind over other animals. Also the subdivision of productions and possessions (279 D) is mainly an example by which the rules of classification are illustrated. These rules were then first expressed by Plato, and appeared to his mind as very important logical laws. The subdivisions ought to be nearly equal to each other, and form natural units, not artificial parts (262 A B: *μὴ σμικρὸν μόριον ἓν πρὸς μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ ἀφαιρῶμεν, μηδὲ εἴδους χωρίς· ἀλλὰ τὸ μέρος ἅμα εἶδος ἐχέτω . . . διὰ μέσων δὲ ἀσφαλέστερον ἰέναι τέμνοντας*). Ideas, as here conceived, are to be found by classification of notions, or are ideal notions in the same meaning as

Even casual observations here take a scientific form.

Productions classified.

Rules of classification. Dichotomy preferred, but natural units always to be preserved.

[259] The various classifications of the *Politicus* have been specially represented by Lukas (*Methode der Eintheilung*), and also recently by C. Ritter (*Platos Politicus: Beiträge zu seiner Erklärung*, Programm des Gymnasiums zu Ellwangen 1896).

the ideas were for Leibniz or Kant. Any attentive reader of the dialectical dialogues will at once observe that in this and similar passages εἶδος and ἰδέα are identical in meaning, and that they cannot mean transcendental beings, but natural kinds or ideas in the same sense as the term is used in modern philosophy, that is, perfect and universal notions of the human or any higher mind. A notion as first formed might be imperfect and subjective. As soon as by dialectical thought it attains perfection and objectivity, it deserves the name of an idea. Objectivity is not separate existence outside any mind, but uniform existence in all possible souls.

Objectivity at first misunderstood.

The separate existence of ideas outside any mind is a poetical absurdity which could subsist only for a very limited time in the imagination of a thinker like Plato, and which has never been expressly affirmed in clear words by him—because the poetical metaphors of the *Phaedrus*, *Republic*, *Phaedo* and *Symposium* cannot be taken as literal expressions of abstract truth. They only supply an indication that Plato, when he first discovered the objectivity of notions, hesitated how to explain this objectivity and felt some inclination to a worship of ideas in an ideal world, whence they could influence our imperfect minds. This conception may have been developed by his pupils to such extremes that he undertook to demonstrate its absurdity in the *Parmenides*. Since that time he continues to use the terms εἶδος and ἰδέα, but no longer suggests the separate existence of abstractions, as this would contradict the increasing importance attached to the priority of soul in the universe.

The exaggeration of Plato's followers may have undeceived him.

The ideas can only exist in a soul, as has been clearly said in the *Sophist*: they are notions, but not every notion is an idea. The idea is a notion of a perfect soul, free from error, and we must carefully distinguish among our own notions the ideas from other imperfect notions. This is the only consistent interpretation of later Platonic logic, and might be confirmed by a long enumeration of

The idea is a notion of a perfect soul.

the passages in the six latest dialogues where *εἶδος, ἰδέα, γένος, μέρος, μόριον, τμῆμα, φύσις, δύναμις* occur. Such a full enumeration, however, with a sufficient interpretation of each passage, exceeds the limits of the present work. But C. Ritter in his very interesting programme on the *Politicus* [259] enumerates the corresponding passages of this dialogue and arrives at the conclusion that not one of these passages confirms the 'herkömmliche, durch Aristoteles eingeführte Auffassung der platonischen Idee.' This is also Campbell's opinion in his Introductions to the *Sophist* and *Politicus*. Here it will be sufficient to re-assert as the result of a careful reading of the six last works of Plato the conviction that the philosopher at this stage of his thought no longer admitted the conception of ideas as existing outside every soul. If anybody sustains the opposite view, he must always recur to the very improbable hypothesis that the second part of the *Parmenides* is a refutation of the objections raised in the first part, and to the serious blunder of interpreting *παντελῶς ὄν* in the *Sophist* (249 A) as ideas, possessing each of them soul, life, movement, and reason. Even this absurdity is insufficient to prove the separate existence of ideas in later Platonism: we challenge our readers and critics to point out in works written after the *Parmenides* a single passage supporting the assumption that ideas exist outside every soul, or contradicting our view that ideas are perfect notions of a perfect Being, natural kinds of particular things in agreement with the thoughts and aims of their Creator.

C. Ritter's examination of passages in the *Politicus* shows that none of them imply the current 'doctrine of ideas.'

This throws the burden of proof on those who maintain the older view.

All the rules given for the finding of ideas by classification become useless if we understand 'ideas' to mean anything else than this. One of these rules compares the division of an idea with the cutting into parts of a sacrificial animal, and recommends dichotomy as the best way of division, leaving open the recourse to a partition in three or more parts only when for some reason dichotomy is impossible (287 C: *κατὰ μέλη τοίνυν αὐτὰς οἷον ἱερεῖον*

Logical division compared to the breaking up of a

διαιρώμεθα, ἐπειδὴ δίχα ἀδυνατοῦμεν. δεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸν ἐγγύτατα ὅ τι μάλιστα τέμνειν ἀριθμὸν ἀεί). In these divisions the parts should be always natural kinds (263 A: *γένος ἅμα καὶ μέρος εὑρίσκειν* . . . 262 E: *μᾶλλον κατ' εἴδη καὶ δίχα* . . . 285 A: *κατ' εἴδη συνειθίσθαι σκοπεῖν διαιρουμένους* . . . 285 B: *διαφορὰς ὁπόσαιπερ ἐν εἴδεσι κεῖνται* . . . . 262 B: *τὸ μέρος ἅμα εἶδος ἐχέτω*, &c.). Constantly *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* are used in the same meaning as *γένος*, coinciding with the conception of parts of a class of objects. This process of classification enables us to find the principles or elements of Being, unknown to those who cannot recognise the essential identity of things apparently different, but really belonging to the same class (278 C D).

sacrificial victim.

Natural kinds indifferently spoken of as *γένη* or *εἴδη*.

Deeper and fuller conception of knowledge.

In order to attain a greater dialectical power, it is necessary to recur to exercise on familiar examples and to observe the analogies between such examples and the highest metaphysical problems (277 D: *χαλεπὸν μὴ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον ἱκανῶς ἐνδείκνυσθαι τι τῶν μειζόνων. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οἷον ὄναρ εἰδὼς ἅπαντα πάντ' αὖ πάλιν ὥσπερ ὕπαρ ἀγνοεῖν*). Sometimes we believe ourselves to have seen things distinctly in dreams, while we are unable to describe them after we are awake. Thus untrained people often are unable to distinguish notions which on other occasions they had distinguished. We are best led to the knowledge of truth by the skilful selection of convenient examples which bring us gradually nearer to the aim of our inquiry. Plato applies this rule immediately by giving an example of the use of example (277 D: *παραδείγματος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα αὐτὸ δεδέηκεν* . . . 278 E). Children when they learn reading recognise a letter more easily in short than in long and difficult syllables. They will learn with the greatest facility if they are first shown short and easy syllables, as examples of the use of letters which recur in long and difficult syllables. Then they will without effort develope their faculty of recognising the same letter wherever they see

Use of the argument from example.

Example of example.

Complexity of nature and of Life compared with the variety of words and phrases.

it, be it in a short or long syllable, as they will notice that each letter remains identical in all the combinations it enters into with other letters, so that it is sufficient to know well the small number of existing letters in order to be able to read the most difficult words and phrases in their innumerable combinations (277 E-278 C). Though Plato had already in his earlier works made use of examples and recommended them (*Phaedr.* 262 C: *ψιλῶς πως λέγομεν, οὐκ ἔχοντες ἱκανὰ παραδείγματα*, cf. *Soph.* 218 D: *περί τινος τῶν φαύλων μετίοντες πειραθῶμεν παράδειγμα αὐτὸ θέσθαι τοῦ μείζονος*), he had never given such direct attention to the theory of analogy as he has done here.

The use of an example has the purpose of inducing a pupil to recognise an idea in a less familiar application, by comparing it with a familiar instance of the same idea (278 C: *τοῦτο . . ἱκανῶς συνειλήφαμεν, ὅτι παραδείγματός γ' ἐστὶ τότε γένεσις, ὁπόταν ὂν ταὐτὸν ἐν ἑτέρῳ διεσπασμένῳ δοξαζόμενον ὀρθῶς καὶ συναχθὲν περὶ ἑκάτερον ὡς συνάμφω μίαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἀποτελῇ*). It is very characteristic that this practice is here represented as leading in the first place to true opinion, not to absolute knowledge, which cannot rest on mere analogy. The use of examples in the *Politicus* is very frequent: thus for instance the long explanation of the art of weaving is an example which is given only for the purpose of explaining the political art (287 B). The politician is also compared to a physician who prescribes drugs according to the state of the patient and changes them when he finds it convenient. Thus also the true politician will change the laws if new experience requires it (295 C–296 A. Cf. *Legg.* 769 D).

The weaver compared with the politician. Example of the physician.

Opportunism as in the *Laws*. Illustration from an

The political opportunism here proposed agrees well with the *Laws*, and is very different from the absolutism of the *Republic*, and for this reason alone it would be impossible to admit that the *Republic* could have been written between the *Politicus* and *Laws*, as Zeller supposes. A very remarkable example is given to illustrate

the incompetence of the majority in political affairs. Supposing that the rules of medicine and navigation were entrusted not to physicians and seamen, but to a majority of citizens, the consequences of this arrangement would certainly be disastrous for all. Not less disastrous are the consequences of the political power of a blind majority (298–299, 300 E: *ὡμολογημένον ἡμῖν κεῖται μηδὲν πλῆθος μηδ' ἡντινοῦν δυνατὸν εἶναι λαβεῖν τέχνην*).

imagined rule of the majority in medicine and navigation.

In the *Politicus* even more than in the *Sophist*, the idea of method acquires a prevailing power over the mind of Plato. At every step reflections on thought arise, thus giving to everything a logical aspect, and showing a tendency to an impartial consideration of all the conditions of each branch of knowledge. For instance we find here a digression on the difference between absolute and relative measure (283 E: *διττὰς . . οὐσίας καὶ κρίσεις τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ σμικροῦ θετέον . . . τὴν μὲν πρὸς ἄλληλα . . . τὴν δ' αὖ πρὸς τὸ μέτριον*). We judge about quantities by comparing them either with each other or with an absolute standard of what ought to be, in thought or action (283 E). The absolute standard named *τὸ μέτριον* is the principle of every art and also of politics and morality (284 A). This absolute standard (284 E: *πρὸς τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ δέον καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀπῳκίσθη τῶν ἐσχάτων*) is equally distant from two extremes and is here indicated as an important new discovery (284 D: *δεήσει τοῦ νῦν λεχθέντος πρὸς τὴν περὶ αὐτὸ τἀκριβὲς ἀπόδειξιν . . . ἡγητέον ὁμοίως τὰς τέχνας πάσας εἶναι καὶ μεῖζόν τι ἅμα καὶ ἔλαττον μετρεῖσθαι μὴ πρὸς ἄλληλα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μετρίου γένεσιν*). Only those who are not accustomed to dialectical distinction are unable to see the difference between absolute and relative measure (285 A). This theory, later applied by Aristotle in his *Ethics*, is here repeated several times with great insistence, and is evidently felt to be expressed for the first time (285 C: *φυλάττωμεν δὲ μόνον, ὅτι δύο γένη ἐξεύρηται τῆς μετρητικῆς*). It corre-

Increasing prevalence of the idea of method.

Measure, absolute and relative: *τὸ μέτριον*.

To be compared with Aristotle's *μεσότης*.

sponds very well to the new conception of ideas and could not easily apply to the primitive transcendental ideas, which were out of relation with particular extremes.

Causes and conditions.

Another logical distinction, which had been already prepared in the *Phaedo*, is here developed as it were casually in the progress of the inquiry:

αἴτια and *ξυναίτια*.

Phaedo 99 A: *αἴτια τὰ τοιαῦτα* (the physical conditions) *καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον · εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν, καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω, οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ' ἦν ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντά μοι, ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι· ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἃ ποιῶ καὶ ταῦτα νῷ πράττων, ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἱρέσει, πολλὴ καὶ μακρὰ ῥᾳθυμία ἂν εἴη τοῦ λόγου.* B: *τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μέν τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ' εἴη αἴτιον · ὃ δή μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφῶντες οἱ πολλοὶ ὥσπερ ἐν σκότει, ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι προσχρώμενοι, ὡς αἴτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν.*

Polit. 281 C: the production of the weaver's tools is designated *συναιτία* of the art of weaving. This term has been used only once before, according to Ast, in *Gorg.* 519 B: *οὐκ αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν κακῶν ἀλλ' ἴσως συναιτίων.* This use of the word is similar to that in Aeschylos and Isocrates. A more technical use of the same term is found *Polit.* 281 D: *δύο τέχνας οὔσας περὶ πάντα τὰ δρώμενα, . . τὴν μὲν τῆς γενέσεως οὖσαν ξυναίτιον, τὴν δ' αὐτὴν αἰτίαν . . . ὅσαι . . . ὄργανα παρασκευάζουσιν . . . ταύτας μὲν ξυναιτίους, τὰς δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀπεργαζομένας αἰτίας . . .*

cf. 287 B: *ξυναιτίων καὶ τῶν αἰτίων.*

287 D: *ὅσαι γὰρ σμικρὸν ἢ μέγα τι δημιουργοῦσι κατὰ πόλιν ὄργανον, θετέον ἁπάσας ταύτας ὡς οὔσας συναιτίους. ἄνευ γὰρ τούτων οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο πόλις οὐδὲ πολιτική, τούτων δ' αὖ βασιλικῆς ἔργον τέχνης οὐδέν που θήσομεν.*

Cf. *Tim.* 46 D: *δοξάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων οὐ ξυναίτια ἀλλ' αἴτια εἶναι τῶν πάντων* (namely material causes as compared with final causes). In the same meaning 76 D: *τὸ . . . δέρμα, τοῖς μὲν ξυναιτίοις τούτοις δημιουργηθέν, τῇ δὲ αἰτιωτάτῃ διανοίᾳ τῶν ἔπειτα ἐσομένων ἕνεκα εἰργασμένον.*

Final and efficient causes.

We see that the distinction between final and efficient cause, which remained the same from the *Phaedo* to the *Timaeus*, acquired its proper terminology only in the *Politicus*. What in the *Phaedo* is called '*ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ' εἴη αἴτιον*' becomes in the *Politicus* *ξυναίτιον* and is again designated by this term in the *Timaeus*. The special application of the term in the

Politicus changes nothing in its general meaning, and the word *ξυναίτιον* is a peculiarity of later style, limited to *Politicus*, *Timaeus*, *Laws* in its technical use, while it is used only once in an earlier dialogue in the earlier meaning, taken from tragic poetry. It will be difficult for the believers in the Megaric period to explain why Plato should use in the *Phaedo* a lengthy circumlocution if he had already introduced a short and convenient term with the same meaning. For us it is quite clear that *ξυναίτιον* as a metaphysical term was not yet in Platonic use when he wrote the *Phaedo*, as can be seen by the comparison of the above passages. Another interesting reference to earlier theories is here found in the familiar mention of the soul as the first principle of movement, which could scarcely be understood in the form in which it occurs here, if the demonstration of the *Phaedrus* were not presupposed (269 E: *αὐτὸ δὲ ἑαυτὸ στρέφειν ἀεὶ σχεδὸν οὐδενὶ δυνατὸν πλὴν τῷ τῶν κινουμένων αὖ πάντων ἡγουμένῳ*). In connection with the cyclic revolutions of the heaven Plato speaks here again of immense periods of time, which he never had mentioned nor imagined before the *Republic*. The universe is supposed to be subject to periodical revolutions which last millions of years [260] (270 A: *ἀνάπαλιν πορεύεσθαι πολλὰς περιόδων μυριάδας*).

Fresh proof of the priority of the *Phaedo*.

Demonstration of the *Phaedrus* also presupposed.

Illimitable periods of time.

If we look at the logical character of the *Politicus* and at the biting humour displayed in this dialogue as in few other works of Plato, it appears incredible that critics were found who doubted the authenticity of this dialogue. What Socher (1820) and Suckow (1855) said in favour of such doubts has been repeatedly refuted by Grote, Campbell and Jowett. But Schaarschmidt's plea for the spuriousness of the *Politicus* seems not yet to

Biting humour of the *Politicus*.

Objections of Schaarschmidt

[260] The meaning of *περίοδος* is not quite certain; Campbell translates 'days,' but in view of the similar passages of *Theaetetus* and *Phaedrus* and of the astronomical studies which appear to have occupied Plato in his later years, it is quite as probable that he meant years, each year being the smallest period in which the heaven returns to the same relative position.

to the authenticity of this dialogue easily refuted.

have been specially considered, though nearly all competent authorities recognise the authenticity of this dialogue as established beyond every doubt. It may not be superfluous to consider these arguments, as Schaarschmidt, living still, has not found it necessary to revoke them in the course of thirty years, and as he has followers among quite recent historians of philosophy.[261] Schaarschmidt thinks that such tedious divisions of notions as are found in the *Politicus* are unworthy of Plato. If we remember that divisions of notions have been recommended in the *Phaedrus*, and very much used in the *Republic*, there is no reason whatever to doubt that Plato at a later period of his literary activity gave a special attention to this logical exercise. What Schaarschmidt says about the use of example and analogy as contrary to Plato's custom is equally contradicted by the *Phaedrus* (262 C D), where examples are as strongly recommended as in the *Politicus*. The myth of the *Politicus*, like the myth of the *Phaedrus*, is used to help the progress of the philosophical argument, and Schaarschmidt has no right on this account to doubt the authenticity of the *Politicus* if he admits, as he does, the authenticity of the *Phaedrus*. The difference between the myth in the *Politicus* (271 D–274 E) and a short mention of the same legend in the *Laws* (713 C D E) has further excited Schaarschmidt's suspicion. But Plato never attempted a painful identity of myths, and anybody can see how freely his imagination worked in the different versions of the eschatological myths.

Schaarschmidt contradicts himself, because he holds

[261] W. Windelband, *Geschichte der alten Philosophie*, 2ᵉ Aufl. München 1894, p. 114, says: 'es ist nicht wahrscheinlich, dass der Philosoph neben der Republik denselben Gegenstand in einem andern Werke behandelt heben sollte, zumal da das letztere in wichtigen Punkten erheblich andere Lehren aufstellt.' In France Huit ('Études sur le politique attribué à Platon,' in *Séances et travaux de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques*, vol. 128, p. 569; vol. 129, p. 169, Paris 1887) popularised Schaarschmidt's views. On the relation between *Rep.* and *Polit.* see Nusser's article, in *Philologus* for 1894, vol. liii. pp. 13–37.

every difference between two dialogues to be a reason for suspicion, while on the other hand every similarity also appears to him as an indication of the work of an imitator. Thus he wonders why in the *Politicus* an ideal ruler is placed above the laws. He forgets that here, as in the *Laws*, the ideal is already admitted to be almost impossible to realise, and the idea of a second best state based on fixed laws, here introduced (297 E), is later developed in the *Laws*. On the other side, the view of a state without fixed laws is already prepared in the *Republic* (425 D: *οὐκ ἄξιον ἀνδράσι καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς ἐπιτάττειν*), as also the comparison of politics and medicine (*Rep.* 426 A, cf. *Polit.* 298 A–300 D). The usefulness of laws is fully recognised in the *Politicus* in the case when a perfect ruler cannot be found. Ordinary governments do best to keep the law (301 A). The same doctrine occurs in the *Laws*, only there it is recognised as impossible that an ideal ruler should be born on this imperfect earth, so that the laws acquire an increased importance, though the notion of an ideal state is not altogether abandoned, except for transient practical reasons (*Legg.* 739 D: *ἡ μὲν τοιαύτη πόλις* (as proposed in the *Republic*), *εἴτε που θεοὶ ἢ παῖδες θεῶν αὐτὴν οἰκοῦσι πλείους ἑνός, οὕτω διαζῶντες εὐφραινόμενοι κατοικοῦσι*, cf. 746 A B). In the *Politicus* as in the *Laws* (874 E: *νόμους ἀνθρώποις ἀναγκαῖον τίθεσθαι καὶ ζῆν κατὰ νόμους, ἢ μηδὲν διαφέρειν τῶν πάντῃ ἀγριωτάτων θηρίων*) the fixed rules become necessary only in consequence of human ignorance and imperfection. This conviction led Plato equally in the *Politicus* as in the *Laws* (684 B C) to recommend coercion in order to maintain the fixed legislation.

Relation to the *Laws*.

In political theories it becomes especially evident that the *Politicus* is intermediate between *Republic* and *Laws*, so that there is no reason to raise any suspicion from that standpoint against the authenticity of our dialogue. Schaarschmidt wonders why the ideal ruler in the *Politicus* is not a philosopher as in the *Republic*, and thinks that this ideal ruler has no other aim than to satisfy the

personal needs and aspirations of the governed. This by no means agrees with what we really read in the *Politicus*. Politics is here counted among the theoretical sciences (259 D) opposed to the practical arts, and the politician's aim is to produce divine and true opinions about justice in his subjects (309 C, cf. 293 D). It is very natural that only opinions are to be expected in the blind majority of men. Knowledge is also in the *Republic* a privilege of the rulers.

Supposed silence of Aristotle.

Schaarschmidt's inferences from the silence of Aristotle about the differences between the *Politicus* and *Laws* are sufficiently refuted if we consider the accidental nature of all allusions to Platonic dialogues in the works of Aristotle. There was no necessity for him expressly to quote the *Politicus*, and we must not apply our standard of literary erudition to Aristotle. His works have come to us in a state which does not guarantee that we possess all the quotations he might have made from Plato's works. And the quotations preserved could in most cases be omitted without any prejudice to the argument of the passages where they occur. The *Politicus* is not, as its title might suggest, a political treatise, and therefore there was no opportunity to quote it in Aristotle's *Politics*, where the *Republic* and *Laws* are dealt with. Here we find more logical than political theories, and the definition of the statesman or politician is only a pretext for many digressions on the method of scientific investigation generally, as can be seen from the above exposition. Ueberweg has sufficiently proved that the *Sophist* and *Politicus* were known to Aristotle, and although he afterwards believed that some pupil of Plato might have written these dialogues, the references he collected show clearly that Aristotle knew them. It is difficult to admit that Aristotle would have named a pupil of Plato an 'earlier writer.' This, as the name is not specified, refers to Plato with greater probability than to anybody else. Bonitz quotes thirteen references to the *Politicus* of Plato in the works of

Denied by Ueberweg,

and shown to be untenable by Bonitz.

Aristotle (*Index Aristotelicus*, p. 598). The feeblest of all Schaarschmidt's arguments against the authenticity of the *Politicus* is based on a misconception of Plato's style. He did not know stylistic peculiarities as they are known now, and was therefore entirely unaware of the fact that the *Politicus* is as near in style to the *Laws* as the *Timaeus*, and this despite the great difference of contents.

Huit's arguments still feebler.

After Schaarschmidt no really new argument against the authenticity of the *Politicus* has been advanced, for what Huit says on the subject demonstrates only the strange ignorance of this author. He is, for instance, astonished that the title is not a proper name, as if he had never heard of the *Banquet*, *Republic*, *Laws*, which he still holds to be authentic. He complains of the absence of well-characterised persons, which is common to the *Politicus* with all later works. He objects to the person of the younger Socrates as unplatonic, and he does not notice that the individual characterisation of all persons in later dialogues is equally deficient. He wonders why the *Politicus* has been so little quoted by later authors, and asserts that only Proclus, Plotinus, Plutarch, Theodoretus, and Simplicius quoted it, while Fischer in his edition (1774) without attempting completeness of enumeration gives a list of a dozen classical authors who had read this dialogue. Such tests are generally of little value, because most of these quotations are accidental. But it is quite unjustifiable to ask for better authorities than Proclus and Plotinus when corroborating Aristotle as to the authenticity of a Platonic dialogue. Huit also professes indignation over the fact that in the *Politicus* the *Sophist* is quoted, and he seems to be unaware that in the *Timaeus* and *Laws* the *Republic* is clearly referred to, and in the *Critias* the *Timaeus*.

The only argument of Huit which might claim some importance is based on a misinterpretation of texts. He thinks that Plato in this dialogue does not distinguish δόξα from ἐπιστήμη. If this were true, we should have reason

to consider it seriously, because the above distinction is fundamental in Platonic philosophy. But really, as has been shown above, Plato speaks of δόξαι as mere opinions, not as knowledge, as it cannot be expected from all common citizens that they should rise to the level of knowledge, and the ideal ruler must be satisfied if he is able to produce in their minds true opinions.

All these arguments of Schaarschmidt and Huit prove nothing, and the authenticity of the *Politicus* is established beyond reasonable doubt by the similarity of its style to the latest works of Plato. Until somebody can show in a work written by another author two hundred and forty stylistic peculiarities recurring in the *Laws*, we must accept the *Politicus* as authentic. It is a work of rare literary and logical excellence, and could not easily be written by anybody else than the author of the *Phaedrus*.

As to the date of the *Politicus*, it is certain that this dialogue must have been written after the *Sophist*. This, taken together with the order of the preceding works, gives to the *Politicus* a place among the productions of Plato's old age, in so far as only the *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and *Laws* are distinctly later. It remains difficult to decide whether the *Philebus* followed or preceded the *Politicus*. Hirzel[262] has already clearly demonstrated that the *Politicus* is very nearly related to the *Laws*.

III. *The Philebus*.

Importance of the *Philebus*.

Schaarschmidt's doubts refuted by Huit.

This dialogue is one of the most important writings not only of Plato but of ancient philosophy in general. Yet it has not escaped unjustifiable suspicions as to its authenticity. Schaarschmidt's attempts in this respect have been already refuted by Tocco, and even his faithful follower Huit feels obliged to dissent in this point from his master. It is delightful to read this refutation of Schaarschmidt by Huit (vol. ii. pp. 171–181), because

[262] Hirzel, 'Zu Platons Politicus,' in vol. vii. p. 127 of *Hermes* for 1874.

nearly every word of it applies equally to the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, while Huit is very careful to produce all arguments of Schaarschmidt as his own when he triumphantly asserts[263] the spuriousness of the *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and *Politicus*. We have limited our previous discussion on authenticity to the *Politicus*, because the authenticity of the *Politicus* implies necessarily the authenticity of the *Sophist* and also of the *Parmenides*. Here it may not be superfluous to say something about a more recent attempt, undertaken by F. Horn,[264] to strike the *Philebus* out of the list of Plato's writings. It is significant that Horn does not deny Aristotle's testimony in favour of the Platonic origin of the *Philebus*. Hence he is obliged to recur to the strange supposition that Aristotle could be mistaken in such a question as the authenticity of a Platonic dialogue, whereby the whole of Ueberweg's investigation on the authenticity of Platonic dialogues is brought into question. Not on this point only Horn seems to be unaware of the method which alone can lead to valid conclusions in such matters. He reasons continually thus: some arguments of the *Philebus* do not agree with enunciations on the same

Objections of Horn, in spite of Aristotle's testimony. Plato's later views not always consistent with earlier statements.

[263] A curious proof of the incomparable ingenuousness of that French author, whom, by a regrettable mistake, the *Académie des sciences morales* crowned, is given by the fact that in his whole argument on the spuriousness of the *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and *Politicus* (pp. 269–311, vol. ii. of *La vie et l'œuvre de Platon*) he quotes Schaarschmidt only once, and this in a note (p. 309) in which he disagrees with him as to the pretended stoic origin of the *Sophist*. This cautious silence about an author from whom nearly all arguments of the text are taken, and who, in the chapter on the *Philebus*, is often quoted with a humorous contempt, is an interesting sample of apparent erudition paired with real ignorance of the subject, displayed for the competent reader at every step, despite all the numerous quotations. Thus Campbell is also quoted in irrelevant matters, and appears to the candid reader either as an authority for the spuriousness of the *Sophist* (vol. ii. pp. 282, 286), or even further from the truth, as a mere critic, populariser or supporter of the views of Dittenberger! (p. 341).

[264] F. Horn, *Platonstudien*, Wien 1893; see against this: Dr. Apelt, 'Die neueste Athetese des Philebos,' in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. ix. pp. 1–23, Berlin 1895, and again the reply of Horn: 'Zur Philebosfrage' in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. ix. pp. 271–297, Berlin 1896.

subject in the *Republic*, therefore the *Philebus* cannot have been written by Plato.

We have seen in the above exposition of Plato's logical theories that even such a thinker as Plato could not be in every particular free from errors, which he corrected later. In the course of his long activity he changed his opinion on several important points, which become specially manifest to anybody who cares to compare the *Republic* with the *Laws*. Also the *Philebus* is according to stylistic observations very distant from the *Republic*—probably about twenty years later. This sufficiently accounts for some divergencies. Horn's general view of the *Philebus* is extremely subjective. For him this interesting dialogue is 'ein mit völlig unzulänglichen Mitteln unternommener und höchst schülerhaft gerathener Versuch einer Vermittlung zwischen den ethischen Hauptrichtungen der Zeit.' Other scholars, as, for instance, G. Schneider, who devoted very special attention to the *Philebus*,[265] are of an entirely different opinion and see in the *Philebus* a masterpiece of Plato's old age.

Philebus, perhaps twenty years later than *Republic*.

A masterpiece of Plato's old age.

The differences between the *Philebus* and *Republic* are all of such a character that they are perfectly well explained by the length of time and the progress of thought from the earlier to the later dialogue.[266] Such differences ought never to be esteemed as an argument against the authenticity of any work of Plato, because

Progress of thought.

[265] G. Schneider, *Die Platonische Metaphysik, auf Grund der in Philebus gegebenen Principien in ihren wesentlichsten Zügen dargestellt*, Leipzig 1884; also: 'Die Ideenlehre in Platos Philebus' in *Philosophische Monatshefte*, vol. x. p. 193, 1874: 'Das Princip des Masses in der Platonischen Philosophie,' *Verhandlungen der* 33 *Philologenversammlung*, Gera 1878; *Das materiale Princip der Platonischen Metaphysik*, Gera 1872.

[266] The relation of the *Philebus* to the *Republic* has been specially investigated by F. Schmitt (*Die Verschiedenheit der Ideenlehre in Platos Republik und Philebus*, Giessen 1891) and Siebeck ('Platon als Kritiker aristotelischer Ansichten: II. Der Philebus,' in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, vol. 107, pp. 161–176, Leipzig 1896). They both agree as to the later date of *Philebus*; see also note 249.

in this way we might find suspicious almost everything Plato has written. The method which Horn uses consists in exaggerating every difference up to the point at which it appears to be an irreconcilable contradiction; on the other hand, if one dialogue agrees in some particular with another, he takes it as a sign that the author imitated Plato; finally if some opinion measured by the standard of our own time appears wrong, he finds herein an opportunity for representing it as unworthy of Plato. Such reasonings are built on three wrong suppositions: 1, that Plato never erred; 2, that he never recognised his errors nor changed his opinion; 3, that he never repeated what he said in another work. Any reader of Plato can easily see in hundreds of instances that all these three suppositions are inadmissible, and, we may add, any philosopher will recognise them to be psychologically impossible. But they are the constant basis of nearly everything that has been said against the authenticity of the dialectical dialogues.

Horn's view is based on mistaken presumptions.

The only argument of Horn which at all deserves our attention is advanced without evidence and rests on no quotation from the *Philebus*. Horn finds in the *Philebus* 'Geringschätzung der Dialektik' (*Zur Philebosfrage*, p. 292). The high esteem of dialectic is such a permanent Platonic peculiarity that any work in which dialectic is despised must excite serious doubts against its Platonic origin. But nothing of that sort occurs in the *Philebus*. It is strange and unjustifiable that Horn was not more explicit on that point, and that he did not quote the passages from which he has drawn his inference. It is evident that he misunderstands Plato and takes for irony what is either solemnity of tone or Platonic humour. It does not follow that Plato despised dialectic, when he required that the philosopher should also have other knowledge. This is not even a difference between *Philebus* and *Republic*, because there also dialectic was only the crown of all sciences, and did not render them superfluous.

He strangely speaks of a disparagement of dialectic in the *Philebus*.

Union of practical with speculative knowledge.

There is a progress in the dialectical dialogues as compared with the *Republic* only in the increasing appreciation of concrete facts and details, which less attracted his attention in the period of self-existing ideas.

But reason must be supreme.

Here we meet the same enthusiasm for the power of reason as in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*. He who has elected the life of a thinker is more divine than other men and remains, like a god, free from exuberant pleasures, as well as from the sorrow which usually follows such pleasures (33 A B : *τῷ τὸν τοῦ φρονεῖν ἑλομένῳ βίον οἶσθ' ὡς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει ζῆν . . . τὸν τοῦ μὴ χαίρειν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι . . . καὶ ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων ἐστὶ θειότατος . . . οὔκουν εἰκός γε οὔτε χαίρειν τοὺς θεοὺς οὔτε τὸ ἐναντίον*). The satisfaction given by knowledge is the purest pleasure in human life, free from the pain which mostly accompanies physiological pleasures (52 A B : *μαθημάτων πληρωθεῖσιν ἐὰν ὕστερον ἀποβολαὶ διὰ τῆς λήθης γίγνωνται . . . χωρὶς λύπης . . . λήθη γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε*). These pleasures of science are the privilege of a very small circle of men (52 B : *τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονὰς . . . ῥητέον . . . οὐδαμῶς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ τῶν σφόδρα ὀλίγων*). Every manifestation of intellectual life is better than sensual gratification for all those who are able to partake of it (11 B : *τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τὰ τούτων αὖ ξυγγενῆ, δόξαν τε ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθεῖς λογισμούς, τῆς γε ἡδονῆς ἀμείνω καὶ λῷω γίγνεσθαι ξύμπασιν, ὅσαπερ αὐτῶν δυνατὰ μεταλαβεῖν*).

All sages are agreed that reason reigns on earth and in heaven (28 C : *πάντες ξυμφωνοῦσιν οἱ σοφοί, ἑαυτοὺς ὄντως σεμνύνοντες, ὡς νοῦς ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς· καὶ ἴσως εὖ λέγουσι*). This rule of reason becomes manifest by the finality appearing in the magnificence of the universe (28 D : *τὰ ξύμπαντα καὶ τόδε τὸ καλούμενον ὅλον . . . νοῦν καὶ φρόνησίν τινα θαυμαστὴν συντάττουσαν διακυβερνᾶν . . . φάναι καὶ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἀστέρων καὶ πάσης τῆς περιφορᾶς ἄξιον*). The ultimate goal of this finality is a

self-sufficing aim, the Good (54 C: *τὸ μὴν οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ ἕνεκά του γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ γίγνοιτ' ἄν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι . . .* cf. 60 C). This is the union of beauty, measure, and truth (65 A). We see here a development of what had been said in the *Republic* on the idea of Good. There it was one and the highest idea, here the union of three ideas, one of which, the ideal measure (*ξυμμετρία* = *μετριότης* 64 E), has been introduced only in the *Politicus* (*μέτριον Polit.* 283 E, *Phileb.* 66 A corresponds to *μετριότης* which in that sense occurs besides *Philebus* 64 E, 65 B only in the *Laws* 701 E, 736 E, while in *Rep.* 560 D it has another meaning).

The final aim of Reason is the union of beauty, measure, truth, wherein dwells the Good.

Truth is the aim of each inquiry, and it must be found in agreement among investigators (14 B), not in their ambition to be each of them right against all others. This ambition is peculiar to youth, and is here described with incomparable humour and a certain benevolence which denotes an experienced teacher, accustomed to see many useless discussions among his pupils (15 D: *ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν· ὁ δὲ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ γευσάμενος ἑκάστοτε τῶν νέων, ἡσθεὶς ὥς τινα σοφίας εὑρηκὼς θησαυρόν, ὑφ' ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιᾷ τε καὶ πάντα κινεῖ λόγον ἄσμενος . . . εἰς ἀπορίαν αὑτὸν μὲν πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα καταβάλλων, δεύτερον δ' ἀεὶ τὸν ἐχόμενον . . .*). True wisdom consists in defining ideas and their relations, until we obtain a continuous system of notions from the highest 'one' down to the 'many' through measured degrees, subdividing each idea into the smallest number in order to give the detailed specification of each subdivision of the one (16 D: *δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς τούτων οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἑκάστοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν· εὑρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν· ἐὰν οὖν μεταλάβωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἴ πως εἰσί, σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἤ τινα ἄλλον ἀριθμόν, καὶ τῶν ἓν ἐκείνων ἕκαστον πάλιν ὡσαύτως, μέχριπερ ἂν τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἓν μὴ ὅτι ἓν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρά ἐστι μόνον ἴδῃ τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁπόσα*). This system of ideas is to be found in nature, as everything

Humorous description of juvenile logic.

A more complex ideal of definition.

has been arranged by reason, and our ideas are copies of the world's finality, existing in the maker's mind.

Natural kinds must be numbered and co-ordinated.

There is no longer any trace of an existence of ideas apart from souls and from particular things. Each idea is the result of the impression which the natural unity of a group of particulars produces in an observing soul. The faculty of thinking ideas is here a divine gift (16 C: *θεῶν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις*) and human imperfection consists in errors as to the number of the subdivisions which connect the one with the infinite many (16 D: *τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ προσφέρειν, πρὶν ἄν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδῃ τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἑνός*). Only gods herein attain perfection (16 E: *οἱ μὲν οὖν θεοὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν παρέδοσαν σκοπεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ διδάσκειν ἀλλήλους*), while even the wisest among men are liable to pass too rapidly or too slowly from the one to the infinity of particulars, through the ignorance of convenient middle terms (17 A: *οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ἓν μέν, ὅπως ἂν τύχωσι, τὰ πολλὰ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον ποιοῦσι τοῦ δέοντος, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἄπειρα εὐθύς· τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει, οἷς διακεχώρισται τό τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐριστικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους*).

Intermediate kinds: 'middle terms.'

Preparation for the theory of syllogism.

We see here for the first time the term *μέσον* used in its technical meaning as later accepted by Aristotle in his theory of syllogism. If we take into consideration that it would be entirely against Plato's view of literary composition to enumerate all possible figures of syllogism in a dialogue, as is done in Aristotle's treatise, it becomes quite possible and even probable that Aristotle's theory of syllogism was more than prepared by Plato. This point must remain unsettled so long as we have no independent testimonies of contemporaries. At all events, we see in the *Philebus* the same striving as in the preceding dialogues towards an universal system of sciences, and we are warned that the classification of ideas, being the most beautiful method and leading to all discoveries which have ever been made, is exceedingly difficult and full of per-

Difficulty of the true method.

plexities (16 B). Therefore a complete realisation of the proposed method, and the consequent reduction of all ideas to their highest aim, appears here as a tale heard in a sort of dream (20 B: *λόγων ποτέ τινων πάλαι ἀκούσας ὄναρ ἢ καὶ ἐγρηγορὼς νῦν ἐννοῶ περί τε ἡδονῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ὡς οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖν ἐστὶ τἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι τρίτον.* This is perhaps a reference to *Rep.* 505 B).

Careful distinction between truth and probability is recommended, and those arts and sciences in which certainty appears unattainable are deemed inferior (56 A: *πολὺ μεμιγμένον ἔχειν τὸ μὴ σαφές, σμικρὸν δὲ τὸ βέβαιον*— is said of music, medicine, agriculture, strategy, navigation, &c.). The highest perfection here as in the *Republic* is attributed to dialectic and mathematics (57 E: *τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν . . .* 58 A: *περὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως ἔγωγε οἶμαι ἡγεῖσθαι ξύμπαντας, ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν προσήρτηται, μακρῷ ἀληθεστάτην εἶναι γνῶσιν*—this after the recognition of mathematical sciences). The priority of dialectic or metaphysics as compared with all other sciences is so insisted upon, that it is difficult to guess on what possible misinterpretation of texts Horn built his contention that dialectic is despised in the *Philebus*. Plato repeats clearly that only dialectical objects or eternal ideas lead us to absolute certainty (59 C: *χρὴ . . . τόδε διαμαρτύρασθαι τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς ἡ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔσθ' ἡμῖν τό τε βέβαιον καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ὃ δὴ λέγομεν εἰλικρινές, περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἀμικτότατα ἔχοντα, ἢ ἐκείνων ὅ τι μάλιστά ἐστι ξυγγενές*). It is very important to observe that eternal ideas (*ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτά*) are not now separate, self-existing, or independent existences (*αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*) as they were in earlier dialogues. They are simply eternal, or always the same, because the true thoughts of a perfect being are not liable to change, and ideas are nothing else than ideal notions.

Dialectic is exalted, not despised.

Ideas *ἄτδια* but not *χωριστά*.

Natural science is represented as deficient in exactness, because it does not refer to eternal ideas, but to changing

Imperfection

attributed to physical science.

appearances (59 A) which are in time, not in eternity, and can never become an object of absolute knowledge (59 B: *τούτων οὖν τι σαφὲς ἂν φαῖμεν τῇ ἀκριβεστάτῃ ἀληθείᾳ γίγνεσθαι, ὧν μήτε ἔσχε μηδὲν πώποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ μήθ' ἕξει μήτε εἰς τὸ νῦν παρὸν ἔχει; . . . οὐδ' ἄρα νοῦς οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη περὶ αὐτά ἐστι τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἔχουσα*). This view agrees perfectly well with what has been said on that subject in the *Republic*, and also with the theoretical views of the dialogue which deals chiefly with natural science, the *Timaeus*. It was Plato's permanent conviction that the immense variety of the physical world did not admit of perfect knowledge. The distinction between theoretical and practical or pure and applied science is also here maintained (57 A–E), and illustrated by the example of mathematical units, which are absolutely equal to each other, while for technical purposes units really unequal are counted as equivalent (56 D E: *οἱ μὲν γάρ που μονάδας ἀνίσους καταριθμοῦνται τῶν περὶ ἀριθμόν, οἷον στρατόπεδα δύο καὶ βοῦς δύο καὶ δύο τὰ σμικρότατα ἢ καὶ τὰ πάντων μέγιστα· οἱ δ' οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῖς συνακολουθήσειαν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἑκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσάν τις θήσει*). This idea of unity in variety haunts Plato's mind here as in all the dialectical dialogues. He goes so far as to say that one who is not able to distinguish the quality and quantity of each kind and its opposite deserves no consideration whatever (19 B: *εἴδη . . . εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μή, καὶ ὁπόσα ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖα . . . μὴ δυνάμενοι κατὰ παντὸς ἑνὸς καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ ταὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου (δηλῶσαι) . . . οὐδεὶς εἰς οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἂν ἡμῶν οὐδέποτε γένοιτο ἄξιος*).

This view confirmed in the *Timaeus*.

Science pure and applied.

Qualitative and quantitative.

Genus and species.

The difference of genus and species is illustrated through many examples, and the species shown to be different and sometimes opposed within one genus (12 E: *γένει μέν ἐστι πᾶν ἕν, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐναντιώτατα ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ διαφορότητα ἔχοντα μυρίαν που τυγχάνει*). All the difficulties implied in the relation between the idea and particulars are repeated as it seems

with a clear reference to a similar exposition of these difficulties in the *Parmenides* (15 A: *ὅταν δέ τις ἕνα ἄνθρωπον ἐπιχειρῇ τίθεσθαι . . . περὶ τούτων τῶν ἑνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ πολλὴ ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται . . . πρῶτον μὲν εἴ τινας δεῖ τοιαύτας εἶναι μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὔσας· εἶτα πῶς αὖ ταύτας, μίαν ἑκάστην οὖσαν ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μήτε γένεσιν μήτε ὄλεθρον προσδεχομένην, ὅμως εἶναι βεβαιότατα μίαν ταύτην*). Here is a very clear indication that a separate existence of ideas is deemed impossible (15 B: *μετὰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὖ καὶ ἀπείροις εἴτε διεσπασμένην καὶ πολλὰ γεγονυῖαν θετέον, εἴθ' ὅλην αὐτὴν αὑτῆς χωρίς, ὃ δὴ πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον φαίνοιτ' ἄν, ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἅμα ἐν ἑνί τε καὶ πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι*). As in the *Sophist*, the theory of ideas is introduced objectively, and not directly supported by the leader of the conversation, at least nothing is decided about the difficulties referred to. Throughout the dialogue the terms used for ideas have no other meaning than ideal notions, as is the case everywhere after the *Parmenides*. The nature of thought requires the union of notions into higher units, and this constitutes an eternal necessity of the human mind (15 D). The absolute unity of knowledge is not prevented by many differences and even partial oppositions between sciences (13 E: *πολλαί τε αἱ ξυνάπασαι ἐπιστῆμαι δόξουσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοιοί τινες αὐτῶν ἀλλήλαις· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐναντίαι πῃ γίγνονταί τινες, ἆρα ἄξιος ἂν εἴην τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι νῦν, εἰ φοβηθεὶς τοῦτο αὐτὸ μηδεμίαν ἀνόμοιον φαίην ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμῃ γίγνεσθαι;*). On the other side, we need not attempt a reconciliation of all contradictions (13 A: *τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πίστευε, τῷ πάντα τὰ ἐναντιώτατα ἓν ποιοῦντι*).

Abstract and concrete unity.

Ideally but not really separable.

The unity of knowledge embraces sciences diverse and even opposed.

Sense perception is explained as a motion common to body and soul, whereby the theory presented in the *Theaetetus* is repeated and accepted (34 A: *τὸ δ' ἐν ἑνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινῇ γιγνόμενον κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην δ' αὖ τὴν κίνησιν ὀνομάζων αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου φθέγγοι' ἄν*). But the soul can become indif-

The theory of sensation is further developed.

ferent to the action of the body, and then receives no sensations (33 E: *ὅταν (ἡ ψυχὴ) ἀπαθὴς γίγνηται τῶν σεισμῶν τῶν τοῦ σώματος, ἀναισθησίαν ἐπονόμασον*). In that state the soul retains the faculty of repeating by its own power the qualitative changes it had undergone on former occasions through the action of the body's movements, and thus reminiscence needs not the co-operation of the body (34 B: *ὅταν ἃ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπασχέ ποθ' ἡ ψυχή, ταῦτ' ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀναλαμβάνῃ, τότε ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαί που λέγομεν*). Sensation and memory are the faculties on which opinions rest (38 B: *ἐκ μνήμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως δόξα ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ διαδοξάζειν ἐγχειρεῖν γίγνεθ' ἑκάστοτε*); our judgments exist in our thought before we give them an expression in words (38 E, cf. *Soph.* 264 A). Plato insists on the faculty of thought as independent of words and of sense perceptions. We are able to represent to ourselves all past perceptions at our will, and such images do not require the co-operation of the organs of sense (39 B). The origin of error is here, as in the *Theaetetus*, attributed to indistinct sensations (38 C: *πολλάκις ἰδόντι τινὶ πόρρωθεν μὴ πάνυ σαφῶς τὰ καθορώμενα ξυμβαίνειν βούλεσθαι κρίνειν φαίης ἂν ταῦθ' ἅπερ ὁρᾷ*).

Sensation, memory, reminiscence.

Comparison and judgment.

Thought independent of language.

The possibility of knowledge is founded on the fundamental similarity between each individual soul and the world's soul from which all individual souls are derived, and in which all our notions exist in far greater perfection (30 A: *τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα ἆρ' οὐ ψυχὴν φήσομεν ἔχειν;—δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν.—πόθεν λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ τό γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὂν ἐτύγχανε ταὐτά γε ἔχον τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πάντῃ καλλίονα;—δῆλον.ὡς οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν*). Our soul is compared to a book, in which memory and sense-perception inscribe opinions and judgments (39 A: *ἡ μνήμη ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ξυμπίπτουσα εἰς ταὐτόν, κἀκεῖνα ἃ περὶ ταὐτά ἐστι τὰ παθήματα, φαίνονταί μοι σχεδὸν οἷον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τότε λόγους*). It may be taken for granted that these opinions remain for Plato essentially different

The human soul similar to the Divine.

Judgments are inscribed on the soul.

from dialectical knowledge. The ideal of knowledge is in no way lowered, as can be seen from the above quotations on dialectic, but it is more and more looked upon as divine and opposed to mere human opinions. Our souls are copies of the world's soul, our notions repeat God's ideas, our knowledge finds out the Creator's final aim. Thus ideas remain eternal, though they have lost their supramundane existence, and are to be sought and found only in souls.

Human knowledge may approximate to the Divine ideas.

There is no substantial difference of doctrine between the *Philebus* and *Politicus*, and both belong most probably to the same time. Only in some points the *Philebus* appears to refer more or less clearly to the *Politicus*:

The *Politicus* and *Philebus* represent the same stage of Plato's thought.

1. The division of sciences into theoretical and practical (57 A–E) appears here more familiar than in the *Politicus* (258 E).

2. The world's soul has been introduced in the *Politicus* (270 A), and is mentioned in the *Philebus* (30 A) as a matter of course.

3. The absolute measure (τὸ μέτριον) is explained as a new notion in the *Politicus* (284 E), while it is here applied (66 A).

These tests are, however, not decisive, and only further stylistic research can lead us to settle the question of priority between these two dialogues, a question which appears not to have a great importance for the understanding of Plato's philosophy so long as both are admitted to be later than the *Sophist*. The difficulty implied in the union of many different predicates with one subject, which has been specially investigated in the *Sophist*, is here mentioned (14 D) in a manner which seems to point to the discussions of the *Sophist*. The relation of the *Philebus* to the *Parmenides* need not be insisted on here, as it is recognised even by Zeller, as well as by many other investigators, including those who have denied the authenticity of the *Philebus*, as for instance Schaarschmidt. Also the question of the relation be-

Priority between *Philebus* and *Politicus* not yet determined with certainty.

Relation to the *Parmenides* and to the *Republic*.

Zeller thought that the *Republic* quoted the *Philebus*, but the *Philebus* makes no reference to the φρόνησις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ so pointedly mentioned in *Rep.* 505 c.

tween the *Republic* and *Philebus* need hardly be discussed, although Zeller persists in arguing that the *Republic* is later. This view has been refuted recently by Siebeck,[266] and Zeller has never accounted for the fact that the chief reference in the *Republic* to the question whether pleasure or reason is the good mentions a difficulty which is not found at all in the *Philebus*, namely, that the defenders of reason are obliged to confess at last that the sought-for φρόνησις is φρόνησις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (*Rep.* 505 B), a position which is declared to be ridiculous (γελοίως). This looks like a criticism of some philosophical opponent who is difficult to identify, and not like a quotation from the *Philebus*. We have seen above that the *Philebus* shows in every respect a later stage of thought than the *Republic*, and stylistic comparisons have made it so evident, that no reasonable doubts remain for those who know Plato's style. Stylistically the *Philebus* is nearest to the *Politicus*, the collected evidence being insufficient to decide with certainty which of the two is later. If we take into consideration the close connection of the *Politicus* with the *Sophist*, and the few points on which the contents of the *Politicus* allow a comparison with the *Philebus*, it becomes very probable that this dialogue is the latest in the dialectical group, to which it naturally belongs.

The *Philebus* probably the latest of the dialectical dialogues.

New dialectic.

Characteristics of the dialectical dialogues. Classification.

The ideas not self-existent.

If now we resume the logical theories of the three dialogues following the *Parmenides*, we observe that their chief peculiarity is the great importance given to division and classification. These logical operations apply here to notions of the human mind, which are similar to the divine ideas. Ideas are no longer self-existing, but exist in the divine mind, and from thence pass to our souls through the observation of concrete particulars. The material world is built up according to God's ideas, and we have to find them out by comparisons and distinctions

of particulars. This credits the external world with an existence which is other than the existence of ideas and of souls. Plato first recognised this double meaning of existence, whereby he advanced far beyond his predecessors. The new dialectic is distinguished from middle Platonism and the earlier theory of ideas by the greater importance attached to particulars. No explanation of the universe is accepted as sufficient, unless it accounts for the smallest and most insignificant detail as well as for the greatest ideas. The unity of all existence is no longer an abstract unity, but a summit built up on the widest basis of the universal experience of mankind, to which each investigator has power to contribute according to his own aptitudes. The attempt made first in the *Theaetetus* to enumerate the highest categories is maintained and carried further throughout the dialectical dialogues. A worship of method, unknown in earlier Platonism, is here predominant over all particular subjects of inquiry. The influence of a long and successful educational activity is visible at every step of the argument, and the final aim of an universal knowledge of all reality is sought through constant logical training and reflections on the method of inquiry.

Reality of the external world, ordered according to God's ideas. Importance of particulars. Knowledge based on universal experience. Enumeration of categories. Importance of method.

CHAPTER IX

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF PLATO'S THOUGHT

WHILE our view of the way leading Plato from the *Protagoras* to the *Philebus* appeared as the result of difficult chronological investigations, and needs still many confirmations before it is generally accepted, there is an almost universal agreement as to the final stage of Plato's philosophy. All critics have unanimously recognised the *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and *Laws* as the latest works of Plato, and there is in this respect scarcely any difference between the representatives of the most diverging views on Plato's chronology. The reasons of this unanimity are found in the peculiar contents of these works, their relation to other earlier writings of Plato, and also in direct testimonies of Aristotle and other witnesses as to the very late date of the *Laws*, to which the *Timaeus* and the *Critias* fragment are nearest in style and doctrine. Campbell has found in *Timaeus* and *Critias* eighty-one words which besides these dialogues are found only in the *Laws* and form so many peculiarities of latest style, absent even from the dialectical dialogues. There are also some important points of theory in which the *Timaeus* coincides with the *Laws* only. Thus for instance the representation of the stars as bodies belonging to perfect divine souls (*Tim.* 41 D, *Legg.* 899 B), and the enumeration of more than two kinds of motion (*Tim.* 43 B, *Legg.* 894 D) are important views not found anywhere else in Plato. It is, perhaps, not quite accidental that both in the *Timaeus* (20 A) and in the *Laws* (638 B) Locris, not mentioned elsewhere

The latest group: *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Laws*.

Coincidences of style and contents.

by Plato, is highly praised, and it may well have a personal explanation in connection with the third voyage to Sicily, or with the tyrannis of Dionysius in Locri (356 B.C.); also Tyrrhenia is mentioned only in the three latest dialogues (*Tim.* 25 B, *Critias* 114 C, *Legg.* 738 C). The number of stylistic peculiarities common to *Timaeus* and *Laws*, and peculiar to this group, is very much more considerable than is shown in our reduced list of 500 marks of style, because with a few exceptions such peculiarities as are common only to a very few dialogues have been excluded. Still it is easy to see that some peculiarities of the *Laws* are found nowhere else than in the *Timaeus* or *Critias*. Such are *πρέπον ἂν εἴη* (312), *καθ' ὕπνον* (432), *θορυβώδης* (278), *οἰστρώδης* (268), and some peculiar uses of *τε* (230, 233, 235). It would be easy to increase this list of peculiarities of the latest style of Plato to any extent, but in view of the universal agreement as to the very late date of *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and *Laws*, it is not necessary to insist any more on this subject. The *Critias* being a fragment and a close continuation of the *Timaeus*, we have really only two works to consider in this group: *Timaeus* and *Laws*.

I. *The Timaeus.*

There are very few logical elements in the *Timaeus*. Here true and probable opinion takes a larger place than in the dialectical dialogues, but the decisive and irreducible difference between such beliefs and perfect knowledge is emphatically maintained (51 D: *νοῦς καὶ δόξα ἀληθής . . . δύο λεκτέον, διότι χωρὶς γεγόνατον ἀνομοίως τε ἔχετον*). Knowledge is imparted by teaching, opinion by rhetoric, knowledge is unchangeable, opinion easily overthrown, knowledge is a divine privilege of a few philosophers, opinion a common faculty of all men (51 E: *τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν διὰ διδαχῆς, τὸ δ' ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ μετ' ἀληθοῦς λόγου, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον πειθοῖ, τὸ δὲ μεταπειστόν· καὶ τοῦ μὲν πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν*

Natural science a work of human opinion, imperfectly approximating to Divine knowledge.

φατέον, νοῦ δὲ θεούς, ἀνθρώπων δὲ γένος βραχύ τι). The ideas which exist in reason eternally are the object of knowledge (27 E: *τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον . . . νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν*), and reason occurs only in souls (30 B: *νοῦν . . . χωρὶς ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον παραγενέσθαι τῳ*). This close relation between soul and knowledge is here insisted upon as in the *Sophist*, and makes it evident that Plato no longer dreamed of separate ideas. He says repeatedly that knowledge and reason cannot exist out of a soul (37 C: *νοῦς ἐπιστήμη τε . . . ἐν ᾧ τῶν ὄντων ἐγγίγνεσθον, ἄν ποτέ τις αὐτὸ ἄλλο πλὴν ψυχὴν εἴπῃ, πᾶν μᾶλλον ἢ τἀληθὲς ἐρεῖ . . .* 46 D: *τῶν γὰρ ὄντων ᾧ νοῦν μόνῳ κτᾶσθαι προσήκει, λεκτέον ψυχήν*).

If the ideas could exist independently, then they would form also an objective system of knowledge, and Plato need not have credited the soul with such an importance in relation to the progress of science. For him the objectivity of knowledge has its only basis in the common origin and similar power of all existing souls. Every soul is anterior to the body, and rules over it (34 C: *γενέσει καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος ὡς δεσπότιν καὶ ἄρξουσαν ἀρξομένου ξυνεστήσατο . . .*). There is an apparent contradiction in the explanation of the relation between soul and space. Once the soul is said to be in the body (30 B: *ψυχὴν ἐν σώματι ξυνιστὰς τὸ πᾶν ξυνετεκταίνετο*) and then to contain the body and to extend through space or to include it (36 D E: *ἐπεὶ κατὰ νοῦν τῷ ξυνιστάντι πᾶσα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ξύστασις ἐγεγένητο, μετὰ τοῦτο πᾶν τὸ σωματοειδὲς ἐντὸς αὐτῆς ἐτεκταίνετο καὶ μέσον μέσῃ ξυναγαγὼν προσήρμοττεν*). The latter view refers clearly to the world's soul, which animates the universe just as each individual soul animates our individual bodies (30 B C: *τὸν κόσμον ζῶον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν*). But it must be remembered that the whole creation of the world-soul and of individual souls is here given as a myth (30 B: *κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν*), and admits of various interpretation.

Priority of soul.

The great philosophical thought here illustrated is the perfect unity of the universe, which is represented as the result of an ordering and over-mastering power of a God over a primitive indefinite and chaotic matter. There cannot be a multiplicity of worlds, argues Plato, because the true world is only that which contains everything according to God's conception of a perfect whole (31 A: *πότερον οὖν ὀρθῶς ἕνα οὐρανὸν προσειρήκαμεν, ἢ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπείρους λέγειν ἦν ὀρθότερον; ἕνα, εἴπερ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα δεδημιουργημένος ἔσται*). If several worlds were imagined, one idea of a universe containing them all would still be needed, and thus the whole forms one unique universe (31 B: *ἵνα οὖν τόδε κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν ὅμοιον ᾖ τῷ παντελεῖ ζώῳ, διὰ ταῦτα οὔτε δύο οὔτ' ἀπείρους ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιῶν κόσμους, ἀλλ' εἷς ὅδε μονογενὴς οὐρανὸς γεγονὼς ἔστι τε καὶ ἔτ' ἔσται*, cf. 92 B). Out of the earlier world of ideas existing by themselves and influencing all appearances, there is only one left now, and so transformed that it is scarcely recognisable. It is the idea of the Good transformed into the good Demiurge, whom we ought not to call really a Creator, because he orders the world only out of a pre-existing chaos, without calling into existence anything that was not before. This Demiurge is outside the world, and different from the world's soul. He imparts to the world its shape and present nature, abiding thereafter in his own eternal peace (42 E: *ὁ μὲν δὴ ἅπαντα ταῦτα διατάξας ἔμενεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ἤθει*).

Unity of the world.

The Demiurge and the Good.

This conception of a God, who dwells at a height above the world ordered by him, is common to the *Timaeus* with the *Politicus* (272 E: *τοῦ παντὸς ὁ μὲν κυβερνήτης, οἷον πηδαλίων οἴακος ἀφέμενος, εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ περιωπὴν ἀπέστη, τὸν δὲ δὴ κόσμον πάλιν ἀνέστρεφεν εἱμαρμένη τε καὶ ξύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία*), where also the contrast between blind necessity and divine rule has been first recognised. God's self-contemplation of the *Politicus* has been here developed into an invariable peace. The difference between *Politicus* and *Timaeus* consists in a more complete sepa-

Time and Eternity.

ration of time and eternity. While in the *Politicus* divine rule and the power of necessity alternated in time, and thus formed consecutive periods, we have here an eternal permanent influence of divine rule opposed to the working of necessity in time. The Demiurge of the *Timaeus* (cf. *Rep.* 530 A: *τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δημιουργός*, also 597 B C) is good and free from envy, desiring to make everything as like himself as possible (29 E: *ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τούτου δ' ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα ὅ τι μάλιστα γενέσθαι ἐβουλήθη παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ*). He is the best of all causes (29 A: *ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων*), and it is difficult for us to find him out, more difficult still to explain him to others if they are unable to find him by their own reason (28 C: *τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν*). His influence is compared to the free conviction of one soul by another, not to the necessary action of one body on another (48 A: *νοῦ δὲ ἀνάγκης ἄρχοντος τῷ πείθειν αὐτὴν τῶν γιγνομένων τὰ πλεῖστα ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον ἄγειν, ταύτῃ κατὰ ταὐτά τε δι' ἀνάγκης ἡττωμένης ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἔμφρονος οὕτω κατ' ἀρχὰς ξυνίστατο τόδε τὸ πᾶν . . .* 56 C: *ὅπῃπερ ἡ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἑκοῦσα πεισθεῖσά τε φύσις ὑπεῖκε*). He is supposed to have found already in existence matter with its necessary forces and movements (30 A: *πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, ἡγησάμενος ἐκεῖνο τούτου πάντως ἄμεινον*), but this is not necessarily to be understood as occurring in time, otherwise it would contradict one of the most important axioms of latest Platonism, the priority of soul.

God is unenvious and rules through free conviction.

For a correct interpretation of the story of creation as told in the *Timaeus* we must constantly keep in mind that it is a mythical and allegorical exposition, which from the outset does not pretend to be true, but only similar to truth. Plato having reached his

The whole discourse is mythical, 'similar to truth':

view of an eternal existence out of time, can scarcely have believed in a beginning of the world in time. If he represents the divine reason as introducing order in the chaotic world of matter, he does not mean that this chaotic disorder had a temporal priority. He only wishes to impress upon the reader's mind the truth that wherever order and reason are found, they ought to be ascribed to divine influence, the origin of all order and thought (30 A B: *θέμις δὲ οὔτ' ἦν οὔτ' ἔστι τῷ ἀρίστῳ δρᾷν ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ κάλλιστον· λογισάμενος . . . νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐν σώματι ξυνιστὰς τὸ πᾶν ξυνετεκταίνετο, ὅπως ὅ τι κάλλιστον εἴη κατὰ φύσιν ἄριστόν τε ἔργον ἀπειργασμένος*).

the action is not to be understood as happening in time.

Taking this for granted, we shall easily recognise that the ideas were nothing else for Plato when he wrote the *Timaeus* than God's thoughts. We see that he re-repeatedly represents the ideas as included in thought (28 A: *νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν* . . . 29 A: *λόγῳ καὶ φρονήσει περιληπτόν*). They are always the same (28 A: *ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτά*, cf. 29 A, 38 A, &c.) and unchangeable, because they have no beginning nor end, nor existence in time (38 A: *τὸ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον ἀκινήτως οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον προσήκει γίγνεσθαι διὰ χρόνου οὐδὲ γενέσθαι ποτὲ οὐδὲ γεγονέναι νῦν οὐδ' εἰσαῦθις ἔσεσθαι*), nor participation of any kind in particulars, being inaccessible to the senses, but evident to reason (52 A: *τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ εἶδος ἔχον, ἀγένητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, οὔτε εἰς ἑαυτὸ εἰσδεχόμενον ἄλλα ἄλλοθεν οὔτε αὐτὸ εἰς ἄλλο ποι ἰόν, ἀόρατον δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἀναίσθητον, τοῦτο ὃ δὴ νόησις εἴληχεν ἐπισκοπεῖν*). The eternal nature of ideas is expressed by various terms: they are *ἀΐδια* (29 A, 37 D) or have a *φύσις αἰώνιος* (37 D) whereby their separate existence in time is recognised to be impossible. Their function is to be eternal models of thought, first existent in God's mind, then reproduced in the investigating souls of men. The term *παράδειγμα* is now constantly applied to ideas (28 A, 37 C, 39 E, 48 E, &c.); they are the models according to which the Demiurge has brought order in the world, and we are

The ideas of the *Timaeus* are God's thoughts, and are out of Time.

They are models or patterns of our best thoughts

and of natural kinds.

able to recognise these models by our own soul's activity. This applies more especially to the natural types which form the limits and definition of each kind of animals.

Animated Beings.

The conception of an animal or animated body becomes more prominent here than ever before. Not only the whole world is an animal, but also each star is the body of a divine animal or a god, distinguished from all other animals by its subtle matter (fire), by the perfection of its spherical shape, and by the great regularity of its movements (40 A: *τοῦ μὲν οὖν θείου τὴν πλείστην ἰδέαν ἐκ πυρὸς ἀπειργάζετο . . . νείμας περὶ πάντα κύκλῳ τὸν οὐρανόν . . . κινήσεις δὲ δύο προσῆψεν ἑκάστῳ, τὴν μὲν ἐν ταὐτῷ κατὰ ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ διανοουμένῳ, τὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ὑπὸ τῆς ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίου περιφορᾶς κρατουμένῳ*).

Conditional immortality.

It is exceedingly important for the understanding of latest Platonism that even these perfect gods with perfect souls are no longer conceived as absolutely immortal by their own nature; they owe their permanence to the Demiurge's personal will (41 A: the Demiurge speaks: *θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, ἃ δι' ἐμοῦ γενόμενα ἄλυτα ἐμοῦ γε μὴ ἐθέλοντος*). We see here a theory which to some extent was already implied in the *Phaedrus*: only the simple substance is indestructible, all compounds being reducible to their elements, and subsisting only through the divine influence. The last consequence of this view had not been drawn in the *Phaedrus*: there the human soul, with its three parts, existed indefinitely; here a mortal part of the soul is distinguished from its immortal part. To this mortal part belongs nearly everything that constitutes personal character: pleasure and pain, courage and fear, anger and hope, perception and love (69 C: *ἄλλο τε εἶδος ψυχῆς προσῳκοδόμουν τὸ θνητόν, δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἐν ἑαυτῷ παθήματα ἔχον*). A vague distinction of a divine and a human or animal part of the soul was occasionally touched upon in the *Politicus* (309 C: *τὸ ἀειγενὲς ὂν τῆς*

The mortal soul of the *Timaeus*.

Anticipated in *Polit.* 309 C.

ψυχῆς αὐτῶν μέρος θείῳ ξυναρμοσαμένη δεσμῷ, μετὰ δὲ τὸ θεῖον τὸ ζωογενὲς αὐτῶν αὖθις ἀνθρωπίνοις), but only here we find a nearer explanation of this difference which exceeds in importance all previous partitions of the soul.

The mortal part corresponds to the two earlier inferior divisions, with the difference that *αἴσθησις* combined with *ἔρως* takes the place of *ἐπιθυμία*, and that *θυμός* holds a lower rank than formerly (42 A: *πρῶτον μὲν αἴσθησιν ἀναγκαῖον εἴη μίαν πᾶσιν ἐκ βιαίων παθημάτων ξύμφυτον γίγνεσθαι, δεύτερον δὲ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ μεμιγμένον ἔρωτα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φόβον καὶ θυμὸν ὅσα τε ἑπόμενα αὐτοῖς καὶ ὁπόσα ἐναντίως πέφυκε διεστηκότα*). The lower part of the soul occupies the lowest part of the body, and is common to men with other animals and plants (77 B: *μετέχει . . . τοῦτο . . . τοῦ τρίτου ψυχῆς εἴδους, ὃ μεταξὺ φρενῶν ὀμφαλοῦ τε ἱδρῦσθαι λόγος, ᾧ δόξης μὲν λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ μέτεστι τὸ μηδέν, αἰσθήσεως δὲ ἡδείας καὶ ἀλγεινῆς μετὰ ἐπιθυμιῶν*).

Re-incarnation.

It is very remarkable that the successive incarnations of the immortal part of the soul are maintained, with the supposition that in each incarnation the lower activities grow with the body. Thus it is admitted that not only the same soul is repeatedly incarnated on earth in the shape of men or women, but also the possibility of a descent into the form of lower animals is left (42 B C).

The immortal principle of thought located in the head.

Under these circumstances nothing remains for the immortal part of the soul except the abstract conception of a principle (*ἀρχή* 42 E), as already formed in the *Phaedrus* with special reference to motion. A place in the body is assigned to this immortal soul in the head (69 E) in order to keep it apart from lower tendencies. Knowledge is the only activity of this immortal principle, which is the divine element in man (90 D: *τῷ δ' ἐν ἡμῖν θείῳ ξυγγενεῖς εἰσὶ κινήσεις αἱ τοῦ παντὸς διανοήσεις καὶ περιφοραί*).

Knowledge the supreme aim.

The ultimate aim is here as in the *Phaedo* and *Theaetetus* to become as like God as possible, only here feelings and even virtues appear to be excluded from the divine perfection, for which only pure knowledge is left. This

is the result of the dialectical construction of universal science. As knowledge was the starting point of Socratic Platonism, it becomes the final aim of Plato's life. The same idea of intellectual exercise which had such importance from the *Parmenides* onwards is also here the predominant factor in reaching the aims of knowledge, being identified with a kind of movement which corresponds to the best part of the soul (89 E, cf. 90 B). These movements produce the various categories of reason, which are here more fully enumerated than in the *Sophist*, being very closely similar to the Aristotelian list of categories :

Categories of Reason.

Tim. 37 A B : (ἡ ψυχή) . . . λέγει κινουμένη διὰ πάσης ἑαυτῆς, ὅτῳ τ' ἄν τι ταὐτὸν ᾖ καὶ ὅτου ἂν ἕτερον, πρὸς ὅ τί τε μάλιστα καὶ ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως καὶ ὁπότε ξυμβαίνει κατὰ τὰ γιγνόμενά τε πρὸς ἕκαστον ἕκαστα εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν καὶ πρὸς τὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντα ἀεί.

Arist. *Categoriae* 1 b 25 : τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἤτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ κεῖσθαι ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν : cf. *Topic.* 103 b 20, and above, pp. 368–369, on the categories in *Theaet.*

For Plato these are the highest kinds of ideas, while Aristotle looks upon the categories as chief kinds of words. But the conception of categories, as later understood in the history of philosophy, we owe to Plato. He explains in the *Timaeus* our faculty of judging all existence through the recognised identity of substance in all souls. The familiar distinction between judgment as an act of the soul and the sentence as an expression of judgment recurs here also (37 B : λόγος . . . ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ ὑφ' αὑτοῦ φερόμενος ἄνευ φθόγγου καὶ ἠχῆς) and judgment includes opinion as well as knowledge (37 C : δόξαι καὶ πίστεις . . . νοῦς ἐπιστήμη τε). The reason acts by distinctions, and requires for the full development of its activity a certain limitation of the stream of bodily changes (44 B).

Judgment and sentence. Control of bodily conditions necessary to thought.

Antenatal vision of

Each soul is supposed to have seen once the nature of the whole universe and the moral laws which thus are an innate possession of each individual (41 E : διεῖλε

ψυχὰς ἰσαρίθμους τοῖς ἄστροις, ἔνειμέ θ' ἑκάστην πρὸς ἕκαστον, καὶ ἐμβιβάσας ὡς ἐς ὄχημα τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἔδειξε, νόμους τε τοὺς εἱμαρμένους εἶπεν αὐταῖς). It is highly characteristic of Platonic logic that such knowledge does not refer to the physical occurrences in the world, as to which Plato has only to offer uncertain opinions and probabilities which do not even pretend to be consistent or to attain any exactness (29 C: *ἐὰν οὖν πολλὰ πολλῶν εἰπόντων περὶ θεῶν καὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως, μὴ δυνατοὶ γιγνώμεθα πάντῃ πάντως αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ὁμολογουμένους λόγους καὶ ἀπηκριβωμένους ἀποδοῦναι, μὴ θαυμάσῃς*). Full knowledge as to these things must be left to God, while men must be satisfied with probable myths and ought not to search further (29 D). Physical investigation is held to be only a convenient pastime in moments when we are tired of metaphysical inquiry (59 C). The same uncertainty refers to empirical psychology as well as to general physics (72 D: *τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς, ὅσον θνητὸν ἔχει καὶ ὅσον θεῖον, καὶ ὅπῃ, καὶ μεθ' ὧν, καὶ δι' ἃ χωρὶς ᾠκίσθη, τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ὡς εἴρηται, θεοῦ ξυμφήσαντος τότ' ἂν οὕτω μόνως διισχυριζοίμεθα*).

Truth and Good. Physical occurrences into which human beings must not inquire too curiously are matters of opinion.

The sensible world consists of appearances which are becoming and changing without true permanent existence (28 A: *δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν*). The physical universe, like everything that is material, had a beginning (28 B: *σκεπτέον . . . πότερον ἦν ἀεί, γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχων οὐδεμίαν, ἢ γέγονεν, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινὸς ἀρξάμενος. γέγονεν· ὁρατὸς γὰρ ἁπτός τέ ἐστι καὶ σῶμα ἔχων, πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα αἰσθητά, τὰ δ' αἰσθητά, δόξῃ περιληπτὰ μετ' αἰσθήσεως, γιγνόμενα καὶ γεννητὰ ἐφάνη*). But if Plato adds later that the world did not begin in time but together with time, leaving it open whether both will have an end (38 B: *χρόνος δ' οὖν μετ' οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, ἵνα ἅμα γεννηθέντες ἅμα καὶ λυθῶσιν, ἄν ποτε λύσις τις αὐτῶν γίγνηται*), he authorises us to interpret the beginning of the world not as a temporal beginning, but a relation of dependence of

Every thing that is material had a beginning; but only in the sense that it is dependent on Divine Power. The material

world is made in the likeness of an eternal pattern.

the material world on a divine power. Physical appearances are represented as an imitation or an image of the eternal ideas (29 B: *πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τόνδε τὸν κόσμον εἰκόνα τινὸς εἶναι*, cf. 49 A: *μίμημα παραδείγματος, γένεσιν ἔχον καὶ ὁρατόν*).

The ideas seem to be chiefly limited to natural kinds, and do not include some of the most general physical notions which are investigated in the *Timaeus* with special care, namely time, space, matter, and causality. The analysis of these notions is not without logical importance and therefore deserves our attention. Time is a moving image of the eternal nature of ideas, and is placed into close relation with the movements of stars (37 D: *εἰκὼ δ' ἐπινοεῖ κινητόν τινα αἰῶνος ποιῆσαι, καὶ διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτον ὃν δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν*). This acts in obedience to a very primitive consideration: days, months, and years are made by the celestial movements, and as they are parts of Time, Plato infers that Time itself is a product of those movements (37 E: *ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἐνιαυτούς, οὐκ ὄντας πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι, τότε ἅμα ἐκείνῳ ξυνισταμένῳ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν μηχανᾶται· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα μέρη χρόνου, καὶ τό τ' ἦν τό τ' ἔσται χρόνου γεγονότα εἴδη*). Thus Plato did not reach the abstract conception of time, and knew only concrete durations measured by physical movements.

General physical notions: Time, Space, Matter, Causality.

Conception of Space.

More elaborate is the conception of space, which Plato introduces as co-ordinated to ideas and their images at a later stage of the inquiry, expressly avowing that he had omitted it at the beginning (49 A: *τρίτον δὲ τότε μὲν οὐ διειλόμεθα, νομίσαντες τὰ δύο ἕξειν ἱκανῶς*). He finds this notion very difficult to explain, and unlike Time, Space is admitted to exist before matter, being necessary for the reception of matter into being (49 A: *πάσης εἶναι γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν αὐτὴν οἷον τιθήνην*). The imagined identity of all matter is here the starting point (49 B), based on the observation that water becomes ice as well as

steam, or air, which is supposed to be susceptible of a change into fire (49 C), thus forming a circle of transformations. From the fact of transformations the unreality of appearances is inferred, and the reality underlying them is found in the notion of space, free from any determining quality (49 E). Plato's fondness for proportions and analogies finds here also an opportunity for display. Space has the same relation to matter as matter to form (50 A). Thus, if various forms were given to one and the same matter, for instance gold, each particular object could best be named gold, and not according to its special changing form. In a similar manner space remains always the same, however different qualities of matter might fill it. Here we see Plato advancing to a more abstract notion than he had of time, and he feels the difficulty of explaining it. He calls it by different names, beginning with *δύναμις* (49 A, 50 B) and *φύσις* (50 B), and ending with *χώρα* (52 A). It is *τὰ πάντα δεχομένη σώματα φύσις* (50 B), *πάσης γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴ οἷον τιθήνη* (49 A), *τὸ ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται* (50 C). Space has no shape, but appears differently according to the phenomena occurring in it (50 C: *δέχεταί τε ἀεὶ τὰ πάντα, καὶ μορφὴν οὐδεμίαν ποτὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν εἰσιόντων ὁμοίαν εἴληφεν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς*). It is not an idea, nor imitates any idea (50 E: *ἄμορφον ὂν ἐκείνων ἁπασῶν τῶν ἰδεῶν, ὅσας μέλλοι δέχεσθαί ποθεν . . . πάντων ἐκτὸς εἶναι χρεὼν τὸ τὰ πάντα ἐκδεξόμενον ἐν αὑτῷ γένη*). Its relation to the ideas is recognised to be most difficult to explain (51 A: *ἀνόρατον εἶδός τι καὶ ἄμορφον, πανδεχές, μεταλαμβάνον δὲ ἀπορώτατά πῃ τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ δυσαλωτότατον αὐτὸ λέγοντες οὐ ψευσόμεθα*). Space is conceived not by the senses, nor by pure reason, but by a kind of fictitious inference which has however a necessary character (52 A B: *γένος ὂν τὸ τῆς χώρας ἀεί, φθορὰν οὐ προσδεχόμενον, ἕδραν δὲ παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν, αὐτὸ δὲ μετ' ἀναισθησίας ἁπτὸν λογισμῷ τινὶ νόθῳ, μόγις πιστόν, πρὸς ὃ δὴ καὶ ὀνειροπολοῦμεν βλέποντες καί φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί που τὸ ὂν ἅπαν ἔν τινι τόπῳ καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινά*). Space has been thus

Space void of qualities.

Notion of Space more abstract than of Time.

Matter.

represented as an indispensable condition of matter, though essentially differing from matter. The difference consists in the entire absence of quality in space, while matter is held to be always qualified.

To illustrate the relation of space to matter, Plato uses many metaphors taken from the impregnation of one matter by another. Thus various perfumes can be communicated to an oil which has no smell by itself, various shapes to a shapeless clay (50 E). The chief kinds of matter, as earth, water, air, and fire, can be changed into one another (49 B), and existed in space before the Demiurge set to work (52 D). The different qualities of matter are only appearances resulting from a variety of movements (52 D). There are amid all the mythical fictions of the *Timaeus* some wonderful glimpses of deep insight which betray Plato's genius. Thus he speaks about invisible matter and its infinitely small elements (56 C : *διὰ σμικρότητα οὐδὲν ὁρώμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν*), about the stream of matter passing through our body (43 A : *ἐπίρρυτον σῶμα καὶ ἀπόρρυτον*), about the spermatozoa, which he seems to have divined many centuries before their actual discovery (91 C : *μέχριπερ ἂν ἑκατέρων ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ ἔρως ξυνδιαγαγόντες . . . ὡς εἰς ἄρουραν τὴν μήτραν ἀόρατα ὑπὸ σμικρότητος καὶ ἀδιάπλαστα ζῷα κατασπείραντες καὶ πάλιν διακρίναντες μεγάλα ἐντὸς ἐκθρέψωνται καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς φῶς ἀγαγόντες ζῴων ἀποτελέσωσι γένεσιν*). By a strange divination he calmly teaches us, in agreement with our modern discoveries, that each particle of water consists of three atoms, two of one gas and one of another (56 D), thus anticipating the results of Lavoisier's experiments. But he declares the analysis of colours to transcend human ability, and to be a divine privilege (68 D). On the contrary, stereometry is here advanced (53 C–55 C) beyond the stage complained of in the *Republic*.

Quality an appearance resulting from invisible motions. The infinitely little. Flux of particles in every organism.

Lavoisier's analysis of water anticipated.

One of the distinctions made by Plato already in the *Phaedo* is here developed and fully explained. The difference between final and efficient causality has a consi-

Causality: final and efficient causes.

derable place in Platonism; while at an earlier stage only the final cause had been recognised as a true cause and opposed to the current notion of causality as employed by Anaxagoras, Plato later admitted efficient causes, and this change had a close relation to the increasing importance of the notion of movement in his system. (See above, p. 452.)

Concurrent causes. Mechanical causes are ξυναίτια.

The terminology established in the *Politicus* is here maintained. The final cause is named *αἴτιον*, and acts everywhere, nothing being possible without an aim (28 A: *πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι· παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν σχεῖν*). Vulgar people call *αἴτιον* what is only *ξυναίτιον*, namely, material causes, used by God only as means for the realisation of the best which is his aim (46 C). The reason of the superiority of final causes over mechanical causation lies in the absence of reason and design from physical causation, if considered alone and apart from aims which can be conceived only by a soul (46 D: *τῶν γὰρ ὄντων ᾧ νοῦν μόνῳ κτᾶσθαι προσήκει, λεκτέον ψυχήν*). The philosopher, as lover of reason and knowledge, thinks more highly of aims of the mind than of necessities of matter (46 E). The final cause is here identified with a first source of movement and contrasted with the physical cause which is a movement caused from without. It is also called divine or free, as opposed to what is necessary (68 E: *διὸ δὴ χρὴ δύ' αἰτίας εἴδη διορίζεσθαι, τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δὲ θεῖον*). The mechanical cause, here as in the *Politicus* called *ξυναίτιον* and identified with the necessary condition without which, as stated in the *Phaedo*, the aim could not be reached, is blind Necessity (*ἀνάγκη*, 48 A), opposed to Reason. Reason acts on Necessity, leading it to the best aim, and Necessity yields to Reason (48 A: *νοῦ δὲ ἀνάγκης ἄρχοντος τῷ πείθειν αὐτὴν τῶν γιγνομένων τὰ πλεῖστα ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον ἄγειν, ταύτῃ κατὰ ταῦτά τε δι' ἀνάγκης ἡττωμένης ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἔμφρονος οὕτω κατ' ἀρχὰς ξυνίστατο τόδε τὸ πᾶν*).

Reason and Necessity.

Being and Becoming.

This general view of Being and Becoming, as given in the *Timaeus*, is not essentially different from the theories contained in the dialectical dialogues, and some theories of the *Timaeus* are already prepared for in the *Phaedrus* and *Theaetetus*. This leaves very few points for confirming by detailed comparison the place generally assigned to the *Timaeus* towards the end of Plato's literary activity. We are justified in accepting in this case the agreement among all investigators (with insignificant exceptions, as, for instance, Munk and Schöne), because the theories here observed agree exceedingly well with the *Politicus* and *Philebus*, two very late dialogues, and because the style of the *Timaeus* is nearer to the style of the *Laws* than the style of any other dialogue. This is here affirmed as the result of the personal impression produced by the perusal of many thousands of stylistic observations; it would take too much space to enumerate here all the peculiarities of style common to the *Laws* with the *Timaeus* only, and we refer the reader to Ast's Lexicon and to the authors quoted in Chapter III. In all these works he will find sufficient evidence for the great stylistic affinity of the *Timaeus* with the *Laws*, an affinity far exceeding the numbers of our own table of affinity, based only on 500 peculiarities. Besides the style there are still the following arguments in favour of placing the *Timaeus* after the dialectical dialogues :

Place of the *Timaeus*.

Stylistic affinity to the *Laws*.

Implied references to previous dialogues. 1. Efficient causes. 2. The visible world proceeding apart from God.

1. The relation to the *Politicus* in the theory of final and efficient causes, as explained above.

2. The relation to the *Politicus* in the theory of God's retirement from the world.

3. The transition from the form of a dialogue to a continuous exposition, recurring in this form only in certain parts of the *Laws*. Longer speeches in earlier dialogues were either of no didactic character (*Apology*, *Protagoras*, *Menexenus*) or interrupted by many questions and answers (*Gorgias*, *Symposium*). Such a purely didactic exposition in a longer speech without interrup-

tion is a peculiarity of the *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and *Laws*, found nowhere earlier.

3. Continuous exposition.

4. The view that the same elements are common to man with the universe is found in both the *Philebus* and the *Timaeus*, but presents in the *Timaeus* a more advanced stage. In the *Philebus* this view is introduced as new and as a daring feat (29 A : *συγκινδυνεύωμεν καὶ μετέχωμεν τοῦ ψόγου, ὅταν ἀνὴρ δεινὸς φῇ ταῦτα μὴ οὕτως ἀλλ' ἀτάκτως ἔχειν*—this refers to the preceding axiom that reason has ordered everything, and also to the following hypothesis : *ὅτι σμικρὸν τούτων ἕκαστον παρ' ἡμῖν ἔνεστι καὶ φαῦλον καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς εἰλικρινὲς ὂν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν οὐκ ἀξίαν τῆς φύσεως ἔχον*). An attempt is made to prove it by induction (29 B : *ἐν ἑνὶ δὲ λαβὼν περὶ πάντων νόει ταὐτόν. οἷον πῦρ μὲν ἔστι που παρ' ἡμῖν, ἔστι δ' ἐν τῷ παντί. . . . σμικρὸν μέν τι τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἀσθενὲς καὶ φαῦλον, τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ παντὶ πλήθει τε θαυμαστὸν καὶ κάλλει καὶ πάσῃ δυνάμει τῇ περὶ τὸ πῦρ οὔσῃ*). All this is supposed to be known in the *Timaeus*, and needs no further demonstration.

4. The elements in Man and Nature.

5. The world's soul as the origin of individual souls is also first introduced in the *Philebus* (30 A), and appears there as something new, while the same view is the basis of the mythus in the *Timaeus*. The relation in this respect of *Timaeus* and *Philebus* is similar to the relation between *Phaedrus* and *Republic* in the question of the threefold partition of the soul : the mythical exposition uses truths previously reached by reasoning. This is not necessarily a general rule, as at an earlier stage the intuition of ideas was first mythically given in the *Symposium*, then reasoned out in the *Phaedo*. But as Plato later had an increasing liking for myths, it is natural that he should represent also mythically truths which had been earlier set forth as based on reasoning.

5. Human souls derived from the world's soul, as hinted in *Philebus*.

6. Philosophy is represented as gift of Gods in *Philebus* and *Timaeus*. Though this is a commonplace of Platonism, there is in the form in which the mention is

6. Philosophy a gift from God.

made in the *Timaeus* something that may well be interpreted as a reminiscence of the *Philebus*:

Phil. 16 C: θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὥς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοί, ποθὲν ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη διά τινος Προμηθέως ἅμα φανοτάτῳ τινὶ πυρί.	*Tim.* 47 AB: . . . ἐπορισάμεθα φιλοσοφίας γένος, οὗ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' ἦλθεν οὔτε ἥξει ποτὲ τῷ θνητῷ γένει δωρηθὲν ἐκ θεῶν.

7. Doctrine of sense-perception.

7. The explanation of sense-perception in the *Philebus* (33 D) as a movement communicated to the soul through the body is more elementary than the corresponding mention in the *Timaeus* (43 C).

8. God free from pleasure and pain.

8. The state of God as free from pleasure or pain is announced in the *Philebus* to be the subject of a future inquiry (33 B: τοῦτο ἔτι καὶ εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεψώμεθα, ἐὰν πρὸς λόγον τι ᾖ), and the *Timaeus* more than any other work seems to correspond to that announcement.

Relation to the *Republic*.

In the above statement we have made no use of the peculiar relation of the *Timaeus* to the *Republic*. The reference to the *Republic* at the beginning of the *Timaeus* is unmistakable, but the relation of the two dialogues is not quite the same as the relation of the *Sophist* to the *Theaetetus*. In the *Sophist* we have a direct continuation of the *Theaetetus*, and the persons of the dialogue are the same, with the single addition of the Eleatic guest. In the *Timaeus* the scene is different from that of the *Republic*, and Plato recurs to the fiction that the substance of the *Republic* dialogue has been narrated on the previous day to the persons first appearing in the *Timaeus*. This fiction is deemed insufficient and improbable by the author himself, and he puts in the mouth of Socrates a recapitulation of the preceding dialogue. In that recapitulation not the whole of the *Republic* is included, and no mention is made of the four last books. Far-reaching inferences have been made from this omission, about the structure of the *Republic* as well as about the date of the *Timaeus*.

Timaeus separated by a long

The most obvious conclusion would be to allow a longer distance of time between *Republic* and *Timaeus* than between *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. This conclusion is con-

firmed by our whole inquiry and best explains the great change of style and of the literary manner. Other conclusions, at first sight plausible, are refuted by the consideration of style. The recapitulation of the *Timaeus* seems to refer only to the first five books of the *Republic*, and thus we might be tempted to suppose that it was written before the following five books. But in view of the great unity of composition of the *Republic* and of the great homogeneity of its style, it is impossible to separate the fifth book from the following by any other work. On the other hand, the close relation of the *Timaeus* to the *Laws* makes it very probable that some twenty years have come between that apparent sequel of the *Republic* and the work which it presupposes. Under these circumstances it is very natural that Plato should omit some details from his recapitulation, and should limit it to the most general results, which happen to be concentrated in the first five books. There is also another psychological reason why he should not now insist on the rule of the philosophers, which is the chief subject of the sixth and seventh books of the *Republic*. We must assume that the *Timaeus* at all events is written after the third voyage to Sicily (361 B.C.), and after Plato's great and definitive failure to obtain political ascendency. His explanation of that failure is given in the *Politicus*, where he says that the ideal state is too perfect for mankind, and that the philosopher who could bring it into existence ought to be a god. Now in the *Timaeus* he plans a practical representation of the conflict between a perfect state and its neighbours. This conflict has not been represented by Plato, because he left the *Critias* unfinished. But we have every reason to assume that he did not intend to identify in everything the historical state of primitive Attica with the ideal state of the *Republic*. The outline given at the beginning of the *Critias* confirms that assumption. Thus it is natural that fixed laws had to play a greater part in the old state of Athens than in the *Republic*. Still the identification of

Interval from the *Republic*.

Rule of philosophers, why omitted in the *Timaeus*.

the political ruler with the philosopher is here also alluded to (19 E : φιλοσόφων ἀνδρῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν) in a similar manner to that which appears in the *Politicus*. Philosophy remains the greatest gift of gods to men (47 B), and ignorance an illness of the soul (86 B). Also the low estimate of poets is maintained (19 D), with a similar ironical compliment to that in the *Republic*. Generally, whoever considers impartially the relation of these two dialogues must recognise not only that the *Timaeus* presupposes the whole of the *Republic*, but that it appears to be very much later.

Thus the place of the *Timaeus* as nearest to the *Laws* is confirmed by every consideration, and no valid objection can be raised against this conclusion. It remains, however, desirable that the great number of stylistic peculiarities of this latest group should be collected and classified in order to confirm the common verdict of all competent authorities.

II. *The Critias.*

The *Critias* unfinished: why?

There is little to say in the present connection about this small fragment of a dialogue left unfinished by Plato for some reason unknown. If we consider the great interest manifested in its introduction for the intended subject of this work, and the circumstance that it is the only fragmentary work of Plato, the most natural supposition is that only death could have prevented him from carrying out such a cherished plan as that of the *Timaeus* trilogy. This supposition is also confirmed by the very late style of the *Critias*, but a definitive proof could be given only through stylometric comparison of the *Critias* with the latest parts of the *Laws*. In view of the small size of the *Critias* (11 pp. ed. Did.) a very great number of stylistic observations is required, and they ought to refer not only to the vocabulary but also to the construction of phrases, inversion of words, phonetic effects, and

all details which constitute the less accidental peculiarities of style. Only then will it be possible to decide with absolute certainty, on a basis of some thousand peculiarities resuming some hundred thousand observations, whether the *Critias* is contemporaneous with the latest parts of the *Laws* or not. Such a special investigation exceeds the limits of the present inquiry: the more so as the whole question has no philosophical importance, and claims only a purely literary interest. The *Critias* contains no contribution to Plato's logic besides the incidental mention of the familiar view that knowledge has a divine origin (106 B: *αὐτὸν (θεὸν) τελεώτατον καὶ ἄριστον φαρμάκων ἐπιστήμην εὐχόμεθα διδόναι*), and the curious appreciation of the cosmogony of the *Timaeus* as acceptable only on account of human ignorance about the gods and everything there expounded (107 A B: *περὶ θεῶν . . . λέγοντά τι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δοκεῖν ἱκανῶς λέγειν ῥᾷον ἢ περὶ θνητῶν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. ἡ γὰρ ἀπειρία καὶ σφόδρα ἄγνοια τῶν ἀκουόντων περὶ ὧν ἂν οὕτως ἔχωσι πολλὴν εὐπορίαν παρέχεσθον τῷ μέλλοντι λέγειν τι περὶ αὐτῶν*).

Divine nature of knowledge.

The *Timaeus* gave only a probable account of Divine things.

III. *The Laws.*

The question has been seriously discussed whether the theory of ideas is alluded to or maintained in the *Laws*. The question put in this indefinite manner is entirely out of place. Anybody who reads the *Laws* must notice the entire absence of the earlier theory of ideas as known from *Phaedo* and *Republic*. This has been recognised by all students of Plato, and Ribbing,[267] who made a special study of the theory of ideas, went so far as to deny the authenticity of the *Laws* chiefly because he did not find there any trace of the Platonic ideas. Equally Ueberweg (*Untersuchungen*, p. 100) recognised that in the *Laws* the theory of ideas is nowhere

Supposed absence of the ideal theory.

[267] S. Ribbing, *Genetische Darstellung der Platonischen Ideenlehre*, Leipzig 1863-64, vol. ii. pp. 150-190.

mentioned. The same has been the impression of English scholars. Grote (vol. iv. p. 275) and Jowett (vol. ii. p. 18; vol. v. p. ccxxxvi) agree that the theory of ideas is left out in the *Laws*. The same conclusion is reached by C. Ritter, in his recent commentary to the *Laws*,[268] and Zeller also finds only one passage which could be interpreted as an allusion to the theory of ideas (*Philosophie der Griechen*, II. i. p. 953). This passage (965 C: *πρὸς μίαν ἰδέαν ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἀνομοίων δυνατὸν εἶναι βλέπειν*) is really as insufficient as evidence in favour of the old theory of ideas as similar passages from the earliest Socratic dialogues (*Euthyph.* 6 D: *μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ τά τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι*). Also Susemihl, who maintained against Zeller that Plato remained faithful to his theory of ideas up to his latest age, acknowledged (*Genetische Entwickelung*, vol. ii. p. 577) that the idea of the good can be only guessed at in the passage concluding the dialogue.

Generalisation.

It is very strange that in the whole discussion about the traces of the theory of ideas in the *Laws* nobody cared to distinguish between the earlier self-existing ideas and the ideas as known from the dialectical dialogues, where they appear as existing only in souls. Such ideas, equivalent to perfect notions, cannot have been abandoned by Plato, though he had no opportunity to mention them in the *Laws*, because the whole dialogue, like the *Timaeus*, rests on right and probable opinion, not on dialectical knowledge. Plato was not obliged to write always for philosophers alone, and he seems to have dedicated his latest years to a popular exposition of his political doctrines adapted to the actual level of mankind, very much below his own ideal standard. If somebody, like Grote, believes that Plato could become untrue to philosophy, he betrays only his own incapacity to judge a philosopher. Plato remained a philosopher up to his latest age, and the very last pages of the *Laws* prove it to

The *Laws* not written for philosophers.

But Plato never

[268] C. Ritter, *Platos Gesetze, Kommentar zum griechischen Text*, Leipzig 1896, p. 355.

any unprejudiced reader. The distinction between knowledge and opinion is one of those logical distinctions which, once reached, cannot be afterwards neglected by a true philosopher, and if Plato could be reasonably suspected of such a desertion, no hope is left for any one of a permanence of knowledge. Plato remains in all ages the ideal type of a philosopher, and philosophy which is not knowledge is nothing. Thus it is from the outset a psychological impossibility to accept Grote's interpretation of Plato's silence about ideas in the *Laws*, according to which Plato contracted 'a comparative mistrust of any practical good to come from philosophy,' 'eliminating or reducing to a minimum that ascendency of the philosophical mind which he had once held to be omnipotent and indispensable.'

abandoned philosophy.

Nor did he mistrust philosophy, as Grote imagined.

Such extravagant conclusions are the result of a widespread error about Plato's philosophy, consisting in identifying the so-called 'theory of ideas' with Platonic philosophy and with his philosophical knowledge. We have seen above that no such identification results from a chronological survey of the development of Plato's logic. Even in the *Republic* the transcendental ideas do not include all the philosophy of Plato, and some of his logical doctrines have little to do with the world of ideas. The last appearance of such a world is in the *Phaedrus*. Already in the *Theaetetus* the categories occupy the place of ideas, which in the *Parmenides* also are supplanted by logical exercise in the analysis of notions. In the *Sophist* Plato speaks of his own earlier doctrine of ideas as belonging to the history of thought, and after the *Sophist* he never uses the terms *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* in the meaning which they had in *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Phaedrus*. It becomes for him a cardinal truth of philosophy that ideas and reason exist only in souls, so that they cannot any longer be looked upon as independent substances, though they are always called True Being. Ideas are perfect notions and refer more espe-

Plato's philosophy has been too much identified with the so-called 'theory of ideas.'

cially to the natural kinds of animals in the largest meaning of this word (including plants) in all dialectical dialogues and also in the *Timaeus*. In this meaning alone we can expect to find them in the *Laws*, and in the only passage in which Plato mentions an idea in this dialogue (965 c), this is the only interpretation acceptable. A very strange prejudice is needed if we are to find everywhere the old supramundane ideas, where Plato speaks of an idea in a meaning which exactly corresponds to the use of this word in modern philosophy. It can only be recommended to all those who still have any doubts on this subject to read with the greatest attention what Campbell (*Rep.* II. pp. 294–321) wrote about the use of metaphysical terms by Plato. They will then see at once that no conclusion can be drawn from the use or absence of terms like *εἶδος* or *ἰδέα* which Plato borrowed from earlier writers and used himself in many different meanings, 'very seldom with a pronounced metaphysical intention' (p. 294). Plato's philosophy is not a mere theory of knowledge, and his theory of knowledge is not limited to the conception of ideas. The soul is not an idea, and acts a more important part in later Platonism than all ideas of Middle Platonism. It is the soul, and not the ideas, which is the central point of Plato's later theory of knowledge. Here it is expressly acknowledged that dialectical questions exceed the scope of the dialogue and the understanding of the hearers (892 E: *νῦν ὁ μέλλων ἐστὶ λόγος σφοδρότερος καὶ σχεδὸν ἴσως ἄβατος ὡς τῇ σφῷν ῥώμῃ· μὴ δὴ σκοτοδινίαν ἴλιγγόν τε ὑμῖν ἐμποιήσῃ παραφερόμενός τε καὶ ἐρωτῶν ἀήθεις ὄντας ἀποκρίσεων*) and even a simple classification of psychical movement is followed immediately by the confession of both Kleinias and Megillus that they are unable to follow (644 D: *μόγις μέν πως ἐφέπομαι, λέγε μὴν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς ἑπομένου—καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ μὴν ταὐτὸ τοῦτο πάθος ἔνι*). Still, despite these limitations, we see here the theory of the soul made the object of a longer explanation, given in a more

The Soul is the centre of Plato's later theory of knowledge.

popular tone than in the *Phaedrus* and *Timaeus*, where the same doctrines were already set forth, and resuming the conclusions reached in both these dialogues.

Resumption of the self-moving principle of the *Phaedrus*.

The old distinction made in the *Phaedrus* between the self-moving principle and all other moving and moved objects of the universe is here again stated with great rhetorical strength and with all the absolute certainty that Plato attached to metaphysical truths. Once entered upon this argument the reader must notice at once that he is outside the realm of probable opinions and plausible myths in the calm region of absolute knowledge which never changes. Material things move in space (893 C: *ἐν χώρᾳ τινὶ τά τε ἑστῶτα ἕστηκε καὶ τὰ κινούμενα κινεῖται . . .* D: *τὰ δέ γε κινούμενα ἐν πολλοῖς . . ὅσα φορᾷ κινεῖται μεταβαίνοντα εἰς ἕτερον ἀεὶ τόπον*) and produce infinite appearances of growth and decay (893 E: *συγκρινόμενα μὲν αὐξάνεται, διακρινόμενα δὲ φθίνει τότε, ὅταν ἡ καθεστηκυῖα ἑκάστων ἕξις διαμένῃ, μὴ μενούσης δὲ αὐτῆς δι' ἀμφότερα ἀπόλλυται*). The material world is here pictured, in agreement with the *Timaeus*, as constantly becoming something else, never remaining the same (894 A: *γίγνεται δὴ πάντων γένεσις, ἡνίκ' ἂν τί πάθος ᾖ; δῆλον ὡς ὁπόταν ἀρχὴ λαβοῦσα αὔξην εἰς τὴν δευτέραν ἔλθῃ μετάβασιν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰς τὴν πλησίον, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ἐλθοῦσα αἴσθησιν σχῇ τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις. μεταβάλλον μὲν οὖν οὕτω καὶ μετακινούμενον γίγνεται πᾶν*).

The material world subject to continual change.

True Being remains always the same.

After an eloquent page on the movements forming the material universe (893 B–894 A) the Athenian guest reminds us in a very short phrase that True Being remains always the same (894 A: *ἔστι δὲ ὄντως ὂν ὁπόταν μένῃ*). This phrase is scarcely supposed to be understood by Kleinias and Megillus, but has an unmistakable meaning for those readers who remember the *Timaeus*. It means the world of eternal notions forming the system of human and divine knowledge. These notions are here as little as in any dialectical dialogue meant to exist as separate substances. They can only exist in

Priority of soul.

souls, and a sample of such eternal knowledge is given in the following explanation of the priority of soul over matter, an important theorem of latest Platonism. The starting point of this argument is an analysis of various kinds of motion, as in the *Phaedrus*. Among all possible movements, those caused from without must be distinguished from those which are their own cause, the latter being by far the strongest and most active movements (894 B: *ἔστω τοίνυν ἡ μὲν ἕτερα δυναμένη κινεῖν κίνησις, ἑαυτὴν δὲ ἀδυνατοῦσα ἀεὶ μία τις, ἡ δὲ ἑαυτήν τ' ἀεὶ καὶ ἕτερα δυναμένη κατά τε συγκρίσεις ἔν τε διακρίσεσιν αὔξαις τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ καὶ γενέσεσι καὶ φθοραῖς ἄλλη μία τις αὖ τῶν πασῶν κινήσεων . . . .* D: *τίν' ἂν προκρίναιμεν ὀρθότατα πασῶν ἐρρωμενεστάτην τε εἶναι καὶ πρακτικὴν διαφερόντως;—μυρίῳ ἀνάγκη που φάναι διαφέρειν τὴν αὐτὴν αὐτὴν δυναμένην κινεῖν, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πάσας ὑστέρας*).

Self-causing movement the strongest.

This is shown more fully than in the *Phaedrus* to be a logical necessity.

The conception of a principle or beginning of movement is here more fully illustrated than in the *Phaedrus*, as a logical necessity (894 E: *ὅταν ἄρα αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινῆσαν ἕτερον ἀλλοιώσῃ, τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἄλλο, καὶ οὕτω δὴ χίλια ἐπὶ μυρίοις γίγνηται τὰ κινηθέντα, μῶν ἀρχή τις αὐτῶν ἔσται τῆς κινήσεως ἁπάσης ἄλλη πλὴν ἡ τῆς αὐτῆς αὐτὴν κινησάσης μεταβολή;*). To make it clearer to hearers who are not used to such metaphysical investigations, the Athenian guest supposes that before all physical movements began there may have been a time of immobility, and asks what kind of movement must have been the first movement in the universe. He answers that it could only be the movement of a self-moving principle, and calls it a logical necessity (895 A B: *εἰ σταίη πως τὰ πάντα ὁμοῦ γενόμενα . . . . ἀνάγκη πρώτην κίνησιν γενέσθαι . . τὴν αὐτὴν κινοῦσαν· ἀρχὴν ἄρα κινήσεων πασῶν καὶ πρώτην ἔν τε ἑστῶσι γενομένην καὶ ἐν κινουμένοις οὖσαν τὴν αὐτὴν κινοῦσαν φήσομεν ἀναγκαίως εἶναι πρεσβυτάτην καὶ κρατίστην μεταβολὴν πασῶν*). After such a decisive explanation of the nature of movement Plato proceeds exactly as in the *Phaedrus* to identify the soul with the self-moving principle. But

he introduces here a middle term which has not been mentioned in the *Phaedrus*, though already used in connection with the theory of the soul in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. In these earlier dialogues life had been stated to be the characteristic distinction of the notion of soul. In the *Phaedrus* the soul was identified with a self-moving principle. In the *Laws*, where the argument on the soul's priority and immortality is more minute and popular than either in the *Phaedrus* or in the *Phaedo*, Plato combines both trains of argument and uses the notion of life as a link between 'self-moving principle' and 'soul' (895 C: *ζῆν αὐτὸ προσεροῦμεν, ὅταν αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινῇ*). What moves itself, lives, and what lives is animated, or has a soul (895 C: *ὁπόταν ψυχὴν ἔν τισιν ὁρῶμεν οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ ταὐτὸν τούτῳ ζῆν ὁμολογητέον*).

Life the middle term between self-moving principle and Soul.

It results from the above that the soul is identical with a self-moving principle, being indeed only a name for what is thus defined (896 A: *ᾧ δὴ ψυχὴ τοὔνομα, τίς τούτου λόγος; ἔχομεν ἄλλον πλὴν τὸν νῦν δὴ ῥηθέντα, τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν αὑτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν; . . . εἰ δ' ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, ἆρα ἔτι ποθοῦμεν μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδεῖχθαι ψυχὴν ταὐτὸν ὂν καὶ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν καὶ κίνησιν . . . , ἐπειδή γε ἀνεφάνη μεταβολῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως ἁπάσης αἰτία ἅπασιν; . . . ἱκανώτατα δέδεικται ψυχὴ τῶν πάντων πρεσβυτάτη, φανεῖσά γε ἀρχὴ κινήσεως*). The proof is held sufficient, both by teacher and pupil, and we see in this passage that Plato had lost nothing of his proud philosophical certainty so far as metaphysical truth was concerned, even after all political disillusions, and in his latest age, when he wrote the tenth book of his *Laws* for vulgar readers and citizens.

Traces of unabated confidence in metaphysical truth.

Without going so far as the Neoplatonists in their suspicions and guesses about a secret doctrine, we are led by a consideration of the whole of Plato's literary legacy to believe that he did not care to leave in writing his answer to all the most difficult problems of philosophy. Even the *Laws*, the largest of his works, representing

a conversation which must have lasted a whole very long summer day—the *Laws*, which in our editions forms a volume of over four hundred pages of close printing—maintain the protreptic character of earlier writings, and appear to have been written as a voluminous programme of the Academy, in order to attract future lawgivers to Plato's oral lessons. Such at least is the impression produced by the concluding pages of this long dialogue. Here the fiction of the dialogue seems to disappear, and Plato exalts his school in such an unmistakable manner that no doubt can be left who the Athenian philosopher is: no one in all the world could speak in this way save the first Master of the Academy. He says that he can supply from among his pupils men qualified as leaders for any state, and that he has in these things unusual experience and knowledge (968 B: *ξυλλήπτωρ τούτου γε ὑμῖν καὶ ἐγὼ γιγνοίμην ἂν προθύμως, πρὸς δ' ἐμοὶ καὶ ἑτέρους ἴσως εὑρήσω διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἐμπειρίαν τε καὶ σκέψιν γεγονυῖάν μοι καὶ μάλα συχνήν*).

Protreptic character of earlier writings continued in the *Laws*.

The philosopher is still the only legislator.

It has been clearly expressed in the preceding passage that such leaders of men can be only dialecticians or philosophers who are able to unite into one whole all knowledge, to apply it harmoniously to the aims of life, and to show the reason of everything that is reasonable (967 E). Whoever is not able to comply with these conditions, however he may have reached a high level of virtue, ought to obey, not to command, and this refers to any given state, not only to the ideal state of the *Republic* (968 A: *ὁ δὲ μὴ ταῦθ' οἷός τ' ὢν πρὸς ταῖς δημοσίαις ἀρεταῖς κεκτῆσθαι σχεδὸν ἄρχων μὲν οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο ἱκανὸς ὅλης πόλεως, ὑπηρέτης δ' ἂν ἄλλοις ἄρχουσιν.* Cf. 969 B: *ἐάν γε μὴν οὗτος ἡμῖν ὁ θεῖος γένηται ξύλλογος, παραδοτέον τούτῳ τὴν πόλιν, ἀμφισβήτησίς τ' οὐκ ἔστ' οὐδεμία οὐδενὶ τῶν νῦν παρὰ ταῦθ' ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν νομοθετῶν, ὄντως δὲ ἔσται σχεδὸν ὕπαρ ἀποτετελεσμένον, οὗ σμικρῷ πρόσθεν ὀνείρατος ὡς τῷ λόγῳ ἐφηψάμεθα, κεφαλῆς νοῦ τε κοινωνίας εἰκόνα τινά πως ξυμμίξαντες, ἐὰν ἄρα ἡμῖν οἵ τε ἄνδρες ἀκριβῶς*

ἐκλεχθῶσι, παιδευθῶσί τε προσηκόντως, παιδευθέντες τε ἐν ἀκροπόλει τῆς χώρας κατοικήσαντες φύλακες ἀποτελεσθῶσιν, οἵους ἡμεῖς οὐκ εἴδομεν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίῳ πρὸς ἀρετὴν σωτηρίας γενομένους).

Plato's last written page again exalts oral above written teaching.

But, as in the *Republic*, Plato declines to explain the highest knowledge in the present dialogue, and he repeats at the end of his life the same conviction which he expressed about thirty years earlier in the *Phaedrus*, when he had just completed some of his most brilliant works. It would be a vain task to set down in writing the highest knowledge, because this can be only implanted in living souls, and would lose all its power if fixed in a literary work (968 D E: πρὸς τούτοις δὲ χρόνους οὕς τε καὶ ἐν οἷς δεῖ παραλαμβάνειν ἕκαστα, μάταιον ταῦτ' ἐν γράμμασι λέγειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς τοῖς μανθάνουσι δῆλα γίγνοιτ' ἄν, ὅ τι πρὸς καιρὸν μανθάνεται, πρὶν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ἑκάστῳ τοῦ μαθήματος ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι). Thus the highest summit of political training and knowledge is not to be foretold, as Plato explains, playing upon words in his usual fashion and inventing a new term for the purpose (968 E: οὕτω δὴ πάντα τὰ περὶ ταῦτα ἀπόρρητα μὲν λεχθέντα οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοιτο, ἀπρόρρητα δὲ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν προρρηθέντα δηλοῦν τῶν λεγομένων). The careful consideration of this passage, one of the last pages written by Plato, must be emphatically recommended to all those who believe that the judgment on writing and literature expressed in the *Phaedrus* is a mark of youthfulness, and could not well fit the author of the *Republic* after he had composed this literary masterpiece. It is exceedingly important for a right understanding of Plato's writings to keep constantly in mind the protreptic character of all his works.

Repetition of earlier statements.

Theory of the Soul.

In this light it becomes also evident why, though we do not find in the *Laws* many traces of logical theories expressed earlier, these theories are by no means abandoned, only omitted as out of place in a very popular work. The theory of the soul, which finds in the *Laws*

an exceptionally large place, is the best measure of Plato's latest metaphysical convictions and shows that they have not been essentially altered since the *Sophist*. Plato complains that nobody before him has sufficiently investigated the nature of the soul, or recognised its priority (892 A: *ψυχὴν ἠγνοηκέναι κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ὀλίγου ξύμπαντες, οἷόν τε ὂν τυγχάνει καὶ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει, τῶν τε ἄλλων αὐτῆς πέρι καὶ δὴ καὶ γενέσεως, ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστὶ σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη καὶ μεταβολῆς τε αὐτῶν καὶ μετακοσμήσεως ἁπάσης ἄρχει παντὸς μᾶλλον*, cf. 967 D: *ψυχή ἐστι πρεσβύτατον ἁπάντων ὅσα γονῆς μετείληφεν ἀθάνατόν τε ἄρχει τε δὴ σωμάτων πάντων*). The soul, with all its manifestations, as will, reason, opinion, memory, is not only earlier than the material world with the three dimensions of space and the forces acting in it (896 C D: *τρόποι δὲ καὶ ἤθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς ἐπιμέλειαί τε καὶ μνῆμαι πρότερα μήκους σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους καὶ ῥώμης εἴη γεγονότα ἄν, εἴπερ καὶ ψυχὴ σώματος*), but also the true cause of all material and moral existence (896 D: *ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι ψυχὴν καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων, εἴπερ τῶν πάντων γε αὐτὴν θήσομεν αἰτίαν*).

This refers primarily, as in the *Timaeus*, to the world's soul, with the difference that the plurality of souls is here more insisted upon. Already in the *Timaeus* a plurality of perfect souls was affirmed on account of the perfection visible in the stars; here another reason is brought forward for a plurality of souls, which reminds us of the discussion in the *Parmenides* about the difference between human and divine notions. Plato refrains from ascribing imperfection to perfect souls, and as he cannot accept every detail of Being as perfect, he wants at least two souls to explain the universe, and generally speaking, a plurality of souls (896 E: *ψυχὴν δὴ διοικοῦσαν καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς πάντῃ κινουμένοις . . . καὶ τὸν*

Plurality of souls: perfect and imperfect.

οὐρανὸν ἀνάγκη διοικεῖν φάναι . . . μίαν ἢ πλείους;—πλείους· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σφῷν ἀποκρινοῦμαι. δυοῖν μέν γέ που ἔλαττον μηδὲν τιθῶμεν, τῆς τε εὐεργέτιδος καὶ τῆς τἀναντία δυναμένης ἐξεργάζεσθαι). This passage has been generally interpreted as implying a dualism contradictory to Plato's earlier doctrines. But there is no need for such an interpretation, if we can take it literally and find it in general agreement with the *Timaeus*. Plato does not say that there are two world souls, two opposed principles like those in the Persian religion. He says only that if perfection is opposed to imperfection, imperfection cannot be ascribed to a perfect soul, and to account for it at least one imperfect soul is needed besides the perfect soul which is the source of perfection. This minimal number of two souls is only introduced for the sake of argument, the conclusion being stated clearly at the outset: a plurality of souls. This agrees with the plurality of unequal souls as represented in the *Timaeus*, and only the argument of imperfection as proof of plurality is new.

That Plato by no means abandoned his views on the fundamental unity of the universe as set forth in the *Timaeus* can be clearly seen from many passages in the *Laws*, and specially from his increasing reverence for divine Providence which is evident at every step of the argument. For the sake of the popular character of his exposition he generally speaks of a plurality of Gods, according to the use of language and the prevailing religious conviction of his hearers. But occasionally the almighty Demiurge reappears under the name of *θεός* or of *νοῦς*. That the term *δημιουργός* is no longer applied to the highest Divinity may be explained by the increasing awe of Plato for the highest soul, which he dares not now compare, as in the *Timaeus*, with other agencies. But he maintains the conception of such a soul (898 c: *ἀρίστη ψυχή*), reigning over a whole hierarchy of Gods down to each man's individual soul, and even below. It is no longer a God abiding after creation in his eternal peace,

One God supreme.

but the true image of Providence which remained in all later religions, being a conception far transcending the natural limits of Greek mythology.

New conception of Providence.

Above the blind necessity of Homer, Plato's genius raised a new idea of the almighty leader of the whole universe, who orders every detail in it according to the aims of the whole (903 B: *τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιμελουμένῳ πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦ ὅλου πάντ' ἐστὶ συντεταγμένα, ὧν καὶ τὸ μέρος εἰς δύναμιν ἕκαστον τὸ προσῆκον πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ· τούτοις δ' εἰσὶν ἄρχοντες προστεταγμένοι ἑκάστοις ἐπὶ τὸ σμικρότατον ἀεὶ πάθης καὶ πράξεως, εἰς μερισμὸν τὸν ἔσχατον τέλος ἀπειργασμένοι . . .*). While the individual souls wander from one life to another, it remains the task of God to fix for each soul its proper place of activity according to its merits or sins (903 D: *ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀεὶ ψυχὴ συντεταγμένη σώματι τοτὲ μὲν ἄλλῳ τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλῳ, μεταβάλλει παντοίας μεταβολὰς δι' ἑαυτὴν ἢ δι' ἑτέραν ψυχήν,*[269] *οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔργον τῷ πεττευτῇ λείπεται πλὴν μετατιθέναι τὸ μὲν ἄμεινον γιγνόμενον ἦθος εἰς βελτίω τόπον, χεῖρον δὲ εἰς τὸν χείρονα, κατὰ τὸ πρέπον αὐτῶν ἕκαστον, ἵνα τῆς προσηκούσης μοίρας λαγχάνῃ*).

In heaven and on earth the movements of the soul are the first causes of all physical movements, the soul being governed either by divine reason or folly (896 E: *ἄγει μὲν δὴ ψυχὴ πάντα τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν ταῖς αὑτῆς κινήσεσιν . . .* 897 A: *πάσαις ὅσαι . . . τὰς κινήσεις σωμάτων ἄγουσι πάντα . . .* B: *οἷς ψυχὴ χρωμένη νοῦν μὲν προσλαβοῦσα αἰεὶ θεῖον ὀρθῶς θέουσα, ὀρθὰ καὶ εὐδαίμονα παιδαγωγεῖ πάντα, ἀνοίᾳ δὲ ξυγγενομένη πάντα αὖ τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεργάζεται*). The most perfect souls are Gods whose bodies we see in the shape of stars. Those perfect movements can be produced only by perfect souls (899 B: *ἄστρων πέρι πάντων . . . ἐροῦμεν . . . ὡς ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μὲν ἡ ψυχαὶ πάντων τούτων αἴτιαι ἐφάνησαν, ἀγαθαὶ δὲ πᾶσαν*

[269] Here appears for the first time the conception of a direct action of one soul on another, which anticipates modern theories of telepathy.

ἀρετήν, θεοὺς αὐτὰς εἶναι φήσομεν, εἴτε ἐν σώμασιν ἐνοῦσαι, ζῷα ὄντα, κοσμοῦσι πάντα οὐρανὸν εἴτε ὅπῃ τε καὶ ὅπως, cf. 966 E, 967 D). God being the true measure of all things (716 C: *ὁ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα*), it is the common aim of all souls to become as similar to Him as possible (716 C: *τὸν οὖν τῷ τοιούτῳ προσφιλῆ γενησόμενον εἰς δύναμιν ὅ τι μάλιστα καὶ αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι*).

God the true measure of all things, not Man.

While Plato thus raises the conception of Divinity above all earlier standards, he does not deprive the individual human soul of its powers and responsibilities. After the Gods, there is nothing in the universe so divine as human souls, which are the nearest to divinity (726 E: *πάντων κτημάτων μετὰ θεοὺς ψυχὴ θειότατον, οἰκειότατον ὄν*, cf. 728 B, 731 C: *ψυχὴ πᾶσι τιμιώτατον*, cf. 966 E). And the soul has power also to err, and is the cause of its own faults (727 B: *τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων αἴτιον . . . καὶ τῶν πλείστων κακῶν καὶ μεγίστων*). Different kinds of life depend upon the variety of souls and their faculties (803 A B: *τὰ τῶν βίων σχήματα διαστήσασθαι κατὰ τρόπους τοὺς τῶν ψυχῶν ὄντως αὐτῶν τὰ τροπιδεῖα καταβάλλεσθαι, ποίᾳ μηχανῇ καὶ τίσι ποτὲ τρόποις ξυνόντες τὸν βίον ἄριστα διὰ τοῦ πλοῦ τούτου τῆς ζωῆς διακομισθησόμεθα, τοῦτο σκοπεῖν ὀρθῶς*).

Life not to be taken too seriously.

The philosopher is looking upon human life from a very exalted point of view, and with almost infinite horizons before his mind, as if he dwelt already in a better place than this earth. He occasionally goes so far as to question whether human life is altogether to be taken seriously, comparing it with a stage performance in which each of us may be looked upon as a puppet of the Gods, perhaps a plaything only pulled by various cords and strings in different ways (644 D: *θαῦμα μὲν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ἡγησώμεθα τῶν ζῴων θεῖον, εἴτε ὡς παίγνιον ἐκείνων εἴτε ὡς σπουδῇ τινὶ ξυνεστηκός· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε γιγνώσκομεν, τόδε δὲ ἴσμεν, ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἐν ἡμῖν οἷον νεῦρα ἢ μήρινθοί τινες ἐνοῦσαι σπῶσί τε ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἀνθέλκουσιν ἐναντίαι οὖσαι ἐπ' ἐναντίας πράξεις, οὗ δὴ διωρισμένη ἀρετὴ*

καὶ κακία κεῖται, cf. 803 C). From the philosopher's standpoint human cares and struggles have not all the importance attached to them by those concerned; still he recommends that they should be met with due earnestness as long as we are here, and that we should play our part as we are expected to do (803 B: *ἔστι δὴ τοίνυν τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα μεγάλης μὲν σπουδῆς οὐκ ἄξια, ἀναγκαῖόν γε μὴν σπουδάζειν· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ εὐτυχές· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐνταῦθά ἐσμεν, εἴ πως διὰ προσήκοντός τινος αὐτὸ πράττοιμεν, ἴσως ἂν ἡμῖν σύμμετρον ἂν εἴη*).

Seriousness of noble pastime.

He complains that most men ignore the relative importance of human things, and take seriously what does not deserve their attention, while they play with things which ought to be taken very seriously (803 C: *φημὶ χρῆναι τὸ μὲν σπουδαῖον σπουδάζειν, τὸ δὲ μὴ σπουδαῖον μή . . . τούτῳ δὴ δεῖν τῷ τρόπῳ ξυνεπόμενον καὶ παίζοντα ὅ τι καλλίστας παιδιὰς πάντ' ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα οὕτω διαβιῶναι, τοὐναντίον ἢ νῦν διανοηθέντας*). Human nature if left to itself easily degenerates (713 C: *ἀνθρωπεία φύσις οὐδεμία ἱκανὴ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα διοικοῦσα αὐτοκράτωρ πάντα μὴ οὐχ ὕβρεώς τε καὶ ἀδικίας μεστοῦσθαι*). But there are always found in the crowd a few divine men, whose character is independent of all outward influences: these are worth seeking over sea and land, and their experience and knowledge are valuable in any state (951 B: *εἰσὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἄνθρωποι ἀεὶ θεῖοί τινες, οὐ πολλοί, παντὸς δ' ἄξιοι ξυγγίγνεσθαι, φυόμενοι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐν εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν ἢ καὶ μή, ὧν κατ' ἴχνος ἀεὶ χρὴ τὸν ἐν ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν οἰκοῦντα, ἐξιόντα κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ γῆν, ζητεῖν ὃς ἂν ἀδιάφθαρτος ᾖ*, cf. *Phaedo* 78 A).

The best security lies in following the good and wise. The worst punishment is

The best men ought to be followed always (728 C), and the worst punishment is to become similar to the worst men (728 B: *τὴν γὰρ λεγομένην δίκην τῆς κακουργίας τὴν μεγίστην οὐδεὶς . . . λογίζεται, ἔστι δ' ἡ μεγίστη τὸ ὁμοιοῦσθαι τοῖς οὖσι κακοῖς ἀνδράσιν . . . προσπεφυκότα δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνάγκη ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἃ πεφύκασιν ἀλλήλους οἱ τοιοῦτοι ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν*, cf. *Theaet.* 177 A).

Against the vulgar worship of wealth, Plato protests with his wonted vehemence, saying that all the gold on earth, added to all the treasures hidden underground, can never equal the value of virtue (728 A: *πᾶς γὰρ ὅ τ' ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς χρυσὸς ἀρετῆς οὐκ ἀντάξιος*). The greatest danger to the soul's growth and the source of all its errors is the wrong popular belief that each man is nearest to himself, and the wicked love of self (731 E: *πάντων δὲ μέγιστον κακῶν ἀνθρώποις τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔμφυτον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐστίν, οὗ πᾶς ἑαυτῷ συγγνώμην ἔχων ἀποφυγὴν οὐδεμίαν μηχανᾶται· τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ὃ λέγουσιν ὡς φίλος αὑτῷ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος φύσει τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ δεῖν εἶναι τοιοῦτον· τὸ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ γε πάντων ἁμαρτημάτων διὰ τὴν σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ φιλίαν αἴτιον ἑκάστῳ γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε*). Each man should love just actions wherever he meets them (732 A: *οὔτε ἑαυτὸν οὔτε τὰ ἑαυτοῦ χρὴ τόν γε μέγαν ἄνδρα ἐσόμενον στέργειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δίκαια, ἐάν τε παρ' αὑτῷ ἐάν τε παρ' ἄλλῳ μᾶλλον πραττόμενα τυγχάνῃ*). It is thoroughly characteristic of a time when Plato no longer admitted the ideas as substances, that he speaks on that occasion of just actions, and not of absolute justice or of the idea of the just. The ruling notions of later Platonism are the soul and activity or movement. The world is represented as a struggle of souls, each of them striving to advance by the love of those who are better and farther ahead on the way to perfection (732 B: *πάντα ἄνθρωπον χρὴ φεύγειν τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν αὑτόν, τὸν δ' ἑαυτοῦ βελτίω διώκειν δεῖ, μηδεμίαν αἰσχύνην ἐπὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ πρόσθεν ποιούμενον*). The close relation of each person to the highest divinity and power of the leading Providence is illustrated by the assertion that even chance is directed by the divine will, and is to be trusted when human reason fails (690 C: *θεοφιλῆ δέ γε καὶ εὐτυχῆ τινὰ λέγοντες . . . εἰς κλῆρόν τινα προάγομεν καὶ λαχόντα μὲν ἄρχειν, δυσκληροῦντα δὲ ἀπιόντα ἄρχεσθαι τὸ δικαιότατον εἶναί φαμεν*).

to grow like the bad. Contempt of the worship of wealth and of self-love.

Good men and righteous actions here replace justice and the idea of Good.

Divine Providence to be relied on where reason fails, as in leaving final election to the lot.

It is evident that in this realm of souls directed by divine Providence, and acting on matter as well as on

No room for

separate ideas.

each other, there is no room for self-existing substantial ideas. Ideas continue to be called true Being (894 A: *ὄντως ὄν*), but their only Being, here as in all the dialectical dialogues, is truly in a soul of some kind, so that the substantial existence of an infinity of souls, affirmed in the *Laws* as well as in the *Timaeus*, throws a new light on the correctness of our interpretation of that famous passage of the *Sophist* (249 A) which gave rise to the strange conception of animated ideas. The truth is that for Plato in his later works *παντελῶς ὄν* corresponded rather to the soul than to the ideas contained in the soul.

Unity of consciousness: subdivision of faculties.

The unity of consciousness, known from the *Theaetetus*, is here reasserted (644 C: *ἕνα μὲν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τιθῶμεν*) and the subdivision of the faculties of the soul is carried farther than in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*. The lowest stage is pleasure and pain, two opposite advisers both deprived of reason (644 C: *δύο δὲ κεκτημένον ἐν αὑτῷ ξυμβούλω ἐναντίω τε καὶ ἄφρονε, ὧ προσαγορεύομεν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην*). These two movements of the soul (896 E) are the earliest in the development of man and begin in childhood (653 A: *λέγω τοίνυν τῶν παίδων παιδικὴν εἶναι πρώτην αἴσθησιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ κακία παραγίγνεται πρῶτον, ταῦτ' εἶναι*); they correspond to the worst part of the soul as represented in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, except that Plato substitutes here as in the *Timaeus* the two opposite notions of pleasure and pain for the earlier *ἐπιθυμητικόν* of the *Republic*, which had been still alluded to in the *Timaeus* as combined with the sensations of pleasure and pain (*Tim.* 77 B: *αἰσθήσεως ἡδείας καὶ ἀλγεινῆς μετὰ ἐπιθυμιῶν*).

Pleasure and pain, replacing desire.

The higher emotions replace the *θυμοειδές*.

Fear and

Also the faculty of the nobler feelings, designated earlier by the term *θυμοειδές*, is now subdivided and reduced to the opposites of fear and confidence, both being defined as expectancy or opinions about the future (644 D: *δόξας μελλόντων, οἷν κοινὸν μὲν ὄνομα ἐλπίς, ἴδιον δὲ φόβος μὲν ἡ πρὸ λύπης ἐλπίς, θάρρος δὲ ἡ πρὸ τοῦ ἐνα-*

ντίου). This is also called *θυμός*, and like desire is equally deprived of reason (863 B: *θυμός, δύσερι καὶ δύσμαχον κτῆμα ἐμπεφυκός, ἀλογίστῳ βίᾳ πολλὰ ἀνατρέπει*), and different from pleasure (863 B: *ἡδονήν γε οὐ ταὐτὸν τῷ θυμῷ προσαγορεύομεν, ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ αὐτῷ φαμὲν ῥώμης δυναστεύουσαν πειθοῖ μετὰ ἀπάτης βιαίου πράττειν, ὅ τί περ ἂν αὐτῆς ἡ βούλησις ἐθελήσῃ*). Once called a state or part of the soul (863 B: *ἓν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ τῆς φύσεως εἴτε τι πάθος εἴτε τι μέρος ὢν ὁ θυμός*), this faculty is generally included among the soul's movements, which are enumerated without any systematic order in the important passage in which the priority of the soul's movement is reasserted (897 A: *ψυχῆς κινήσεσιν ὀνόματά ἐστι βούλεσθαι, σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, βουλεύεσθαι, δοξάζειν ὀρθῶς, ἐψευσμένως, χαίρουσαν, λυπουμένην, θαρροῦσαν, φοβουμένην, μισοῦσαν, στέργουσαν*).

confidence.

Various movements of the Soul, to be directed by Reason.

All these movements ought to be directed by the highest faculty of reason, which alone is able to decide about their value (644 D: *ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις λογισμός, ὅ τί ποτ' αὐτῶν ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον*). It is one of the strangest errors of a purely philological interpretation of Plato, that some authors believed themselves to find evidence in the *Laws* for affirming such a radical change in Plato's convictions as would have been implied by the identification of true opinion and knowledge. Even Hermann, despite his great knowledge of Plato, says in a note (p. 709, note 737), as if it were an indifferent observation, that the *Laws* imply an entire absence of the earlier conception of knowledge, which now appears to be identified with true opinion. If this were true, then the *Laws* could not be authentic. For a philosopher who once recognised the existence of knowledge above all opinions cannot return to the vulgar faith of the multitude. From the standpoint of philological or literary interpretation it might seem a very irrelevant question, but for the historian of logic it is the most important point in Platonism and the greatest merit of Plato that he distinguished invariable

Knowledge is still differentiated from right opinion.

knowledge from changing opinion and found permanence of ideas in the waves of appearances. Hermann was misled by Plato's complaint about the scarcity of reason in human life (875 D : *νοῦς . . . οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδαμοῦ οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ βραχύ*). But if in practical life and for practice a great scarcity might be equivalent to entire non-existence, there is an infinite difference between the two for the logician. Reason is scarce, but scarce as it is, it is recognised by Plato as the only trustworthy leader in our life, the golden thread which unites us with God (644 E : *μιᾷ γάρ φησιν ὁ λόγος δεῖν τῶν ἕλξεων ξυνεπόμενον ἀεὶ καὶ μηδαμῇ ἀπολειπόμενον ἐκείνης ἀνθέλκειν τοῖς ἄλλοις νεύροις ἕκαστον, ταύτην δ' εἶναι τὴν τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀγωγὴν χρυσῆν καὶ ἱεράν*).

νοῦς and *φρόνησις*.

It may have misled Hermann and some other readers that Plato often uses in the *Laws* the term *φρόνησις* in a sense which is equivalent to *νοῦς*. But this use is by no means limited to the *Laws*, and is to be found already in the *Phaedo* (79 D). In the *Symposium* *φρόνησις* (202 A) was opposed to *ἀμαθία*, and in the *Republic* it is sometimes equivalent to Science or Knowledge (496 A). If Plato sometimes enumerates *φρόνησις* or *ἐπιστήμη* together with *δόξα* (645 E : *αἰσθήσεις καὶ μνήμας καὶ δόξας καὶ φρονήσεις*), this does not mean that he abandoned the distinction between opinion and knowledge, but only that both are opposed to indefinite feelings (645 D : *ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ θυμοὺς καὶ ἔρωτας*). Once *δόξα* is named between *ἐπιστήμη* and *λόγος* (689 B : *ὅταν οὖν ἐπιστήμαις ἢ δόξαις ἢ λόγῳ ἐναντιῶται, τοῖς φύσει ἀρχικοῖς, ἡ ψυχή, τοῦτο ἄνοιαν προσαγορεύω*). But even this proves only that opinion is held to be different from knowledge. It is the ruling faculty for the great majority; because Plato here as in his earlier writings does not expect to find knowledge and science in every citizen. He said already in the *Meno* that for the practical life right opinion is sufficient; in the *Politicus* he sees the aim of the rulers in implanting right opinions in

the souls of the people, and this remains his aim in the *Laws*. He does not even pretend that all the laws proposed have the character of permanent knowledge. The laws are a matter of opinion generally and should be tested by experience (769 D: *πρῶτον γράψαι τοὺς νόμους πρὸς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν κατὰ δύναμιν ἱκανῶς· ἔπειτα προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τῶν δοξάντων ἔργῳ πειρώμενον ἆρ' οἴει τινὰ οὕτως ἄφρονα γεγονέναι νομοθέτην, ὥστ' ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι πάμπολλα ἀνάγκη παραλείπεσθαι τοιαῦτα, ἃ δεῖ τινὰ ξυνεπόμενον ἐπανορθοῦν*). It is impossible to foresee everything in legislation (875 D: *τὸ δεύτερον αἱρετέον, τάξιν τε καὶ νόμον, ἃ δὴ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὁρᾷ καὶ βλέπει, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀδυνατεῖ*) and time alters opinions (888 B: *προϊὼν δέ σε ὁ χρόνος ποιήσει πολλὰ ὧν νῦν δοξάζεις μεταβαλόντα ἐπὶ τἀναντία τίθεσθαι*).

Law depends on opinions and experience.

That in the *Laws*, as in the *Timaeus*, plausible opinions are chiefly expressed, is caused by the subjects dealt with in these works, and does not change anything in the immense distance between opinion and knowledge in Plato's mind. He states this difference on every opportunity in the most emphatic way. Nothing is exalted above knowledge and reason, nor can they be subordinated to any political considerations, because science and reason, whenever they are found, overrule every law and tradition (875 C: *ταῦτα εἴ ποτέ τις ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἱκανός, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ γεννηθείς, παραλαβεῖν δυνατὸς εἴη, νόμων οὐδὲν ἂν δέοιτο τῶν ἀρξόντων ἑαυτοῦ· ἐπιστήμης γὰρ οὔτε νόμος οὔτε τάξις οὐδεμία κρείττων, οὐδὲ θέμις ἐστὶ νοῦν οὐδενὸς ὑπήκοον οὐδὲ δοῦλον ἀλλὰ πάντων ἄρχοντα εἶναι, ἐάνπερ ἀληθινὸς ἐλεύθερός τε ὄντως ᾖ κατὰ φύσιν*). Truth leads Gods and men (730 C: *ἀλήθεια πάντων μὲν ἀγαθῶν θεοῖς ἡγεῖται, πάντων δὲ ἀνθρώποις*). In such things as practical regulations of political life complete truth is a divine privilege (641 D: *τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς διισχυρίζεσθαι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν, πολλῶν ἀμφισβητούντων, θεοῦ*), and always very difficult to attain for men (804 B: *θαύματα ὄντες τὸ πολύ, σμικρὰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἄττα μετέχοντες*), equally

But Law itself is overruled by Reason.

This, however, is a height which few men can attain.

difficult to impart to others (968 D: *ἃ δεῖ μανθάνειν, οὔτε εὑρεῖν ῥᾴδιον οὔτε εὑρηκότος ἄλλου μαθητὴν γενέσθαι*). But difficulty is not impossibility, and Plato most certainly claimed to possess full knowledge on such matters as the priority of the soul before matter in the universe. He repeatedly contrasted also in the *Laws* truth and knowledge with right opinion and experience (632 C: *ὁ θεὶς τοὺς νόμους ἅπασι φύλακας ἐπιστήσει, τοὺς μὲν διὰ φρονήσεως, τοὺς δὲ δι' ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἰόντας, ὅπως πάντα ταῦτα ξυνδήσας ὁ νοῦς ἑπόμενα σωφροσύνῃ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ ἀποφήνῃ, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλούτῳ μηδὲ φιλοτιμίᾳ.*—668 A: *οὐκ εἴ τῳ δοκεῖ ἡδὺ ἤ τις χαίρει τῳ, τό γε ἴσον ἴσον οὐδὲ τὸ σύμμετρον ἂν εἴη σύμμετρον ὅλως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀληθεῖ πάντων μάλιστα, ἥκιστα δὲ ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ*—720 C D: *ὁ δοῦλος προστάξας αὐτῷ τὰ δόξαντα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, ὡς ἀκριβῶς εἰδώς, καθάπερ τύραννος . . . ὁ δὲ ἐλεύθερος . . . ἐπισκοπεῖ . . . μανθάνει . . . διδάσκει*).

Opinion and knowledge are repeatedly contrasted.

Opinion is based on sensible experience, reason like the soul in which it is contained remains unattainable to the senses, and can be grasped only by our invisible thought (897 D E: *μὴ ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὡς νοῦν ποτὲ θνητοῖς ὄμμασιν ὀψόμενοί τε καὶ γνωσόμενοι ἱκανῶς*—898 D E: *τὸ γένος ἡμῖν τοῦτο ἀναίσθητον πάσαις ταῖς τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεσι περιπεφυκέναι, νοητὸν δ' εἶναι νῷ μόνῳ*). Opinions are held by children, knowledge or right opinion founded on reason can be reached only late in life, and by few happy men (653 A: *φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἀληθεῖς δόξας βεβαίους, εὐτυχὲς ὅτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας παρεγένετο*, cf. *Theaet.* 186 C). The truth carries all advantages with it (667 C: *τὴν ὀρθότητα καὶ τὴν ὠφέλειαν καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἶναι τὴν ἀποτελοῦσαν*), and wisdom is the highest good (631 C: *ὃ πρῶτον τῶν θείων ἡγεμονοῦν ἐστὶν ἀγαθῶν, ἡ φρόνησις*). The power of reasoning acts without either constraint or violence (645 A: *λογισμοῦ καλοῦ μὲν ὄντος, πράου δὲ καὶ οὐ βιαίου*—690 C: *τὸν φρονοῦντα ἡγεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἄρχειν . . . κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ νόμου ἑκόντων ἀρχὴν ἀλλ' οὐ βίαιον πεφυκυῖαν*).

Even here, where as little opportunity as anywhere is given for logical theories, Plato insists upon the unity of science, and shows how each particular detail is connected with the most general views on the whole (857 C D, cf. *Phaedr.* 270 C). He illustrates it by the familiar example of the difference between an ordinary medical practitioner and a true physician, the first being like a slave, and the second a philosopher, inquiring into the nature of all bodies (720 D) in order to heal a particular illness. Equally the lawgiver is asked to write not only for a present purpose, but to prepare a general view of law (858 C: *σύνοψις τῶν νόμων*), and to know wherein consists the unity of virtue (965 D: *ἀναγκαστέον . . . φύλακας ἀκριβῶς ἰδεῖν πρῶτον, ὅ τί ποτε διὰ πάντων τῶν τεττάρων ταὐτὸν τυγχάνει, ὃ δή φαμεν ἔν τε ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἐν φρονήσει ἓν ὂν ἀρετὴν ἑνὶ δικαίως ἂν ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεσθαι*).

Particulars are still dependent on the Universal. The true lawgiver has grasped the Unity of Virtue.

As to the order of sciences, mathematics and astronomy are here also recommended as introductory to dialectic, which is alluded to only in a general way, as the hearers are supposed not to be trained for dialectical conversations. Once the term *τὰ κάλλιστα μαθήματα* (818 D) is applied to dialectical science. Also the well-known dialectical term *κατ' εἴδη ζητεῖν* (630 E) is used once, and the rulers of the state are asked to be able to proceed from the indefinite many to the one which constitutes dialectical inquiry according to the earlier dialogues (965 B: *ἐλέγομεν τὸν πρὸς ἕκαστα ἄκρον δημιουργόν τε καὶ φύλακα μὴ μόνον δεῖν πρὸς τὰ πολλὰ βλέπειν δυνατὸν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἓν ἐπείγεσθαι γνῶναί τε καὶ γνόντα πρὸς ἐκεῖνο συντάξασθαι πάντα ξυνορῶντα*). The dialectical method is even clearly recommended as the best way to truth. It consists in perceiving unity in the variety of appearances. This unity is the unity of notions, which here as in the dialectical dialogues are called ideas. The Athenian philosopher rebukes his Doric friends for their indifference, and this imagined indifference is the best

Distant allusion to dialectic, to which mathematics and astronomy are propaedeutic as in the *Republic*.

Unity of notions in variety of appearances.

explanation why Plato did not expound at length in the *Laws* his dialectical theories: 965 C: *ἆρ' οὖν ἀκριβεστέρα σκέψις θέα τ' ἂν περὶ ὁτουοῦν ὁτῳοῦν γίγνοιτο, ἢ τὸ πρὸς μίαν ἰδέαν ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἀνομοίων δυνατὸν εἶναι βλέπειν;—ἴσως—οὐκ ἴσως, ἀλλ' ὄντως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ταύτης οὐκ ἔστι σαφεστέρα μέθοδος ἀνθρώπων οὐδενί* (cf. 638 E: *ὀρθὴν μέθοδον δηλοῦν*). Still it is evident that the same dialectical knowledge is here required from the rulers of the state as in the *Republic*. They should perceive the unity of beauty and of the good, and be able to prove it by reasoning (966 A: *περὶ καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ . . . τοὺς φύλακας ἡμῖν γνωστέον . . . ὅπως ἕν τε καὶ ὅπῃ . . .* B: *τί δ', ἐννοεῖν μέν, τὴν δὲ ἔνδειξιν τῷ λόγῳ ἀδυνατεῖν ἐνδείκνυσθαι;—καὶ πῶς; ἀνδραπόδου γάρ τινα σὺ λέγεις ἕξιν*). Thus on every subject the rulers are supposed to have true knowledge, and to be able to explain it, to apply it in practice, and to judge about the results (966 B: *περὶ πάντων τῶν σπουδαίων ἡμῖν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ὄντως φύλακας ἐσομένους τῶν νόμων ὄντως εἰδέναι τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν, καὶ λόγῳ τε ἱκανοὺς ἑρμηνεύειν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ξυνακολουθεῖν, κρίνοντας τά τε καλῶς γιγνόμενα καὶ τὰ μὴ κατὰ φύσιν*). These conditions show very clearly that the true rulers can be only philosophers or dialecticians, though Plato representing a conversation with untrained simple hearers did not lay a special stress upon the terms. At the end of the *Laws* he resumes the two chief points of his doctrine, the priority of the soul and the rule of reason in the universe (967 D). It is the aim of the philosopher to apply the whole of his general knowledge also to moral problems and to explain the reasons of everything reasonable (967 E: *συνθεασάμενος χρήσηται πρὸς τὰ τῶν ἠθῶν ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ νόμιμα συναρμοττόντως, ὅσα τε λόγον ἔχει, τούτων δυνατὸς ᾖ δοῦναι τὸν λόγον*). He who possesses knowledge is also bound to transmit it to others according to his best ability (730 E: *ὅσα ἀγαθά τις κέκτηται δυνατὰ μὴ μόνον αὐτὸν ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοις μεταδιδόναι· καὶ τὸν μὲν μεταδιδόντα ὡς ἀκρότατον χρὴ τιμᾷν*).

Plato still maintains the rule of reason and the priority of soul.

In all parts of the *Laws*, and on every occasion, Plato exalts the power of reason in the universe and in human life; in these respects the *Laws* agrees perfectly with the *Timaeus*. Reason is the leading power for gods and men (631 D: *τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα εἰς τὰ θεῖα, τὰ δὲ θεῖα εἰς τὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν ξύμπαντα βλέπειν*), binds all virtues into one (632 C: *πάντα ταῦτα ξυνδήσας ὁ νοῦς*, cf. 963 A), rules over everything (875 D), has produced everything (890 D: *νοῦ γέ ἐστι γεννήματα κατὰ λόγον ὀρθόν*), helps the soul in its movements (897 B: *ψυχὴ . . νοῦν . . προσλαβοῦσα αἰεὶ θεῖον ὀρθῶς θέουσα*), and has ordered the universe (966 E: *νοῦς τὸ πᾶν διακεκοσμηκώς*). For readers who everywhere in Plato see the theory of ideas, this reason so often spoken of might mean an impersonal reason; but if we consider the exceeding importance of God and souls in the latest phase of Platonism, no possible doubt is left that *νοῦς* is the reason which can exist only in a thinking soul. In a similar way ignorance is represented as the source of evil (688 C). The worst ignorance leads to the prevalence of the lower activities of the soul (689 B), and its worst form is ignorance which feigns to be wisdom (863 C: *ἄγνοιαν λέγων ἄν τις τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων αἰτίαν οὐκ ἂν ψεύδοιτο . . . διπλοῦν, ὅταν ἀμαθαίνῃ τις μὴ μόνον ἀγνοίᾳ ξυνεχόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξῃ σοφίας, ὡς εἰδὼς παντελῶς περὶ ἃ μηδαμῶς οἶδε*). To this belongs all the wrong learning which is dreaded by Plato as worse indeed than pure ignorance (819 A: *φοβοῦμαι . . . τοὺς ἡμμένους . . . μαθημάτων, κακῶς δ' ἡμμένους· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δεινὸν οὐδὲ σφοδρὸν ἀπειρία τῶν πάντων οὐδὲ μέγιστον κακόν, ἀλλ' ἡ πολυπειρία καὶ πολυμαθία μετὰ κακῆς ἀγωγῆς γίγνεται πολὺ τούτων μείζων ζημία*).

God and the Soul.

The worst ignorance is still conceit of knowledge.

Plato maintains his right here, as in the *Politicus*, to judge for himself about the length of his explanations on any simple subject (642 A: *σκοπῶ δή, μὴ δόξαν ὑμῖν παράσχωμαι περὶ σμικροῦ πολλὰ λέγειν . . . τὸ δὲ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῦ διόρθωσις οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο ἄνευ μουσικῆς ὀρθότητός ποτε σαφὲς οὐδ' ἱκανὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπολαβεῖν*). If everything is truly known and explained, the length of

Prolixity defended, as in the *Politicus*.

the explanation is easily recognised as corresponding to the importance of the subject (645 C: *ἐναργεστέρου δ' αὐτοῦ γενομένου . . . καὶ τὸ περὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς οἴνοις διατριβῆς, ὃ δοξασθείη μὲν ἂν εἶναι φαύλου πέρι μῆκος πολὺ λόγων περιττὸν εἰρημένον, φανείη δὲ τάχ' ἂν ἴσως τοῦ μήκους γ' αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀπάξιον*).

The distinction between thing, name, and definition, brought forward as a logical instrument with the purpose of identifying the soul with the self-moving movement, is already known from earlier dialogues, but it leads here to a far-reaching generalisation. All possible questions appear to be reduced to only two kinds: either asking the name of a subject of which the definition is given, or asking the definition of a given name (895 D: *ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις περὶ ἕκαστον τρία νοεῖν· ἓν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἓν δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον, ἓν δὲ τὸ ὄνομα· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐρωτήσεις εἶναι περὶ τὸ ὂν ἅπαν δύο.—πῶς δύο;—τοτὲ μὲν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον τοὔνομα προτεινόμενον αὐτὸ τὸν λόγον ἀπαιτεῖν, τοτὲ δὲ τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν προτεινόμενον ἐρωτᾷν αὖ τοὔνομα*). Those who know only names without being able to give definitions have no true knowledge of anything. Thus knowledge is here, as in the dialectical dialogues, based on definitions (964 A: cf. *Soph.* 218 C).

Relation of Definition to name and thing.

Among the allusions to scientific investigations one of the most remarkable is the reduction of all material appearances, including colours, temperatures, pressure, taste, to physical movements, which consist only of agglomeration and dispersion of atoms (here not expressly mentioned), analysis and synthesis of matter (897 A: *κινήσεις σωμάτων ἄγουσι πάντα εἰς αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν καὶ διάκρισιν καὶ σύγκρισιν καὶ τούτοις ἑπομένας θερμότητας, ψύξεις, βαρύτητας, κουφότητας, σκληρὸν καὶ μαλακόν, λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν, αὐστηρὸν καὶ γλυκύ*). This audacious anticipation of modern views is one of Plato's many happy guesses, which produce on the impartial reader the strange impression of an unaccountable *a priori* knowledge of nature.

All physical qualities are to be explained dynamically.

The breadth of view about the whole of Being is shown also in repeated references to the great periods of time which have elapsed since the beginning of life on earth. Millions of states have existed, grown, and decayed, with many changes in their constitutions (676 B C: *μυρίαι ἐπὶ μυρίαις ἡμῖν γεγόνασι πόλεις ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦ πλήθους λόγον οὐκ ἐλάττους ἐφθαρμέναι, πεπολιτευμέναι δ' αὖ πάσας πολιτείας πολλάκις ἑκαστα χοῦ*). Nothing is new, and everything must be sought and found again after it had been lost and forgotten (677 D: *μυριάκις μύρια ἔτη διελάνθανεν τοὺς τότε, χίλια δ' ἀφ' οὗ . . . καταφανῆ γέγονε*). It is even doubted whether human life had any beginning, and this confirms our interpretation of the myth told in the *Timaeus*. The Athenian philosopher is speaking to people unaccustomed to the conception of an infinite past, and still he says clearly that the long periods referred to are only a symbol of the actual eternity of mankind (781 E: *εὖ . . . χρὴ πάντ' ἄνδρα ξυννοεῖν, ὡς ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένεσις ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν εἴληχεν οὐδ' ἕξει ποτέ γε τελευτήν*, 782 A: *ἀλλ' ἦν τε ἀεὶ καὶ ἔσται πάντως ἢ μῆκός τι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀφ' οὗ γέγονεν ἀμήχανον ἂν χρόνον ὅσον γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη*).

Conception of vast periods of time.

Eternity of Man.

It forms a curious contrast to this enlarged horizon that in the *Laws*, as in the *Timaeus* and *Critias*, Athens is praised as it had never been since the death of Socrates (642 C: *ὅσοι Ἀθηναίων εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ διαφερόντως εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι, δοκεῖ ἀληθέστατα λέγεσθαι*). This reconciliation with the natal city may be explained by the success of the Academy of which we see some trace in the constant allusions to the great importance of education (642 A, 644 A, 653 A C, 803 D, 965 A). But the old enmity against the poets remains unabated; they are submitted to a severe censure (816 E–817 C), and often ill-treated (890 A, 964 C, 967 C). Thus we see Plato remaining faithful to many of his most important doctrines up to his latest age. His love of knowledge and science is not lessened by the circumstance that he devoted his latest years to a popular

Athens is praised as never before, but the old quarrel between poetry and philosophy continues.

exposition of practicable political schemes. What he had discovered in earlier years,—the fixity of knowledge as opposed to the inconstancy of opinions,—remained for him a permanent truth. Only the ideas which were at first credited with a substantial existence out of the mind have been later enclosed in souls, and the hierarchy of souls became the highest reality, the last explanation of the problem of existence. These souls are free to fall or to rise according to their own will, and they have the power of becoming the source of evil. But a divine Providence leads those who trust their inspirations out of all troubles to a higher and better life, of which our life on earth is only a small and insignificant part. This latest form of Platonism comes remarkably near the views of later religions, and it is Plato's peculiar merit to have progressed so far by his perfected method of dialectical investigation.

The highest reality is found in a hierarchy of Souls.

Anticipation of modern religious belief.

CHAPTER X

PLATO'S LOGIC

WE have been obliged to include many psychological and metaphysical theories in our account of the origin and growth of Plato's logic, in order to illustrate the stages of his development and to confirm by every possible hint the conclusions about the chronology of his works built upon the study of his style. It is now our purpose to give a general view of Plato's logic and its development, without special reference to texts or to chronological difficulties which have been sufficiently dealt with in the preceding chapters. Here we may also supplement our direct information on the subject by probable inferences as to some aspects of logical theory and practice which did not find a full expression in Plato's literary production. For this most certainly is one of the results of the above inquiry. Plato did not care to write all he knew, nor were his works intended to be handbooks of any science. All of them, not excepting the *Laws*, had the character of academic programmes, dealing with some question in order to attract the reader's attention to more difficult problems, and referring for the solution of these to oral teaching. Much as has been said about the last page of the *Phaedrus*, and of the neglect of writing it seems to imply, this interesting passage has not been sufficiently compared with the concluding pages of the *Laws*, in which we find about thirty years later much the same opinion. Nor is it difficult to point out many other passages in which oral teaching is recommended as the true teaching, as a serious occupation, contrasted with

General view of Plato's logic.

Plato did not write down all he knew.

He prefers oral teaching not only in the *Phaedrus*,

but at the end of the *Laws*.

literature as a pastime, a noble pastime, though it can never be so serious as the seed implanted in living souls by living intercourse with a living teacher.

Law-giving the noblest form of literature: but life is nobler still.

This 'game' of writing was never despised by Plato, as some interpreters of the *Phaedrus* have wrongly inferred. In the *Symposium* (209 D E), in the *Phaedrus* (278 C), and in the *Laws* (858 C) Plato insists on the literary character of the work of the lawgiver, which he esteems as the noblest model of literary production. But literature has its limits, and is not comparable to life; life, not literature, is Plato's aim; the soul and its ideas, not words nor speeches, claim his highest attention. He wrote for those who could not hear him, and play with him at the laborious game described in the *Parmenides*; also for his pupils who had lived through some of the problems fixed by him in writing; but to the end he regarded his works as artistic reminiscences of a small part of his thoughts, and of some of the conversations held in the Academy. We have therefore no reason to suppose that any part of his philosophy has been fully expressed in his works, though we may look at these as sufficient evidence of his thought, enabling us to acquire a fair and probable conception of his theories.

His writings do not fully express his philosophy, which, however, may still be traced in them.

Socratic period of inductive definition.

In earlier days Logic seems not to have had much interest for him. His small dialogues and the *Protagoras* contain attempts at definition, and proceed generally by induction in a manner which, so far as our knowledge goes, does not differ from the mode of Socrates. Moral questions are chiefly discussed, without any special attention to logical difficulties, except perhaps the mention of a science of science in the *Charmides*, in which dialogue also the term *συλλογισάμενος* is applied to a formal syllogism of the form Cesare. This need not appear very startling even at an early stage of Plato's literary career. Inferences are older than Logic, and even the term for the process of inference is older than Plato. The absence of logical preoccupations is also manifest in the *Prota-*

goras, notwithstanding all the praise there bestowed upon knowledge and the incidental observation about the invalidity of the conversion of universal affirmative judgments. This is a sign rather of logical practice than of logical theory. Anybody who thinks consciously must notice that an universal affirmative judgment cannot undergo total conversion, or that it can be converted only into a particular affirmation. This is not yet a beginning of logic, just as the distinction of transparent and opaque bodies is not a beginning of optics.

Anticipation of Platonic theory in the *Meno*.

The first start in Plato's logic is made in the *Meno*, and it is a very remarkable beginning, because besides the lesson in generalisation at the opening, this dialogue contains a foreshadowing of Plato's latest thought: the foundation of our *a priori* knowledge on the supposition of a previous existence of each soul, and the highest axiom of the unity of the universe indicated as the source of the similarity of souls. Here also true opinion is repeatedly distinguished from knowledge as a different power, parallel to the distinction of substance and appearance. These are the great lines on which Plato progressed all his life, and their expression in the *Meno* is a strong confirmation of that psychological theory according to which youthful genius foresees the chief results of its later labours. This psychological theory is here in so far confirmed, as Plato is supposed to have written the *Meno* at the age of thirty-three, certainly a very early age for a Greek writer. Those who in the name of the same theory attributed the *Phaedrus* to a youth of twenty-five seem to have been unaware of the great logical superiority of the *Phaedrus* over the *Meno*, which is evidently written after the death of Socrates, and probably after 395 B.C. (as is shown by the mention of Ismenias).

Early genius forecasts its latest results.

However important are the logical theories of the *Meno*, the method here followed still remains Socratic. It is by induction and experience that Plato attempts to prove the pre-existence of the soul, not by that logical

Hypothetical reasoning a new thing.

necessity which is so much employed in the *Republic* and later works. Also hypothetical reasoning, or the following out of the consequences of each hypothesis before its truth is decided, is here evidently introduced for the first time and is admittedly taken from mathematical experience, while at a later time it is constantly used as a very familiar method.

Euthydemus: exposure of current Sophisms. In the *Gorgias*, Socratic ignorance is changed to ethical certainty.

The practical and inductive character of the *Meno* is common to this dialogue with the *Euthydemus*; in which examples of Sophisms are quoted and refuted, without any attempt at a general discussion on the origin of error. The *Gorgias* insists on the permanence and consistency of true knowledge without attempting to go deeper into the question of its nature: still the ethical results of this dialogue are affirmed as knowledge with a certainty very much opposed to the earlier Socratic ignorance. It was natural that at this point of his philosophical development Plato should begin to consider with greater attention the question of method. He had arrived at the truth in individual ethics, and he saw that truth assailed by the vulgar eloquence of his opponents. In the *Gorgias*, despite his apparent condemnation of eloquence, he challenged eloquence and rhetoric in a somewhat rhetorical manner.

Cratylus: first logical dialogue. Relation of language to thought.

But he was already on the way to a new armoury for the conquest of truth, and we see in the *Cratylus* the first logical dialogue—the question debated being the relation of thought to language,—certainly a logical question. It is decided against the current identification of speech with thought, and this is a great victory of Plato not only over his contemporary adversaries, but over a natural and almost invincible tendency of the human mind to credit words with more importance than they deserve. The question raised in the *Cratylus*,—what is the true substance of things, as distinguished from their changing appearances?—is not definitively answered, but certain allusions make it probable that Plato had

Plato had already caught

already conceived the supremacy of ideas over the human mind and over the world of appearances. The transition from Socratic notions to Platonic ideas may have been effected in Plato's mind long before he represented it in his writings. It would therefore be useless to seek in his works a first mention or first exposition of the theory of ideas. Eternal unchangeable ideas independent of the human mind have arisen suddenly as a beautiful vision, and this vision he represented with masterly skill in the *Symposium*, where it is prepared by a scale of succeeding views of Love and Beauty. A more detailed account of the ideas is given in the *Phaedo*, a dialogue in which logical questions take almost an equal place with metaphysical investigation.

glimpses of the supremacy of ideas. *Symposium*: Idea of beauty self-existent, and an object of blessed contemplation.

If we take the description of ideas literally, they appear to have been for Plato true substances, existing outside every consciousness. But this conception being very difficult to realise, it may be that Plato did not intend to convey it by his highly metaphorical language, and that he only endeavoured to illustrate the fixity and objectivity of ideas as contrasted with the instability and subjectivity of appearances. Objectivity does not require substantial existence: anything that by its logical nature must be universally admitted is an objective truth. The difference between this objectivity and the objectivity of substances may not yet have been fully realised by Plato, and in many passages of the *Symposium* and *Phaedo*, as well as of the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, the ideas appear to exist outside the world and outside souls, forming a separate and more perfect universe of true Being, the model and the cause of the apparent universe of matter.

Phaedo: the ideas true substances, outside consciousness: objectivity not yet distinguished from transcendental Being.

This period of Middle Platonism, during which the *Republic* and *Phaedrus* were written, and to which also the two immediately preceding dialogues might be referred, shows in many details an increasing interest in logical studies. Hypothetical proceeding is supplemented

Middle Platonism: *Republic* and *Phaedrus*.

Increasing interest in logical theory. Classification of notions. Knowledge and opinion. Consistency the test of truth.

by the careful classification of notions, and the aim of science is stated to be the reduction of all truths to one highest principle. The difference between knowledge and opinion is explained by the difference of their objects: knowledge refers only to eternal ideas; opinion to changing appearances. The test of truth is consistency, and the universal relation of all parts of knowledge affords a mutual confirmation for each of them, all depending upon one central idea of the Good, or the final cause of the universe. Ideas, being inaccessible to the senses, are still very much clearer and more distinct to thought than material things to the senses. A truth only then deserves our full confidence, if it be above every sense illusion, and based on the intuition of pure ideas, which alone are the object of knowledge. Among the notions which acquire an increased importance in the period of the *Republic* the term δύναμις is the most important, as it leads to the later conception of self-moving souls. In the *Phaedrus* this latter conception appears for the first time, and may be looked upon as the starting point of the logical reform initiated in the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*.

New conception of δύναμις, a point of transition towards the new Criticism of Ideas.

The Highest Kinds, or Categories. No idea apart from a soul. Fresh interest in the material world. Becoming depends on movement, and the prime

In these essentially critical dialogues logical categories as the highest kinds of notions are introduced and enumerated for the first time, while the ideas of the Good and of the Beautiful which played such a great part in Middle Platonism are less prominent. Moreover, the existence of ideas outside conscious souls is completely abandoned, and the importance of soul as a first principle of movement is greater than in the period of Middle Platonism. Appearances remain illusory, but a certain reality of the material world is recognised in so far as all happening and all Becoming is reduced to movement, movement being either change of position in space or change of quality in a soul. This view of a real world acted upon by souls remains throughout the later Platonism. The old conception of substantial ideas is

criticised in the *Parmenides* in a manner that may suggest a doubt whether it had ever been maintained by Plato in the crude form admitted by his interpreters.

mover is the Soul.

With the *Sophist* our philosopher begins a dialectical period during which the classification of notions is his chief aim. The notion of being or substance now occupies the first place, and is made the subject of very special investigations. It is found that it applies to the soul generally or to souls in a higher degree than to anything else. Knowledge ceases to be a pure intuition, and becomes the product of thought as a co-ordinating agency. This activity of thought has produced the existing order in the material universe, and our individual thought is a reproduction of the more perfect divine thoughts. The continuity of human science is based on our historical knowledge of the efforts of our predecessors. Classification and co-ordination, analysis and synthesis, are the two powerful instruments of inquiry. Soul and movement are the ultimate explanation of everything that happens.

The *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*. Activity of thought.

Analysis and synthesis.

These views, brought forward in the three dialectical dialogues (*Sophist, Politicus, Philebus*), are also maintained in the latest group of *Timaeus, Critias*, and *Laws*. The system of latest Platonism is no longer a system of ideas, but a system of souls, of different and increasing perfection, from the lowest soul of a plant to the souls of stars which are termed gods. Above all rises the ruling soul of the universe, the world's maker and ordainer, a divine Providence, which places each soul in the right place, and allots it its proper task in a series of successive lives extending over millions of years, probably without beginning and without end. Knowledge is acquired by each soul through its own exertions, increased by constant exercise and imparted by teaching. Ideas exist only in souls—they are eternal and unchangeable because their first model is created by God in his own thought. Thus ideas are the patterns of reality, and their existence in

The latest group: *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Laws*. Not now a system of ideas, but a system of souls acting on the universe surrounding them. Supremacy of divine Providence, yet

free action of individual souls.

souls is named true Being. But they are not now suddenly perceived in ecstatic visions, as in the period of Middle Platonism. They must be created and elaborated by each soul in its own turn, and sought for by the logical exercises of classification, generalisation, and division.

Classification, generalisation, and division. Dichotomy to be preferred, but nature always followed. Natural types.

The logical rules given by Plato refer chiefly to these elementary operations. Each notion should be subdivided into as few parts as possible, and dichotomy according to the law of contradiction is always preferred. Sometimes a greater number of subdivisions is allowed, but we are asked to show what essential differences distinguish each part from all others. This is more specially applied to the kinds of animals, or living beings, which extend from the vegetable kingdom to the Gods. We are warned against the error of selecting superficial marks for the distinction of kinds. Each kind of beings has by its nature and by God's design one really essential peculiarity which should be found and manifested. The exact definition of notions is the chief condition of a consistent system of knowledge, and must be independent of the prejudice produced by the use of language. Thought precedes language, and speech is but an instrument of thought; true eloquence being the privilege of the thinker. In this respect Plato's logic appears to be more independent of the traditional forms of language than the logic of Aristotle, while his range of investigation, if less minute, was scarcely less universal.

The essential difference of each kind. True eloquence the privilege of the thinker.

Aristotle's debt to Plato.

Plato, unlike Aristotle, did not attempt to leave in his writings a full account of his teaching, and thus it is probable that his teaching included more logical rules than those enunciated in his works. We find in them a frequent use of syllogisms, and though this does not imply that he had brought the theory of syllogism to that precise form which it has taken in the works of Aristotle, there is a distinct progress in the form of reasoning from the Socratic dialogues up to the latest age of Plato. It would be a very interesting subject for a

Logical fallacies in Plato.

special investigation to collect and compare the logical fallacies which are found very often in the earliest writings, while they are rare in the latest group. Such a special inquiry could not be included in the present work, as our chief aim was a representation of Plato's logic and theory of knowledge in their relation to some psychological and metaphysical doctrines. We have seen that Plato altered his primitive idealism into a more comprehensive philosophy, recognising the soul and a definite number of souls as the chief active powers of existence.

Plato's early idealism grew afterwards into a comprehensive philosophy.

This conclusion of latest Platonism is Plato's greatest discovery, far more important in philosophy than his discovery of the fixity of ideas. It has been strangely overlooked by many readers of Plato, and first of all by Aristotle, whose authority gained a lasting ascendency on the opinion of Plato's other interpreters. We have seen that the philosopher's genius anticipated many discoveries of modern science, as for instance the identification of heat and light with movement, the existence of invisible organisms in the seminal fluid of animals, the periodic changes in the movements of stars, the reduction of all material changes to aggregation and dispersion (or, as it has been termed recently, to integration and differentiation), the distinction between atoms and molecules, the composition of each molecule of water out of two atoms of one gas and one atom of another, &c. The same wonderful power of intuitive knowledge he displayed also in reference to purely philosophical questions. He is the first idealist, and has given rise to a long succession of idealistic philosophers from his own time to that of Hegel. But in his later stage of thought he anticipated that new course of philosophy which led Descartes two thousand years later to seek the origin of all knowledge in individual consciousness, and Kant to seek in the categories *a priori* forms of all appearances. How far Plato advanced on this road can easily be seen from the above survey of his theories. We do not pretend to say that Descartes or Kant added nothing

Aristotle misread Plato. Plato's anticipations of modern science.

Relation of Plato's views to the speculations of Descartes, Kant, and Leibniz.

to Plato's views. But there are in Plato's latest works clear anticipations of the most important theories of Descartes and Kant, and also of Leibniz's view of Divine Providence.

This need not appear surprising to serious seekers after Truth. Truth about Being, so far as it is attainable to man, must be essentially the same now as in Plato's times. Thinkers of his power are so exceedingly rare in the history of mankind that nobody among his successors can claim to be his peer. Power of thought and power of expressing thought were united in this great thinker and great writer to an extent which never has been again attained. Other great philosophers, such as Descartes and Leibniz, while they enjoyed the same personal independence as Plato, did not devote their lives so exclusively to philosophy. Those who spent their lives in study and teaching, as Kant or Hegel did, were deprived at the beginning of that material independence which is the indispensable condition for the full display of philosophical power. Thus even the greatest of our philosophers labour, as compared with Plato, under the constraint of a certain inevitable one-sidedness and personal limitation, from which Plato was free. He had all the highest conditions for making the most of his passage through earthly life. Of noble ancestry, he inherited a bodily strength and power enabling him to sustain the efforts necessary in order to acquire all the knowledge of his times and to increase it; he was not compelled in any way to struggle for material existence, being a wealthy citizen in the wealthiest city of his times; he was born after a generation which included some of the greatest poets of mankind, and had himself an exceptional poetical talent, which he reserved entirely for the purposes of his philosophical teaching. He did not live in isolation, like Descartes or Spinoza, nor in a whirl of worldly interests, like Leibniz, nor in humiliating dependence upon an absolute government, like Kant or Hegel. His

Plato's power of thought and of expression. His exclusive devotion to philosophy under the most favourable conditions.

freedom of speech and teaching was actually secured by the crime committed against Socrates, because the Athenians were not likely to repeat it after the reaction produced by the writings of Socrates' pupils, and because religious intolerance was on the decline. Amidst all these favourable conditions imagine a divine soul of the greatest power, disposing of all means in the fulfilment of a providential mission: that of showing for the first time the fixity of ideas and the infinite dignity of the human soul. What limits can be set to the intellectual progress of such a philosopher? He stands far above his great teacher, far above his great pupil, alone in his incomparable greatness, and his works are only a splendid remembrance of his living activity, the result of the least serious of his endeavours. What amount of his influence was transmitted to his pupils from generation to generation we can only guess: but for us Plato's dialogues are unique as a literary and philosophical monument, and deserve the greatest attention of all who long for metaphysical Truth, who remain unsatisfied with the world of appearances and with the passing aims of material life.

Unique philosophical excellence of Plato.

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